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Abstract
The recognition of native title in Australia contained in the Mabo (No 2) decision, in the
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and in the following judicial and legislative creations, has
been defined as the recognition of traditional interests in land arising from the traditions
of Australian Indigenous peoples and given content by the traditional Indigenous laws
and customs in which they find their origin. The native title discourse, therefore,
represents - at least in theory - a point of intersection between distinct legal systems that
are articulated within different ontologies, epistemologies and world views.

This thesis undertakes a study of the theoretical premises upon which this recognition of
native title rests from the perspective of comparative law. In looking closely at the
assumptions of this recognition, a critique of the native title discourse can be offered.
This critique questions the conceptual process of identification of the boundaries of the
legal contained in this supposed intersection of legal systems. Furthermore, it
investigates this intersection between distinct legal systems as it is characterised by the
unilateral translation of traditional normative protocols into legal propositions capable
of being recognised by the Australian common law for the purpose of recognising the
traditional interests in land that they articulate. In challenging the inconsistencies of the
current epistemological and methodological perspective on native title, the theoretical
and practical shortcomings of an incomplete and unilateral articulation of this process of
recognition are considered, and the detrimental impact that native title has on traditional
legal protocols is revealed. In reflecting on the difficulties in undertaking a comparative
legal analysis and the danger of legalism as a form of cultural imposition, this thesis
positions itself within the broader field of comparative legal studies rather than purely
within the boundaries of native title discourse.
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PROLOGUE

How vain it is to sit down to write when you have not stood up to live.1

1 Henri David Thoreau and Bradford Torrey, The Writings of Henry David Thoreau. Journal Edited by
Bradford Torrey II 1850-September 15, 1851 (Thoreau's Writings, 6) (Riverside, first published 1851,
1906 ed).
1

Every research is a story. A story with a beginning and a story with an ending. And yet, every
story is also a journey, a journey of discovery, a journey of the mind along paths of arguments. I
want to begin this journey, then, this story, with my own journey, and my own story, to walk
briefly with the reader along the many paths that this research will follow.

In 2005 I decided to permanently leave Italy, the place where I was born and where I had shaped
my life for thirty years. My family and I, we had applied for a Permanent Resident Visa to
Australia a few years before. We had been waiting for a response for months, years even, until
one day, among an explosion of contagious enthusiasm, we had received it. The choice of where
the path would have led me was thus already made for me. Australia was the destination of
another stage of my life. This meant to return to the place where, half a lifetime before, I had
first learned the meaning of inter-cultural awareness.

As a young High School exchange student, I had spent eight months in the Western Australia
outback in 1991, in a farm one hour away from a tiny town, a village really, called Dalwallinu.
In an age before the internet, before computers even, in an age when intercontinental telephone
calls were still relatively rare, in an age when geographical distance also meant cultural
distance, I had fallen in love with the Land, with what I now know Aboriginal Australians call
Country. Not the country of peoples’ identities and of artificial boundaries, the country of
political entities and legal structures, the country of cars and man-made marvels, but the
Country of long red sunsets and of big black ants, the Country of timeless times and of
imperceptible whispers, the Country that had then Spoken to a corner of my soul until then
badly anaesthetised by the noises, the constant voices, the endless advertisement signs along the
roads that had constellated the big city in Italy where I had lived until then.

What a cultural shock, that was. Even more so because I had never learned English before
coming to this exchange (I had studied French at school). I still remember thinking to myself
that learning English was something essential to my very survival. Outback Australia could be
quite merciless, especially when the arbiters of such mercy were fifteen years old teenagers.
And so I learned English as fast as I could. But in the process of learning the secret nuances of a
language that was alien to me, in a geographical context that was equally as alien, I began to see
unique and subtle differences in cultures. The pain of understanding such differences suddenly
faded, to be replaced by awe. I suddenly suspended my judgement and I became curious, almost
ravenous in my curiosity for other cultures. I began to see beauty in cultural difference, and
2

richness, and deep similarities across cultures. I began to look, to observe with care, and to tread
lightly along different walks of life. That curiosity has never abandoned me.

I recently discovered that the farm I had lived in sat on the border of the Rabbit Proof Fence.
Maybe it is something in that connection that led me to this research, that I do not know. What I
do know is that in coming to Australia I needed to reinvent myself. I needed to find something
to do. In the fifteen years I had spent away from Australia since my first journey, I had nurtured
my curiosity for cultural diversity. I had lived in the South American Andes, away from a
Western culture, for nine months, I had studied law, becoming enamoured of the disciplines of
comparative law and legal anthropology. I even became a professional actor, exploring diversity
from the eyes of the Other in every character I had the chance to play. But what had kept
together a very diverse range of explorations had been an extreme interests for the pleas and the
issues of the Indigenous peoples of the world. I had completed my first thesis on pre-Colombian
family law in the Andes, sharing stories with Quechua and Aymara peoples of Peru, Bolivia and
Ecuador, learning from their words of the amazing story of cultural survival that people in the
area had enacted against 500 years of colonisation. I had worked closely with Native American
activists, organising talks at Italian Universities to present the struggle of Mount Graham and of
Big Mountain. Most importantly, I had participated, as part of an NGO created along with other
young researchers, in the works of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva,
then drafting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

In coming to Australia, I knew I did not know much of the Australian reality. I did know,
however, that I wanted to learn, and that I wanted to continue my involvement with Indigenous
issues. It was not only a matter of interest and curiosity. If this was to be the place where a new
stage of my life were to unfold, I wanted to make sure that I could contribute to what I had
always believed to be a fundamental issue of social justice. How, that I truly did not know. My
knowledge of Australia’s relationship with its Indigenous peoples was limited to a couple of
internationally popular novels. My knowledge of the legal relationship of Australia with its
colonial past and with Indigenous Australians was even more limited. One thing, however, had
struck me in reading Bruce Chatwin’s Songlines.2 Although by no means an authoritative
source, Chatwin’s compelling narrative had nonetheless led me to raise a few questions on
another topic I had heard about, native title.

How was it possible to reconcile, I had asked myself, the secret/sacred nature of Indigenous
knowledge of the land that Chatwin had presented in his novel with a public process such as the

2

Bruce Chatwin, Songlines (Jonathan Cape, 1987).
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one established by the native title discourse? There seemed to be an intrinsic contradiction in a
legal process that, in order to ‘recognise’ pre-existing titles to the land, in so doing altered the
fundamental structure of these pre-existing titles. I told myself that I had to explore the
theoretical justifications given by theorists and legal scholars in order to understand what I was
unable to reconcile. I told myself that surely I would have uncovered a rich theoretical discourse
able to clarify what was then obscure to me. In discussing these issues with the two people who
were to become my supervisors, I was then encouraged to pursue this exploration as part of a
PhD research project. I enthusiastically agreed, without really knowing what a PhD research
project was. Thankfully I did not, lest I would have probably been disheartened by the length of
time involved.

Thus began this research. My question was further and further refined, when I discovered, as a
result of my intense readings, that the situation was much more complex than expected, and that
a number of disciplines needed to be involved in the research. Before familiarising myself with
the legal materials related to the issue of native title, I read and watched almost every piece of
popular culture I could get my hands on. With my surprise, I discovered that not all Australians
shared my sense of wonder and curiosity toward Indigenous Australian cultures, quite the
opposite indeed. I then realised that the answer to my questions was to be found in the intercultural misconstruction of cultural traits that was the result of two centuries of colonisation.

I then realised that I needed to structure my research around a series of more articulated
questions. What does it mean to ‘recognise’ native title at common law? Where is the origin of
native title to be found? What are the implications of this ‘recognition’ for traditional normative
protocols? What theoretical perspectives and methodologies are in place to effect this
‘recognition’? I then started to explore these issues from the comparative legal perspective I had
been trained in, thus combining diverse disciplines in a discursive reconstruction of various
topics, in the belief that the final academic narrative could shed some light on my perplexities.
Given the breadth and diversity of literature I engaged with, I decided to divide the literature
review among various chapters, exploring the relevant literature in the appropriate sections. I
also decided to explore the issue by focussing on a specific case study, in the hope of unveiling
empirical data that could validate the perspective and methodology I had set out to explore.

However, I was not satisfied that research focussed on an extensive literature review and
involving interviews would be sufficient to satiate my thirst for understanding. In 2008, after
receiving my Australian citizenship, I thus left for a physical journey across the Land. In a car
bought for the occasion I set out on a 33000 km long journey of discovery, exploration and
acknowledgement of Australia over four months. I was driven by the need to acknowledge
4

everything I had learned about relationship with Country much more than the need to
‘discover’ it. Many stories are the result of this voyage, and they might be told, in another place
and at another time. What this journey did, however, was to link my research to the voices of the
many people I had the chance to discuss the issues with along the path.

The result of this rich exploration is this research thesis. Its path will hopefully unfold
coherently regardless of the many tracks I set out to explore. In Part A, I will establish the
theoretical perspectives from which all observations will be conducted. Epistemological issues
will be the first to be considered, with particular attention given to Indigenous epistemological
perspectives. I will then consider legal pluralist analyses, offering a specific perspective within
which to frame the comparative investigation. I will then construct a specific methodology
around this perspective.

Any comparison involves at least two terms of comparison, the observer and the observed. The
nature of the relationship between the two elements will be introduced in Part A. Part B will
consider the first term of the comparison that is at the core of this research: the laws surrounding
native title. I will explore issues of sovereignty, the Doctrine of Discovery and the impact that
they have on the native title discourse. I will then explore land rights discourses and the path
that led to the Mabo (No 2) 3 decision, to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) 4 and to following cases
and legislation.

In Part C, I will explore existing anthropological literature in light of the comparative
perspective introduced in Part A, in order to highlight traditional normative protocols that are
relevant to the native title discourse. I will offer a diachronic reconstruction of such protocols,
by considering them in light of historical reconstructions of the Australian colonial process.
Finally, Part D will be dedicated to a specific case study in the Illawarra. The case has chosen
me much more than I have chosen the case. Nonetheless, it epitomises a perfect case study to
empirically apply the perspectives established in Parts A, B and C.

What does it mean to ‘recognise’ Indigenous legal protocols? What is the impact that the native
title discourse has on such ‘recognition’? Or, more simply, what is the impact of the native title
discourse on Indigenous legal protocols? With this question in mind as the central question of
this thesis, I can now begin the narrative journey, the story, that is this thesis.

3

Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.

4

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
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PART A
EPISTEMOLOGIES

I tell this story to remind myself to not simply “tolerate diversity”. We should, instead, be
fully engaged, changed and humbled by it. We should be directed, enlightened and scolded
by it. We should know more of it and critique its influence on our thoughts and actions. 1

1

Manulani Aluli Meyer, Ho’oulu. Our Time of Becoming (‘Ai Pohaku Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 4.
6

CHAPTER ONE
PREMISES

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical parameters of the research study. There
is an inherent difficulty in exploring native title from a comparative legal perspective. The
definition of what the law is, or, more precisely, of what is legally relevant in Indigenous
cultural protocols, requires an extensive theoretical and epistemological analysis. Without such
an analysis, there is a great risk of imposing cultural categories that are either inconsistent or
even detrimental to the Indigenous theoretical premises that form the basis of the legal protocols
investigated. Moreover, it is only as a result of such an analysis that the impact of the legal
instrument of native title upon traditional protocols related to interests in land can be effectively
measured. In order to adopt an epistemological approach that encompasses different
perspectives, I have extensively followed the approaches suggested by Indigenous scholars on
the topic, paramount among them being the work of Manulani Aluli Meyer2 and Karen Martin 3
on Indigenous epistemologies.

I. EPISTEMOLOGY
Epistemology is the ‘philosophical science of the nature of knowledge and truth. It answers the
questions: “What is knowledge?” and “How do we know what we know?”’. 4 The term is the
combination of two Greek words: episteme, meaning knowledge, and logos, meaning theory or
study. The study of the definition of knowledge and of the conditions and parameters for the
justification of such knowledge in western philosophical sources can be traced back to
Aristotle,5 in turn heavily influenced by Plato’s ideas contained in Meno 6 and Theaetetus.7 In

2

Ibid.

3

Karen Lillian Martin, Please knock before you enter: Aboriginal regulation of outsiders and the
implication for researchers (Post Pressed, 2008).
4

D D Runes (ed), Dictionary of Philosophy (Adams and Co,1980) 94

5

J Barnes (ed), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton University
Press, 1971).

6

Plato, Meno (Dominic Scott trans, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

7

Plato, Theaetetus (Robin A H Waterfield trans, Penguin, 1987).
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contemporary research, epistemological discourses are a core issue for all researchers. 8
Moreover, epistemological issues are particularly relevant in dealing with cross-cultural
research which attempts to identify fundamental legal structures within different cultural
paradigms. Thus, as Manulani Aluli Meyer provocatively points out,
the risk is inherent: how does one discuss oranges with an apple vocabulary? Herein lies the subtle
paradox - how to discuss ... beliefs in a structure that is set up to engage them at best, semiotically,
and at worst, as quaint anthropological stories of a distant land. It is a struggle that is made
conscious in every epistemological image and description. 9

The paradox is ever more present in a context where an imbalance of power resulting from the
colonial enterprise has had the result of producing extensive non-Indigenous research on
Indigenous issues. This in turn shapes the limits of what is to be considered acceptable and
admissible knowledge and what is to be excluded from it, framing the paradigm of such
construction in that of an alien culture such as the colonial one.

The study of different cultural epistemologies, Manulani Meyer continues (referring specifically
to her research on Hawaiian epistemology), ‘is a study of difference’. Moreover, ‘[b]ecause
formulating ideas in Hawaiian epistemology needs contrast from which to emerge, descriptors
such as ontology, empiricism, rationality and objectivity are used’. 10 I will be using similar
descriptors in approaching the issues at the core of my thesis. Ontology, one of the major
components of metaphysics, is the study of the ultimate nature of being, reality or ultimate
substance. 11 It is strictly connected to the concept of cosmology, that is the study of the universe
as a totality of phenomena. Cosmological constructions combine abstract metaphysical
(ontological) speculation on the nature of reality and empirical evidence in a coherent
framework.12 The topics covered by all these philosophical disciplines include, among others,
concepts of time, space, teleology (the purpose of things), immanency and transcendency.
‘Cosmology is the framework in which to discuss ontological facts and cannot be separated
from epistemology’.13

8

See, eg, Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 2003).

9

Meyer, above n 1, 76. See also, Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive
Anthropology, Basic Books (1983).
10

Ibid.

11

Runes, above n 4, 294.

12 A Flew,
13

A Dictionary of Philosophy (St. Martin’s Press, 1984) 78.

Meyer, above n 1, 78.
8

If ontological and cosmological perspectives form the basis of any epistemological discourse that is of the definition of any set of knowledge - then it is important to consider ontological and
cosmological perspectives in approaching Indigenous views, in particular Indigenous views of
law and the land. Moreover, ontologies and cosmologies are culturally embedded in specific
spiritual and political belief structures and practices. As a result, cultural practices can operate
as indicators of the underlying ontological frames. Empiricism, meaning the doctrine which
regards experience as the source of knowledge, and rationality, meaning the construction of
logical arguments, are ancillary to and dependent on the ontological and cosmological
frameworks in which they operate.

The attribution of meaning to direct experiences and the construction of arguments derived from
assumed premises are determined and defined by the context in which all experience and all
axiomatic premises originate. This leads to the most contentious and delicate descriptor,
objectivity. If empiricism and rationality are deeply steeped in ontological and cosmological
frameworks, then they cannot claim to be the objective indicators of any observed phenomenon
or reality. For a theoretical construction, to be objective means to ‘possess the character of a real
object existing independently of the knowing mind’.14 A critique of an objective knowledge of
the world in western philosophical discourse can be traced back to the allegory of the cave that
Plato advanced in the Republic.15 Such a critique has indeed informed the history of western
philosophy.16 Manulani Meyer suggests that ‘to be objective is to be without bias, to be
detached. ... [Her] thesis critiques the “cognitive achievement” of objectivity, and examines the
illusion of a non-biased relationship we may think we have with objects, peoples and ideas’ 17
from a Native Hawaiian epistemological perspective. Her work is particularly relevant as it
introduces an epistemological critique of knowledge derived from and steeped in an Indigenous
cultural framework. Any cultural research, even more so a cross-cultural one, is determined by
the cultural perspective from which it originates. Therefore, on the one hand it is necessary to
delineate the field of investigation in order to contextualise the intention, purpose and function
of the research. On the other hand, it is important to maintain an open and comparative look on
the different cultural epistemologies involved in the cross-cultural analysis. Although this thesis
is grounded in classical social research methods, 18 the purpose of this self-representation of the

14

Runes, above n 4, 217.

15

Plato, Republic (Benjamin Jowett trans, Vintage Books, 1991).

16

See, eg, Nicola Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia (Utet, 1993).

17

Meyer, above n 1, 79.

18
See generally W Laurence Neuman, Social Research Methods. Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches (Allyn and Bacon, 3rd ed, 1997).
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perspectives adopted is to contextualise the research in light of its Indigenous epistemological
component.

‘Intention is the portal to right action, it inspires motivation, movement, and why we understand
anything. ... Of course, intentions are inspired by history, culture and the needs of those around
us’.19 The first element to consider in contextualising the epistemological approach of any
research is the intention, or the purpose, of the research itself. In clearly stating the intention of
the research study, it is possible to highlight the function that the research wishes to serve, or the
goal that it wishes to achieve. What question does the research seek to answer? What solution
does it wish to suggest? What problem does it wish to solve? ‘[I]f history/culture is the dynamic
energy that forms knowledge and gives us cues that help us prioritize it, and intention is how we
engage in it, then function becomes the consciousness it will exist in’.20 In other words, a
teleological analysis of the function of any research makes it possible to highlight the reasons
for its specific constructions and, in the case of social research, for the social patterns that the
researcher will identify and determine as relevant in light of that specific function. This position
is not suggesting a functionalist approach to researching, however. The identification of the
function of the research is an epistemological tool, in this case. It is used to clarify and
contextualise some (if not all) of the premises in which the research framework is embedded.
Moreover, this epistemological tool is to be used in a self-representative manner. That is, it is
the researcher that has the task of identifying the parameters and function, or functions, of the
research itself, leaving space for a constant adjustment of this self-representation in accordance
with data and discourses encountered throughout the research process.

In light of this position, the primary function of this thesis is to present a critique of native title
using non-orthodox legal methodologies drawn from the social sciences. The audience of this
critique is composed by readers who are familiar with and operate within the legal structures in
which native title is articulated. As a result, the analysis attempts to increase the understanding,
from the point of view and for the benefit of the common law legal audience, of legal (or, more
broadly, normative) structures that are distinct from that common law legal tradition. Any
reconstruction of Indigenous paradigms and protocols, as any identification of relevant patterns
and structures, are all done with the explicit purpose of presenting these very paradigms,
protocols, patterns and structures to an audience whose epistemological framework is derived
from and embedded in historically developed European ontological premises. This point is
extremely relevant as the thesis attempts to identify cultural elements which are relevant for the
target audience, and to reconstruct these elements into a suggested structure for the benefit and
19

Meyer, above n 1, 55-56.

20

Ibid.
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the understanding of the same audience; it attempts to ‘discuss oranges with an apple
vocabulary’ 21 in order to explain oranges to apples. As a result, constant care must be given to
such process of identification and reconstruction, in order to minimise the risk of imposing alien
(in this case, European) ontological premises onto the (Indigenous) cultural elements observed
and considered.

II. INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES
How then is it possible to conceive and execute a comparative research project able to construct
a structural narrative in order to present specific cultural data that are intrinsically dynamic and
fluid to a different cultural audience? What does it mean to reconstruct events in a non-orthodox
legal narrative? Furthermore, and even more importantly, what does it mean to be
epistemologically accurate in an inter-cultural analysis of legal protocols? The language and the
methodology used in this thesis, whether consciously or not, are derived from the same
historical and cultural milieu of the target audience and are based on European ontological and
cosmological assumptions that are at the core of the current academic world. The analysis, on
the other hand, will focus on Aboriginal cultural patterns embedded in very different
epistemological premises. Consequently, any theoretical construction (or re-construction) of
Aboriginal cultural structures by a non-Indigenous researcher requires an understanding and a
complete consideration of Indigenous epistemologies. This understanding requires both the
construction of an appropriate theoretical model and a participative analysis in order to
contextualise the construction.

Early research on Aboriginal peoples is abundant in racist comments indicating an assumption
of Aboriginal inferiority. Dampier’s description is indicative: ‘[t]he inhabitants of this country
are the miserablest people in the world. The Hodmadods [Hottentots of Africa] ... for wealth are
gentlemen to these’.22 Ever since such early descriptions, the history of cultural representations
has seen many similar remarks, which often even denied human status to the Aboriginal
subjects of study who were regarded as ‘specimen’ and physiologically compared to animals. 23
21

Meyer, above n 9.

22

William Dampier, Dampier’s Voyages [1697] in Josephine Flood, The Original Australians: story of the
Aboriginal people (Allen & Unwin, 2006) 5 .

23

Significant is a passage presented by Karen Lillian Martin in quoting Darlymple’s research in 1874:
‘Mr. Johnstone found in a large bark gunyah of the blacks, a curious and interesting specimen of defunct
humanity, viz., the body of a black gin, doubled up and tied like a roll of spiced beef, and of the same
color and somewhat of the same smell ... Mr. Johnstone brought it on board, and I have had the pleasure
of placing it in the Brisbane Museum. Mr. Johnstone left a couple of blankets and a tomahawk for the
bereaved relatives, who would doubtlessly rightly appreciate the exchange. The head of this mummy is
small - the animal organs being developed in distortion, the mental being next to nil; in fact, it is of the
very lowest type of human formation’ in W.Darlymple, Narratives and reports of the Queensland northeast coast expedition 1873 (1874) in Martin, above n 3, 26.
11

Classical research, according to Martin, was underpinned by three assumptions: firstly, that the
taking of Aboriginal belongings (both cultural and physical, including human remains) could be
justified as data collection; secondly, that such collection required no permission from
Aboriginal people; and thirdly, that the losses incurred by Aboriginal people could be
compensated. Moreover, that such compensation could be determined by the researchers
themselves. 24

Connected to these three assumptions are five beliefs identified by Hart as underpinning early
Aboriginal research:25 firstly, that scientific (that is, ‘good’) research could only be done by nonAboriginal researchers, or, more precisely, in the context of a European scientific epistemology.
Secondly, that researchers had the intrinsic right to research Aboriginal peoples and
communities. Thirdly, that the findings of such research would have reinforced the ideas of
Aboriginal inferiority (this point indicates a tautological approach to the research itself, in that
the findings were unilaterally used to reinforce the premises that determined the parameters of
the research itself). Fourthly, that knowledge is always public and that Aboriginal knowledge, as
a consequence, must be treated as public and entirely accessible to the researchers. Fifthly, and
consequently, that any exploitation of Aboriginal knowledge was to be justified in light of the
research enterprise. The result of this early researching attitude is that Aboriginal research was a
research on and about Aboriginal people by non-Aboriginal researchers. It’s only with Noel
Loos and Henry Reynolds that cross-cultural interactions are re-constructed in terms of
frontiers, and only in the last two decades of the twentieth century.26 Frontiers are here to be
intended not simply as physical and spatial boundaries but mainly as the interaction of distinct
epistemological horizons.

What is the role of history in what is worth knowing? Is history an event that keeps us shackled to
mindless repetition or is it a clue on our path toward liberation and right action? For many, history
and the ideas embedded in culture help us think about the distinctness of a people and how that
uniqueness thrives or shrinks in the contexts we now find ourselves in. Culture has been described
as actions, beliefs and values that a group of people agree are “best practices”. It is specific to
place, climate and time. Culture has an origin, a present expression and a future design. With
regard to knowledge, the specifics of culture are what springs from scores of generations living in
a location. That knowledge, shaped by space and time, is open to historic influences and becomes
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“current” because it is the nature of culture to survive. I would like to suggest, however, that the
“form” of knowledge adapts but the “essence” remains strong, vital and swims in a cultural stream
that has never stopped flowing even though some of us no longer linger on its shorelines. 27

This passage highlights two of the core issues related to the analytical consideration of different
epistemologies. Firstly, cultural traits are specific not only to an historical succession of events
but also to a specific place with its unique environment and climate. Because of this, it is
necessary to pay particular attention to the interconnectedness between cultural traits and
environmental context. Secondly, the passage highlights the fact that cultural traits are modified
as a result of external pressure and events. Because of that, cultural traits are dynamic and any
categorisation faces the risk of a crystallisation in time of cultural structures, an operation that
fails to account for the dynamism indicated above. Therefore, it is important to focus on the
chain of events that indicate continuity of change in the modified structures considered, in order
to emphasise the ‘essence’ to which Manulani Meyer refers; that is, the dynamic cultural
elements contained in different cultural epistemologies. Cultural epistemologies are, therefore,
more stable indicators of cultural autonomy and continuity than specific cultural traits, practices
and structures. As a synonym for cultural epistemologies Meyer uses the phrase ‘cultural views
of intelligence’.28 Intelligence is used, in this case, in the etymological sense of the two latin
words intus and legere, literally “to read into”; that is, to analyse the essence of things and
ultimately of reality. Intelligence, in this sense, is not a quality but instead a process. Such a
process, moreover, is dynamic. The changes, as much as the process itself, are strictly connected
to the environmental context, intended in the larger sense; that is, including political and social
features.

If cultures are influenced by the environmental (including the social and the political) context,
then a participative analysis that is aware of the epistemological context and premises allows the
researcher to directly perceive the context and to contextualise the constructed theoretical
model. Meyer confirms that ‘in Indigenous epistemologies, Knowledge ... is grounded in the
natural environment and in the ancestral line of family. This is a spiritual concept.’ 29 This
suggests that it is not possible to develop an understanding of Indigenous epistemologies
abstracting them from the context in which they operate. It follows that an understanding of
Aboriginal epistemologies can only be complete if it allows for an Aboriginal selfrepresentation of its own cultural epistemology. Meyer makes the point as follows: ‘[i]t is time
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for Native voices, imagery and words to expose the festering wounds of colonial influence’. 30
However, such a representation must take into account cultural protocols of transmission of
knowledge specific to the culture itself, such as, for example, extended silences and non verbal
communication, contextually implied arguments and progressive access to knowledge through
initiation phases.

The issue then becomes one of establishing specific guidelines in the preparation of the research
methodology. Methodology is commonly defined as ‘the ways knowledge can be known and
understood’. 31 A more relevant definition, however, is the one advanced by Hart:
a system of methods and rules to facilitate the collection and analysis of data. It provides the
starting point for choosing an approach made up of theories, ideas, concepts and definitions of the
topic, therefore the basis of a critical activity consisting of making choices about the nature and
character of the social world. 32

This definition is particularly important in highlighting the relevance of a methodological
approach that takes into account not only the way data is collected, but also the way in which it
is shared. In other words, it is important not only to establish how to categorise and define
different cultural epistemologies, but also how these epistemologies are to be collected and
shared.

The main issue at this point is often perceived as one of establishing specific ethical guidelines
for the research. However, as Tuhiwai Smith explains:
[s]ome scholarly communities of scientists may have well-established ethical guidelines, many
have not. Even if such communities have guidelines, the problem to be reiterated again is that it
has been taken for granted that [I]ndigenous peoples are the ‘natural’ objects of research. 33

The perception of any human group as the object of any research not only raises issues about the
nature of objectivity but is also intrinsically antithetic to any interactive discourse. In portraying
the human group as the object of the research, the same human group is removed from the
position of being an active participant in determining the epistemological premises of the
research itself. In the course of this thesis project, I have experienced this very problem in
facing an ethics approval process not based on a dialogical construction of appropriate research
protocols but instead on the application of strict ethical guidelines unilaterally determined. The
30
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purpose of this thesis is instead to use a dialogical approach. As a result, priority is given to
epistemological and methodological approaches formulated by Indigenous scholars and to
cultural protocols as communicated by the participants themselves.

Particularly relevant in this respect is the work by Karen Lillian Martin and her development of
an ‘Indigenist research paradigm founded on the principles of cultural respect and cultural
safety and embedded in Aboriginal ontology, epistemology and axiology’.34 Martin clearly
states that ‘[i]t is the claim of this research study that an Aboriginal research paradigm based on
Aboriginal worldviews, knowledges, values and behaviours will afford greater agency for
Aboriginal Peoples as both researchers and research participants’.35

Anthropological

descriptions of Indigenous peoples have been indeed marked by an enormous amount of work
done by non-Indigenous researchers, often without proper consideration of the intrinsic cultural
structures of the peoples described. In the case of Aboriginal theoretical representations, this
was often done in conjunction with a policy agenda: ‘many [non-Indigenous] Aboriginal
researchers spoke with self-claimed authority to advise various State and Commonwealth
governments on ways to inform Aboriginal policy and thus, “fix the Aboriginal problem”’.36

An example of this are the words of Professor Elkin: ‘Aboriginal psychology and intelligence
are talked about but not scientifically understood. It is a three-sided task, to be tackled by
physical anthropology, psychology and social anthropology. It is urgent because both public
opinion and Government policy demand up-to-date educational facilities for all Aborigines, fullblooded and mixed blood.’37 Apart from the irrelevant connection between culture and genetics
contained in the short passage 38 and the clear statement of an express agenda, all disciplines
involved in the descriptive task are part of a European epistemological framework. That is not
to say that such disciplines are irrelevant to constructing a cultural description. Quite the
opposite, the methodologies developed by these disciplines are capable of presenting an
audience immersed in the same epistemological background with a clear description of different
cultural elements. This description, however, is one-sided and does not rest upon a dialogical
34
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exchange with the described culture or cultures. The result of this is twofold: on the one hand, it
doesn’t allow for a complete comparative analysis, while on the other hand imbalances in power
relationships are exacerbated by it, often forcing the dominant representation upon the other.
Mick Dodson poignantly expresses this point: ‘[n]one of us has escaped the effect of the
representation and invisibility. We feel it every day when we come into contact with the
dominant society. We even feel it when we look into the mirror. Our experiences of ourselves,
and of our Aboriginality, have been transformed by these representations’. 39

In making our self-representations public, we are aware that our different voices may be heard
once again and only in the language of the alien tongue. We are aware that we risk their
appropriation and abuse, and the danger that a selection of our representations will be used to once
again fix Aboriginality in absolute or inflexible terms, that one character or one painting will be
picked out as the authoritative archetype of Aboriginality, now the ‘real Aboriginality’ because it
came from an Aboriginal person. However, without our own voices, Aboriginality will continue to
be a creation for and about us. This is all the more reason to insist that we have control over both
the form and content of representations of our Aboriginalities. All the more reason that the voices
speak our languages. 40

This is particularly relevant in addressing the issue of Aboriginal political activism in respect to
Aboriginal epistemology. If what is relevant is the flowing and changeable ‘essence’ of
Aboriginal epistemology, then Aboriginal political claims heavily determined by an external
representation as the one just mentioned have to be considered contextually.

Martin states that ‘[i]n the Australian context ... an overall framework and strategic approach [to
an Aboriginal research agenda] is yet to be articulated’.41 She then suggests a ‘self-regulating
researcher behaviour’ founded on the observation of seven abstract ‘respect’ rules: respect your
land, respect your laws, respect your Elders, respect you culture, respect your community,
respect your families and respect your futures.42 Moreton-Robertson confirms that ‘[t]he
protocol for introducing one’s self to other Indigenous people is to provide information about
one’s cultural location, so that connection can be made on political, cultural and social grounds
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and relations established’.43 In the process of establishing the reciprocal cultural locations,
connections can be made and a dialogue can be initiated. Paraphrasing and abstracting this
initial protocol of communication, it is the very purpose of the epistemological critique
contained in the present chapter to establish the cultural position in which the research takes
place.

Another element to consider is the extensive use of metaphorical language in Aboriginal
communication, a trait common to many Indigenous peoples as exemplified by Tuhiwai Smith’s
suggestion of a Maori research agenda based on a metaphor of the ocean as a framework of four
tides and four directions.44 Aboriginal epistemologies are often based on the prominent use of
narrative structures rather than purely descriptive ones. It’s the process defined by Martin, in
quoting Archibald’s definition, as ‘Storywork ... a Meta-process’:45
I also learned to appreciate how stories engage us as listeners and learners to think deeply and to
reflect on our actions and reactions ... I called this pedagogy storywork because the engagement of
story, storyteller, and listener created a synergy for making meaning through the story and making
one work to obtain meaning and understanding’. 46

Aboriginal knowledge is thus transmitted through the use of this meta-narrative process and is
embedded in Stories that contain multiple layers of meaning. The capitalisation of the term
Stories serves to indicate the different approach that is required in addressing these narratives. If
these narratives were approached as simple stories, that is, as simple anecdotal or storytelling
devices, the research would fail to perceive the pedagogical complexity and the normative
nature of these Stories.47

Moreover, these Stories require a specific epistemological position in order to be fully
understood, a position that Martin defines as ‘Living Relatedness’. 48
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An Indigenous paradigm comes from the fundamental belief that knowledge is relational.
Knowledge is shared with all of creation ... it is with the cosmos, it is with the animals, with the
plants, with the earth that we share this knowledge. It goes beyond the idea of individual
knowledge to the concept of relational knowledge. 49

This passage suggests three relevant points to consider in approaching Indigenous knowledge.
Firstly, that there is a physical connection with the surrounding environment, both in the
structure of knowledge and in the methodology of transmission of that knowledge. Uncle Max
Dulumunmun Harrison states that ‘[t]here is plenty in that library up there, it is the text of the
land. The library is open, it has its own dictionary to explain the languages spoken there. It has
all those wonderful gifts for us to borrow, so we can pass them on’;50 as a result, Stories are
meaningfully shared (that is, they acquire meaning) only in specific spatial, and temporal,
locations. Secondly, that knowledge is perceived not as a predetermined and distinct set of
descriptive narrative that explain external and separate phenomena, but instead as a dialogical
process with the same surrounding environment. Thirdly, and finally, that the epistemological
structure allows for the potential inclusion of non-human others in this dialogical process of
knowledge. Once identified, it is easy to see these three elements in various Aboriginal
discourses. 51

Furthermore, the transmission of these Stories is regulated by very strict and precise protocols. 52
The intrinsic meaning of each Story is defined and determined by these very protocols. Stories
are meaningfully shared only by specific individuals with specific individuals (either because of
their initiated status or because of their relationship to the storyteller) in specific places at
specific times. Moreover, the same Story may have multiple versions told with different
languages, and these different languages are only open to certain individuals. The respect of
these highly refined protocols and the contextualisation of the Stories used are therefore
paramount to establish an appropriate inter-cultural epistemological dialogue.

49

S. Wilson, ‘What is an Indigenous Research methodology?’ Canadian Journal of Native Education 25
(2) 166-174 in Martin, above n 3, 82.
50

Harrison and McConchie, above n 47, 39.

51

‘Just a year after the handback of Gulaga and Biamanga to the Yuin people, forestry went in and cut
trees down and disrupted the sacred songlines. When I tried to tell them they shouldn’t do that because it
cut the direct line of teaching, it was disregarded’. Ibid, 37.
52

See, eg, Caroline Josephs, ‘Sacred Storytelling: Braiding Personal, Presentational and Experiential
Modes’ (Paper presented at Locations of Spirituality: ‘Experiences’ and ‘Writings’ of the Sacred,
Humanities Research Centre, Old Canberra House, ANU, 26-27 October 2002); Peter Sutton, ‘Myth as
history, history as myth’, in Ian Keen (ed), Being Black: Aboriginal cultures in ‘settled’ Australia
(Aboriginal Studies Press, 1991) 251.
18

Finally, the use of English language by Indigenous peoples has also been the object of
investigation by the discipline of sociolinguistics. Diana Eades’ work has shown a number of
relevant indicators of traditional cultural practices in the use of English by Indigenous
speakers. 53 Her research has identified six areas in which the continuity of traditional culture
can be encoded in the use of the English language: use of kin terms, avoidance behaviour, the
role of indirectness, seeking and giving information, making and refusing requests and seeking
and giving reasons. The use of English in a culturally defined manner thus becomes relevant in
establishing an appropriate epistemological and methodological research framework.

III. METHODOLOGY
The comparative analysis that is the object of this thesis is the result of the many
epistemological premises and methodological parameters presented throughout Part A, both in
this Chapter and in the following ones. Part B will be an exploration of the legal constructs
pertaining to native title in order to establish the boundaries of the observation, using law as a
comparative and analytical construct. In Part C, I will be exploring existing anthropological data
in order to determine the cultural protocols to be observed. The choice of the term ‘protocols’
derive from a conversation with one Interviewee: ‘I totally get it [the relationship between law
and culture]. You see, I come from a different perspective. I grew up with protocols. You did
what you had to do.’54

The term protocol appears to be a more culturally appropriate term. It captures the idea of
regulatory mechanisms encapsulating the totality of cultural premises and discourses presented
above. At the same time it is perceived as less formalistic and yet inclusive of negotiating
processes and social forces not rigidly predetermined. I deliberately reject the term ‘customary
law’, preferring the term (Indigenous) legal protocols, as the concept of ‘customary law’ can be
interpreted in a reductive and demeaning sense, as a second degree law. The general definition
of the term ‘custom’ - found in a number of dictionaries - refers to ‘a rule peculiar to a particular
locality, trade or profession, which may be recognised as having legal force provided that it does
not contradict a general rule of common or statutory law ... or a group pattern of habitual
activity usually transmitted from one generation to another’,55 ‘a practice that has been followed
in a particular locality in such circumstances that it is to be accepted as part of the law of that
53 Diana Eades, ‘They don’t speak an Aboriginal language, or do they?’ in Ian Keen (ed), Being Black:
Aboriginal cultures in ‘settled’ Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, 1991) 97.
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locality.’56 Custom appears to be a concept overall less binding than law and lacking law’s
prestigious status within society. The combined term customary law, therefore, can be viewed as
a lesser degree of law and for such reason I will not adopt it in the course of the thesis. I will
prefer to it the term Indigenous legal protocols.

Throughout Part A, I will establish the conceptual and epistemological parameters for the
analysis. In Chapter Two, I will explore in details fundamental issues of comparative law and
legal pluralism. In Part B, as a consequence of the parameters established in Part A, I will
explore the existing discourse on native title in order to establish the boundaries of the analytical
comparison that is the aim of this thesis.

In Part C, I will refer to existing anthropological literature, reinterpreting it in light of the
approach discussed in Chapter Two. As a result of an analytical comparison, a number of
cultural elements will be highlighted, many of which are ignored by Australian law as irrelevant
or independent from the realm of the legal within the theoretical boundaries of the common law.
All the protocols (cultural patterns) teleologically, structurally and functionally equivalent to the
legal model constructed as the comparative tool, together with all the indivisible jurisprudential,
political and ontological premises will then be considered as legally relevant for the purpose of
the comparison. This will establish the impact of native title legislation and practices on what
will be defined as Indigenous legal protocols.

Part D will consist of a specific case study. The research for this case study has been conducted
in the Illawarra in consultation with and under the supervision of Indigenous participants and
elders in order to respect cultural protocols and practices that form the observation, avoiding
culturally inappropriate behaviour or comments. One of the results of this ongoing consultation
has been the request of including the transcripts of the interviews verbatim. The reason for
doing so is to maintain the narrative nature of Indigenous epistemologies as much as possible.
The case study will be used to explore the theoretical model constructed as the result of the
epistemological and methodological approach presented in Parts A,b and C. Consequently,
suggestions of possible alternatives able to reconcile different cultural and legally relevant
perspectives will be presented, focussing on the need for a more articulated comparative and
interactive definitory work and on the international context in which the Australian discourse is
deeply rooted.

56

Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) custom
(26 September 2010) Oxford Reference Online <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?
subview=Main&entry=t49.e995>
20

Further methodological considerations will be introduced in Chapter Three, after the appropriate
attention has been given to the epistemological parameters of comparative law and legal
pluralism. Given the scope of the thesis and the breadth of disciplines and authors upon which
the arguments rely, it is not possible to present a concise literature review contained in a
specific, self-contained and separate chapter. As a result, relevant literature will be explored in
each different section. In general, an extensive reconstruction of the relevant literature will be
presented at the beginning of each Chapter, whereas specific arguments will be constructed only
after the relevant literature will have been introduced.

IV. ETHICS
Given the culturally sensitive nature of this research project, particular attention has been given
to the process of ethical approval. Much more important than the approval by the University of
Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee was the approval of every step of the research
by Indigenous people of the area, whose knowledge was to be discussed in the thesis. The
Indigenous supervisor to the thesis, a respected elder in the Illawarra, has been overseeing every
progressive step of the research project, involving, where necessary, other Indigenous
participants and elders. The research project has also received the approval of the University of
Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee. Prior to negotiating the research with the
prospective participants, I underwent rigorous cultural training under the tutelage and guidance
of the Indigenous supervisor to this thesis, covering the entire material taught by the Indigenous
supervisor to University students. Subsequently, specific potential participants to the research
project have been identified and informally contacted. Specific negotiations with the future
Indigenous participants to the thesis were then carried out under the constant and rigorous
supervision of the Indigenous supervisor, in order to guarantee that cultural protocols were
respected and that culturally appropriate behaviour was to be present at all times. As a result of
these negotiations, a specific information sheet about the research project was drafted. This
information sheet was then sent and circulated to all prospective participants prior to their
agreement to participate. The subsequent step in the process was to establish a series of
questions capable of investigating the issues raised in the research which at the same time were
culturally appropriate and capable of allowing the participants to respond in a narrative way.
The need for this narrative approach has been emphasised by the indigenous supervisor together
with the negotiations carried on with the Indigenous participants. A series of general questions
were then collected into a general questionnaire to be presented to the participants, with the
explicit understanding that such questionnaire was to provide a general guideline only for the
interviewing process. Only after the previous points were fully satisfied, a consent form was
then circulated to all participants and signed. The University of Wollongong Human Research
Ethics Committee then gave ethical clearance to the methodologies presented and to the entire
research project.
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V. LAW AND LORE
The focus of this research project is an analysis of the impact that the legal instrument of native
title has on traditional Indigenous normative protocols - defined as legal protocols - that define
and regulate traditional interests in land. As a consequence, this research thesis finds its
epistemological framework in the discipline of comparative law, rather than being an analysis of
native title itself as a component of the Australian legal system. If, in fact, we assume or
acknowledge the existence of at least two distinct cultural entities (considered whole and
separate), a colonial Australian one and an Indigenous one that predates colonisation and that
continued throughout the entire colonial period, then we might wonder whether these distinct
cultural entities have distinct and separate sets of laws. If that is the case, then native title
represents an interesting element of comparative legal analysis.

What does it mean to define certain cultural and social protocols as legal? McRae et al suggest
taht ‘[i]n the past, lawyers argued that Indigenous peoples lack anything capable of being
recognised as “legal” law at all, a view finally discredited by Mabo (No 2)’. 57 The picture,
however, is much more complex than this apparent recognition contained in Mabo (No 2). 58
Indeed, in Mabo (No 2) the High Court confirmed Blackburn J’s view, contained in Milirrpurm
v Nabalco Pty Ltd, 59 where he stated the following:
Counsel for the defendants relied ... upon the argument that ... in the Aboriginal world there was
nothing recognisable as law at all. 60 The Solicitor-General contended that before any system can
be recognised by our law as a system of law, there must be not only a definable community to
which it applies, but also some recognised sovereignty61 giving the law a capacity to be
enforced ... Implicit ... was ... an Austinian definition of law as the command of a sovereign ... I do
not find myself much impressed by this line of argument. The inadequacy of the Australian
analysis of the nature of law is well known. I do not believe that there is utility in attempting to
provide a definition of law which will be valid for all purposes and answer all questions. I prefer a
more pragmatic approach. ... It may be that it is possible to place native systems of law into some
sort of scale ranging from the unrecognisable to the juristically advanced ... I am very clear of
opinion, upon the evidence, that the social rules and customs of the plaintiffs cannot possibly be
57
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dismissed as lying on the other side of an unbridgeable gulf. The evidence shows a subtle and
elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which provided
a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence.
If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the
evidence before me ... I hold that I must recognise the system revealed by the evidence as a system
of law. 62

However, although this passage appears to be a complete acknowledgment of the existence of
one or more Indigenous legal systems in Australia, it contains a number of epistemological
premises that need to be highlighted. Blackburn J explicitly shies away from the attempt of a
theoretical definition of law. Such a definition could be either a unilateral definition advanced
from a colonial or hegemonic power, or a negotiated definition resulting in the combination of
different legal epistemologies and ontological views. Blackburn J, however, prefers to pursue a
‘more pragmatic approach’,63 focussing on the immediate need for a recognition of Indigenous
customs and cultural protocols as a system of law by the Australian law.

Such an approach, however, rests on a number of premises that in being ignored acquire a
dogmatic and unquestioned (if not unquestionable) nature. The need for such a recognition rests
on the assumption that the Australian law has the unilateral power and authority to recognise
pre-existing Indigenous cultural protocols as legal or not. In other words, that the Australian
legal system is the only unchallenged and unchallengeable sovereign legal system, the only one
capable of such an operation of recognition (certainly not vice versa). Regardless of the
indisputable power imbalances between the Australian and the Indigenous cultural complexes,
the premise is neither unchallenged nor unchallengeable, and I will explore this further in
chapter three.

Moreover, such a premise has the immediate consequence of raising the question of the methods
of such a recognition. Indeed, if the recognition is the unilateral act of one legal system, the
most relevant part of such a recognition becomes the constant analysis of the epistemological
and ontological premises contained in such a recognition, an analysis which is in clear
opposition to the ‘pragmatic approach’ quoted above.64 Even in the context of this unilateral
recognition, the concepts to deal with are not immediately and automatically comparable to the
ones employed by Australian law, as noted by McRae et al: ‘[f]rom the outset, it needs to be

62

Milirrpum (1971) 17 FLR 141, 264-268.

63

Ibid, 267.

64

Ibid.
23

noted that Indigenous concepts of “law” are much broader than the concept of “law” as
understood within the context of the Australian legal system.’ 65 Such a comparison, however, is
not explored by legal scholars or practitioners, but rather by anthropologists.

Although informed by a colonial past, the discipline of anthropology and the writings of
anthropologists are thus essential to highlighting the process of recognition advanced by the
courts. It is in these writings that the starting point for a comparative analysis must be found.
In the Gibson Desert of Western Australia ... the Mardudjara have the word julubidi, glossed as
‘law’ by those who speak English. To say that an action is julubidingga, ‘according to the law’, is
to commend it. In the opinion of the anthropologists Robert Tonkinson ... the Mardudjara term
‘connotes a body of jural rules and moral evaluations of customary and socially sanctioned
behaviour patterns’; it is practically a synonym for ‘traditional culture’. The rules and practices
comprised in this culture are said by the Aborigines to have originated in the Dreamtime, that
mythical era in which creative beings shaped the land and imposed life’s order.66

This passage highlights the two fundamental issues connected to the process of recognition of
Indigenous law by the Australian legal system. Firstly, the intrinsic interconnectedness of the
concept of law with and within the Aboriginal cultural continuum. The concept of law as a
separate discipline and body of cultural and social rules is not applicable to the equivalent
concept in Aboriginal culture. Secondly, the relevance of the explicit cosmological premises
upon which Indigenous ‘legal’ rules are based; the analysis of the ontological milieu in which
these rules operate becomes then paramount both to their understanding and to their recognition.
However, these two issues are not consistently explored by judges or legal scholars in Australia
and their exploration is instead often left to anthropologists and social scientists.

As a consequence, the lack of awareness of the ontological and epistemological premises of the
cultures whose protocols and customs are (or are not) recognised as law leads to a selective
recognition of customs and protocols insofar as they are acceptable and coherent with the legal
and political sensibilities of the recognising system. This attitude has been effectively presented
by Mulqueeny:
[t]he ambivalence felt by the judiciary in coming to terms with an alien system is exemplified by
the continuing ambiguity in the terminology used. In the face of compelling anthropological
evidence and in the context of the contemporary retreat from epistemological constructs based in
culturally imperialistic paradigms, judges and commentators alike have increasingly supplemented
the more patronising and perhaps demeaning concept of native ‘custom’ with recognition of ‘law
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and customs’ or even the hybrid ‘customary law’ The equivocality, so long as it remains
uncrystallised by reference to definitional criteria, retains and disguises a degree of operational
flexibility in facilitating judicial rejection of what are deemed socially and culturally repugnant
practices, as mere customs. Rules of behaviour which fail to threaten the values of the dominant
society then can be labelled laws in less problematic fashion with whatever consequences that may
entail.67

In introducing the dialogical distinction between the term Law and the term Lore,68 Mulqueeny
points out the unsatisfactory explanation provided by the term customary law. Such a term
inscribes Indigenous laws and the whole of the Indigenous legal system in a scale of legal
validity, where the Indigenous legal systems occupy a lower place in the ladder. This value
driven recognition is the direct consequence of the exclusion of a thorough analysis of the
ontological and epistemological premises of the recognised system or systems. Indeed, the risk
of a ‘pragmatic’ approach is that of ignoring the epistemological premises behind such a
recognition, thus perpetrating an imposition of epistemological filters that results in choosing
what to recognise for the specific purposes of the moment.

This is very apparent in the report of the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1986,69 after a
decade of the most comprehensive investigation directed towards establishing the potential
recognition of Aboriginal customary law. The report covers what are described as criminal or
quasi-criminal aspects of customary law. Such a distinction is based on a colonial category
inherited from the Common Law legal system. This point is further reinforced by McRae et al:
despite the logic of the argument that if the rejection of terra nullius meant that Indigenous laws
relating to land survived colonisation, then Indigenous laws in other areas - criminal law, family
law, intellectual property ... cultural heritage and so on - must also have survived, Mabo (No 2) has
been restricted to land laws. The High Court specifically rejected any extension to criminal law.70

The survival of what is defined as ‘customary criminal law’ is expressly rejected by the High
Court in Walker v New South Wales: ‘[e]ven if it be assumed that the customary criminal law of
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Aboriginal people survived British settlement, it was extinguished by the passage of criminal
statutes of general application’.71 The selective choice of what parts of a pre-existing legal
system survive the passage of Australian legislation is based on a legal categorisation entirely
embedded within a European epistemological framework, without appropriate analysis of
whether such categorisation is in fact applicable to a non-European system.

It appears that this selective and purpose-driven ‘recognition’ of Indigenous laws is more
detrimental than beneficial. The Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody, 72 for example, has been fundamental in voicing the concerns toward the differential
and discriminatory impact of the criminal justice system upon Aboriginal people. As a
consequence, many have advocated a recognition of Aboriginal laws that is consistent with the
entire epistemological framework of such laws:
[w]hile it has been recognised that giving greater recognition to Aboriginal laws will have little
direct bearing on the resolution of ... the institutionalised demographic and sociological disabilities
associated with systemic and endemic deprivation among Aboriginal communities ... indications
of an emerging pan Aboriginal ethos give some ground for optimism that reforms in disparate
fields may synergise advances of a higher order than they might otherwise attain separately.73

Mabo (No2), then, becomes a momentous milestone in determining the nature and the methods
of such a recognition. ‘Mabo may be no more than “one brick in the wall” in rebuilding
Aboriginal self esteem and cultural integrity, but in establishing a legal bridge-head it presages a
quantum leap in the potential for innovative political and legal polemics.’74 It appears, then, that
the discourse for a recognition of Indigenous law was ripe at the time of Mabo (No 2) and that
the time has come for legal scholars to adopt a less ‘pragmatic approach’75 and to ask the
necessary theoretical questions of what it means to ‘recognise’ Indigenous normative systems as
systems of law.

The fundamental question of what it is that is to be recognised is still far from receiving an
answer, but it can be already noticed that the intention to do so is advocated in the current legal
discourse. 76 If the selective recognition presented above is to be rejected, however, what is then
that is to be recognised? In other words, what is ‘Indigenous law’? The question is particularly
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relevant and delicate because of the ontological and epistemological differences presented in the
use of the term law/lore in an Indigenous context. 77

Moreover, the issue is made even more complex by the existence of two concurring issues.
Firstly, colonial political relations have forced upon colonised peoples the adoption of a series
of strategies in order to resist the colonial process and to assert a continuous, pre-existing and
independent cultural and political identity.78
[a]nother important characteristic of Indigenous laws is the extent to which they have been forced
to respond to the intervention of colonisation and the Australian legal system. It is undeniable that
in many ways this intervention has had a traumatic effect on the operation of Indigenous laws. But
instead of concentrating solely on the destructive aspects of colonialism, international
commentators now explore the dynamic and creative responses made by indigenous legal systems
throughout the world ... In the first place, an important survival strategy for Indigenous law has
been its capacity to accommodate non-Indigenous values, while at the same time upholding
underlying traditional values. For example, Warlpiri laws requiring to marry older men have been
modified in many communities, in the face of missionary opposition and threats of legal
intervention, but the basic kinship rules continue to be enforced ... Secondly, aspects of the
Australian legal process are “captured” and incorporated into Indigenous procedures ... Thirdly,
many Indigenous communities have utilised aspects of the Australian legal system ... in
developing a wide range of community justice programs79 ... Other Indigenous communities
reacted differently. Instead of adapting their laws, they set up a system of “two laws”, by
quarantining aspects of their laws from outside interference, while relegating other matters to the
sphere of Australian law. 80

Whatever the strategy, or strategies adopted, however, this issue has two direct consequences.
The first is that the issue of recognition of Indigenous law is an issue of cultural and legal
comparison, which requires a very precise identification of the comparative methodologies and
epistemological approaches involved. The second is that any comparison must be inserted in a
historical analysis that diachronically takes into account mechanisms of adaptation and
modification in a coherent and cohesive reconstruction.
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Poka Laenui, a Hawaiian scholar, theorises a process of decolonisation of Aboriginal
Communities, or societies, in five distinct phases. These phases structure a process for the
‘reevaluation of the political social and economic, and judicial structures themselves and the
development, if appropriate, of new structures that can hold and house the values and
aspirations of the colonized people.’81 Lenui’s analysis is important for a number of reasons.
Firstly, clearly the colonial process is what caused the problem in the first place. If we agree that
colonisation was an unjust event, and if we want to put an end to the heritage of colonialism,
although it is not possible to remove the colonial event and the historical process that followed,
it is possible to explore avenues of redress. One such avenue is the comparative reconstruction
of traditional normative orders in a framework that can be recognised and understood by the
Australian common law at common law. However, this reconstruction cannot be a unilateral
enterprise, in order to avoid the continuation of the colonial process. Consequently, it needs to
engage with the broader process of de-colonisation, without avoiding issues of selfdetermination and of contested sovereignty claims.

As Laenui notes:
The first phase, rediscovery and recovery, occurs when an individual or group realises that the
state of their realities as caused by colonialism. [I would add that the group must first have a sense
of distinct identity] Here the separation from their cultures, worldviews and beliefs becomes
exposed as a strategy of colonialism. The danger is that because this separation has become usual,
and normalised, the colonised sometimes perpetuate colonial attitudes ... The next phase,
mourning, is defined as “a time when a people are able to lament their victimization” ... This phase
is necessary for healing the wounds caused by colonialism. The next phase, dreaming, is
considered crucial to the overall decolonisation process as these are the dreams upon which the
“new social order” ... are discussed and mobilised ... [t]his phase is so important ... that it requires
adequate time and attention. Any actions to intervene in, shorten and hasten the actualisation of
these dreams will inevitably prolong the overall decolonisation process ... The next phase ... is
commitment that emerges from the consideration of all aspects of the rediscovery and recovery
phase, the mourning and the dreaming phases ... The next and final phase of decolonisation is
action. This is achievable only when a consensus has been reached in the previous phase of
commitment. This consensus must contain the choices of the People. 82

Indigenous claims have continued throughout the entire colonial period until present times.
Moreover, cultural protocols, often referred to as law, lore or customary law, have continued to
be practiced as well; regardless of the impact of colonial law, these protocols pre-date the event
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and the first act of colonisation and represent an aspect of cultural continuity. On the one hand,
then, political and legal claims cannot be simply ignored, while, on the other hand, cultural
protocols that often engage with colonial law and that often require a legal comparison are
undeniably present and can trace their origin in a pre-colonial cultural continuum. As a result,
the most crucial question in addressing the issue of recognition of Indigenous laws becomes an
issue of cultural and legal comparison. Therefore, a pragmatic approach does not appear to be
the most satisfactory one. Neither the subordinating term customary law nor the adoption of
western legal categories seem to be able to thoroughly address the issue.

What is the law? More importantly, is it a universal phenomenon or a culturally specific one?
Some writers have extended the concept to include almost all forms of social regulation 83
whereas, on the other end of the spectrum, legal centralists posit that only the law of the State
can be properly and correctly defined as law. The question is not purely theoretical. Indeed, if
the law is a culturally specific phenomenon, then it follows that its existence is limited to the
cultures that do possess it. Consequently, a legal comparison of different legal structures and
protocols can only occur among these cultures. On the other hand, if it is a phenomenon which
is universal to all human cultures it allows a legal comparison to take place between all cultural
groups. At the same time, however, it requires the identification either of a universal definition
capable of application to any culture at any given time or of a comparative methodology that
allows any comparison to occur, regardless of any culturally specific definition.

VI. COMPARATIVE LAW
In order for a legal system to recognise the laws of another (or more precisely, to recognise
specific normative protocols as laws) it is necessary either to negotiate a fundamental common
definition of what the law is to be or, failing to do so, for a legal system to establish the most
accurate epistemological framework in order to identify and define the parameters of what is
legal and what is not among the cultural protocols to be considered. The issue then becomes one
of comparison, in specific of legal comparison.

This immediately and initially raises a teleological question, a question of purpose. Works of
comparative law are written to inform legal readers about the similarities and differences
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between legal structures present in different cultures.84 As Rodolfo Sacco, one of the most
prominent figures of Italian comparative law, has pointed out, ‘comparison, in linguistics as
much as in ethnology and in many other fields, revealed itself to be the most powerful
instrument able to highlight structural regularities which would otherwise be overlooked
upon.’ 85 The process of comparison between different structures is not unique to the realm of
law, nor was it initially developed by legal scholars. The discipline of linguistics was the first to
explore different structures in order to evaluate their differences and similarities.86 There exist
works of comparative law dedicated to comparing specific legal systems (or specific rules), but
there is also a well established body of works dedicated to the formulation of the theoretical
framework for any comparison.

Any comparison follows from the knowledge of theoretical models. It’s not possible to compare
other than the models that are known. However, comparative sciences (both social and natural
sciences) know - and they teach to their sister discipline, legal science - that knowledge of these
very models advance as a result of the act of comparison 87

In other words, any act of comparison is both an act of approximation and an act of creation. It
is an act of approximation in that the structures and regularities described are approximated to
the structures and categories of the receiving audience, thus making the identification of the
audience - and of its underlying structures and categories - a fundamental pre-requisite of any
epistemologically open comparison. Moreover, it is an act of creation in that such an
approximation is creative in nature, insofar as the categories used to describe structures and
regularities are created by the comparison itself.
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To define such structures and regularities, such categories, I will use a variation of the term
models suggested by Sacco, 88 yet maintaining the same concept. The term adopted throughout
this thesis will be protocols. The relevant issue then becomes one of creatively identifying legal
protocols in order to compare them. It is an undeniable factual premise that structures and
regularities can be observed in any social milieu, and that such regularities can be defined and
described in terms of social rules, accounting for the existence of a multiplicity of protocols in
all social arenas. The problem faced by any legal comparison, however, is that of identifying the
protocols that can be described and defined as specifically and exclusively legal. Failure to
clearly identify legal protocols leads to the theoretical confusion introduced in the previous
sections. A brief overview of the discourse surrounding the issue of legal pluralism will help in
effectively framing the issue.

The fundamental question to be asked is whether the concept of law is a universal concept,
existing in all human cultures and societies, or a culturally specific one, as described and
defined by western legal tradition. 89 Before attempting to answer such a paradigmatic question,
however, it is fundamental to clarify two issues. Firstly, the use of the underlying terms and
concepts of culture and society and secondly, the etymological meaning of often
interchangeable terms such as rules, laws and norms.

VII. SOCIETY AND CULTURE
The term society refers to ‘the aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered
community ... the community of people living in a particular country or region and having
shared customs, laws, and organizations’, 90 ‘[a] group of persons unified by a distinctive and
systematic set of normative relations, whereby actions of one are perceived as meriting
characteristic responses by others. To be part of the same society is to be subject to these norms
of interaction’ 91 and finally, to
[a]n abstract term for the complex set of beliefs, practices, rules, and traditions groups of people
adhere to. Society is always greater than a single individual, and as such it is often defined in the
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negative as the opposite of the individual, or as that which constrains the individual and prevents
him or her from living out their desires. But it is also used in more affirmative terms to classify the
ensemble of institutions, organizations, and relationships that give support to the individual. It is
often contrasted with culture, with the implication that society is the form to culture's content—it
is organized and organizing, whereas culture is not. To put it another way, society speaks in the
imperative, whereas culture uses the interrogative. 92

Underlying and unifying each of those definitions is the reference to the existence of a
multiplicity of individuals connected and reciprocally bound and defined by a variety of
normative relations. The necessity for each separate individual to live in the same shared
physical space, albeit clearly relevant to determining the specific nature of each society as a
whole and of each specific social structure, appears to be secondary to the binding and identitydefining nature of the distinct normative relations that characterise each society (or,
alternatively, each social group). I will explore shortly the etymological meaning of the term
norm; throughout this entire thesis, however, I will use the term society in this broad and general
sense of a group of individuals sharing a set of normative relations. The existence of a
multiplicity of human groups organised in different, distinct and separate societies implies the
existence of a plurality of different, distinct and separate normative relations. Such normative
relations are then described and articulated by term culture.

The term, and the concept, of culture is inextricably connected to the concept of society, as
indicated by the last definition of society presented above. Indeed, Tylor’s classical definition of
culture relies upon and expands this concept and definition of society. 93 Tylor’s definition of
culture referred to a learned complex of knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, and custom and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. 94 Such a definition is still
extensively used today: ‘all knowledge that is acquired by human beings through their
membership of a society. A culture incorporates all the shared knowledge, expectations and
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beliefs of a group’.95 Also, ‘[t]he way of life of a people, including their attitudes, values,
beliefs, arts, sciences, modes of perception, and habits of thought and activity. Cultural features
of forms of life are learned but are often too pervasive to be readily noticed from within’.96 It is
apparent that the term culture is used to describe the entire spectrum of relationships happening
within any specific society.97 In other words, it seems to refer directly to the set of normative
relations identified above.

This is made even clearer by Buchanan:
in the social sciences, particularly history and sociology, culture has usually been opposed to
society, and given a lower status, as it was thought to refer to pastimes rather than the serious
business of holding the collectivity together. However, the general trend with this term, even in the
social sciences, has been expansive, so that even within the confines of specific disciplines it has
been enlarged to encompass virtually every facet of human behaviour. And in recent times it has
overtaken society as the dominant term as doubts have grown as to the existence or even the
possibility of society. Culture has thus come to stand for ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’ ties between
people within a given collectivity. ... The advent of Cultural Studies in 1950s Britain began to
change that, as it combined ways of thinking about culture from history and sociology and
conceived of culture as the glue holding society together.98

The debate over the definition of the term culture is certainly too big to be properly explored
here.99 However, for the purpose of this thesis and of its use of the term, it’s useful to highlight
the relationship between law and culture presented in all previous definitions, the first being one
of the component elements of the latter. In light of the definition of society previously adopted,
the term appears to refer to the whole spectrum of the social interactions between individual
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members of any specific society, whether verbally formulated or not and however inherited or
transmitted. In other words, any culture is ‘the system of values in terms of which participants
in a form of life find meaning and purpose.’ 100 In light of this, and in conjunction with the
definition of society adopted above, throughout this thesis I will use the term culture to refer to
the set of normative relations shared by all individual members of a society.

The concept of normative relations is here used broadly, including the whole spectrum of
values, beliefs, practices, habits and rules shared by a group of individuals with differing
degrees of awareness, recognition and understanding. If the concept of society refers to the
individuals sharing a specific system of values and practices, then the concept of culture refers
to the system of values and practices shared by those individuals. In acknowledging both the
deeper complexity of the two terms and the fact that they are not immediately and automatically
interchangeable, I will use these two simplified definitions for the purpose of introducing the
discourse on legal pluralism and of establishing the epistemological framework for the legal
comparative analysis that is the purpose of this thesis.

The two terms society and culture, according to the definitions adopted as well as in all other
definitions presented above, refer to a set of normative relations binding together a group of
individuals. These normative relations appear to refer to all kind of behavioural rules, practices
and expectations of all individual members of the group. It is therefore essential to properly
define these normative relations, in particular by exploring the meaning of the term norm,
especially in relation to the concepts of rule and of law.

The set of normative relations that define each society and that constitute its culture can
certainly be re-phrased as a set of social rules, or of social norms. Some of those social rules are
also commonly articulated as law: indeed, the most common definition of law is that of ‘[t]he
enforceable body of rules that govern any society.’ 101 However, it doesn’t follow that the terms
can be used interchangeably. That is certainly the case in the use of the term law (intuitively, not
all social rules are laws), but it is also the case in the use of the terms rule and norm. In order to
introduce the discourse on legal pluralism to answer the question of whether the concept of law
is a universal or a culturally specific one, it is therefore paramount to identify the appropriate
meaning of the three terms rule, law and norm.
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VIII. RULES, NORMS, LAWS
What is a rule? And a law? And a norm? How do they conceptually relate to each other? These
are not purely ontological questions. They are extremely relevant to provide the framework
necessary to introduce the discourse on legal pluralism. I will begin the exploration of the
concepts from the etymological meaning of the various terms as they are expressed in various
dictionaries. This will be purposely done in this section in order to anchor the analysis to the
most common use of the terms themselves.

The term rule is often used both in the realm of the physical and of the theoretical sciences, with
different conceptual boundaries. The Oxford Dictionary’s broadest definition is that of ‘a law or
principle that operates within a particular sphere of knowledge, describing or prescribing what
is possible or allowable.’ 102 Comparing the definition of law presented in the previous section
with this definition of rule presents us with a tautology, a circular thinking in that each
definition relies upon the other for its validity. I will therefore explore the etymology of the
word to gain further insight into its ontological concept. The english word rule derives from the
latin word regula, meaning ‘straight stick’,103 the straight stick being a fundamental Roman unit
of measure. The root of the word, regul-, appears in other english words particularly suggestive
of the ontological meaning of the word used today, as for example regularity. The etymological
origin of the word seems to suggest that the original concept of the term refers to a repeating
pattern (the unit of measure, the straight stick), used in order to obtain a measurement.
Abstracting this concept, the identification of repeating patterns can be seen as a fundamental
epistemological tool used in order to create meaning. As a result, I would suggest the
ontological concept of the term rule as one of a repeating pattern, one that allows the creation
of meaning out of randomness. In this sense, the term can be applied to a variety of cases,
whether describing a pattern of a pre-existing series of events or prescribing definite
behavioural patterns.

Twining and Miers have observed that
‘[o]ne reason why the notion of ‘rule’ is such an important one not only in law, but in fields as
varied as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, education, psychology and philosophy, is that there

102

Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds) The Oxford Dictionary of English (revised edition)
(Oxford University Press, 2005) rule noun (30 September 2010) Oxford Reference Online <http://
www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e67302>
103 Julia Cresswell, Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins (Oxford University Press), rule (30 Septmeber
2010) Oxford Reference Online <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?
subview=Main&entry=t292.e4271>
35

is hardly any aspect of human behaviour that is not in some way governed or at least guided by
rules; indeed there are some kinds of acts, such as pawning in chess, that can be said to be
constituted by rules, in the sense that act could not even be conceived of without the rules. 104

There appears to be an immediate dichotomy between descriptive rules - rules that describe preexisting patterns, whether of human behaviour or relating to the physical world - and
prescriptive ones - rules that dictate patterns that do not exist before and without the rules that
determine them. The concept of rules can be further differentiated between rules that apply to
human behaviour, that is social rules, and rules that do not (for examples, mathematical rules).

For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of rules represents the fundamental building block
upon which to construct any further analysis of other related terms, such as norms and laws. A
rule, then, is the epistemological instrument used to create the categories of human experience,
whether in ordering the randomness of events in a coherent framework or in prescribing a series
of behavioural patterns. Therefore, all societies and cultures are intrinsically defined by a series
of social rules and could not exist without them. As Roberts has observed, ‘[s]ome degree of
order and regularity must be assured if social life in any community is to be sustained.’ 105 Rosen
further explains:
this categorizing capacity - the key feature of the concept of “culture” - was not something that
happened after we became human but something that preceded our present speciation ... Culture this capacity for creating the categories of our experience - has ... several crucial ingredients. As a
kind of categorizing imperative, cultural concepts traverse the numerous domains of our lives economic, kinship, political, legal - binding them to one another. Moreover, by successfully
stitching together these seemingly unconnected realms, collective experience appears to the
members of a given culture to be not only logical and obvious but immanent and natural. 106

In this passage Rosen also introduces two important issues connected to the necessary existence
of a regulatory system in any given society or culture. Firstly, this regulatory system transcends
the boundaries of explicitly formalised rules, resulting in an interconnectedness of a number of
elements that are today the realm of exploration of apparently independent disciplines.
Secondly, the vast majority of these elements are not immediately known or apparent to the
members of each particular society or culture, with the result that they are often considered as
immanent and unquestionable premises.
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As the concept of rule is the reference for the subsequent definition of the terms norm and law,
it is also necessary to draw attention to the systemic nature of rules. Indeed, as Twining and
Miers have noted ‘[i]t is usually artificial ... to talk of single rules, for most rules belong to some
agglomeration. Like problems, rules cumulate and aggregate: unlike problems there are often
cogent reasons for treating rules as an integral part of some larger system.’107 As rules do not
exist in isolation but are, rather, integrated - with varying degrees of consistency - with other
rules, it is more appropriate to speak of systems of rules, and, consequently of normative
systems (or systems of norms) and of legal systems (or systems of laws):
How far is it feasible, sensible or desirable to think and talk of systems of rules is one of the
perennial problems of legal theory. On one view, a legal system is an internally consistent,
‘gapless’ body of rules within which it is theoretically impossible for two rules to be in conflict. At
its extreme, the notion of ‘system’ is taken literally; logical consistency is a prime value and
rigorous logical analysis is the main, perhaps the only, tool for resolving doubts in interpretation. It
is the role of the ‘legal scientist’ to create and maintain this consistent, systemic quality.108

The second term often used in the discourse on legal pluralism and legal comparison is that of
norm. The etymological root of the Latin word norma, meaning ‘pattern’, ‘standard’ is the same
as the English word normal.109 ‘A norm is a rule for behaviour, or a definite pattern of
behaviour, departure from which renders a person liable to some kind of censure.’110 ‘In
sociology a norm is ‘a shared expectation of behaviour that connotes what is considered
culturally desirable and appropriate.’ 111 Most definitions of the term seem to indicate the nature
of the concept as a synonym for social rule, emphasising its application to social patterns of
behaviour that are expected, or, in other words, normal, in any given social arena. In this sense,
the phrase normative relations used above to define both society and culture, is adopted to
describe the whole system of social rules (that is of all repeating patterns, descriptive as well as
prescriptive) that define any specific society and culture.
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The English word law derives its origin from the Latin lex, the etymology of which is a subject
of controversy. Some authorities derive it from the Old Norse lög, neuter plural of lag, meaning
‘to put in order’, ‘put in place’, while others derive it from the Latin legere, ‘to read’, thus
giving it an exclusively Latin origin. 112 The term was used by Romans to indicate a series of
normative protocols possessing a particularly stringent and authoritative nature which identified
them as above and apart from all other social rules and norms.113
The word lex followed by a personal name in the feminine gender (Lex Julia, Lex Papia Poppæa)
signified, in Roman Law, a lex rogata, i.e. a legislative enactment that was the outcome of an
interrogation (from rogare) by the magistrate of the Roman people: the magistrate proposed the
law to the citizens, and they declared their acceptance. The law was called by the family name of
the author or authors of the proposal. 114

Since its early use, the term has been connected to institutional and procedural elements.
However, already in Roman times the term was also used to indicate the most important and
relevant normative structures of the peoples encountered or conquered by Romans (leges
barbarorum, ‘barbarian laws’). The term carries two interconnected and yet different meanings.
On the one hand, one meaning is connected to specific social rules, that is, specific norms
constructed within a specific theoretical, institutional and procedural framework. On the other
hand, another less defined and definable meaning refers to a set of rules that stand above all
other rules. This second meaning becomes apparent in the usage of the term for rules
(descriptive patterns) coming from the realm of the physical sciences: the laws of physics, the
law of gravity, etcetera. The term law thus combines a multiplicity of meanings, giving rise to
potential theoretical contradictions.

To conclude this introduction to some of the key theoretical concepts and terms in this thesis,
the term rule refers to the epistemological tool with which order can be identified and, or,
created. Social rules, or norms, refer to rules that apply specifically to human interactions,
hence the reference within the definitions of society and culture to a set of normative relations.
Moreover, normative relations are intrinsically essential to the possibility of existence of a
society or culture. The term law is much more complex and challenging to define univocally.
For present purposes, it refers to a specific set of normative relations, whether precisely
identified within a specific theoretical, institutional and procedural structure, or as a reference to
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a set of norms that are perceived as of superior importance in relation to all other norms,
regardless of whether they are identified with and within that structure. With these definitions in
mind, it is now possible to introduce the discourse on legal pluralism.
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CHAPTER TWO
LEGAL PLURALISM

Intrinsic to the idea of society and, or, of culture, then, is the idea of regulatory mechanisms, of
social rules otherwise articulated as normative regulatory mechanisms or protocols, as identified
above. The term protocol is the one chosen in this thesis in order to focus attention on
identifiable mechanisms capable of comparison. Moreover, the term has a more neutral
connotation than rules, norms or laws, as well as models.

I. LEGAL PLURALISM
All societies and all cultures are defined by very specific regulatory protocols. Even more than
an observable fact, this is an inevitable epistemological premise to the notions of society and
culture. However, this does not yet answer the question of whether all societies and cultures
possess legal protocols; that is, whether law is a universal phenomenon or not (and
consequently whether different laws are indeed comparable). The question has two immediate
consequences. If law is indeed a universal phenomenon, one shared - albeit in different forms by all human groups, then what is the distinguishing factor (or factors) that set legal protocols
apart from all other social regulatory ones? If, on the other hand, law is a culturally specific
concept, then what definition is appropriate for the task of identifying the boundaries of what is
law and what is not?

Traditional legal positivism asserts that only positive laws exist. Laws are made, or chosen, by
legislators and law-makers (including judges in the common law tradition). 1 They do not exist,
awaiting discovery, before a law‐making act occurs. The distinction between laws and non‐laws
is a question of judging whether the source of a rule is or is not an entity (or an institution) with
the authority to determine any regulatory protocol as a legal one. In John Austin’s version of
legal positivism laws are simply the commands of a sovereign - a person or institution whose
general commands are habitually obeyed by the bulk of a reasonably numerous population.2 A
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more complex version of legal positivism is offered by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law
(1961).3 Hart characterises law as ‘a system of rules’:
The most basic type of rules are primary rules which impose rights and obligations and which
include the criminal law. Secondary rules stipulate how primary rules are ‘formed, recognized,
modified or extinguished’. A system is identified by its ‘rule of recognition’ that defines its legal
status. A rule of recognition is, in effect, a definition of what Austin called a sovereign. 4

Dissatisfaction with positivistic conceptions of law can be traced to early twentieth century legal
scholarship. Eugen Ehrlich, in his Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, published in 1913,
lamented ‘the tragic fate of juristic science’ being devoted exclusively to ‘state law’ and went on
to identify law with associations in the social world at all levels, including the factory and the
family.5

The label legal pluralism firstly appears in Franz von Benda‐Beckmann's

Rechtspluralismus in Malawi, published in 1970, immediately followed by Gilissen’s Le
Pluralisme Juridique, published in 1971, and rapidly came into common use among
comparative legal scholars. 6 The term is used in direct opposition to legal centralism, the phrase
used to describe the positivistic idea of law which states that only the law of the state can be
identified as law.

Before we begin to examine legal pluralism, there is the preliminary question of how we should
conceptualise heterogeneity generally in the social world. Scholars have talked about
‘pluralism’ and the ‘local’ in very different ways: as fields, arenas, domains, regions, discourses,
systems, and orders.7 Each of these terms has a particular resonance for one or more strands of
modern social theory, now complicated by the uncertain currents of post‐modernism. Legal
pluralism presupposes a distinctive way of thinking about norms and about social space as being
made up of a number of co‐existing, more‐or‐less discrete compartments. Adopting this
conceptualisation, two questions are immediately posed: how can we best view the relationship
between these different orders; and where should the boundary of the legal be fixed?
3
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Legal positivism and legal centralism posit that only the positive laws of the state exist.
Scholars like Sacco, on the other hand, suggest that law ‘is “always” somewhere in the
picture’.8 Sacco argues that law has always existed in the social world, well before men aspired
to be ‘kings’, at a time when no institutions of domination had been developed.

9

‘[T]his early

moment of law’s existence even preceded the discoursive formulation of cosmology, before
people had started to talk about how the world was and ought to be’.10 Indeed, Sacco claims that
‘we need to trace the origins of the basic structures of law from beyond the recent past covered
by conventional legal history’.11 In his Introduzione al Diritto Comparato, published in 1992, 12
he proceeds to identify and deconstruct the most topical moments in history connected with the
elements that are (falsely, he explains) considered essential to the western contemporary concept
of law and, more importantly, without which law wouldn’t be possible.

Firstly, Sacco challenges the idea that law, in order to exist, needs a legislator, or a law-maker,
by pointing to the origin of the common law legal tradition rooted in a series of judicial
processes that did not require the intervention of any legislative figure or process. Secondly, he
deconstructs the idea that law intrinsically requires any jurist; that is, any professional or
institutional figure of legal practitioners (lawyers, judges et cetera). His examples involve both
the Chinese empire and the most classical Roman legal tradition.13 Furthermore, he provides
examples of historical documents that refer to legal traditions where writing was not present,
showing that law can exist, and has indeed been formulated as law, expressly so, even in the
absence of writing. Following from this point, Sacco then compares diffused-power societies
and centralised-power societies, 14 identifying the existence of law within both categories, and
supporting his argument with the example of European international law (operating well before
the creation, in 1919 and in 1945, respectively of the League of Nations and of the UN). Sacco’s
analysis shows that law as an expressly defined historical phenomenon (that is, one that has
been expressly acknowledged by specific societies within their cultural boundaries) has existed
8 Simon Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing Law Without the State’ (2005) 68 Modern Law
Review 1, 5.
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in the absence of the fundamental pillars often quoted as essential to the idea of law: a
centralised form of power, a law-making power (whether a legislative body making laws or a
judiciary ‘identifying’ the law), specialised and specifically institutionalised legal roles and,
finally, writing. Sacco then theorises that the existence of law can be posited in the absence of
institutions (that is, of specific roles expressly dedicated to a specific, legal function, as shown
by the Roman example) and even of language (that is, of an expressly verbalised form). 15

The significance of Sacco’s analysis is not only, as Roberts suggests, that ‘[it] involves an
enormous claim: that there never was a pre-legal social world’,16 but more importantly that law
is a phenomenon that historically transcends the boundaries that are traditionally connected with
its definition, permeating all social structures to a much deeper and all-pervasive extent. Sacco
does not explicitly suggest any specific definition of law as a result of his analysis and remains
silent on the question of how the boundaries of the legal should be defined. 17 His analysis
becomes transformed into a specific epistemological premise, one that allows for a comparative
analysis of all regulatory system across all societies and cultures.

Although extremely valuable, Sacco’s analysis does not offer a comprehensive theoretical
framework for the concerns of this thesis. Specifically, it does not provide a basis for
distinguishing between legal and non-legal social regulatory protocols. It does, however, offer
support to the assertion that the state cannot claim a conceptual monopoly over the law as a
defined phenomenon. How then did the state get to claim that monopoly, and what are the
counter-arguments to such a claim? Anne Griffiths provides a very clear and concise answer to
the first question:
authority became centralised in the form of the state, represented through government, the most
visible manifestation of which is the legislature. Law formed part of this process of government
but was set apart from other government agencies, having its own specific institutions, such as
courts and legal personnel who required specialist training. Law was conceived as gaining its
authority from the state ... This authority, at its most basic level, was upheld through the power to
impose or enforce sanctions. While associated with government, law was at the same time able to
develop relative autonomy both from the state and from society through the existence of its own
15
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institutions, which dealt exclusively with legal matters. Legal activity became set apart from other
forms of social and religious activity, not just in terms of institutions, but also through the
language that accompanied this development, which reinforced the need for specialist personnel.
In this way law became established as a self-validating system, a system whose validity, authority,
and legitimacy rely no longer on any external source such as morality or religion, but rather on
internal sources which are self-referential for it regulation and perpetuation. These sources include
written texts embodied in statutes and cases. They acquire recognition and derive authority
through the institutional domain that gave rise to them, namely, legislatures and courts, as well as
through the personnel, judges and lawyers, who are instrumental to their creation. The rules
generated from these sources are ‘legal’ rules which are set apart from those rules created from
other sources. 18

Rouland, in his Legal Anthropology, 19 has provided an excellent reconstruction of the response
to this centralisation of law:
[t]hus conceived, the science of law could advance only through leaving by the wayside all those
societies which were then classified as ‘primitive’, if not ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’. For, if it has been
difficult for legal theorists to define their own societies, one can readily understand why they have
not tried to tackle - save by excluding them - societies which differ from their own. The existence
of the state fortunately furnished them with a strong alibi, transforming their ignorance into
prejudice: law could thrive only under the influence of the state ... The syllogistic identification of
the law with the state thus relegated non-state societies to the shadowy status of primitiveness, or
pre-state formation.20

It should come as no surprise, then, that the initial discourse on legal pluralism originated at the
height of the colonial enterprise during the nineteenth century.

In 1748, Montesquieu had already begun to reject the fixed attitude of his contemporaries
toward law, considering it instead a changeable entity, varying according to society, time and
place.21 Moreover, and more importantly for this thesis, ‘[i]n common with some legal
anthropologists today, he believed that the close relationship between law and society militated
against the transfer of law from one society to another, unless the societies were themselves
similar’. 22 It is during the colonial period, however, that authors began to talk of legal pluralism
using a varied terminology: comparative jurisprudence, legal palaeontology, legal archeology
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and finally, with Post’s work, Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz, published in 1893,
legal ethnology.23 Contemporary to this is the birth of legal sociology, that is the exploration of
law as a social phenomenon. Early theorists, of whom Durkheim was the leading figure, wished
to discover what held society together, focussing on the social function of law as a mechanism
for the maintenance of order.24 Malinowski’s Crime and Custom in Savage Society, published in
1926, 25 explicitly broke with the evolutionary studies of ‘primitive law’ that proliferated from
the mid‐nineteenth century, exploring the elaborate networks of reciprocal economic obligation
that, he argued, ensured compliance with core normative understandings among the
Trobrianders. His work has been acknowledged as beginning the discipline of legal
anthropology26, together with the equally significant work of Llewllyn and Hoebel, The
Cheyenne Way, published in 1941.27

In 1926 Malinowski had already advanced the idea that within a single society several legal
systems could interact, but didn’t develop the idea any further. 28 As Engle Merry has pointed
out, ‘[s]ocial scientists (primarily anthropologists) were interested in how ... peoples maintained
social order without European law,’29 giving birth to what she defined as ‘classic legal
pluralism’; that is, the analysis of the intersections of Indigenous regulatory systems and
European law. The general definition of legal pluralism can be traced back to this initial
analysis: ‘a situation in which two or more legal system coexist in the same social field’.30

Although very generic and open to a number of immediate critiques (it lacks a definition of
what a legal system is and it assumes that multiple regulatory practices can be identified as law
23
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without establishing definite parameters for doing so), this classic version of legal pluralism
initiated a re-thinking of the monistic view of the law of the state as the only possible (or valid)
law.
State law is itself [seen as] plural: it contains procedures for establishing facts, general substantive
rules that guide citizen action, enforcement of judgements, provisions for physical punishment,
modes of appeal, insurance against loss, ideological and symbolic dimensions, and the ability to
provide a degree of private ordering through facilitative laws. Law and legal institutions mean
different things to different people.31

Against this argument, however, John Griffiths remarks that, given that the law of the state,
even in its apparent plurality, represents a single theoretically consistent legal order, legal
pluralism can only be said to exist where non-state law and state law coexist. 32

Authors began to identify European medieval societies as intrinsically and richly pluralist:33
The mid-to-late medieval period was characterised by a remarkable jumble of different sorts of
law and institutions, occupying the same space, sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary,
and typically lacking any overarching hierarchy or organisation. These forms of law included local
customs (often in several versions, usually unwritten); general Germanic customary law (in code
form); feudal law (mostly unwritten); the law merchant or lex mercatoria - commercial law and
customs followed by merchants; canon law of the Roman Catholic Church; and the revived Roman
law developed in the universities. Various types of courts or judicial forums coexisted: manorial
courts; municipal courts; merchant courts; guild courts; church courts and royal courts. Serving as
judges in these courts were, respectively, barons or lords of the manor, burghers (leading city
residents), merchants, guild members, bishops (and in certain cases the pope), and kings or their
appointees. Jurisdictional rules for each court, and the laws to be applied, related to the persons
involved - their status, descent, citizenship, occupation or religion - as well as to the subject matter
at issue ... Things were even more complicated in cities with Jewish populations or on the Iberian
Peninsula following the Muslim invasion, for Jews and Muslims had their own comprehensive
bodies of law, yet they interacted with one another and with Christians. 34

That European legal history was marked by an intense plurality of coexisting and competing
laws became an established fact in legal history. Rouland has shed even more light on the nature
of this medieval example of legal pluralism:
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[f]ollowing the breakup of the Roman Empire, the barbarian kingdoms that took its place nearly all
proclaimed laws which were to form compilations with their own particular characteristics: each
individual was subject to the law of his people. With the gradual merging of peoples, law, in the
middle ages, once more became territorial, yet it remained diverse in character. Customs were
locally based, whilst legal pluralism was a logical consequence of social ranking ... These legal
systems, whose existence and validity were well recognised (though less and less as the monarchic
state grew in influence), applied different rules to the same legal situation ... Gradually, the
monarchy eroded this legal and judicial pluralism, but was never able to eliminate it completely.’ 35

These examples show very clearly that the initial analytical scope of ‘classic’ legal pluralism,
focussed on the dichotomy of colonial states and colonised societies, was soon enlarged well
beyond these boundaries. As Woodman points out, legal pluralism expanded from a concept that
referred to the relations between colonised and coloniser to relations between dominant and
subordinate groups and unofficial forms of ordering located either in social networks or
institutions. 36 Scholars of legal pluralism were concerned not merely with the coexistence of
different legal protocols within the same social or geographical space, but with their specific
interactions. As Tamanaha has observed: ‘[w]hat makes pluralism noteworthy is not merely the
fact that there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there
is diversity amongst them. They make competing claims of authority.’ 37 Furthermore, as Engle
Merry explains, ‘[l]egal pluralism not only posits the existence of multiple legal spheres, but
develops hypotheses concerning the relationships between them.’38

The concept of legal pluralism, then, extends well beyond the co-existence of colonial and precolonial regulatory systems within the colonial boundaries. Colonial experience had forced
colonial state law to deal with local ‘customs’ in a variety of way but always to acknowledge the
social authority of such customs. As Anne Griffiths explains, the theoretical shift in the
conceptualisation of legal pluralism is from a ‘recognition of differing legal orders within the
nation-state, to a more far reaching and open-ended concept of law that does not necessarily
depend on state recognition for its validity.’ That is because ‘[o]n the one hand, state law defines
the conditions under which legal pluralism is said to exist. On the other, its centrality is
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displaced by the recognition that state law may be only one of a number of elements that give
rise to a situation of legal pluralism.’ 39

The simple dichotomy between state law and non-state law became restrictive in this new,
expanded conceptual context, as the debate over terminology shows. If the terms used to define
state law are relatively uniform and straightforward (law, state law, lawyers’ law, official law,
bourgeois legality), names used for non state law are much more problematic. The initial
distinction between law and custom is deconstructed by Diamond, as reported by Griffiths,
rejecting the notion that custom is a form of primitive law that will gradually develop into state
law.40 The proposed term folk law was equally problematic.41 The problem is not simply one of
terminology; rather, it stems from a deeper conceptual level. ‘Why is it so difficult to find a
word for nonstate law? It is clearly difficult to define and circumscribe these forms of
ordering.’42

This new perspective on law began, toward the end of the twentieth century, a new and distinct
period in the discourse on legal pluralism. John Griffiths43 defined these two separate and
distinct phases as ‘weak’ legal pluralism (a term that is identified with Merry’s definition of
‘classic’ legal pluralism), whereby the earlier comparative work dealt with Indigenous law as a
counterpoint to European colonial legal systems, and ‘strong’ legal pluralism, where it is
recognised that legal pluralism exists in all societies, ‘that is, that there are multiple forms of
ordering that pertain to members of a society that are not necessarily dependent upon the state
for recognition of their authority.’44 In this second phase, the focus of the discourse shifted
toward the definition of the boundaries of the legal.

Vanderlinden initially suggested that societies undergo processes of ‘de-pluralisation’; that is,
processes whereby societies tend toward normative homogeneity.45 According to Rouland, the
process of de-pluralisation is in fact an imperfect process, as homogeneity can never be
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achieved and a degree of pluralism is always present in all societies.46 This suggests that the
degree of plurality is never constant, and that processes of homogenisation coexist with varying
degrees of pluralism.

In 1971 Pospisil advanced the theory of the ‘levels of law’, arguing that law is and has been
universally present in human society (stating that rule derived from authoritative decision
represents the form of law) and that every society consists of hierarchically arranged diverse
subgroups, each one possessing its own separate legal system. 47 Legal systems are thus
organised in a hierarchy of subgroups more or less stratified and more or less coordinated, with
no qualitative difference between different legal systems.

Sally Falk Moore’s popular theory of the ‘semi-autonomous social field’, first articulated in
1973, replaced the previous concept of ‘subgroup’ and introduced the idea of horizontal (that is,
not hierarchical, pluralism):48
The semi-autonomous social field is defined, and its limits identified, not by its type of
organization (it may be perhaps an organization, perhaps not) but by a character of a processual
type residing in the fact that it gives birth to norms and by constraint or incentives ensures their
application. The space within which a certain number of corporate groups are in relation one to
another constitutes a semi-autonomous social field. A large number of fields of this type may be
connected one to another in such a way that they form complex chains, in the same way as the
networks of social relations which link individuals may be compared to chains which have no end.
The interdependent connection of a large number of semi-autonomous social fields constitutes one
of the fundamental characteristics of complex societies. 49

As noted earlier, John Griffiths has observed that two different kinds of legal pluralism exist:
the one tolerated by the state and the one that escapes the control of the state.50 In his view, only
the second one is authentic. Chiba redefined and re-articulated the distinction between official
and non-official law, identifying several ‘levels’ of law (albeit in a different sense than the one
proposed by Pospisil).51 Geertz, in his Local Knowledge, developed an interpretive view of legal
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pluralism, studying law as a system of symbols, of meanings, a cultural code for interpreting the
world, a means of imagining and articulating what we want the social world to be like.52 In
Toward a New Common Sense, Santos defined law as ‘a body of regularized procedures and
normative standards, considered justicable in any given group, which contributes to the creation
and prevention of disputes, and to their settlement through an argumentative discourse, coupled
with the threat of force.’ 53

A number of critiques have been directed at this ‘strong’ legal pluralism. Carbonnier had already
attacked in 1972 ‘the great illusion of pluralism. It purports to have filmed the combat between
two legal systems; but all we see is a legal system at grips with the shadow of an opponent.’ 54
Legal pluralism, particularly the ‘strong’ version of legal pluralism, the one that challenges the
traditional definition of law given by traditional legal theory, indeed presents a fundamental
problem: in order to define the boundaries of the legal, legal systems need to be somehow
identified a priori. It is impossible to define the boundaries of the legal without firstly defining
the concept of law, yet any definition of law refers to the broader cultural and social normative
system in which law is to be found. The potentially tautological problem has been provocatively
identified by Engle Merry: ‘[w]hen do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply
describing social life? Is it useful to call all these forms of ordering law?’ 55

Law and culture are thus seen to be inextricably interlinked. The relationship between law and
culture has been elegantly described by Rosen:
law is so inextricably entwined in culture that, for all its specialized capabilities, it may, indeed,
best be seen not simply as a mechanism for attending to disputes or enforcing decisions, not solely
as articulated rules or as evidence of differential power, and not even as the reification of personal
values or superordinate beliefs, but as a framework for ordered relationships, an orderliness that is
itself dependent on its attachment to all the other realms of its adherents’ lives. Different societies
may play up one or another institution as a vehicle for creating and exhibiting this sense of order ...
but nowhere is law (in this sense of ordered relationships) without its place within a system that
gives meaning to people’s life. 56

The problem in describing law as intrinsically entwined with culture, however, is that its
boundaries become indefinite. As Roberts points out,
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[i]f we give too much space to cosmology, we lose sight of the really interesting questions
surrounding the specific contexts in which discursive formulation takes place and the manner in
which we should interpret the presence of such formulations ... while we can think about law just
in terms of normative order that does not tell us enough about it. 57

Tamanaha suggests that any attempt to define law for scientific purposes falls into one of two
basic categories.58 The first approach, pioneered by Malinowski, defines law in terms of the
maintenance of normative order (the set of normative relations identified above as intrinsic to
the very notion of society) within a social group. Since every social group has, by definition, a
set of normative regulatory mechanisms, then it follows that every social group has law.
Tamanaha agrees with Falk Moore that ‘the conception of law that Malinowski propounded was
so broad that it was virtually indistinguishable from the study of the obligatory aspect of all
social relationships.’ 59 The second approach, propounded by Weber and Hoebel, defines law in
terms of public institutionalised enforcement of norms. The main problem with this approach is
that many institutions enforce norms and, ‘as there is no uncontroversial way to distinguish
which are ‘public’ and which are not, [that] runs the danger of swallowing all forms of
institutionalised norm enforcement under the label law.’ 60 As some societies historically lacked
any form of institutionalised norm enforcement, then not all societies would have possessed
law (as stated by Hart about ‘primitive societies’). 61 Moreover, Tamanaha indicates that both of
the categories he identifies are
‘oriented toward law in functional terms - in that both revolve around the maintenance of social
order - ... [t]he former category focuses on the norms and mechanisms embodied within ordered
behaviour itself; the latter category focuses on institutional responses to the disruption of ordered
behaviour.’ 62

Teubner’s autopoietic approach to legal pluralism echoes Tamanaha’s critiques. Teubner
‘recognized two basic flaws of legal pluralist attempts to define law: their inability to
distinguish law from other kinds of social norms, and the limiting effect of defining law in terms
of a single function.’ 63 In order to overcome these two flaws, he adopts what he defines as the
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‘linguistic turn’: ‘[l]egal pluralism is then defined no longer as a set of conflicting social norms
in a given social field but as a multiplicity of diverse communication processes that observe
social action under the binary code of legal/illegal.’64

Tamanaha has provided the most articulate critique of current legal pluralism, partially in line
with Teubner’s autopoietic criterion for defining law.65 His critique originates from the
observation that ‘the dominant approach to legal pluralism contains two essentialists
assumptions: it assumes that law consists of a singular phenomenon which can be defined, and
it assumes that law is by nature functional.’ 66 After critiquing the functionalist approach,
Tamanaha’s main argument attempts to deconstruct what he identifies as the ‘essentialist’
approach that has informed the entire discourse on legal pluralism; that is, the attempt to find an
essential definition of law that can be applied equally to an indefinite variety of diverse social
phenomena. In rejecting the ‘essentialist’ approach as intrinsically unable to distinguish law
from other forms of normative regulation, he suggests what he describes as a ‘conventionalist’
approach, which resembles Teubner’s autopoietic definition: ‘[l]aw is whatever people identify
and treat through their practices as ‘law’ (or recht, or droit, etc.).’ 67

Although successful in identifying the intrinsic and inescapable problems of any essentialist
approach, Tamanaha’s suggestion also presents some problems. First of all, it is tautological and
circular in nature, in that it relies on a discursive self-representation of a specific social
phenomenon as law, a self-representation that is itself based on a category identified as law.
Consequently, if such a category is absent in any social discursive landscape, then it follows that
that specific society doesn’t have law, thus confirming Hart’s view presented above, limiting
law to the societies that make an explicit claim to it. The main problem with this argument is not
so much that it leads to claims of monopoly of a phenomenon identified as law by some
societies, but that such a claim is predicated on the assumption that the normative, social
regulatory phenomenon of law is superior to all other normative systems. Inasmuch as law is
above all other normative orders within the cultural boundaries of any specific society, it can be
easily inferred that such superiority extends to all other normative orders outside of that society
that are not self-represented in comparable terms of law.
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According to Tamanaha’s distinction, all legal pluralist approaches are based either on an
essentialist approach or on a conventionalist approach. For the purpose of this thesis and in
order to overcome the problems and tautologies presented in this chapter, I suggest instead the
adoption of an operative approach to legal pluralism that rejects both the essentialist and the
conventionalist approaches, while at the same time maintaining their fundamental constructions.
I will refer to this approach as analytical pluralism, an approach which is both comparative and
relative. Rather than asking if law is a phenomenon present in all societies and cultures, I
suggest to formulate the question differently: is it possible to talk about law in regards to all
societies and cultures, regardless of whether law is or is not a feature common to all societies
and cultures?

II. ANALYTICAL PLURALISM
To claim that law is simply a modern construct is both imprecise and prone to political bias. On
the one hand, such a claim can be used to justify an apparently irreconcilable distance between
legal and non-legal normative orders (however the legal is defined). Such a distance can, in
turn, justify or support imperialistic actions. Even though no express claim of superiority is
made, the general claim of exclusivity can lend itself to an exclusion of all normative orders that
are not consistent with it from all political debates. On the other hand, the claim is also
imprecise. Sacco has demonstrated the historical disconnection between the existence of law
and most of its alleged essential components. 68 Moreover, claiming an irreconcilable distinction
between legal and non-legal normative orders fails to explain the functional equivalence of
normative orders in areas commonly connected to the realm of law, such as maintenance of
order and settlement of disputes. This is even more apparent in regards to societies that have
successfully performed these functions prior to the arrival of colonial law (apparently ‘without’
law), with the result that interactions, clashes and exchanges between pre-colonial normative
orders (however defined) and colonial legal orders performing identical functions are not
properly considered.

In Chapter One, I argued that the idea that every society and culture possess a series of
regulatory mechanisms is intrinsic to the very concept of society and culture. That multiple
regulatory mechanisms co-exist within each society is also intuitive. However, the recognition
of this normative pluralism (both among distinct societies and internally) does not automatically
imply the existence of legal pluralism. That the world is legally plural is, of course, a certainty.
Independent, state-derived legal systems are grouped in distinct families (common law, civil
law, islamic law et cetera), attesting to the fact that, at least on a global scale, the international
arena is legally pluralistic. Moreover, considering the entire planet as the territorial expanse, the
68
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co-existence of legal systems within the same geographical space (such as the planet) becomes a
fact rather than an assumption. It follows that it is possible to theorise legal systems as separate
from their territorial isolation and independence. The problem of identifying the boundaries of
the legal, however, is complicated when these distinct and yet co-existing legal systems and
families have distinct definitions of what law is.

Furthermore, the distinction between legal and non-legal is a fact in a number of societies and
cultures, at least insofar as the distinction is expressly stated. However, any universal distinction
between the legal and non-legal is not to be found in the jurisprudential and doctrinal selfdefinitions of any particular legal systems, as the existence of distinct legal systems denies the
universality of such definitions. Nor can it be found in the content of any specific rule: legal
rules often regulate behaviour that was previously legally unregulated and vice versa. The form,
the institutionalisation and the processes of norms are also insufficient to explain the difference
satisfactorily, as Sacco’s analysis of the history of western law has shown.

The problem is circular in nature. Any identification of law rests on the assumption that, even
though any a priori existing definition of law is not universally valid, law exists as a
phenomenon (or better, as a plurality of phenomena). Yet, it is impossible to identify any legal
phenomena without the application of some a priori definition. The argument has two main false
assumptions: that law is a thing, and that the law is at least a culturally diverse (if not universal)
thing. I will argue shortly that rather than a thing, law is best considered a category of
knowledge. Firstly, however, I will consider again the three main approaches to legal pluralism
introduced in the previous section.

Legal positivism - the idea that law is conceptually limited to a series of institutionalised
positive rules - is flawed for a number of reasons. It is based on the existence of a priori criteria,
the fundamental elements of which have been proven unconvincing by Sacco’s analysis69 and
are not anyway universal. 70 It is based on the claim of monism, that the law is a coherent, selfreferential whole. This claim has been proven false by the analysis of the interaction (and
conflict) of diverse normative orders within the same legal culture, as identified by Falk
Moore’s theory of the semi-autonomous social fields and by Pospisil’s theory of the levels of
law.71 Centralism, another fundamental positivist assumption, has been proven as historically
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false by Sacco. Prescriptivism posits that law exists as a separate phenomenon from what it
prescribes, thus resting on the reification of law which I will deconstruct shortly.
Chirographism, the idea that law is expressed in a verbal form (generally written), has also been
proven false by Sacco. Legal positivism is therefore an unsatisfactory theory to explain
normative differences.

Of the two main approaches to legal pluralism suggested by Tamanaha,

72

essentialist

definitions rest on the need to provide a definition as an analytical a priori to be applied
universally to all observed social phenomena. Tamanaha has demonstrated the intrinsic
tautology of this approach, which is ultimately unable to distinguish the legal from the nonlegal. However, conventionalist definitions, of which Tamanaha himself is a proponent, are no
less tautological. Their self-referential autopoietic identificatory principle, that ‘[l]aw is
whatever people identify and treat through their practices as ‘law’ (or recht, or droit, etc.)’, 73 is
unable to explain the law-like nature of normative orders that lack such an autopoietic
definition. In other words, what if a social group doesn’t think in terms of law? Is it sufficient to
think in terms of regulatory orders? In this case, such an approach would revert to the same
essentialist tautology presented above. What conventionalist definitions have been able to do,
however, is to highlight the intrinsic cultural relativity of the concept of law, and yet its
transferability beyond the cultural boundaries from which it originates and within which it
operates.

Law is a culturally and historically defined concept, yet it transcends the boundaries of its
definitions and ‘law-like’ normative orders; that is, orders that are similar if not identical to it.
As law is a concept based on the underlying concept of social rules (or norms), and as
normative orders are universal to all societies and cultures, talking about law potentially
transcends the limits of any specific social group. Any specific definition of law appears to refer
to principles, functions and ideas embedded in different normative orders that are viewed as
universal, thus suggesting the possibility of speaking in terms of law in regards to all societies
and cultures, regardless of the identification of the concept within the cultural boundaries of any
specific society. Claims of cultural exclusivity of law appears to be unsatisfactory, yet extending
the concept to all social groups is equally problematic. The problem in trying to identify a
universal definition of law is circular and twofold. On the one hand, any existing definition is
based on cultural constructs, and it cannot exist outside and without such constructs. On the
other hand, there is the necessary attempt to identify a phenomenological definition that
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transcends any specific phenomenon, one that applies to observable phenomena and facts as
intrinsic to these very phenomena and facts and yet is independent of any cultural definition.

In this thesis, I suggest to abandon what I define as the phenomenological approach to law
common to the legal positivist and the legal pluralist perspectives presented above, and instead
to use what I define as a constructivist approach. In other words, both the essentialist and the
conventionalist perspectives on legal pluralism (and certainly legal positivism) rest on the idea
that law is an external, observable phenomenon, more or less defined - either internally or
externally - in terms of the legal. I suggest instead that law is a construct that describes,
prescribes and generally defines normative and social phenomena.74 As a construct, therefore, it
can be used as an analytical and comparative tool. Law is not the object to be observed but is
instead the analytical filter for the observation, or, more precisely, for the comparison.

I will call this approach analytical pluralism. Such an approach is both comparative and
relative. Legal pluralism is relative to the comparison, it is not an intrinsic attribute of certain
social phenomena that pre-exists the comparative analysis. This approach renounces any
pretence of absolutism - that is, the identification of an absolute definition of law - because any
such pretence is essentialist in nature. Legal pluralism is said to exist (or not to exist) as a
premise of the comparative analysis, rather than being the result of the comparison. Whether
law is a universal or a cultural phenomenon then becomes an irrelevant or incorrect question.
The theoretical definition of the legal is not the premise of any comparative or analytical work,
but the result of it. In this sense, this approach is one of operative legal pluralism: as a result of
the comparative effort, it is then possible to talk of law about all human cultures, regardless of
whether all cultures possess law or not.

This approach follows Geertz’s definition of law as symbolic system of meanings, of
categorising the world and articulating social expectations about it.75 Roderick McDonald, a
proponent of critical legal pluralism, has articulated law as ‘the endeavour of symbolising
human conduct interactions as governed by rules.’ 76 His approach has the advantage of not
excluding a priori any norm from potentially being considered law, while at the same time not
defining any normative order as necessarily and intrinsically legal. The definition of the legal is
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thus not the premise but the conclusion of the analysis. The underlying premise is that norms
(and therefore laws) are not facts and actions, they are hypotheses of and on facts and actions.

Norms (and laws) are not the interactions they describe or prescribe, they are instead categories
that either describe or prescribe social events. Norms and laws are thus theoretical constructs,
not social phenomena.77 As theoretical constructs, norms and laws are regulatory mechanisms.
They are not in themselves social interactions, they regulate social interactions. They might help
to win arguments, and they are certainly bound up in human interactions, but are not the
interactions themselves. They refer to interactive behaviour and they attempt to regulate it (that
is, to identify repeating and predictable patterns of behaviour) by using both descriptive and
prescriptive rules that form projections about future behaviour or retroactive sanctions of past
behaviour. It follows that social rules will guarantee the projected behaviour or that it will be
possible to rely on coercive power to retroactively enforce behaviour that has departed from
projected expectations. 78 Moreover, as conflict is an inevitable part of human interactions (based
on physical violence and, or, on coercive social pressure), law is bound up in conflict. In other
words, conflict is not the state to which law (as a social regulatory mechanism) is opposed but
merely another one of the interactions that it aims to regulate.

If norms and laws are not phenomena, but instead they are considered theoretical constructs,
then the analysis of the legal is not a definitory one but a constructive one, a creative one: it
creates the categories that ‘observe’ and regulate phenomena. 79 This premise is in line with F.
von Benda-Beckmann’s call for a ‘more rigorous attention to be paid to legal pluralism as an
analytical concept.’80 Any comparative analysis, consequently, is a creative analysis. Any predetermined universal binary code of legal/non-legal (more precise than Teubner’s legal/illegal)
is rejected, as it presupposes the objective existence (or absence) of a pre-existing phenomenon
identifiable or identified as law. If, however, law is not a phenomenon, not a thing but rather a
theoretical construct, then any comparative effort is relative in nature. It becomes valid not in
universal terms to uncover a pre-existing binary code of legal/non-legal as the premise of the
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comparison, but it creatively defines instead the boundaries of this binary code as the result of
the comparison. It does not ask whether law exists (or not) in all societies and in all cultures in a
plurality of forms, but whether it is possible to talk about law when talking about all societies
and all cultures.

This relative approach follows from the premise that the category of law does indeed exist as a
conceptual category in certain societies. As a result, it exists as the first term of comparison.
Any comparison requires at least two terms: what we compare ‘from’ and what we compare
‘to’. Law as a conceptual category can exist as the first term of comparison. The comparative
analysis is therefore done for the benefit of the first term of comparison - the conceptual
category of law that represents the ‘observer’ - in order to understand similar (or different) traits
of the ‘observed’ social reality. Legal pluralism is thus the result of the comparison, not its
premise; law is not a phenomenon but rather a conceptual construct belonging to the first term
of comparison (the one we are comparing from), to be used as a comparative analytical tool.
Law is not what is compared, but what is used as the parameter of the comparison and that can
be constructed as the result of the comparison.

What is compared within this approach, then? Not laws, but instead normative protocols, using
law as the parameter for the comparison. Legal pluralist research has proven that multiple
normative orders exist, both in separate societies and cultures and within each society and
culture itself. Even though the question of whether law is or is not universal has become
irrelevant, what is conceived as universal is this existence of normative orders within all social
groups. These normative orders do not have the same social relevance. Different levels of
relevance are always present.81 Moreover, normative orders are grouped together in more or less
coherent wholes, the most comprehensive grouping of them being defined as a separate culture.
The question of comparison then becomes the following: on what basis is it possible to compare
distinct normative orders belonging to distinct cultures?

Levi-Strauss suggested that
[i]f, as we believe, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms on content, and
if these forms are fundamentally the same for all minds, ancient or modern, primitive or
civilized ... it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each
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institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other
institutions and other customs, provided of course that the analysis is carried far enough. 82

Colonial examples show that multiple coexisting forms of social regulation co-exist and
overlap. Karl Llewllyn, in his ‘Law Jobs Theory’, has shown that not only distinct normative
orders possess ‘law-like’ qualities but also they share the same functions performed by law. 83
Different normative orders then compete for the same ‘space’. If rules are not directly
comparable, the fields in which they operate are. What is ‘law-like’ about all normative orders is
that they potentially share the same functions, goals or mechanisms. The first corollary of this
analytical pluralist approach is the principle of legal equivalence: normative orders can be
compared and identified as functionally, structurally or teleologically equivalent to the field
expressly covered by law.

To recapitulate this first element of comparison (what are we comparing ‘to’?), the premises of
this analysis are the following. Normative mechanisms are universally present throughout all
cultures and societies. A plurality of normative mechanisms coexist (with varying degrees of
integration, reciprocal influence and conflict) in the same geographical and, or, cultural space.
They are conceptual constructs84 that refer to interactive phenomena and they are intrinsically
connected to the entire cultural structure, including its specific ontological and political
premises. They are hierarchically related, in that some normative orders are reciprocally more
prominent than others.85 They exert varying degrees of reciprocal influence.86 They are not
necessarily articulated in rigid linguistic formulations and, or, in predetermined rules (they are
rather discussed and articulated throughout a direct process of negotiation). Some of these
normative orders are articulated with the binary code legal/non-legal. It is possible to compare
and discuss them in terms of a plurality of functionally, structurally or teleologically equivalent
normative orders. When compared using the binary code legal/non-legal, they can be discussed
in terms of legally equivalent normative mechanisms. It is therefore possible to identify specific
normative mechanisms (protocols) that are ‘law-like’ and that can be defined as legally relevant
as a result of the comparison rather than because of any positivist, essentialist or conventionalist
intrinsic and phenomenal legal nature. The question is not what the law is, but what is legally
relevant. Finally, this comparative approach is relative because the resulting plurality of legally
relevant protocols is not presented in essentialist terms but relatively to the specific comparison,
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with the result that it is measurable against the epistemological and teleological parameters of
the comparison itself.

Legal pluralist perspectives have generally rejected legal formalism as intrinsically contrary to
the very concept of pluralism. Instead, I suggest that legal formalism can support, rather than
hinder, any comparative analysis and it can reinforce rather than oppose a legally pluralist
perspective. Legal formalism sees law as incapsulated in specific forms, more or less rigidly
defined in linguistic terms, without which law as a concept becomes indistinguishable from
other non-legal normative mechanisms. Yet, at an ontological level the concept necessarily
transcends the forms that define it. Legal formalism is thus embraced not as an essentialist
definition of law, but rather as the analytical tool that allows the comparison, by clarifying the
conceptual construct that acts as the comparative filter. 87 Law, even in a formalistic sense, is a
construct - although not a purely abstract and self-referential one: it is intrinsically bound in
with the social interactions it describes and prescribes, thus being at the same time a
phenomenon and its theoretical description or prescription. As a comparative and analytical
tool, it offers the parameters to identify legally relevant normative protocols as a result of the
comparison. Rather than searching for an observable objective phenomenon defined as law, law
in a formalistic sense becomes the parameter to define the field of investigation.

Together with the epistemological perspective outlined, its teleological nature is equally
important. In other words, what is the reason for such a comparison, what is its goal? By
adopting this comparative perspective, it should be possible to identify what cultural protocols
are legally relevant. As a result, cultural elements that would be generally ignored as law, even
in a comparative sense, cannot be excluded from any legal analysis if they are identified as
legally relevant. It is not necessary to attempt to identify any cultural protocol as law in an
essentialist sense. The comparison highlights the intrinsic and inextricable cultural
interconnectedness of apparently independent cultural elements by showing their legal
equivalence and their consequent legal relevance. As a result, it is possible to measure the
impact that legal instruments articulated within a certain legal discourse (such as the Australian
common law) have on legally equivalent and relevant normative protocols. The central concern
of this thesis - examining the impact of native title on Indigenous legal protocols - will be
facilitated by the adoption of this perspective.
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This approach does not suggest abandoning the theoretically possibility of a definition of law, but rather
suggests that such a definition is by nature relative and should be constantly treated as such.
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CHAPTER THREE
COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

The comparative analysis presented in Chapter Two belongs to the discipline of legal
anthropology in that it requires a combined use of legal discourse and of social sciences. If law
offers the parameter for the comparison, ‘sociology is an explanatory activity ... [s]ociologists
look for patterns of behaviour in social life.’ 1 A specific methodology able to combine the legal
discourse with the social analysis must be introduced. This methodology is the necessary result
of the epistemological and teleological premise that has been presented in Chapter Two.

On the one hand, it is not possible to compare what is known with what is unknown: there must
always be a first ‘known’ and it will be then necessary to learn the ‘unknown’. On the other hand,
it is rare, if not impossible, that in this act of learning the ‘unknown’ a comparison with already
known law wouldn’t appear, even just in an elementary form, or as mere translation of concepts
and terms ... to compare, then, is to investigate a phenomenon (or a multiplicity of phenomena) by
comparing it with phenomena of the same nature. 2

Italian comparative writers are very aware of the reflective nature of the comparative effort, in
that any act of legal comparison primarily and initially clarifies the observer’s legal system
rather than the observed one. Rouland confirms this view: ‘the observer is not impartial and the
object of the observer’s gaze can be modified by his or her own vision: there is more than a little
truth in the saying that it is the ethnologist who is the first to undergo observation.’3 The
comparative process is ‘a process of knowledge almost circular, going from one term to another

1

John R Sutton, Law/Society (Sage, 2001) 7-9.

2 Giorgio Lombardi, Premesse al corso di diritto pubblico comparato (Giuffre’, 1986) 22-9. Translated
from the original: ‘da un lato non si puo’ comparare cio’ che si conosce con cio’ che non si conosce: vi
sara’ sempre un primo “noto” e bisognera’ quidni apprendere l’ignoto”. Dall’altro e’ difficile, se non
impossibile, che in quest’atto di apprendere l’ignoto non si inserisca, piu’ o meno emotivamente o
surrettiziamente, una comparazione con il diritto noto, sia pure elementare, o rozza, o come mera
traduzione di concetti e nomi ... comparare e’ dunque indagare un fenomeno (o una molteplicita’ di
fenomeni) raffrontandolo con fenomeni dello stesso ordine.’
3

Rouland, Norbert, Legal Anthropology (Philippe Planel trans, Athlone, 1994) 136 [trans of:
Anthropologie Juridique (first published 1988)].
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in order to return to the initial terms from which it began.’4 As a result, the observer should
abandon any pretence of absolute objectivity, both in the purpose of the research and in the
quest for an objective, essentialist representation of his analysis:
it is essential that any researcher, in describing what Di Robilant has defined as the ‘horizon of
knowledge’, describes clearly the premises, the starting points, of her observation, in order to
allow its users to measure the relations between the active object of the research and its passive
subject (the researcher herself). 5

I. FIRST TERM OF COMPARISON: THE LAW
Sacco suggests that any comparative analysis presupposes the use of a series of ‘models’ able to
define the systems analysed, the parameters of the comparison and the results obtained.6 A
comparative analysis, then, results in the translation of ‘models’ from one cultural discourse to
another. Such a process is relatively easy if the ‘models’ share an apparently similar nature, but
it becomes more difficult as the distance between cultural ontologies progresses. Formal,
verbalised and institutional rules become insufficient to satisfy the comparative effort. They
provide, however, together with jurisprudential principles, the necessary initial framework for
the comparison, the ‘first known’ suggested by Lombardi above.7

The initial question to be posed with the analytical pluralist approach is still ‘what is the law?’
The question, however, shifts from the object of the comparison to the initial referent of the
comparison itself. As law is used as the analytical tool for the comparison to occur, it is
necessary to establish very clearly its boundaries and parameters. In this sense, legal formalism
provides an excellent framework to begin with. The starting point is defined by the expressed
rules and principles that establish the field of analysis. Rules and jurisprudential principles,
however, are not themselves self-referential descriptors of normative behaviour. Their analysis
is in itself more complicated than it would appear by considering them at face value.

4

Gorla ‘Diritto Comparato’ in Enciclopedia del Diritto, vol XII (Giuffre’, 1964) 933 n 14. Translated
from the original: ‘un processo quasi circolare di conoscenza che va dall’uno all’altro termine, per
ritornare poi sui termini di partenza.’
5Alessandro

Pelizzon, Naupaqma. Il diritto tradizionale di famiglia nelle Ande (Universita’ degli studi di
Torino, 2004). Translated from the original: ‘E’ fondamentale che qualunque ricercatore, nel descrivere
quello che Di Robilant definisce orizzonte del sapere, l’obiettivo cioe’ della ricerca, descriva in maniera
altrettanto esplicita le premesse, i punti di partenza in un certo senso, della propria osservazione, per
permettere a chi ne usufruisce di misurare le relasioni intercorrenti tra l’oggetto attivo della ricerca ed il
suo soggetto passivo (il ricercatore, appunto).’
6

Rodolfo Sacco, Introduzione al Diritto Comparato (Utet, 5th ed,1992).

7

Lombardi, above n 2.
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Regular behaviour is not guaranteed by the sole existence of rules. Sutton asks,
[h]ow and why does legal behaviour departs from that prescribed by formal rules? In Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s terms, what is the relationship between “law in the books” and ‘law in
action”? If rules don’t predict behaviour, what does? ... The most interesting and significant forms
of discretionary behaviour in the legal system are collective, patterned, and remarkably stable over
time. 8

Moreover, he suggests that ‘[j]urisprudence is not very useful for explaining law, in part because
jurisprudence is an element of law’.9 Sutton’s suggestion shows the intrinsic inability of law,
intended as a self-referential system of rules designed to prescribe and regulate behaviour, to
explain any departure from the behaviour thus prescribed and regulated. Therefore, it is
necessary to integrate the study of law with the methodology and the study of social sciences:
‘[s]ociology is an explanatory activity ... Sociologists look for patterns of behaviour in social
life’.10

What legal rules are to be used as the comparative framework? In other words, what is it that is
compared? Sacco states that ‘comparison of a [legal] rule to a corresponding one from another
legal order, and the empirical analysis of their concordance or diversity, is probably as ancient
as the awareness of the legal datum.’ 11 His words suggest, firstly, that the history of comparison
has always focused on the comparison of specific rules and, secondly, that in the act of
comparison the identification of the rule to be compared has always been paramount. The
problem arises when a legal rule is to be compared with other rules that might or might not be
considered legal. The adoption of an analytical legal pluralist approach suggests that the
question regarding the legal nature (or lack thereof) of the rule to be observed is the result of the
comparison rather than the premise, focussing the attention on the delimitation of the legal rule
to be compared. Sacco indicates that
the method, the procedure with which the legal proposition is created, transmitted and diffused, the
influence of the people that create such proposition, the presence of organs and of facts of any kind
that can influence it, they are all of paramount importance to the comparativist, as they should be
for the territorial jurist. 12

8

Sutton, above n 1, 11.

9

Ibid, 7.

10

Ibid, 7-8.

11

Sacco, above n 6, 6.

12

Ibid, 18. In the original: ‘[i]l modo, il procedimento con cui si crea la proposizione giuridica, con cui
essa viene trasmessa e diffusa, il reclutamento delle persone che potranno influire nella creazione della
proposizione, la presenza di organi e fatti di qualsiasi genere, i quali possano influire nella creazione della
proposizione, tutto cio’ e’ di somma importanza per il comparatista, come dovrebbe essere importante per
il giurista territoriale.’
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The legal proposition - that is, any verbalised statement of law (whether of legislative or judicial
origin) - is obviously the initial element of ‘the law’ to be compared. Sacco’s theory of legal
models helps to contextualise such verbal, formal statements. A ‘legal model’ is the model that
provides a uniform and unified answer to any specific legal question, by referring to a plurality
of legal indicators that he defines as ‘formants‘ (in the original: ‘formanti’).13 He identifies five
different ‘formants’: ‘the legislative rule [the legal rule of legislative origin], the doctrinal rule,
the rule that can be extracted from doctrinal examples, the rules that courts express in maxims
[the legal rule of judicial origin] and the rules that the courts apply’. 14 Although clearly
influenced by fundamental legal categories typical of the civil law tradition, Sacco’s theory is
useful in suggesting that the analysis of any legal proposition requires an initial study of
multiple statements that need to be uniformly reconciled.

Rather than looking at any specific ‘law’ embodied in a single legal proposition, it is the
observance of ‘the law’ contained in this uniform legal model that matters. Sacco further
highlights this distinction by defining the abstract construction of such a legal model as the
‘genotype’ of law (or ‘super-abstract notion’), as opposed to the ‘phenotypes’ that are the
multiple embodiments of such model. Legislative rules, judgments, jurisprudential and doctrinal
principles must be combined in order to identify the legal model that forms the basis of the
comparative framework.15

The main issue with this approach, however, arises as soon as legal and normative orders with
diverging categories are compared. Parkinson is certainly right in stating that ‘[m]any of the
features of the western legal tradition are so familiar that it is tempting to see them as
universal.’16 It is indeed important to remember that the parameters invoked by and contained

13

Ibid, 43-63.

14

Ibid, 44. In the original: ‘la regola legale, la regola dottrinale, la regola che puo’ essere estratta dagli
esempi della dottrina, la regola che le corti enunciano nella massima e la regola che le corti applicano.’
15

Jurisprudence is defined as ‘[t]he theoretical analysis of legal issues at the highest level of abstraction.
Jurisprudence may be distinguished from both legal theory and the philosophy of law by its concern with
those questions (e.g. about the nature of a particular right or duty, or a particular line of judicial
reasoning) that arise within or are implied by substantive legal disciplines. Legal theory is often used to
denote theoretical enquiries about law “as such” that extend beyond the boundaries of law as understood
by professional lawyers ... Legal philosophy or the philosophy of law, as its name implies, normally
proceeds from the standpoint of the discipline of philosophy; that is, it attempts to unravel the sort of
problems that might concern moral or political philosophers, such as the concepts of freedom or
authority.’ in "jurisprudence n."Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law (Oxford
University Press, 2009) jurisprudence (21 October 2010) Oxford Reference Online <http://
www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t49.e2135>
16

Patrick Parkinson, Tradition and Change in Australian Law (Thomson, 3rd ed, 2005) 23.
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within any legal model are not universal, nor they should be assumed to be equally present in
other cultural contexts. Again, Sacco has been able to explain this point perfectly:
ancient Romans have given us a concept - ius - that we have inherited and proficiently used. This
category ius ... becomes diritto, droit, Recht, law, pravo etc. in different languages ... This
category, however, is not universal. Romans derived it by fusing together previously disparate
phenomena: fas, lex, ritus. In many culture, both ancient and modern, a category equivalent to ius
is missing ... examples are chinese fa and islamic shari’a. We consistently translate shari’a with
islamic law, but not all shari’a equates with our idea of law, nor only shari’a enters our category of
law. 17

Sacco’s passage highlights that a number of philosophical premises are often contained within
any legal model and assumed as universal, intrinsic, elements of law. With reference to the
paradigmatic work of Malinowski, Rouland has clarified even further the connection between
formal, institutional law and the whole of the cultural continuum:
Malinowski was the founder of a new theory, functionalism. Law did not reside solely in the
abstract principles of legal codes, but also in concrete phenomena, which could be understood by
direct observation. On the other hand his vision of society as a cultural system, whose component
parts were interconnected, led him to stress the dependence of law on other elements, biological or
cultural ... In attempting to define the field of law, we need to proceed beyond an analysis of the
discourse and practices of law to the perceptions and beliefs that underpin them. In any society law
must be considered as representing certain values and fulfilling certain functions ... Nevertheless,
law cannot be defined solely in terms of the perceptions and beliefs that are identified with it: law
extends beyond people’s perceptions of it. Consequently we must turn to intellectual constructs, to
the realm of theory, to determine the nature of law.18

Sacco has defined the cultural constructs that underpin any legal model, its hidden formants, as
‘cryptotypes’ (in the original, ‘crittotipi’): ‘Humans constantly apply rules of which they are not
completely aware, or that, at the least, they would be unable to formulate properly’.19 An
appropriate theoretical representation of the relationship between law and its cryptotypes has

17 Rodolfo Sacco, Antropologia Giuridica (Il Mulino, 2007) 222-3. Translated form the original: ‘gli
antichi romani ci hanno legato un concetto - ius - che noi abbiamo custodito e utilizzato con profitto.
questa categoria ius ... diventa diritto, droit, Recht, law, pravo ecc. a seconda della lingua dell’operatore ...
Ma questa categoria dello ius non e’ universale. I romani costruirono felicemente la categoria assorbendo
in essa fenomeni dapprima creduti disparati: il fas, la lex, il ritus. In molte culture antiche e moderne una
categoria dotata di un’estensione pari allo ius manca ... esempi ne sono il fa nel diritto cinese, la sari’a
islamica. Noi traduciamo quotidianamente il termine sari’a con l’espressione “diritto islamico”. Ma non
tutta la sari’a corrisponde alla nostra idea di diritto, e non solo la sari’a rientra nella nostra idea di diritto.’
18
19

Rouland, above n 3, 36-7, 114.

Sacco, above n 6, 125. Translated from the original: ‘L’uomo pratica di continuo regole di cui non e’
pienamente consapevole, o che, comunque, non saprebbe formulare bene.’
65

been suggested by Elizabeth Rivers.20 According to Rivers, law rests at the top of a four layered
pyramid, where the lower layers represent fundamental premises, the changing of which would
radically change the nature of law itself. If law is represented by the legal model discussed
above (thus calling this first layer the legal one), the layer immediately under it is represented
by all jurisprudential and doctrinal principles - such as the doctrine of tenure etcetera,
identifying it as the jurisprudential layer. This rests in turn on a series of political assumptions for example, social equality - more or less historically determined, identifying the third layer as
the political one. Finally, all legal, jurisprudential and political elaborations rest on certain
specific ontological premises - for example, regarding the nature of time - the changing of
which would change any legal consideration.

As an example, the concept and nature of time can be explored in relation to legal principles. If
time is defined as a mono-directional line, as in a Judeo-Christian derived philosophical
discourse, then it is possible to discuss issues of retroactive laws; this discourse becomes
invalid, however, as soon as time is conceived as circular. Although the relationship between
these four levels is one of direct influence of the basic ones upon the upper layers, there is also a
minor degree of reverse influence. Whenever considering any legal model, then, it is important
to acknowledge the complexity of the relationship between the legal prepositions and the
cultural continuum in which they are formulated.

II. SECOND TERM OF COMPARISON: NORMATIVE ORDERS
Once the parameters for the analytical lens represented by the law are established, it is
necessary to turn the attention toward the object of the comparison, toward that which is to be
observed and compared. The premise of such an observation is twofold. Firstly, all human
groups are defined by regulatory mechanisms that guarantee a form of order (not in absolute
terms, but order as perceived by the specific society itself). Secondly, these regulatory
mechanisms can be compared in terms of goals, structures and, or, functions.

Rouland suggests two couples of dualisms in order to analyse all normative orders.21 The first
dual category is represented by the two main paradigms of rules and processes: ‘[n]ormativists
believe that since social life is governed by rules, normal behaviour means conformity, and
conflict may be described as a pathological behaviour.’ 22 On the other hand, ‘whilst processual
20

Elizabeth Rivers, ‘Wild Law’ (Speech delivered at the First Australian Conference on Wild Law and
Earth Jurisprudence, Adelaide, 21 October 2009).
21

Rouland, above n 3.

22

Ibid, 41.
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analysis permits a wider definition of legal phenomena than the normative approach, the case
method on which it is based cannot pretend to encapsulate the totality of law, for law cannot be
reduced to disputes ... humankind can experience law beyond conflict.’ 23 Rouland suggests a
synthesis of the two approaches in order to construct a more holistic comparative picture.

The second couple of criteria is represented firstly by the analysis of institutions, which ‘relates
to the explicit and visible aspects of social and legal relations’ However, Rouland adds, ‘in the
case of the oral system of law prevalent in the majority of traditional societies this is a poor
choice and gives an incomplete picture.’ 24 Secondly, by the observation of behaviour, which
‘relates to the fact that institutional information is often difficult to retrieve from the oral
record ... it is based on the premise that all societies, each in its own way, acknowledge social
situations as just or unjust through the process of “juridicization”. This is explicit in discourse or
statements and implicit in behaviour.’ 25 Therefore, any behavioural analysis must be placed in
the context of specific political relationships and of the specific cultural discourse on values and
beliefs.

Rouland also analyses the pre-eminence of the spoken word in oral cultures: ‘our own legal
culture has assumed a predominantly written form for several centuries. Most traditional
societies, however, communicate through the spoken word’26

The oral word carries a

multiplicity of contextual and emotional meanings that often cannot be repeated in a written
form. Moreover, oral communication is more interested in the complete range of meanings
transmitted by the totality of this contextual and emotional meanings rather than the verbal
precision of any given formulation. The reference to the ‘oral word’ includes all modes of
communications that are not written and can be misleading: it includes the use of silences,
contextual indicators of information, suggestive gestures, acts and inactions et cetera.

The information sought by the researcher is thus presented in this extended oral form, divided
by Rouland into several categories of oral record. Firstly, ‘legitimation’, which is composed by
myth and legend: ‘no dates can be attributed to myths, they are normally encountered in
segmentary societies dominated by kinship’. 27 Secondly, ‘justification’, that is tales and epics:

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid, 141-2.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid, 139.

27

Ibid, 140.
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‘these focus on an individual, whose actions have been rewarded by the conferring of special
status, temporary or permanent’. 28 Thirdly, ‘socialisation’:
this category concerns the integration of the individual into the group through the transmission of a
common cultural heritage. Proverbs are the concise expression of principles or rules which directly
relate to social or legal existence. Stories are fictional accounts, allegorical or anthropomorphic, in
which the origin of a rule may be discerned ... Also of interest are the songs accompanying dance,
mourning, marriage and even the language of drumming29

Fourthly and finally, ‘personification’: ‘in contrast to justification, its purpose is not the
glorification of an individual, but the integration of a person into a group. Genealogies ... are
important ways of identifying relationships between individuals; they are recited when people
meet. People have several names ... linked to particular status or role.’ 30 Oral records are stored
and transmitted in various ways. ‘As a general rule they are taught progressively (from
childhood through to old age), they are personalised (according to the status and wisdom of the
receiver) and they feature in rites of passage (birth, circumcision, marriage, giving birth,
bereavement, death)’.31 Language, finally, is often connected to a specific and limited use,
according to the specific place, time and status (individual and reciprocal) of the participants,
thus carrying different information accordingly.

In identifying all those indicators, it is also important to be aware of the four layered pyramid
presented above. The capacity to identify the relationship between the four levels becomes even
more important in regards to the observed normative orders here identified. Jurisprudential,
political and ontological premises that are ignored and taken for granted in the legal model
become apparent and inseparable from normative protocols when looking at different cultural
perspectives. As a result, these premises might be regarded, at the end of the comparison, as just
as legally relevant as the regulatory mechanisms to which they are connected.

The final question to be asked is whether it is possible to talk of systems, specifically of legal
systems. Rene David pioneered the new branch of comparative law called legal systemology in
his work Major Legal Systems in the World Today.32 His intuition was to consider together
28

Ibid.

29

Ibid, 140-1.
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Ibid, 141.

31

Ibid.
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Rene David and John C Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the world today: an introduction to the
comparative study of law (Stevens, 3rd ed, 1985) [trans of: Les grands systemes de droit contemporaines,
first published 1964)]. See also R C Van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors (Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Herbert M Kritzer (ed), Legal systems of the world : a political, social, and
cultural encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, 2002).
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groups of legal rules isolating their most essential data. His research, looking at various
systems, managed to ignore their most transient elements, instead identifying their most
permanent and less variable data. The greatest collection of similar systems is called a
‘family’ (thus it would be more correct to talk of the common law and civil law legal families).
Legal systems are thus constructed through the process of comparison and analysis. They are
not immanent, unchangeable realities. Instead, they vary with the varying context (and purpose)
of each comparative effort.

Systemology is thus another operative device that supports and allows the comparison, by
creating a reference model able to group the variety of regulatory mechanisms in a coherent
whole. Some authors disagree with the theoretical possibility of what they call
‘macrocomparison’; that is, the comparison of systems too culturally distant to be reciprocally
understood. 33 Against this view, and in line with Rouland (Rouland suggests that there exist
today more than 10000 distinct known legal systems)34, I will reject this approach. The cultural
distance requires a more thorough and multidisciplinary approach, and it is certainly necessary
to tread carefully in order to acknowledge the many different cultural elements that become
indivisible from regulatory mechanisms, but this does not render the comparison theoretically
impossible.

To support this last point, and to stress the relevance of an approach that combines both legal
and anthropological perspectives, the words of Sacco are particularly clarifying:
Differences between technologically complex societies and ethnic law are truly great. The
differences increases if, rather than considering the law of those complex societies, we consider
the representation that euro-americans have of their own law. A major difference, not properly
explained by anthropologists, is this: in civill law and common law culture the judgement reflects
the happening of a possible and natural fact perfected before - and independently from - the
judgement itself. If (and only if) the elements constituting the fact are present, then can the actor
implement the right connected to that fact. Outside our cultural standard it can happen that the
judgment may consider more flexibly the position of the parties before and during the trial. The
degree of approval generated by their attitude influences the success of the trial: to obtain the

33

See J L Constantinesco, La Methode comparative (Economica 1983); J L Constantinesco, La Science
des droits compares (Economica 1983).

34

Rouland, above n 3, 1.
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sympathy and the consensus of the community (which means to adhere to the socially accepted
values) is relevant also for the judgement. 35

To strengthen Sacco’s words and to conclude this section, it is useful to present the table
developed by the Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Juridique de Paris in order to facilitate and to
structure the proceedings of any legal anthropological research:36

Stage

Purpose

Implication

Consequences

research design

endoculturation
scientific acculturation
specific training

definition of subject:
move to stage II

collection of information

written and oral information
(fieldwork)
choice of methods

return to stage I for
completion or move
on to interpretation;
formation of
hypotheses

study of important
relationships within systems

return to stage I or
stage II, or move to
formulation of
explanations (stage
VI)

comparison

properties of different
systems

depending on results,
return to one of
earlier phases or
move on to stage V,
generalization

V

generalization

definition of general
principles of operation of
data system

move to stage VI;
define new subject;
return to stage I or
stage II

VI

presentation of results

description of data used and
conclusion drawn at various
stages of study

I

II

III

IV

analysis

35

Sacco, above n 6, 24. Translated from the original: ‘Le differenze fra il diritto delle societa’
tecnologicamente avanzate e l’etnodiritto sono veramente molto grandi. La differenza aumenta se, invece
di considerare il vero e proprio diritto delle societa’ avanzate, si considera la rappresentazione che gli
euroamericani hanno del loro proprio diritto. Una differenza importante, che gli antropologi non
descrivono con chiarezza, e’ questa: nella cultura di civil law e di common law il giudizio riflette
l’andamento di un fatto possibile e naturale perfezionatosi prima del - e indipendetemente dal - giudizio.
Se (e soltanto se) i costituenti del fatto si trovano riuniti, l’attore puo’ far valere il diritto che dal fatto
deriva. Fuori dal nostro standard culturale puo’ avvenire che il giudizio tenga conto in modo piu’ elastico
della posizione delle parti prima e durante il processo. Il grado di approvazione che la loro condotta
riscuote concilia il successo nel giudizio: avere la simpatia e il consenso della comunita’ (il che si ottiene
adeguandosi alla scala di valori socialmente accettata) e’ rilevante anche agli effetti giudiziarii.’
36

Rouland, above n 3, 150.
70

PART B
LAWS

It might seem like an academic luxury to question the ‘theoretical’ construal of native title
while supporting (something like) it is as a matter of fact. But to say so would be to
overlook an important consideration: If ... native land tenure is a fact in the process of
legal and political construction, then the way in which it is theorised and motivated can
indeed have consequences for the way in which this fact takes legal and political shape.
Moreover, there is a sense in which it is the moral significance of native title - rather than
just its legal facticity - that lies at the heart of the majority judgements. 1

1 Ian Hunter, ‘Native title, Acts of state and the rule of law’ in Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (eds), Make a
better offer: the politics of Mabo (Pluto Press, 1994) 97, 97.
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In Part A I highlighted the reciprocal nature of any comparative study: at least two terms of
comparison must exist for any comparison to occur, and the parameters of such a comparison
must be established in a coordinated and integrated discourse. The initial step, however, is to
identify the first term of comparison. In the present case, that is the Australian law and the legal
principles involved. The identification of such principles will determine the parameters and
framework of the legal comparison that follows, allowing for an exploration of traditional
protocols related to land ownership and possession; that is, the underlying issues of any
Aboriginal land claim.

The focus of this thesis is on the impact of native title upon Indigenous legal protocols. In
accordance with the analytical approach and methodology outlined above, then, the legal model
to be identified and constructed both as the first term of comparison and as the analytical tool
for the comparison is to be found in the instrument of native title. The issue, however, is not as
simple as merely identifying the ‘formants’ of the legal model of native title. Indeed, the very
authority to establish this model is in question. Issues of sovereignty, acquisition of land,
recognition of identity and of legal autonomy are intrinsically connected to the issue of native
title and need to form part of the legal model as well.

Native title has been defined as a recognition of Indigenous titles to the land. However, what
this means is rather complex. Two hypotheses are possible. It is only possible to either:
recognise something which legally pre-exists such a recognition; or recognise a right that is
morally due but legally not pre-existent.2 In the first case, the overlapping and distinct
conceptualisations of land would be cause for a thorough legal exploration. In the second case,
Native Title would fail to address a series of strictly connected issues, primarily sovereignty and
treaty claims.

The aim of this thesis is to suggest that native title not only is an intrinsically unjust legal
instrument but also a practically unsatisfactory one. From a theoretical point of view, it is
fraught with many conceptual inconsistencies, fallacies and gaps. Although highly
compromisory in nature, it is not a negotiated instrument, thus providing an imprecise
compromise. From a practical point of view, it also fails to address a vast number of claims. The
result is that native title is not necessarily the preferred modality for Indigenous claimants to
deal with land issues, thus failing to achieve its very teleological purpose.

2

See Kirsten Anker, The Unofficial Law of Native Title (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2007).
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Before beginning the exploration of Native Title, however, it is fundamental to establish the
ground upon which the authority to establish it (or to recognise it), is based. In other words,
issues of sovereignty are the first issues that need to be addressed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOVEREIGNTY

Acquisition of territory already occupied and claimed by other human beings doesn’t require
any ontological justification. It can happen, and has indeed happened throughout history,
because of the mere fact of military superiority. Justification for the dispossession and
acquisition of other peoples’ territory, however, has often been offered and articulated by the
conquerors, and that has certainly been the case with the European colonial enterprise that
began in the fifteenth century.
Throughout human history, peoples occupying one territory have sometimes acquired other
peoples’ territory. In so far as such takeovers are thought to require justification, many writers have
been able to propose such justifications. Typically these involve some denigration of the prior
inhabitants. Roman historian Tacitus, writing of the Britons in 97-98 CE, disparaged their
agricultural and industrial practices: ‘Who the first inhabitants of Britain were, whether natives or
immigrants, remains obscure; one must remember we are dealing with barbarians’. 3

Australia was colonised during the process of European colonisation of the world that took
place between the fifteenth and the twentieth centuries. European colonial powers have indeed
provided justification for their colonial enterprise, and they have articulated such justifications
in legal terms. Struggles, both physical and political, against such acquisition of land have
occurred from the very onset of the colonial period. Moreover, claims that counter the alleged
acquisition of sovereignty by European colonial powers have been voiced and are strongly
voiced today by the very people whose sovereignty had been dispossessed.4 As a result, an
exploration of the legal justification of the acquisition of sovereignty over the land forms the
indispensable theoretical basis upon which any native title discourse rests.

Resolution of the legitimacy of the acquisition of sovereignty entails a number of consequences.
Firstly, if the legal argument offered by the colonial entities and their successors is not valid or
sound, then the acquisition of sovereignty is rightfully contested. Two things follows:
sovereignty and treaty claims by Indigenous peoples that dispute British sovereignty over
3
4
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Australia have a legal foundation and must be properly considered and addressed; and, any
native title discourse cannot be properly considered without including in the consideration
issues of sovereignty. Secondly, if, on the contrary, sovereignty is indeed indisputable (if not
undisputed), then Australia could position itself within a legal centralist perspective from a
formalist point of view. However, even in denying the legal authority or even the legal nature of
Indigenous normative orders, such normative orders still need to be properly understood and
properly considered in regards to native title. Even if native title can be soundly articulated as a
legal instrument that exists only at common law, the ontological and epistemological premises
of Indigenous normative orders are still legally relevant when considering the nature of the
interests in land that form the theoretical basis of native title rights.

Two political considerations must be also taken into account before addressing the issue of
sovereignty. Firstly, Australia defines itself, at a political and structural level, as a democratic
state based on the rule of law. The measure of any democracy, however, is whether it is able to
justify itself, and more precisely to ‘legally’ justify itself (that is using a series of legal
arguments), toward all claims, whether advanced by individuals or groups, that challenge its
very existence and authority. 5 In order for any democracy to claim ultimate authority toward all
of its subjects, such a justification must be legally coherent and universally convincing.
Therefore, it is not possible to simply ignore and dismiss as inconsequential any conflicting
sovereignty claim. This is neither coherent nor a convincing justification. Secondly, it is
important to distinguish cultural minorities from Indigenous peoples. Cultural minorities - that
is, migrants and their descendants maintaining a sense of separate identity from that of the
majority culture - enter an already established political entity. In the case of Indigenous Peoples,
on the other hand, one or more cultural groups pre-exist the event of colonisation and their
cultural identity has continued throughout the entire process and period of colonisation,
regardless of any numerical consideration that can define them as a numerical minority.
I. SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty represents ‘the most fundamental right of governance’. 6 Under current international
law, sovereignty is thus defined:
Sovereignty in the sense of contemporary public international law denotes the basic international
legal status of a state that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental,
executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to foreign law other than public

5

See, eg, Antonio Gramsci, Prison notebooks (Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari trans, Columbia
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6

McRae and Nettheim, above n 3,147.
75

international law ... The concept of sovereignty reflects the fact that contemporary international
law is a legal order predominantly between coordinated, juxtaposed states as its typical subjects. 7

It is also defined as the ‘[u]ltimate authority, held by a person or institution, against which there
is no appeal. In early modern Europe, sovereignty came to be ascribed to the absolute monarchs
of the new nation‐states’. 8 For the purposes of this concept of sovereignty, then, the concept of a
‘state’ is essential.

McRae and Nettheim, quoting the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States that followed the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, define a
State as ‘an entity that has defined territory and permanent population, under the control of its
own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities’.9 Although it can be argued that such criteria were indeed met by Aboriginal
groups in Australia, the element of recognition by other similar entities (other states) is crucial
to introduce the discourse about the claim of acquisition of sovereignty over Australia by the
British Crown. McRae and Nettheim note that ‘Aboriginal nations would have recognised each
other, and some had long standing relations with people from other lands’.10 Moreover, Anaya
argues persuasively that Indigenous Peoples were indeed regarded as subjects of international
law until well into the nineteenth century when the colonising European nation-states denied
them such status’.11 Martinez concluded that:
the main finding that emerges ... relates to the widespread recognition of “overseas peoples” including Indigenous peoples in the current sense of the term - as sovereign entities by European
powers and their successors, at least during the era of the Law of Nations ... Consequently, the
problematique of Indigenous treaties and other juridical instruments today ... hinges on what the
Special rapporteur has termed a process of retrogression, by which they have been deprived of (or
saw greatly reduced) three of the four essential attributes on which their original status as
sovereign nations was grounded, namely territory, their recognized capacity to enter into
international agreements, and their specific forms of government.12
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Although implicit in the concept of sovereignty mentioned above is a universal one of territorial
self determination of any distinct human group, the development of modern international law in
the nineteenth century emphasised instead the mutual recognition by European nation-states. As
Brennan J observed in Mabo (No 2): ‘British colonists went out to other inhabited parts of the
world, including New South Wales, and settled there under the protection of the forces of the
Crown, so that the Crown acquired sovereignty recognized by the European family of nations
under the enlarged notion of terra nullius’.13 Sovereignty thus became a much more historically
defined concept, while still maintaining its universal implications of autonomy and selfdetermination. Street and Brazier have observed:
[w]e speak of sovereignty in international law when we mean independence, or freedom from
external control; in this sense Australia is a sovereign state, but it does not have a “sovereign”
Parliament, because the powers of that Parliament are subject to the constitution. Is the
constitution, then “sovereign” in Australia? To John Austin, the best known British writer on
sovereignty, every developed state had to have a “sovereign”, who made laws in the form of
commands which were habitually obeyed, and whose legal authority was absolute, indivisible and
illimitable. 14

This passage reveals the tension between a universally applicable meaning and a historically
developed and defined conceptualisation connected to the idea of nation-states.

The application of the concept of nation-state has indeed facilitated the dispossession of
Indigenous peoples’ lands and the alleged acquisition of sovereignty by European colonial
powers, providing a conceptual barrier for the application of the concept to Indigenous
sovereignty, as noted by Anaya, current United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous
Rights:
The very idea of the nation-state would always make it difficult for non-European aboriginal
peoples to qualify as such. The concept of the nation-state in the post-Westphalian sense is based
upon European models of political and social organization whose dominant defining
characteristics are exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical, centralized authority. By
contrast, Indigenous peoples of the Western hemisphere and elsewhere, at least prior to European
contact, typically have been organized primarily by tribal or kinship ties, have had decentralized
political structures often linked in confederations, and have enjoyed shared or overlapping spheres
of territorial control.15
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Consequently, the concept of nation-state requires a brief exploration of its paradigmatic
assumptions developed throughout the course of history, in order to highlight the implication of
the application of the concept of sovereignty to the acquisition of non-European territories by
European powers:16
Sovereignty doctrine has been central to modern international relations, and sovereign nation
states are the primary units and actors. According to Hedley Bull (1977), the system of
international relations is based upon the existence of states that assert both ‘internal sovereignty,
which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population’ and
‘external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities’.
This system of sovereign states that possess the monopoly of force within their boundaries and
interact somewhat anarchically as equals in international affairs is often called a Westphalian state
system, supposedly dating from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years
War. Some, like Anthony Giddens (1985), reject the notion that state sovereignty preceded the
European state system; rather, nation states are created through the processes and recognition of
international relations.17

The contemporary doctrine of state sovereignty18 is often said to originate with the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648 mentioned in the previous passage. The conceptual reasons that led to the
Treaty of Westphalia, however, can be traced to a much earlier period.
The doctrine of sovereignty developed as part of the transformation of the medieval system in
Europe into the modern state system, a process that culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648. In some ways the emergence of the concept of sovereignty ran parallel with the similar
emergence of the idea of private property, both emphasizing exclusive rights concentrated in a
single holder, in contrast to the medieval system of diffuse and many‐layered political and
economic rights. Within the state, sovereignty signified the rise of the monarch to absolute

16 See Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jean Bodin, On
sovereignty (Julian H Franklin trans, Cambridge University Press, 1992) [trans of Les Six Livres de la
Republique (first published 1576)]; Tomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Hackett, first published 1651, 1994 ed);
Jacques Rousseau, The social contract (Charles Frankel trans, Hafner, 1947) [trans of Contrat social (first
publsihed 1762)]; Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (George Schwab trans, MIT Press, 1984) [trans of:
Politische Theologie (first published 1922)]; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare
Life (D Heller‐Roazen transStanford University Press, 1998).
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prominence over rival feudal claimants such as the aristocracy, the papacy, and the Holy Roman
Empire.

19

Sovereignty discourse indeed played a major role in defining and legitimising the rise of nation
states with autocratic monarchic rulers in Europe in the early modern period. Jean Bodin, the
French jurist writing in the sixteenth century, explained the indispensability of sovereignty in
accounting for law.
Since Bodin's On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576), it
has been a regular dictum that sovereignty is ‘that which gives the law’. However, the sovereign is
not, for Bodin, entirely beyond the limits of law ... the acts of the sovereign [must] conform with
divine law ... the imperative for the early modern thinkers of sovereignty was to provide an
account of the ‘authority of a mortal God’, to put it in Hobbesian terms. ... The ambivalence about
the monism and absolutism of sovereignty is readily apparent in Hobbes's Leviathan (1651). ...
Rousseau provided an account of sovereignty as a ‘general will’ in The Social Contract (1762).
The ideal‐type of republic is conveyed through the anatomic metaphor of a ‘whole body and its
parts’, where the will of the sovereign is the ‘general will’ of a body composed of parts, the
citizenry ... for Rousseau sovereign power must be general. ... The German jurist Carl Schmitt in
Political Theology: Four Chapters on Sovereignty (1922) famously defined sovereignty as the
‘decision on the exception’—and thus deepened the focus on the limit that separates sovereignty
and law. For Schmitt, the sovereign is the person who decides when a state of exception or
emergency is present and suspends the normal legal order.20

Although the concept of sovereignty is linguistically linked to the concept of the sovereign,
Motha points out that Foucault suggested that we should abandon this preoccupation with the
centrality of the sovereign, in order to fully understand its meaning.
Instead, he suggested a focus on power at its extremities. In his lectures at the Collège de France
(1975–1976), published later as Society Must be Defended (2003), he argued that the individual is
a ‘power effect’, a ‘relay for power’: ‘power passes through the individuals it has constituted’. A
type of power that Foucault termed ‘non‐sovereign power’ or ‘disciplinary power’, can be
exercised, circulates, and forms networks. Rather than the attention given to determining the
juridical limits of sovereignty, or the relationship between sovereignty and law, Foucault suggested
that we explore how power penetrates bodies, how it acts to normalize and regularize behaviour. 21
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Echoing Foucault’s suggestion, Sacco traces the origin of the figure of the sovereign to the
historical transition from what Levi-Strauss called ‘diffuse power societies‘ to ‘centralised
power societies’. 22 In the first instance, power is constantly negotiated among all members of
the group and legal and political discourses are intrinsically connected both to kinship ties and
metaphysical and ontological considerations. The second category is the result of one of the
most momentous changes in regards to economic food production in the history of humankind:
that from mobile and migratory hunting/gathering practices to settled agricultural ones. Power
begun to be centralised in a single individual which assumed supernatural and preter-human
connotations. Such a figure, the most striking example of which was the Egyptian Pharaoh,
assumed control over other individuals by virtue of that preter-human, god-like, divine nature.
Power, once constantly negotiated among all members of the group, becomes the prerogative of
one individual. Its theoretical absoluteness and its sacred nature are the two elements that define
the original form of centralised power in all ancient agricultural empires. Moreover, centralised,
divine power is completely identified with the individual in whom such power is vested.

According to Sacco, another radical change occurs with the transition from bronze-producing
societies to iron-producing societies, the last defined by a much more egalitarian nature (that is,
when compared to previous empires, not to hunting/gathering societies). Power is shared among
a number of individuals, as epitomised by the Greek city-states and by Republican Rome. It is
actually Rome that gives birth to the modern concept of law as a collection of disembodied and
abstract rules and principles. The authority upon which this concept of law rests, the underlying
premise of its power, is defined as imperium.

The ancient kings, and then the aristocracy, and then the magistrates, were all invested with
imperium, ‘a key concept, which designated the acknowledged right to give orders to those of
lower status and expect them to be obeyed. ... Originally, the kings of Rome had been given
imperium by the gods when the city itself was founded. Thus the kings had been granted the
responsibility of getting things done on behalf of the people. As a result imperium was a quality
that ‘belonged’ to the person who exercised the power and it was, therefore, accepted that he could
use it at his own discretion. At the same time, imperium also stood for the power of Rome itself, or
at least of her people. ... It was less an abstract notion of power, more a propensity to issue orders
(from the Latin word imperare, ‘to order’). Long after the kings had been disposed of, magistrates
still consulted the gods ... about future courses of action. On his first day in office, a magistrate
would rise early and pray to the gods, to ascertain whether he had divine approval for the exercise
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of his imperium. Despite the fact that there are no known cases of the gods refusing such approval,
the ritual was always deemed necessary.23

This concept of imperium forms the basis for any sovereignty discourse of future European
nation-states, because of the Charlemagne coronation in the year 800 AD, as explained below.
The concept is comprised of the elements recognisable in the contemporary concept of
sovereignty outlined above: firstly, it refers to a general, absolute and ultimate power; secondly,
it is vested in a recognisable figure; thirdly, it is articulated in terms of specific rules and
principles defined as laws. In addition, it rests on a divine origin, proving continuity with the
pre-existing bronze-producing societies indicated by Sacco. This divine origin of the imperium,
however, becomes embodied in such a very abstract concept, rather than in any specific
individual. It is the role (magistrate, dictator, emperor etcetera) that is invested with imperium,
not the individual fulfilling that role. In a reversal from what had been the case with ancient
kings, Roman Emperors gained their divine status as a consequence of the divine nature of the
imperium with which they were vested, not vice versa. In other words, whereas the absolute
power of the Pharaoh was a consequence of his divine status, the divine status of the Roman
Emperors was a consequence of their absolute power.24

The transfer of such a construct into modern Europe, thus marking the origin of the concept of
sovereignty presented above, happened with Charlemagne.25 His coronation on the 25th of
December in the year 800 AD by Pope Leo III explicitly names him ‘Holy Roman Emperor’,
underlying a conceptual continuity (of principles, if not of practices) with Rome.26 The event is
particularly significant for a number of reasons: firstly, it marks the birth of the European
concept of the sovereign that is at the basis of contemporary nation-states (through the Treaty of
Westphalia and the vesting of power on the ‘people’ with the American and the French
Revolutions);27 secondly, it recognises a conceptual continuity with the legal and political
principles developed and articulated by Rome; thirdly, in maintaining the sacrality of power
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indicated above, the identification of the divine nature of the sovereign is entrusted in a very
specific figure, the Pope. This last point, I believe, is the most important in understanding how
and why European powers articulated the acquisition of sovereignty and the dispossession of
Indigenous land through the ‘doctrine of discovery’ which will be explored below.

II. SOVEREIGNTY ACQUIRED. OR NOT?
Given the brief reconstruction of the concept of sovereignty outlined above, and given the
process of ‘retrogression’ suggested by Martinez,28 how did European powers actually justify
the acquisition of such sovereignty over territories already occupied by others In particular, how
did the British Crown justify its acquisition of sovereignty over the territory that was to become
Australia?

McRae and Nettheim suggest that ‘[u]nder Anglo-Australian law, it is settled doctrine that
Britain acquired sovereignty over what is now Australia. Any prior Indigenous sovereignty was
not acknowledged, or was treated as totally displaced by the assertion of British sovereignty’. 29
The assertion is partly circular, in that justification for the acquisition of Anglo-Australian
sovereignty is articulated within a doctrine expressed by that very Anglo-Australian entity
whose sovereignty is potentially in question, but it is revealing of a general attitude within the
legal discourse in Australia. More importantly, however, that very doctrine advanced and
articulated within the parameters of Anglo-Australian legal discourse is fraught with internal
inconsistencies. Finally, Indigenous writers and activists have continuously challenged this
assumption.

Aboriginal sovereignty does exist. Before whites invaded Australia, Aborigines were the sole and
undisputed sovereign authority. The invasion prevented the continuing exercise of sovereign
authority by Aborigines. The invasion and subsequent occupation has not destroyed the existence
of Aboriginal sovereignty. 30

Mansell’s statement is in line with numerous demands for Indigenous self determination
articulated within the language of sovereignty. The very existence of the Aboriginal Tent
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Embassy in Canberra is testimony to such claims. Its establishment in 1972 is a clear act of
express rejection of Anglo-Australian sovereignty over the territory. As McRae and Nettheim
point out, ‘[m]oves to initiate a treaty began during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, briefly
supported by Prime Minister Bob Hawke. However, the treaty initiative fell by the wayside’. 31
The language of treaty appears to be the language with which sovereignty issues have been
recently addressed. Moreover, the authors add,
[t]he execution of a possible treaty (or treaties) is a recurring theme in political assertions of
Indigenous governance rights. A treaty between non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians could
be of importance both as a process (that is, as an exercise of self determination or sovereignty by
Indigenous peoples), and as a method of ensuring the entry of Indigenous peoples into the
Australian polity and of resolving “unfinished business’. 32

A number of authors have addressed the issue of a possible treaty 33, together with a number of
activists. Waratah Rose Gillespie quotes Isabelle Coe, stating that ‘[b]ecause the invasion was
illegal at international law, all white people are here illegally. Through recognizing Aboriginal
sovereignty, their presence in this country can be legitimised.’ 34 In exploring the transition
‘from Invasion to Dispossession; from Dispossession to Destitution’, she powerfully echoes
Mansell’s words:
[w]hen a nation has been invaded and occupied, and the people rendered destitute in their own
land as a result, the issue of sovereignty may be temporarily submerged. The use of overwhelming
force, directed at subjugating the people and crushing any resistance to the occupation, sparks
further violence, which ricochets through the community under occupation. Where the invader
uses overwhelming force to subdue the people of a nation and occupy their country, the exercise of
sovereignty by the people of that nation is impeded but not extinguished. For example, the Nazi
occupation of Poland during World War II impeded but did not extinguish the sovereign rights of
the people of that country. Following its liberation at the end of that war, Poland once more took
its place among the world’s nation states. Following invasion and occupation, the sovereign rights
of the people of the occupied nation continue, as long as the bloodlines of the invaded people
continue to produce claimants to this sovereignty, as an identifiable and distinct people.35
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The challenges to the Anglo-Australians claim of acquired sovereignty have also been explored
by anthropologists outside of legal discourses, highlighting the same theoretical rejection.
Deborah Bird Rose, for example, in research carried out during 1980-1982 in the Victoria River
District of the Northern Territory among Yarralin people, has investigated what she calls the
‘Captain Cook Saga ... an Aboriginal oral narrative which describes a set of historic and
contemporary processes through which Aborigines have been deprived of land, autonomy and
self-sufficiency.’36
Captain Cook’s law ... can be crudely summarised as the law that might makes right. More
specifically, the Saga shows it to be a law of oppression. Powered by his vision of what he wanted
to do with the country, Captain Cook denied all previous claims to ownership. In order to make a
social reality of this denial he implemented laws of oppression ... For Yarralin people, it is not
conceivable that the current state of affairs, their oppression under Captain Cook’s law, will
continue indefinitely. It is not just that they don’t want it to; it is that it cannot. In defying moral
principles, Captain Cook’s law defies the ultimate goal of maintaining the cosmos as a life-giving
system. In Yarralin logic, this defiance cannot have a long-term future. 37

What, then, is the basis for the justification for this contested acquisition of sovereignty over
Australia? It is important to remember the importance of such justification, as suggested by
Gillespie:
Hugh Morgan, the former managing director of Western Mining Corporation, a company involved
in mining gold, has a history of attacking processes which could lead to recognition of Aboriginal
sovereignty and/or land rights. In 1988, when the government was considering making a treaty
with Aboriginal people, Morgan claimed that Australians were subject to a ‘neurotic obsession’
with the treatment of Aboriginal people over the previous 200 years. ... Following the Mabo
judgement in 1992, Morgan attempted to characterise terra nullius as a ‘political slogan in an
important power game’. This, as law professor Gerry Simpson observes, is a ‘good example of the
way legal decisions are denigrated as mere politics when they can no longer serve the interests of
the political elites. While this obscure legal term (terra nullius) was providing the justification for a
denial of land rights to this country’s original inhabitants for two hundred years it remained
conveniently immune from such criticism’. 38

Sovereignty was not contested in Mabo (No 2) However, the High Court clearly stated that ‘the
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the several parts of Australia cannot be challenged in
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an Australian municipal court’.39 This statement does not imply the theoretical impossibility of a
challenge to the acquisition of sovereignty in absolute terms, it merely acknowledges that any
Australian municipal court derives its judicial authority from that very sovereignty that is
challenged, thus preventing it from ruling on any sovereignty issue to avoid paradoxical results.
Indeed, any ruling that would reject the acquisition of sovereignty as legally valid would
deprive the court of the very authority to rule, thus making the decision invalid. With this caveat
in mind, the justification for the acquisition of sovereignty is then properly introduced by
Brennan J in Mabo (No 2):
International law recognized conquest, cession and occupation of territory that was terra nullius as
three of the effective ways of acquiring sovereignty. No other ways is presently relevant. The great
voyages of European discovery opened to European nations the prospect of occupying new and
valuable territories that were already inhabited. As among themselves, the European nations
parcelled out the territories newly discovered to the sovereigns of the respective discoverers,
provided the discovery was confirmed by occupation and provided the Indigenous inhabitants
were not organized in a society that was untied permanently for political action. To these territories
the European colonial nations applied the doctrines relating to acquisition of territory that was
terra nullius. They recognized the sovereignty of the respective European nations over the territory
of ‘backward peoples’ and, by State practice, permitted the acquisition of sovereignty of such
territory by occupation rather than by conquest. Various justifications for the acquisition of
sovereignty over the territory of ‘backward peoples’ were advanced. ... When British colonists
went out to other inhabited parts of the world, including New South Wales, and settled there under
the protection of the forces of the Crown, so that the Crown acquired sovereignty recognized by
the European family under the enlarged notion of terra nullius, it was necessary for the common
law to prescribe a doctrine relating to the law to be applied in such colonies, for sovereignty
imports supreme internal legal authority. the view was taken that, when sovereignty of a territory
could be acquired under the enlarged notion of terra nullius, for the purposes of the municipal law
that territory could be treated as a ‘desert uninhabited’ country. 40

Brennan’s reconstruction in the Mabo (No 2) judgement is indicative of the main assumptions
upon which sovereignty could effectively be claimed by European powers, as articulated by
Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England and by Emerich De Vattel in his The
Law of Nations. In his Commentaries on the Laws of England published in 1765, Blackstone
wrote:
colonies in distant countries, are either such where the lands are claimed by right of occupancy
only, by finding them desart [sic] and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or
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where, when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conquest, or ceded to us by
treaties. And both these rights are founded on the law of nature, or at least upon that of nations. 41

Swiss international lawyer Emerich De Vattel, in The Law of Nations published in 1760, had
written:
Every nation is ... obliged by the law of nature to cultivate the land that has fallen to its share; and
it has no right to enlarge its boundaries, or have recurse to the assistance of other nations, but in
proportion as the land in its possession is incapable of furnishing it with necessaries ... When a
nation takes possession of a country to which no prior owner can lay claim, it is considered as
acquiring the empire or sovereignty of it, at the same time with the domain ... The whole space
over which a nation extends its government becomes the seat of its jurisdiction, and is called its
territory. If a number of free families, scattered over over an independent country, come to unite
for the purpose of forming a nation or state, they altogether acquire the sovereignty over the whole
country they inhabit ... since they are willing to form together a political society, and establish a
public authority, which every member of the society shall be bound to obey, it is evidently their
intention to attribute to that public authority the right to command over the whole country. All
mankind have an equal right to things that have not yet fallen into the possession of any one; and
those things belong to the person who first takes possession of them. When, therefore, a nation
finds a country uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfully take possession of it: and, after
it has sufficiently made known its will in this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another
nation ... There is another celebrate question, to which the discovery of the New World has
principally given rise. It is asked whether a nation may lawfully take possession of some part of a
vast country, in which there are non but erratic nations whose scanty population is incapable of
occupying the whole! We have already observed, in establishing the obligation to cultivate the
earth, that those nations cannot exclusively appropriate to themselves more land than they have
occasion for, or more than they are able to settle and cultivate. Their unsettled habitation in those
immense regions cannot be accounted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too
closely pent up at home, finding land of which the savages stood in no particular need, and of
which they made no actual and constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and
settle it with colonies.42

De Vattel’s reconstruction forms the basis for the ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius’ quoted by
Brennan above.43 De Vattel’s words are significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, they provide
an explicit attempt to offer a legal (‘lawful’) justification for the acquisition of European
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sovereignty over previously inhabited land. Secondly, they explicitly define the political
structure of the ‘savages’ as ‘nations’, thus granting them an implicit recognition as selfdetermining political entities (also as articulated in the generic definition of sovereignty that
applies to all congregations of ‘free families’). Thirdly, they immediately limit such an
acknowledgment to a culturally defined ‘use’ of the land. This concept is strictly connected to
specific economic practices of food production based on intensive and settled agriculture.

Apart from being culturally and historically specific (thus intrinsically irrelevant for the
application of any universal principle as the ones articulated by De Vattel), the connection
between space required and the cultural specific form of food production has been explored by a
number of authors, offering a radically different perspective.44 Lindqvist has provided an ironic
contemporary response to the premises upon which the principle of terra nullius rests:
Terra nullius. From the Latin terra, earth, ground, land, and nullius, no one’s. Thus: no one’s land,
land not belonging to anybody. Or, at any rate, not to anybody that counts. Originally: land not
belonging to the Roman Empire. In the middle Ages: land not belonging to any Christian ruler.
Later: land to which no European state as yet lays claim. Land that justly falls to the first European
state to invade the territory. Empty land. Uninhabited land. Land that will soon be uninhabited
because it is populated by inferior races, condemned by the laws of nature to die out. Land where
the original inhabitants are, or can soon be rendered, so few in numbers as to be negligible. ... Asia
has some of the world’s most densely populated areas; Australia is the most sparsely populated
continent. In fact, when viewed through Chinese or Indonesian eyes, Australia seems virtually
unpopulated. The terra nullius doctrine used by the British when they occupied Australia would
give Asians the right to take over the country.45

The two combined concepts upon which the reconstruction of the acquisition of sovereignty is
founded are the right of occupancy (as opposed to conquest or cession) and the uncultivated
nature of the occupied territory. The right of occupation refers indeed to a much more
articulated doctrine, the Doctrine of Discovery articulated in Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823 by the
United States Supreme Court.46 Before exploring this doctrine, it is necessary to briefly
introduce the main cases that have applied the doctrine of terra nullius in the Australian courts
until Mabo (No 2).
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The term terra nullius was not used neither at the time of Cook’s discovery claim nor at the time
of Phillip’s occupancy claim, but rather later in the courts. One of the first cases to address the
issue was the Murrell case in 1836, as explored by Hookey.47 In this murder case, the
submission by the defendant was that
New South Wales was neither conquered, ceded, nor a British settlement by occupation, a realistic
submission consistent with historical fact, and with contemporary opinion. The purpose of this
submission was to avoid the jurisdictional consequences flowing from a preference for one or
other of the conventional modes of acquisition of territory; for in a settled colony the settlers
brought with them the common law of England ... while in a ceded or conquered colony the new
sovereign could impose what laws he pleased, though local law, if deemed capable of recognition,
applied until he exercised his rights. 48

In the decision, Justice Burton wrote:
[a]lthough it be granted that the Aboriginal natives of New Holland are entitled to be regarded by
civilised nations as a free and independent people, and are entitled to the possession of those rights
which as such are valuable to them, yet the various tribes had not attained at the first settlement of
the English people amongst them to such a position in point of numbers and civilisation and to
such a form of government and laws, as to be entitled to be recognised as so many sovereign states
governed by laws of their own. 49

Burton J’s ruling is clearly in line with De Vattel’s and Blackstone’s comments presented above.

Successive cases confirm this position. In the Bonjon case in 1841, Justice Willis explicitly
reconstructed the ‘history of the colony’, stating that ‘the natives ... had made little progress in
the arts, their canoes were wretchedly formed, their huts were very slight and incommodious’
and that there was ‘not the least appearance of cultivation in any part of this vast region’. 50
Justice Willis, however, did not accept that Australia was practically unoccupied, nor did he
accept the theory that Indigenous Australians were lawless and had no sovereignty. Nonetheless,
he accepted the acquisition of territory as justified by De Vattel, thus highlighting the unique
situation of Aboriginal peoples who ‘have remained unconquered and free in a settled colony’, 51
a domestic dependent nation similarly to the American Indian nations.
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In Attorney-General (NSW) v Brown (1847), Chief Justice Stephen resolved a dispute about
whether the Crown was in possession of coal reserved from a grant to Brown’s landlord.
Stephen CJ traced the origin of the property in the colony to the fact that ‘[t]he territory of New
South Wales, and eventually the whole of the vast inland of which it forms a part, have been
taken possession of by British subjects in the name of the Sovereign ... the lands in the Colony
are, and ever have been, from the time of its first settlement in 1788, in the Crown ... as his or
her property, they have been and may now be effectually granted to subjects of the Crown’.52

In Cooper v Stuart (1889) English land law was held to apply in New South Wales because
‘there was no land law or tenure existing in the Colony at the time of its annexation to the
Crown’, 53 confirming the view that the territory of New South Wales was annexed to the Crown
through the occupation of a land practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled
law. Successive judgments reinforce this position: Justice Isaacs in Williams v Attorney General
for NSW (1913) affirmed that ‘when Governor Phillips received his first commission from King
George III on 12th October, 1786, the whole of the lands of Australia were already in law the
property of the King of England’,54 while Justice Fullager in Randwick Corporation v Rutledge
(1959) declared that ‘[o]n the first settlement of New South Wales (then comprising the whole
of eastern Australia), all the land in the colony became in law vested in the Crown’. 55

In Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971), Justice Blackburn adopted the opinion that the legal theory
used to justify the acquisition of British sovereignty at the time of settlement was more
important than any factual reconstruction of events. Blackburn J stated that ‘historical fact may
give place to legal fiction’, with the consequence that once the legal characterisation of the
colony has become settled it is ‘not to be questioned upon a reconsideration of the historical
facts.’ 56

Anker notes that in Coe v Commonwealth (1979), following the decision of the International
Court that, in its opinion on the Western Sahara
had written that terra nullius was not applicable to the territory as its nomadic peoples were
politically organised into tribes, [w]iradjuri lawyer Paul Coe then used the term, for the first time
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in an Australian court case, to claim that the Aboriginal ‘nations’ had exercised a sovereignty over
Australia which had never been ceded. Given that Britain’s assertion of sovereignty was
erroneously based on terra nullius, it should be open to question.57

Justice Gibbs refused to accept that Australia’s status as ‘settled’ was justiciable, as this status
was determined by the historical point that ‘by European standards [of the time, the territory]
had no civilised inhabitants or settled law’.58

The High Court in Mabo (No 2) confirmed the proposition set out in Coe, while at the same
time revising the assumptions of earlier judgements and rejecting the ‘doctrine’ of terra nullius
according to which territory occupied by peoples ‘so low in the scale of social organisation that
their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or
the legal ideas of a civilised society’59 could be acquired by European settlement.

The position of the courts does not provide a satisfactory justification for the initial acquisition
of sovereignty toward political claims that challenge British sovereignty, as it is based on a
rejection of the doctrine of terra nullius60 that nonetheless retroactively justifies the legal fiction
applied at the time of settlement, reflecting the ‘process of retrogression’ mentioned by
Martinez. 61 Nonetheless, although politically unsatisfactory the position could be justified
against all such claims if the premise upon which is based were true. The premise is that of a
clear an uncontested ‘legal fiction’ as applied at the time of settlement. Such ‘legal fiction’
however, is much more complicated than the version that has been reconstructed by the courts
until now. The Johnson v M’Intosh case and its recent analysis by Miller shed light on the
Doctrine of Discovery upon which such ‘legal fiction’ is predicated (and to which Justice Willis
implicitly referred in the Bonjon case).

III. THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
Although never articulated in the Australian courts in these terms, the colonisation of Australia
was based on the international legal principle known today as the Doctrine of Discovery as
articulated in Johnson v M’Intosh in 1823 by the United States Supreme Court. Robert Miller
has recently examined the case in relation to Lewis and Clark’s exploration of the North
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American continent.62 The initial part of his analysis, however, can be applied to all colonial
claims, particularly to the ones made by Britain.
When Europeans and Americans set out to explore and exploit new lands in the fifteenth through
the twentieth centuries, they justified their governmental and property claims over these territories
and over the indigenous inhabitants with the Discovery Doctrine. This legal principle was created
and justified by religious and ethnocentric ideas of European and Caucasian superiority over other
cultures, religions and races of the world. The Doctrine provided, under established international
law, that newly arrived Europeans immediately and automatically acquired property rights in
native lands and gained governmental, political and commercial rights over the inhabitants without
the knowledge nor the consent of Indigenous peoples. When Europeans and American planted
their national flags and religious symbols in these “newly discovered” lands, they were not just
thanking Providence for a safe voyage. Instead, they were undertaking the well-recognized legal
procedures and rituals of Discovery designed to demonstrate their country’s legal claim over the
“newly discovered” lands and peoples. 63

In 1823 the United States Supreme Court was presented with a case that required it to address
the nature of Indian land titles, how those titles were extinguished and whether individuals
could purchase Indian lands. 64 In spite of a Royal Proclamation by King George III of 1763,
whereby the Crown had expressly taken control of all trade with and purchase of land from
Indian tribes, in 1773 William Murray had purchased land from the Kaskaskia, Peoria and
Cahokia peoples of what is now the State of Illinois. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had then
authorised the newly formed federal government of the United States to manage settlement of
the old Northwest and pursuant to that policy the government negotiated treaties with the same
Indian Nations William Murray had dealt with. The United States purchased vast tracts of lands,
including the lands that Murray had allegedly purchased three decades before. William
McIntosh, the defendant in Johnston v M’Intosh, had then purchased that same land from the
United States, receiving his patent, or governmental title, in 1818. Johnson and Graham, the
plaintiffs in the case, had inherited the disputed property in 1819 and had brought an ejectment
lawsuit in federal court to remove MacIntosh from the property they claimed as their own.

The plaintiffs argued that because Indians were not English subjects, the Royal Proclamation of
1763 did not apply to them, thus not limiting the tribes’ natural right to sell their land. Chief
Justice Marshall, in determining the legal rule to be applied, ‘stated that a nation or society
where land is located has to make the rules of how property can be acquired ... a court cannot
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just look to “principles of abstract justice” or natural law.’65 After a methodic investigation of
the rules of property adopted in North America, the court noted that ‘the legal rule for realproperty acquisitions and transfer applied by Holland, Spain, Portugal, France and England ...
was the Doctrine of Discovery.’ 66 The court stated that ‘all the nations of Europe, who have
acquired territory on this continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognised in others,
the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians,’67

Marshall CJ then traced the title in the English Crown and eventually in the American States
and the United States as a result of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Marshall reasoned that the
Crown had ‘absolute title’ in Indian lands ‘subject only to Indian rights of occupancy’, and that
this situation was ‘incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians’.68 Moreover,
since the American States and the United States had inherited this title, ‘it has never been
doubted, that either the United States, or the several States had a clear title to all the lands ...
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that
right, was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it’.69 The court ruled
in favour of the plaintiff, declaring Murray’s purchase null and void as the United States
government, possessing the Discovery authority acquired from England, had exercised its
exclusive preemption power to buy land from the Indian Nations. The court ruled that Indian
tribes had lost their absolute title to their lands, limiting their capacity to sell them only to the
discoverer possessed of the discovery power.

In a nutshell, the Supreme Court said that, under Discovery, when European, Christian nations
discovered new lands, the discovering country automatically gained sovereign and property rights
in the lands of non-Christian, non-European peoples ... The property right Euro-Americans
gained ... was defined as a future right, a kind of limited fee-simple title or ownership right. This
“European title” was the exclusive right to buy the newly discovered lands whenever natives
consented. The right held by the discovering European country was limited by and subject to the
natives’ right to occupy and use the land. ... The Doctrine of Discovery was the international law
under which America was explored and was the legal authority the English Crown used to
establish its colonies in America. Discovery passed to the Crown the “title” to Indian lands,
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preempted sales of these lands to any other European country or any individual, and granted
sovereign and commercial rights over Indian Nations to the Crown and its colonies. 70

In order to reach the decision, Marshall both articulated the doctrine and reconstructed its
historical origin by referring to documents from the fifteenth century onward. In reconstructing
the court’s formulation, Miller traces the origin of the doctrine to ‘the idea of a worldwide papal
jurisdiction, which created a legal responsibility for the Church to work for a Christian
commonwealth.’ 71 I have identified above the basis for the authority of the Roman Catholic
Church and of the Pope to establish such idea in the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman
Emperor. 72

A controversy between Poland and the Teutonic Knights to control non-Christian Lithuania in
the 1400s ‘raised the question of the legality of the seizure of infidels’ lands by papal sanction
because infidels lacked lawful dominium, that is sovereignty and property rights.’ 73 It is at this
point that the authority of the Pope is confirmed:
In the Council of Constance in 1414, the Teutonic Knights argued that their territorial and
jurisdictional claims to Lithuania were authorized by papal proclamations from the time of the
Crusades, called papal bulls, that allowed the outright confiscation of the property and sovereign
rights of heathens. The Council ... disagreed and accepted Poland’s argument based on Pope
Innocent IV’s writings that infidels possessed the same natural law rights to sovereignty and
property as Christians but the pope could order invasions to punish violations of natural law or to
spread the gospel. ... The Church and the secular Christian princes had to respect the natural rights
of pagans but not if heathens strayed from the European definition of natural law. 74

Through the issue of papal bulls, therefore, the Church became both the moral and legal
authority to determine the fate of all human flock, in accordance with its own claims to
theological universal jurisdiction.75 In response to a clash between Spain and Portugal over the
Canary Islands, Pope Eugenius IV issued in 1434 a papal bull, Creator Omnium, that banned all
Europeans from the islands as a protection toward the islanders. King Duarte of Portugal,
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however, appealed against the decision, arguing that his actions had allowed the advance of
civilisation and of Christianity, asking the pope ‘to grant the islands to Portugal out of the
Church sense of guardianship duties toward the infidels.’76 This dialogue led to a revision of the
Doctrine of Discovery.

The new argument for European and Christian domination ... based Portuguese rights of discovery
on the perceived need to protect natives from the oppression of others and to lead them to
civilization and conversion under papal guidance ... Pope Eugenius IV’s legal advisors ... cited
Pope Innocent Iv’s writings from 1240 that said the Church had the authority to deprive pagans of
their property and sovereignty if they failed to admit Christian missionaries or if they violated
European defined natural law.77

Pope Eugenius issued another bull in 1436, Romanus Pontifex, which granted Portugal the
authority to convert the natives and to manage and control the islands on behalf of the pope.
Successive bulls further extended Portugal’s jurisdiction and geographical rights. Under the
threat of excommunication for violating these papal bulls, Spain looked elsewhere for lands to
explore and conquer, declaring Columbus the Spanish Admiral of any lands that he would
discover. In response to Ferdinand and Isabella’s request, Pope Alexander VI issued a new papal
bull in 1493, Inter caetera divina, ‘which stated that the lands found by Columbus, because they
had been “undiscovered by others”, belonged to Ferdinand and Isabella. ... [He] granted Spain
any lands it might discover in the future, provided they were “not previously possessed by any
Christian owner.’ 78

This established the notion of the first discovery as the fundamental requirement of the doctrine
of discovery.79 Spain and Portugal claimed their rights of discovery from merely seeing nonChristian lands first and by performing the formalities and rituals of symbolic possession. Both
England and France advocated the use of the doctrine of discovery. ‘England claimed for
centuries that John Cabot’s 1496-1498 explorations and first discoveries of North America,
from Newfoundland to Florida, gave England priority over any other European country.’80 Both
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France and England, however, were faced with the threat of excommunication for violating the
papal bulls that granted Spain and Portugal the rights of future discoveries.

[T]he legal scholar of England and France analysed canon law, the papal bulls, and history and
devised a slightly new theory of Discovery that allowed their countries to explore and colonize in
the New World. ... The new legal theory, primarily developed by English legal scholars, argued
that the Catholic king of England, Henry VII, would not be violating the 1493 papal bull ... if
English explorers restrained themselves to only claiming lands not yet discovered by any other
Christian prince. This expanded definition of Discovery was further refined by Elizabeth I and her
advisers in the mid-1500’s.81 They added a crucial new element to the Discovery test, They argued
that the Doctrine required a European country to actually occupy and have current possession of
non-Christian lands to perfect a Discovery title to newly found lands.82

This introduced the second concurrent fundamental element of the doctrine of discovery, that of
actual occupancy. The final essential element of the doctrine, that of terra nullius, was
introduced, again by England and France:
England and France also developed another element of Discovery to justify their alleged right to
lands of native peoples. This was the principle called terra nullius (literally a land or earth that is
null or void), or less often called vacuum domicilium (literally an empty, vacant, or unoccupied
house or domicile). This element stated that lands that were not occupied by any person or nation,
or which were occupied but not being used in a fashion that European legal systems approved,
were considered to be empty and waste and available for Discovery. 83

This brief historical reconstruction, as articulated by Miller, offers the context in which the
discourse on the acquisition of sovereignty of North America by England has been articulated.
Furthermore, it introduces the ten elements characterising the doctrine as presented by Miller:
1. First discovery. The first European country to ‘discover’ new lands unknown to other Europeans
gained property and sovereign rights over the lands. First discovery alone, without taking physical
possession, was often considered to create a claim of title to the newly found lands, but it was
usually considered to be only an incomplete title.
2. Actual occupancy and current possession. To fully establish a ‘first discovery’ claim and turn it
into a complete title, a European country had to actually occupy and possess newly found lands. ...
81
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This physical possession had to be accomplished within a reasonable amount of time after the first
discovery. ...
3 Preemption/European title. The discovery European country gained the power of preemption,
the sole right to buy the land from the native people. This is a valuable property right. The
government that held the Discovery power of preemption prevented or preempted any other ...
government or individual from buying land from the discovered native people.
4. Indian title. After first discovery, Indian Nations and the indigenous peoples were considered ...
to have lost the full property rights ad ownership of their lands. They only retained rights to
occupy and use their land. Nevertheless, this right could last forever if the indigenous people never
consented to sell their land. But if they ever choose to sell, they could only sell to the government
that held the power of preemption over their lands. Thus, Indian title was a limited ownership
right.
5. Tribal limited sovereign and commercial rights. After first discovery, Indian Nations and native
peoples were also considered to have lost some of their inherent sovereign powers and the rights to
free trade and diplomatic international relations.
6. Contiguity. ... This element provided that Europeans had a Discovery claim to a reasonable and
significant amount of land contiguous to and surrounding their settlements and the lands they
actually possessed ... Most importantly, contiguity held that the discovery of the mouth of a river
gave the discovering country a claim over the lands drained by that river
7. Terra nullius. ... According to this idea, if lands were not possessed or occupied by any person
or nation, or were occupied by non-Europeans but not being used in a fashion that European legal
systems approved, the lands were considered to be empty and waste and available for
Discovery. ...
8. Christianity. ... Under Discovery, non-Christian people were not deemed to have the same rights
to land, sovereignty and self-determination as Christians because their rights could be trumped
upon their Discovery by Christians.
9. Civilization. The European and later American definition of civilization was an important part of
Discovery and the idea of Euro-American superiority. Euro-Americans thought that God had
directed them to bring civilized ways and education and religion to indigenous peoples and often
to exercise paternalism and guardianship powers over them.
10. Conquest. We will encounter two different definitions for this element. It can mean a military
victory. We will see this definition reflected in Spanish, English and American ideas that “just
wars” allegedly justified the invasion and conquest of Indian lands in certain circumstances. But
that is not the only definition we will encounter. “Conquest’ was also used as a “term of art”, a
word with a special meaning, when it was used as an element of Discovery.84
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To summarise, the act of discovery is comprised of first discovery, marked by the rituals of
making known such discovery (such as planting the flag), and of actual occupancy, the extent of
such occupancy defined by the principle of contiguity. It appears that the three methods
presented by Blackstone, De Vattel and Brennan in regards to the acquisition of sovereignty 85
apply to this act of discovery. Secondly, the act of discovery in itself grants the European
discoverer both sovereign and property rights over the newly acquired lands. However, whereas
sovereign rights appear to be immediately connected to the very act of discovery, limiting all
tribal sovereign rights to ‘free trade and international diplomatic relations’, the case appears to
be different in regards to property rights.

The European discoverer acquires, together with sovereign rights, the preemptive right to
acquire land from the native peoples against any such claim by individuals or other European
nations. However, this preemptive right is limited by what is defined as ‘Indian title’; that is, the
right of the natives to occupy and use the land, potentially in perpetuity, until a decision to the
contrary is expressly made by the sovereign. Within the doctrine, there does not appear to be
any reason to believe that different modes of acquisition of sovereignty (conquest, cession or
settlement according to the principle of terra nullius) entail different consequences for the
acquisition of land. It appears that, according to the Doctrine of Discovery, the operation of the
preemptive European, limited, title is the same whether sovereignty has been acquired as a
result of any of the three modes presented by Blackstone. Consequently, whether sovereignty is
acquired through conquest, cession, or because of the enlarged notion of terra nullius, property
rights are not automatically derived from the mere act of acquisition of sovereignty itself.

The question is whether the Doctrine of Discovery, which has been ignored by Australian
municipal courts, did apply to the acquisition of sovereignty in Australia. Although articulated
by a U.S. Court, the doctrine refers to a doctrine applied by all European colonial nations prior
to the existence of the United States, as confirmed by the documents collected by the Court in
Johnson v M’Intosh. That being the case, and given that the doctrine formed the basis for
England’s acquisition of sovereignty over the North American territories, there is no immediate
reason to deny its application to the acquisition of the Australian territory. Moreover, two more
points have to be considered. Firstly, Miller indicates how the use of the Doctrine of Discovery
to justify colonial claims is neither limited to a colonial past nor it is limited to North America. 86
Secondly, if the doctrine applies universally to all English colonial enterprises, it would
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certainly constitute the valid ‘legal fiction’ in operation at the time of initial settlement to which
Justice Blackburn referred in Milirrpum v Nabalco. 87

The question, then, is whether there are any signs that suggest an awareness of the operation of
the Doctrine of Discovery in Australia. According to Miller, ‘[i]n 1776-1778, Captain Cook also
engaged in symbolic possession activities in what is today British Columbia, Canada. He
claimed to take possession of lands by performing Discovery rituals such as leaving English
coins in buried bottles.’88 It stands to reason that the application of the first of the two elements
of the act of discovery (the performance of the rituals of discovery) had been performed for
identical purposes 7 years before in Botany Bay.

Even more indicative are the words issued by the Admiralty to Captain Cook in 1768:
You are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of convenient situations in the
country in the name of the King of Great Britain, or, if you find the country uninhabited take
possession for His Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions as first discoverers and
possessors.89

In allowing for the potential application of the enlarged principle of terra nullius, the words
contained in the instructions explicitly acknowledge the application of the doctrine of discovery.

If the Doctrine of Discovery was in operation and was explicitly applied as the ‘legal fiction’ of
the time, the colonial powers were aware of the distinction between acquisition of sovereignty
and acquisition of land because of preemptive European title, as illustrated by the dismissal of
Batman’s treaty with the Aboriginal peoples of Port Phillip District in what is now Victoria in
1835.90 The argument advanced by Justice Willis in the Bonjon case91 regarding the status of
Aboriginal peoples as domestic dependant nations appears to be in line with the articulation of
limited tribal rights as one of the elements of the Doctrine of Discovery.
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The term ‘radical title’ (said to derive immediately from the Crown’s sovereignty and articulated
as part of the feudal doctrine of tenure) 92 appears to parallel the notion of preemptive European
title of the Doctrine of Discovery. Hepburn states that
[i]t is important ... to distinguish between radical title and full beneficial title. The radical title that
the Crown acquires as a ‘concomitant’ of tenure exists merely to enable the Crown to become
‘paramount lord’, through the exercise of sovereign power, over all who hold a tenure granted by
the Crown. It is not a corollary of this to assume that the title acquired by the Crown was absolute
beneficial title which would effectively exclude all other claims. It is not necessary for the doctrine
of tenure that Crown title be absolute and exclusive of all other interests. Absolute, beneficial title
to the land can only exist where the land is truly terra nullius and the myths of extended terra
nullius have now been exploded by the Mabo decision. 93

Even more revealing are Justice Brennan’s words in Mabo (No 2):
It is not a corollary of the Crown’s acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that
the Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the indigenous
inhabitants. If the land were desert and uninhabited, truly a terra nullius, the Crown would take an
absolute beneficial title (an allodial title) to the land ... But if the land were occupied by the
indigenous inhabitants, and their rights and interests in the land are recognised by the common
law, the radical title which is acquired with the acquisition of sovereignty cannot itself be taken to
confer an absolute beneficial title to the occupied land. Nor it is necessary to the structure of our
legal system to refuse recognition to the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants.
The doctrine of tenure applies to every Crown grant of an interest in land, but not to rights and
interests which do not owe their existence to a Crown grant. 94

The passage is particularly interesting, as it appears to be in line with the fundamental notions
and elements of the Doctrine of Discovery, while at the same time it introduces the notion of
‘recognition of [native] rights and interests in the land’, an element that is absent from the
notion of preemptive title.

The issue of sovereignty has been dismissed by the Australian courts as non-justiciable in any
municipal courts, potentially leading to the erroneous assumptions that issues of sovereignty can
be disregarded when discussing native title. However, the situation cannot be resolved with such
an assumption.
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Firstly, to state that Australian sovereignty cannot be challenged in the Court as it is nonjusticiable in Australian municipal courts does not entail a theoretical rejection of such a
challenge. It simply states that the jurisdictional authority of the courts is derived by that very
sovereignty, thus making it impossible for the courts to challenge their very reason of being.
Secondly and consequently, although sovereignty is non-justiciable in the courts, it does not
automatically follow that its acquisition is ‘settled doctrine.’ Indeed, if the issue of sovereignty
is truly non-justiciable in the courts, then logic dictates that the courts should be unable to
express any judgment on it, leaving them in no position to settle any doctrine on the acquisition
of sovereignty. If the courts rightfully declare themselves unable to rule on any sovereignty
issue, then any reasoning on sovereignty expressed by the courts cannot be ever considered as
settled doctrine. Finally, the Mabo (No 2) decision certainly rejects the continuos application of
the principle of extended terra nullius, but it does not challenge its initial application in regards
to the initial acquisition of sovereignty.

Two main points are the results of the complex discourse on sovereignty applied to the
Australian context. Firstly, the very authority to acquire sovereignty in the first place can be
challenged. Any attempt to ‘settle’ the legal justification for the acquisition of sovereignty by
using the legal discourse of the colonial power lacks any absolute validity if the authority of the
colonial power itself is rejected. Occupied peoples maintaining a distinct identity, regardless of
the length of time of the occupation, maintain an intrinsic right to reject any authority of the
occupier, regardless of any justification advanced by the occupier itself. At international law, the
issue of reciprocal international recognition is used to settle conflicts between competing
sovereign claims. However, such recognition has occurred between European nation-states, thus
excluding a vast number of ‘unrepresented peoples’. Where Indigenous peoples reject the
authority of the Pope to grant the power of European sovereigns to dispossess non-Christian
peoples of their sovereignty - that is, the authority upon which colonisation has been legally
justified - they also reject the theoretical legal justification that deprives them of sovereignty,
thus making the issue of legal justification of sovereignty far from being ‘settled’.

Secondly, it appears that the arguments used to provide legal justification for the acquisition of
Australian sovereignty have ignored the well established international Doctrine of Discovery.
Moreover, this doctrine appears to have been the very principle upon which the acquisition of
sovereignty was based at the time when such acquisition occurred. The principle of terra nullius
was not expressly used at the time of settlement, but instead was used retroactively in the courts
in posterior judgements. If the Doctrine of Discovery applies to Australia as it applies to all
other lands acquired by the English Crown, even assuming that discovery occurred at the time
in accordance with the theoretically fallacious but legally applied notion of extended terra
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nullius, the exercise of the preemptive European title to property rights was not applied
(according to the Doctrine of Discovery itself) because of the acquisition of sovereignty itself.
The courts do not provide any legal justification but, in direct contrast to the doctrine, they
introduce the possibility of a unilateral extinguishment of Indigenous proprietary rights.

In conclusion, it appears that the issue of sovereignty is far from being ‘settled’ and the legal
justifications for the acquisition of sovereignty in Australia have not provided answers to
multiple contentious points. As a result, it is not possible to disconnect any native title discourse
from these unresolved issues. A potential solution will be explored at the end of this thesis,
discussing the possibility either of different challenges to the issue of sovereignty or of shared
sovereignty. The focus of this chapter, however, is on the legal model of native title in order to
determine the field of exploration of related Indigenous normative protocols. It is already
apparent that sovereignty discourses cannot be removed from the model. Before exploring the
specificity of land rights claims in general and of Native Title in particular, two other issues
need to be addressed: the status of Indigenous Australians; and the ‘recognition’ of Indigenous
law.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CITIZENSHIP AND CUSTOMARY LAW

I. CITIZENSHIP AND STATUS
The sovereignty discourse and debate presented in Chapters Four has a direct influence on the
status of Indigenous Australians within the colonies first and within the Commonwealth of
Australia after. Lindqvist notes that
[t]he fiction of Australia as a terra nullius demanded a mental suppression of the Aborigines.
White historians wrote nothing of the Aborigines’ achievements, or even of their existence. In
white historiography, the Aborigines long remained an inferior race doomed to ‘fade away’ on
contact with Western culture.1

McRae and Nettheim have identified two major phases of the colonial historical reconstruction
of contact and post-contact history, 2

defining the first stage the ‘old history’, which

‘concentrated on European exploits and concealed the price paid by indigenous peoples for
white settlement’, 3 and the ‘new history’ which began in the mid of the 1960’s and ‘explored in far more realistic terms - the relationships between Indigenous peoples and colonists’. 4

I will explore in Part C the historical reconstructions offered by academic historians in order to
evaluate the impact of contact events on cultural protocols, in light of the comparative filter
offered by native title. However, for the purpose of this chapter, it is important to suggest the
relationship between these diametrically opposed views of history and the policies adopted by
colonial and Australian governments toward the Indigenous peoples of Australia.

1

Sven Lindqvist, Terra Nullius (Granta Books, 2007), 202.

2 See, among others, E W Said, Culture and Imperialism (Vintage, 1993), Henry Reynolds, The Other
Side of the Frontier (Penguin, 1981), Henry Reynolds, Dispossession (Allen & Unwin, 1989), Bain
Attwood et al, A Life Together, A Life Apart: A History of Relations Between Europeans and Aborigines
(Melbourne University Press, 1994), B Attwood and S Foster, Frontier Conflict: The Australian
Experience (National Museum, 2003). See contra, Keith Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal
History, Volume One: Van Diemen’s Land 1803-1847 (Macleay Press, 2002).
3
4

Heather Mc Rae and Garth Nettheim, Indigenous Legal Issues (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009), 11.

Ibid. The authors further refer to the more recent ‘history wars’, where a minority group of ‘new right
historians’, led by Keith Windschuttle, have ‘chastised the new historians for denigrating Australia’s past
[and for] producing black armband history.’
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Highlighting how those policies where not only facilitated but also allowed by the historical
perspective adopted, Attwood describes the attitude of racial superiority adopted by the
colonists:
the Aborigines’ decline was inevitable because they were a weak, inferior, archaic and
unprogressive race which was incapable of adapting to the presence of the white man - in short a
dying race who would pass away. By contrast, British settlers, drawing on the knowledge of
intrepid explorers, settled upon the strange and alien continent, and with enormous courage,
fortitude and hard work came to possess it. 5

Against the backdrop of such a view, colonial policies toward Indigenous Australians unfolded.
McRae and Nettheim identify a series of stages of such policies. 6 The first stage is defined as
‘conciliation’, in accordance with the instructions given to Captain Phillips (which I will
analyse shortly).7 Quite understandably, hostilities were inevitable (as I will explore in the
following Part C), leading to the ‘failure of conciliation’ and to a new stage termed ‘the killing
times: the long period of dispossession and despoliation [when] the colonists seized the land,
Indigenous peoples died in their thousands from diseases and massacres until in the more
populated areas they were in danger of total destruction, and the law left them virtually
unprotected.’ 8 The events of this period, that stretches between the early nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century,9 have been reconstructed by the ‘new historians’ cited
above toward the end of the twentieth century.10 The reaction to the violence perpetrated against
Indigenous Australians led to the third stage, named ‘protection’. ‘This was the era of the
“Aborigines Acts” designed to protect and control Indigenous peoples by forcing many onto
reserves and strictly regulating their lives by an Apartheid-like system of discriminatory laws.’ 11
The following stage, called ‘assimilation’, repealed the former policy, although it did so for
mixed motives, partly to pursue social equality but partly also to eliminate cultural difference,
making Aboriginality ‘a thing of the past’.12 The three final stages, ‘self-determination’,
‘practical reconciliation’ and policies of the present, have seen an increase in the debate on
Indigenous rights, opening the discourse to radical claims that challenged, and still challenge,
5

Bain Attwood, ‘Mabo, Australia and the End of History’ in Bain Attwood (ed), In the Age of Mabo
(Allen&Unwin, 1996) 102.
6
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the assumptions upon which all these policies have been previously based, such as, for example,
the ‘Treaty Initiative’,13 briefly supported by Prime Minister Bob Hawke.

What are the legal bases upon which all these policies have been articulated? In other words,
how have Indigenous Australians been considered, and what are the justifications for this? The
initial instructions given to Captain Phillips are quite revealing:
[y]ou are to endeavour, by every possible means, to open an intercourse with the natives, and to
conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in amity and kindness with them. And
if any of our subjects shall wantonly destroy them, or give them an unnecessary interruption in the
exercise of their several occupations, it is our will and pleasure that you do cause such offenders to
be brought to punishment according to the degree of the offence.14

The passage is revealing of the explicit distinction between British subjects and the natives,
clearly implying that the natives are not considered British subjects.

A question immediately follows: when did the colonies begin to consider them as subjects, and
what was the legal justification for this is? However, there are no documents that directly
discuss the issue. The discourse has been partially articulated in regards to the survival (or not)
of Indigenous law in the colonies, but no clarification has been offered on the explicit reversal
of the distinction contained in Captain Phillip’s instructions. The ambiguous position occupied
by Indigenous Australians has been noted by Neal:
[t]he Aboriginal inhabitants occupied an ambiguous position in the new white polity. Colonisation
proceeded on a legal myth: that New South Wales was terra nullius, a land that no one owned,
either because no one lived there or those who did were uncivilised. The governors were instructed
to conciliate and protect the Aboriginal natives. ... On the one hand, the Aborigines were entitled to
the protections of the legal system: on the other, because they did not believe in God, they could
not take the oath and give evidence in court, thus rendering a fairly marginal protection even less
effective. The truth is that for the first fifty years the colonial legal system had trouble deciding
whether the Aborigines should be treated as subjects of the Crown or foreign enemies who could
be hunted down in reprisal raids and shot ... For the white settlers, the Aborigines occupied a status
appropriate to the English legal designation of the colony, terra nullius, a no-man’s land. 15

I have noted above how the use of the notion of terra nullius to justify sovereignty claims has
been posterior to the act of colonisation itself. More importantly, the initial silence on the
13

Ibid, 49.

14

G Barton, History of New South Wales from the Records, Vol 1 (Governor Phillip) (Charles Potter,
1889) 485.
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method of acquisition of land according to the Doctrine of Discovery appears to be paralleled by
the silence in regard to the status of the Indigenous inhabitants of Australia. The ambivalence
toward Aborigines is made even more remarkable by the silence regarding their status, thus
making the successive Aboriginal Acts another example of retroactive assumptions. Indeed,
successive legislation doesn’t clarify the initial status of Indigenous Australians. Instead, it
relies on the assumption that the colonies first, and the Commonwealth after the 1967
Referendum, have always had the power to legislate over Indigenous peoples.16

Yet, as Reynolds has shown,
[a] perceptive visitor to New South Wales in the 1840’s noted that there were “two opinions,
diametrically opposed to each other, respecting the character of the aboriginal population” which
greatly influenced the “justice or otherwise, of the manner in which the natives” were treated. One
class of settlers maintained that the aborigines were “not entitled to be looked upon as fellow
creatures” and consequently adopted the “harshest and most sever measures towards them”. The
second group viewing “with horror the inroad made into the possession of the natives” spoke of
the colonists humanitarian duties to their “ignorant but innocent” brothers.17

Following the assumption that the Colonies first, the States after, could legislate over
Indigenous Australians, the appalling conditions in which Indigenous Australians were placed
have been well described by Markus:
[u]nlike other Australians, any person classified as an Aborigine could be denied elementary
human rights. In most states an Aborigine “under the Act” could be deprived of freedom of
movement and association, have his or her children taken away, and lose control over personal
property. How often this actually happened depended on which region or state the Aborigine lived
in, and on the attitude of the Europeans who chanced to be in authority. In the 1930s European
legislators were widening the definition of “an Aborigine”, in order to formalise control over an
increasing population of mixed descent. Administrators hoped that a wider definition would give
them, among other things, more control over sexual relations and marriage choices, and so halt the
growth of the “half-caste” population. In 1934 Queensland redefined Aborigines as persons of full
descent and “half-castes”, including “any person being the grandchild of grandparents one of
whom is an aboriginal”, and any person of Aboriginal extraction who “in the opinion of the Chief
Protector is in need of ... control”. In 1936 Western Australia deleted reference to caste and defined

16 See, for example, The Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld),
Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW), Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders’ Affairs Act 1965 (Qld),
Northern Territory Aboriginals Act 1910 (SA), Aborigines Act 1911 (SA), Aborigines Act 1934 (SA),
Aboriginal Affairs Act 1962 (SA), Cape Barren Island reserve Act 1912 (Tas), Aborigines Protection Act
1886 (Vic), Aborigines Act 1890 (Vic), Aborigines Protection Act 1886 (WA), Aborigines Act 1905 (WA),
Natives Administration Act 1905-1936 (WA), Native Welfare Act 1963 (WA).
17

Henry Reynolds, ‘Racial Thought in Early Colonial Australia’ (1974) 20(1) Australian Journal of
Politics and History 45, 45.
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persons ranging from “full blood” to certain classes of “quadroons” or persons “only one-fourth of
the original full blood”. People of mixed descent might be exempted from the legislation, but
exemptions could be partial and were revokable. 18

These were the conditions that led to the removal of Indigenous children and to the process of
withholding Indigenous wages.

The ambiguity toward the status of Indigenous Australians led to the confused and paradoxical
scenario reconstructed by Read, based on documented sources:
[i]n 1935 a fair-skinned Australian of part-Indigenous descent was ejected from a hotel for being
Aboriginal. He returned to his home on the mission station to find himself refused entry because
he was not an Aboriginal. he tried to remove his children but was told he could not because they
were Aboriginal. He walked to the next town where he was arrested for being an Aboriginal
vagrant and placed on the local reserve. During the Second World War he tried to enlist but was
told he could not because he was an Aboriginal. He went interstate and joined up as a nonAboriginal. After the war he could not acquire a passport without permission because he was
Aboriginal. He received exemption from the Aborigines Protection Act - and was told that he
could no longer visit his relations on the reserve because he was not an Aboriginal. He was denied
permission to enter the Returned Servicemen’s Club because he was. 19

The Australian Constitution did not clarify the issue; furthermore, its drafting was ‘neither
representative nor inclusive of the Australian people generally.’ 20 The Constitution contained
two discriminatory clauses regarding Indigenous Australians, later removed as a result of the
1967 Referendum: s51 read that ‘[t]he Parliament shall subject to this Constitution, have power
to make laws ... with respect to .... (xxvi) The people of any race, other than the aboriginal race
in any State..’ 21 The italicised words were then removed. Another section, s127, was removed in
its entirety: ‘In reckoning the numbers of people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other
part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted.’22 Although expressly
discriminatory, the two sections do not automatically suggest that Indigenous were not
considered Australian citizens (and previously British subjects) prior to the Referendum. On the
contrary, it only rejects two discriminatory clauses that, although in contrast with twentieth
century democratic statements, are nonetheless within the power of a sovereign country in
discriminating among different classes of citizens.
18 A Markus,
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Nevertheless, the 1967 Referendum has been heralded as the recognition of ‘citizenship rights’
to Indigenous Australians:23
[b]y representing the referendum as the moment when the Aborigines were granted ‘citizenship
rights’, celebration of it serves other functions. Its focus on the political rights Aboriginal people
were granted distracts attention from the substantive economic and social rights typically
associated with citizenship in a flourishing democracy which they have never gained.
Remembered in this way, a sharp but artificial distinction is drawn between the past and the
present. ... The referendum seems to play ... an imaginary historic point of transition from a bad
old racist regime to a good new non-racist one. It stands as proof of the humanity of settler
Australians. 24

Indeed, the referendum constituted an advancement on the (long overdue) path of social justice
and equal social rights for all citizens, but it does not in any way address the unspoken premises
upon which the sovereign claims by the nation-state over its alleged citizens are based. It did,
however, mark the beginning of the more recent struggles for Aboriginal rights, whether this
struggle has been articulated within the parameter of the sovereign nation-state or with
sovereignty claims.25 Moreover, it established the Constitution as the major term of reference
for all discourse on Aboriginal rights,26 as stated by Attwood and Markus:
The Constitution ... was silent about the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Australian
state, at least since the 1967 referendum had removed the references to Aboriginal people. ...
Aboriginal leaders took an especial interest in constitutional change, encouraged by the High
Court’s 1992 Mabo decision which had changed the way in which the law of the land told the
story about the historical relationship between Australia and the Aboriginal people. Indeed, they
invested the Constitution with the most profound importance for their political struggle. They saw
it as the fundamental or basic law of the nation and thus a means by which the Aboriginal
relationship to the nation might be determined. 27

McRae and Nettheim have noted that whereas before ‘[o]ffensive and nonsensical concepts of
blood-quantum were used, as people were designated full-blood or half-caste or, sometimes,
23
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quadroon, octroon and so forth’, 28 the current identification of Indigenous Australians rest on a
threefold test requiring:
• Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent,
• self identification and
• community acceptance by other Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
The test, developed by the High Court in the Tasmanian Dam case,29 has been further discussed
in length in Shaw v Wolf:
It is unfortunate that the determination of a person’s Aboriginal identity ... has been left by a
Parliament that is not representative of Aboriginal people to be determined by a Court which is
also not representative of Aboriginal people. ... It is to be hoped that one day if questions such as
those that have arisen in the present case are again required to be determined that that
determination might be made by independently constituted bodies or tribunals which are
representative of Aboriginal people.30

Indeed the current test present some conceptual issues. Firstly, although avoiding an offensive
and racist terminology based on blood-quantum, it still posits an inevitable connection between
cultural identity and genetic descent. Secondly, it doesn’t take into account the cultural
diversities of Indigenous peoples that, prior to colonisation, would not have identified
themselves as belonging to an identical cultural milieu. Indeed, the third requirement, that of
reciprocal recognition and acceptance by other Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, does not
differentiate between traditional cultural entities, grouping them all together under a common
blanket of Indigeneity that is the result of colonisation but that doesn’t reproduce existing
cultural differences that have been maintained regardless of colonisation. This constitutes what
Attwood has termed the ‘making of the Aborigines’.31 Thirdly, and finally, the test is not the
result of a negotiation with the people to be recognised as Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders,
but it represents instead the imposition of a series of categories by the Australian legal system.

Two fundamental problems are therefore connected to the issue of Indigenous identity and
identification, which are directly relevant in regard to the subjective claimants of any native title
claim. Firstly, the status of Indigeneity rests upon the assumed premise that Indigenous
Australians were British subjects at the time of the acquisition of sovereignty and because of
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that event. The assumption, however, is not only retroactive and historically unproven by
existing documents, but is also not resolved by successive arguments, as shown above. The
issue of identity and citizenship is, therefore, immediately connected to and dependent on the
issue of sovereignty discussed above. Secondly, even leaving the first point aside, the discourse
on citizenship and social rights of Indigenous Australians is intrinsically at odds with the
discourse on cultural rights, as the very test used to identify Indigenous people is not respectful
of traditional cultural protocols connected to status and belonging.

II. ‘CUSTOMARY LAW’
The other issue that immediately follows the sovereignty discourse is the one related to the
survival, recognition and existence of ‘customary law’. In this section, the concept of customary
law is not explored comparatively but only from the perspective of the colonial assumptions on
the continuity of pre-existing customary laws, regardless of how they could be properly
identified in light of a more appropriate comparative analysis. The term ‘customary law’ is
adopted here in its common use, although it has been conceptually rejected as argued in Part A.

Ellis points out how Blackstone’s distinction between conquered or ceded colonies and colonies
acquired by settlement determined the attitude toward Indigenous customary law at the time of
colonisation. 32
Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such where the lands are claimed by right of
occupancy only, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother
country; or where, when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conquest or ceded to
us by treaties. And both these rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of
nations. But there is a difference between these two species of colonies, with respect to the laws by
which they are bound. For it is held, that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by
English subjects, all the English laws are immediately there in force. For as the law is the
birthright of every subject, so wherever they go they carry their laws with them. But in conquered
or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change
those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain, unless
such as are against the law of God, as in the case of an infidel country ... They are subject however
to the control of the parliament, though ... not bound by any acts of parliament, unless particularly
named. 33
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Elizabeth Ellis, Principles and Practices of Law (Lawbook, 2005).

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1765, Book 1 (Clarendon Press, 1976)
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Following the premise of sovereignty being acquired, the distinction implied that Australia,
being a settled colony, had no existing laws. Consequently, all the laws in force in Britain at that
time were also immediately in force in the settled colony. The fact that a settled colony was
actually inhabited did not prevent the imposition of English law because the inhabitants were
considered too ‘backward’ to have any laws in place. These beliefs were sustained by
contemporary theories about the evolution of human society, from a state of nature through the
stages of hunting and gathering, pastoralism, agriculture and commerce. 34

This view, that the law of England immediately and universally applied to the Australian
colonies because of the nature of the acquisition of sovereignty, has been recently shown to be
less monolithic and certain than previously believed.35 Indeed, in R v Ballard in 1829 Chief
Justice Forbes wrote that ‘the savage is governed by the laws of his tribe - & with these he is
content’, adding that ‘in the absence of legal authority to the contrary and consistent with
practices of the North American colonies, English law had no application to crimes committed
between Aborigines.’36 Justice Dowling also stated that, although English law should apply to
disputes between ‘inhabitants’ and settlers, ‘all analogy fails when it is attempted to enforce the
laws of a foreign country amongst a race of people, who we owe no fealty to us [sic], and over
whom we have no natural claim of acknowledgment or supremacy.’ 37

Nonetheless, the view appears to have been the premise upon which all decisions were based
until Mabo (No 2). In 1971, in response to the Yirrkala bark petition of the Yolngu people,
presented with the traditional symbols signifying the protocols connecting the people to specific
portions of the land, the issue of customary law in Milirrpum v Nabalco was approached
differently. 38 Justice Blackburn recognised the following:
Counsel for the defendants relied ... upon the argument that ... in the Aboriginal world there was
nothing recognisable as law at all. The Solicitor-General contended that before any system can be
recognised by our law as a system of law, there must be not only a definable community to which
it applies, but also some recognised sovereignty giving the law the capacity to be enforced ...
Implicit in much of the Solicitor-General’s argument ... was, I think, an Austinian definition of law
as the command of a sovereign. At any rate, he contended, there must be the outwards forms of
machinery for enforcement before a rule can be described as law. he did not deny the deep
34
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religious sanctions which underlay the customs and practices of the Aboriginals; indeed, he
stressed them, and contended that such sanctions as there were, were religious and not otherwise. I
do not find myself much impressed by this line of argument. The inadequacy of the Austinian
analysis of the nature of law is well known. I do not believe that there is utility in attempting to
provide a definition of law which will be valid for all purposes and answer all questions. If a
definition of law must be produced, I prefer “a system of rules of conduct which is felt as
obligatory upon them by the members of a definable group of people” to “ the command of a
sovereign”, but I do not think that the solution to this problem is to be found by postulating a
meaning for the word “law”. I prefer a more pragmatic approach. I take, first, the suggestion that
recognition is in principle impossible because the system claiming recognition is manifestly on the
other side of the unbridgeable gulf to which their Lordships refer in Re Southern Rhodesia [1919]
AC 211. It may be that it is possible to place native systems of law into some sort of scale ranging
from the unrecognisable to the juristically advanced ... I am very clearly of opinion, upon the
evidence, that the social rules and customs of the plaintiffs cannot possibly be dismissed as lying
on the other side of an unbridgeable gulf. The evidence show a subtle and elaborate system highly
adapted to the country in which the people led their lives ... If ever a system could be called “a
government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me ... I hold that I
must recognise the system revealed by the evidence as a system of law. 39

Nevertheless, as McRae and Nettheim point out, ‘Blackburn J decided [that] customary land
laws were incapable of recognition, because they lacked the essential elements which define a
proprietorial interest known to the Australian system: the right to alienate and to exclude
others.’ 40

Justice Blackburn’s judgement, however, is of extreme importance for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it clearly suggests a distinction between the recognition of Indigenous practices as a
system of law in absolute terms and the recognition of such a system of laws by the Australian
legal system. Although Indigenous practices can be recognised as a system of law, and indeed
are recognised as such in the judgement, it does not necessarily follow that such laws are
automatically recognised by the colonial legal system. Blackburn J does not address the
underlying issue of such recognition in the terms presented above by Blackstone. That he relies
on such a premise, however, is implicit in the argument with which he ultimately rejects
customary land laws. In other words, although he allows for a theoretical, general recognition of
traditional system (or systems) of law in Australia, he specifically rejects particular elements of
that system (or systems). In doing so, however, Blackburn J does not formally address the
fundamental premise upon which recognition is predicated.

39

Ibid, at 264-8.

40

McRae and Nettheim, above n 3,121.
111

Secondly, the passage is extremely revealing of the shortcomings of an incomplete theoretical
approach to the legal construct. Even leaving aside the recognition of Indigenous law by the
Australian legal system, the recognition of Indigenous practices as a system of law is
problematic, emphasising the need for the different theoretical approach presented in Part A.
Justice Blackburn’s own definition of law parallels the various phenomenal approaches to the
definition of law presented in Chapter Three. The shortcomings of such an approach are
apparent, as the implicit ontological, political and jurisprudential premises are projected, almost
unquestioningly, upon the Indigenous regulatory system.

The result of this projection is twofold: on the one hand, it generates confusion as to the legal
nature of Indigenous rules, a confusion that Blackburn J begins to address in the judgement but
does not pursue to its full extent; on the other hand, it determines as legal only the cultural
elements that are consistent with the projected categories. Finally, and connected to the second
point, Justice Blackburn suggests that ‘a solution to this problem [of confused boundaries of the
legal] is [not] to be found by postulating a meaning for the word “law”.’ The answer to this
problem is again twofold: the solution is impossible insofar as the postulation is the result of a
unilateral theoretical construction; if a meaning has to be postulated, such postulation needs to
be negotiated. In addition, the theoretical approach must engage with the conflicting issues
regarding legal pluralism and the nature of law as phenomenon or as a construct presented in
Part A, emphasising the relevance of the analytical legal pluralist perspective introduced there.

The dual problems of the unclear existence of an Indigenous system of law as the result of the
acquisition of sovereignty and of the theoretical boundaries of this system of law have been
maintained in successive judgements. Justice Brennan in Mabo (No 2) argued the following:
It is one thing for our contemporary law to accept that the laws of England, so far as applicable,
became the laws of New South Wales and of the other Australian colonies. It is another thing for
our contemporary law to accept that, when the common law of England became the common law
of the several colonies, the theory which was advanced to support the introduction of the common
law of England accords with our present knowledge and appreciation of the facts. ... The facts as
we know them today do not fit the “absence of law” or “barbarian” theory underpinning the
colonial reception of the common law of England. That being so, there is no warrant for applying
in these times rules of the English common law which were the product of that theory. ... The
theory that the Indigenous inhabitants of a “settled” colony had no proprietary interest in the land
thus depended on a discriminatory denigration of Indigenous inhabitants, their social organization
and customs. As the basis of the theory is false in fact and unacceptable in our society, there is a
choice of legal principle to be made in the present case. This Court can either apply the existing
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authorities ... or [it] can overrule the existing authorities, discarding the distinction between
inhabited colonies that were terra nullius and those which were not. 41

Implicit in Justice Brennan’s passage is the assumption that the acquisition of sovereignty is a
settled doctrine. However, the judgement is indeed revolutionary in that it overrules the existing
authorities that followed Blackstone’s distinction between conquered or ceded colonies on the
one hand and settled colonies on the other, completely contradicting the doctrine presented by
Blackstone.

The immediate theoretical consequence is that pre-existing legal systems have co-existed with
the colonial one insofar as they are not explicitly rejected or in conflict with the laws of the
colonies. The articulation of the reasons for the continual existence of pre-existing laws
constitutes one of the most important parts of the Mabo (No 2) decision in relation to land rights
and interest. Nonetheless, the decision doesn’t contain any further clarification on what is to be
considered law, thus potentially perpetuating the projection of culturally specific legal
categories upon precolonial normative orders.

The broader issue of legal survival has been further addressed in subsequent decisions. In
Walker v New South Wales Chief Justice Mason initially stated that
[t]here is nothing in the recent decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) to support the notion that
the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and New South Wales lack legislative competence to
regulate or affect the rights of Aboriginal people, or the notion that the application of
Commonwealth or State laws to Aboriginal people is in any way subject to their acceptance,
adoption, request or consent. Such notions amount to the contention that a new source of
sovereignty resides in the Aboriginal people. Indeed, Mabo (No 2) rejected that suggestion. 42

The statement confirms the implicit reliance on the doctrines reconstructed in the previous part
in regards to sovereignty issues. Moreover, it confirms the new doctrine introduced in Mabo (No
2) that considers all colonies equal in their relationship to pre-existing legal orders:
counsel for the plaintiff ... submitted that the question which arose was whether customary
Aboriginal criminal law is something which has been recognized by the common law and which
continues to this day, in the same way that Mabo (No 2) decided that the customary law of the
Meriam people relating to land tenure continues to exist. ... It is a basic principle that all people
should stand equal before the law. A construction which results in different criminal sanctions
applying to different persons for the same conduct offends that basic principle. ... Even if it be
assumed that the customary criminal law of Aboriginal people survived British settlement, it was
extinguished by the passage of criminal statutes of general application. In Mabo (No 2), the Court
41
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held that there was no inconsistency between native title being held by people of Aboriginal
descent and the underlying radical title being vested in the Crown. There is no analogy with the
criminal law. English criminal law did not, and Australian criminal law does not, accommodate
and alternative body of law operating alongside it. 43

The decision confirms the fact that the Mabo (No 2) decision cannot be used to challenge the
acquisition of sovereignty; such challenge must be articulated elsewhere. It refers to a ‘radical
title’ that strongly resembles the ‘pre-emptive title’ discussed by Miller in regards to the
Doctrine of Discovery, without further clarification on the actual lawful exercise of such title. 44
The decision also relies on a historically defined political principle, that of equality before the
law, which is not intrinsically universal but rather the result of a specific political choice deeply
embedded in the entire legal system. The reliance on such a principle is consistent with the new
doctrine introduced in Mabo (No 2), in that pre-existing laws only survive as long as they are
not in conflict with colonial principles. The argument is revealing, however, of the fact that the
conflict can occur not only at the level of expressed rules but also of the various underlying
levels (such as the political and ontological ones) suggested in Part A.

The entire argument is articulated on the assumption that the two categories considered,
‘criminal law’ and ‘land law’, are, on the one hand, two parallel categories in Indigenous law
and, on the other, that they can be separated. The immediate question is whether these two
categories exist and can be identified as such in Indigenous law. Immediately after, even if these
two categories can be identified, the question is whether they can be separated or whether they
operate as a coherent and cohesive, inseparable, whole. Although I will explore the issue further
in Part C, it is important to emphasise the legal theoretical assumptions contained in the
decision. Mason CJ remains silent in regards to the questions just raised. The questions are
comparative legal questions, asked in light of the arguments advanced by scholars and presented
in Part A. Ignoring such questions not only projects a vast number of unspoken premises
(jurisprudential, political, ontological), but also can produce effects that are unpredictable and
are indeed contrary to the ‘recognition’ of Indigenous laws (however defined).

Indeed, the issue of ‘recognition’ is further articulated in the Yorta Yorta case, decided ten years
after Mabo (No 2), suggesting that Indigenous rights to land, including native title, depended
entirely upon their recognition by the Australian legal system. Chief Justice Gleeson and
Gummow and Hayne JJ wrote:
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what the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown necessarily entailed was that there could
thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it asserted sovereignty. To
hold otherwise would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty and ... that is not permissible.
because there could be no parallel law-making system after the assertion of sovereignty it also
follows that the only rights or interests in relation to land or waters, originating otherwise than in
the new sovereign order, which will be recognised after the assertion of that new sovereignty are
those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom.45

Significantly, the doctrine presented by Blackstone did not require an express recognition by the
colonial legal systems of pre-colonial laws, whereas the new doctrine appears to require a
reversal of recognition, in that such recognition must be positively required and asserted.

This last point leads to the crucial issue of the nature of recognition. The active recognition by
the Australian legal system, particularly given its lack of a comprehensive comparative and
systemic survey and reconstruction, rests heavily on the projection of Australian legal categories
upon Indigenous normative protocols. The Australian Law Reform Commission published in
1986 a report on the recognition of Indigenous laws by the Australian legal system. 46
Recognising that ‘[a]n important aspect of self-determination is the ability for Indigenous
communities to apply their own laws on their own land’, ‘[i]t recommended wider recognition
of Indigenous laws within the framework of the Australian legal system in many areas, but it
stopped short of advocating separate Indigenous legal mechanisms for Indigenous
communities.’ However, ‘[e]ven these conservative recommendations were ignored.’47

Two successive momentous reports have also contributed to highlight the impact that the lack of
recognition of traditional laws has had on Indigenous peoples, the report by the Royal
Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 48 in 1991 and the Bringing Them Home Report
of the National Inquiry into the Stolen Generations in 1997. 49 A vast literature has been
produced, showing the complexities of Indigenous beliefs in regards to what could be identified
as Indigenous law.50 A number of community programs have been developed within the last two
45
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decades, harnessing a measure of self-determination within the structure of the Australian legal
systems. One of the most significant of these programs is the Circle Sentencing procedure
derived from Canadian practices.51 However, the recognition of Indigenous laws by the
Australian legal system is neither negotiated nor is it based on a properly articulated
comparative and pluralist perspective.

The shortcomings are intuitively apparent, and the inherent risk that the projected categories of
the Australian legal system can be detrimental to Indigenous legal protocols has been analysed
by a number of scholars.
The conundrum of how Aboriginal law intersects with the Australian legal system has been a
preoccupation of law reform in Australia for decades. To date, recognition of Aboriginal law in the
legal system and its processes has been piecemeal and haphazard and most Australian legislatures
have been reluctant to formally recognise Aboriginal law ... These perennial sentiments about the
detrimental impact of institutional inertia upon Aboriginal culture have been echoed
internationally. A recent meeting of experts at a United Nations Seminar on Indigenous People and
the Administration of Justice found a number of problems contributing to Indigenous peoples’
ongoing marginalisation. These problems included the lack of official recognition for customary
law and jurisdiction ... the subordination of customary law and jurisdiction to national or federal
jurisdiction. 52

Rather than ‘recognition’ of Indigenous laws, indeed the combination of current doctrines,
perspective and the lack of a coherent theoretical framework have led to what McIntyre defines
the ‘incorporation’ of Aboriginal customary law within the Australian legal system:
Incorporation of Aboriginal customary law means the recognition of certain aspects of Aboriginal
customary law at the discretion of the state legal system. It may take the form of incorporation at
the initiative of the judiciary of aspects of Aboriginal customary law into the decisions they have
power to make at common law. Alternatively, it may be in the form of a statutory provision which
directs judicial and administrative decision-makers of the state to be guided by aspects of
Aboriginal customary law as part of their normal decision-making process ... Such contemplation
of recognition assumes that one system is dominant and that it is possible, necessary, appropriate
or desirable for the “dominant” system to legitimise Aboriginal customary laws by incorporation
or recognition. Depending upon one’s perspective, that may or may not be so in relation to some or
all of the laws in contemplation. Incorporation therefore reinforces a power relationship where the
51
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dominant legal system chooses how and when to incorporate compatible portions of customary
laws. The notion of the law of a sovereign state recognising Aboriginal customary law by
incorporation is not one which leads to the recognition or maintenance of plural legal systems. it is
directed to a single state system ... To the extent that there have been, and will continue to be, laws
and customs of Aboriginal societies in this state which do not have any interface with the state
legal system, then there is a plural legal system operating in the state which may continue to
operate and govern the lives of members of Aboriginal societies within the state. The taking of any
steps towards recognising the existence of Aboriginal customary laws by incorporation, does not
increase, but rather reduces, the pluralism with the state. 53

This passage confirms the contradictory attitude of the Australian legal system toward
Indigenous laws. All judgements presented here, including Mabo (No 2), can be articulated
within the assumption of a singular sovereign entity and, therefore, within the theoretical
parameters of legal centralism. The recognition of the existence of Indigenous normative orders
as a system of laws in Milirrpum first and by the Australian legal system in Mabo (No 2) after,
however, is a recognition of a legally pluralist arena. The attempts to address this pluralistic
arena with a centralist approach as the one presented in Yorta Yorta appears to be both
theoretically unconvincing and practically unsatisfactory.

A blatant example of the Australian legal system’s refusal to consider Indigenous protocols is
the controversy that surrounded the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth).54 Ngarrindjeri
women in South Australia were faced with the cultural conundrum of having to reveal secret
women’s business information or to see a sacred area desecrated. The Hindmarsh Island Bridge
Act was passed, allowing the construction of a bridge on sacred Ngarrindjeri women’s land. The
decision was upheld in various cases. 55 In Chapman v Luminis (No 5) 56 there is a reconstruction
of the principles adopted in the various cases, with the explicit reference to Justice Mathews’
comment that, given the lack of access to confidential information there was ‘insufficient
material from which the Minister could be satisfied that the building of the Hindmarsh Island
bridge would desecrate this area according to these traditions.57 In direct contrast are the words
of Ngarrindjeri women who ‘decided to reveal ... secrets concerning the Lower Murray River in
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South Australia ... when it became clear ... the new State government was determined build a
bridge to Kumarangk (Hindmarsh) Island’.58

The example is significant in highlighting the refusal to acknowledge specific protocols
regarding the transmission of information as ‘law’ (or, using the terminology suggested in
Chapters Four and Five, as ‘legally relevant’), with the direct consequence of disregarding
explicit interests and laws related to land. The words of Ngarrindjeri women are also revealing
of the fact that the epistemological gap cannot be bridged by legal perspectives lacking an
appropriate comparative and pluralistic approach:
our oral history, they can’t take that away. They can’t say the black fellas have no culture, because
they have their stories, and they are reality, not myth. They are now trying to take them away, by
demeaning and talking about our oral history as if it is nothing. In olden days people would have
been punished by killing for breaking Aboriginal law by revealing secrets ... This is women’s
business. Men aren’t supposed to know about these things. My biggest fear since I told of the
secrets has been men finding out. I had to wonder, do I tell? Will they respect the confidence of
it? ... It’s white man’s law, [the secrets] ... had to be presented ... So I stated everything ...
Kumarangk and the surrounding area is the most sacred site we Ngarrindjeri have ever had.59

Courts and legislatures incorporate customary law at their discretion. Such incorporation is
based both on a blatant lack of a theoretical framework and on the consequential ad hoc
recognition only of ‘laws’ that are consistent with the various ontological, political and
jurisprudential premises of the incorporating system. The legal categories of the incorporating
system become the paradigm to define all cultural protocols. It is within these parameters that
land rights and native title have been articulated.
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CHAPTER SIX
LAND RIGHTS AND MABO (No 2)

I. LAND RIGHTS
Galarrwuy Yunupingu tells us that the beginning of land rights in Australia is the beginning of
time. 1 The intimate connection that Indigenous Australians have with the land - and the
articulation of such interconnectedness in legally relevant protocols - has been suggested by
Anker, who writes that ‘[e]ven when claims for land have been articulated on the basis of
economic need, such as to enable self-sufficiency, the desire for land on behalf of Aboriginal
peoples is unlikely to ever be purely economic.’ 2 The ontological and epistemological
implications of a desire for land that transcends economic and legal justifications are directly
relevant to the comparative analysis of this thesis. However, for the purposes of this Chapter I
will explore land rights and land claims as articulated by and within the Australian legal system,
as a prelude to the analysis of native title.

The language used in referring to land and land rights has been successfully defined by Goodall,
specifically in relation to NSW:
I have used the words ‘country’ and ‘lands’ interchangeably to refer to the area(s) for which
Aboriginal people were the owners and custodians. An area set aside as a ‘reserve’ for Aborigines
was and is technically ‘Crown land Reserved for the Use of Aborigines’. The term ‘reserve’ was
used by NSW administrations to refer to such land if it did not have a supervisory manager
resident on it. Aborigines usually called such a place a ‘reserve’ but occasionally they called it a
‘camp’. The term ‘camp’ was more usually used by all parties to refer to an Aboriginal living area
on land not reserved for Aborigines. ... When the Protection or Welfare Board appointed a manager
to live on a reserve and supervise the Aboriginal residents, the reserve became known as a
‘station’ in all official references. In most cases managed reserves (‘stations’) were known ... as
‘the Mission’. ... To avoid confusion, I refer to the pastoral concerns which are often called sheep
or cattle ‘stations’ as ‘pastoral properties’ or ‘properties’. 3
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The same terminology referring to ‘country’, ‘land’, ‘reserve’, ‘station’, ‘missions’ and ‘pastoral
properties’ will be used in the course of this thesis to refer to the same concepts.

By the early 1960’s, no Australian Indigenous persons or groups owned their land by virtue of
being Indigenous. ... The Aboriginal reserves still in place in the late 1960’s were unevenly
distributed across the States and Territories. They were typically large in remote areas, smaller
when located on the edge of country towns and scarce or non-existent in the more populous parts
of Australia. In total they represented a sizeable amount of land. Legally, however, they were
nothing like the land base held by many North American tribal groups at the same time. Under
intense pressure, Native American tribes frequently ceded large expanses of their communal land
to the United States by treaty in the 19th century, but managed to retain “reservations” of
sometimes considerable size. While the United States nationally held title to reservations, it was
constrained by an (admittedly ill-defined) trust relationship and the tribe was presumed to hold full
beneficial ownership. ... By contrast, land in Australia held back from sale and reserved for the use
and benefit of Indigenous people remained entirely under the control of the Crown. ... Despite
many adverse experiences, Aboriginal people often identified very strongly with these reserves
and came to regard them as their land.4

The passage is revealing of the different application of the Doctrine of Discovery in Australia.
Whereas the acquisition of land in the United States appears to be consistent with the Doctrine
of Discovery principles presented in Chapter Seven, in the Australian case there is no consistent
justification for the acquisition of land, regardless of the evidence suggesting the application of
the Doctrine of Discovery to Australia. Land is assumed to have been acquired by the Crown,
without any justification that parallels the example of the United States. Land rights demands
and legislation in Australia are a direct response to such an assumption. Consequently, issues of
sovereignty and of consistency with the doctrines and principles presented above are secondary
(if even present) in the land rights discourse. Moreover, Indigenous claims are often related and
responsive to the alteration of land patterns caused by the reserves system. Finally, Indigenous
claims, pursuing the premise just mentioned, have been articulated in terms of recovery of land.

McRae and Nettheim identify the beginning of the legal avenues for the recovery of the
Indigenous Estate at common law in the 1960’s: ‘[i]n statutory terms, the modern land rights era
began in 1966 when the Dunstan government in South Australia legislated for the grant of
freehold title over reserves to a State-wide Aboriginal-run land trust.’ 5 The language adopted,
the legal categories used and the ontological, political and theoretical implied premises of these
4
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legal structures (Sacco’s and Rivers’ cryptotypes)6 are all framed and articulated within the
parameters of the Australian legal system. This entails a theoretical prevalence of an English
derived and historically developed world view, with the consequence that world views that are
alien and, or, inconsistent with it are often glossed over or completely ignored.

The land rights legislation that developed from the 1960’s has indeed been a response to
Aboriginal political activism and Aboriginal demands. However, the articulation of these
demands with the language of the colonial power and of the colonial legal system shouldn’t
suggest that Aboriginal political activisms wholeheartedly embraced (and embraces) colonial
theoretical world views at the expense of traditional cultural perspectives and protocols, but
only that political strategies operate within the framework of certain power relations and are
therefore shaped by the dominant power. I will explore the adaptive nature of Aboriginal
political activism and political and legal claims in Part C, emphasising the contextual political
nature of these strategies in relationship to traditional protocols and premises. It is worth noting
here, however, that Aboriginal demands voiced in the legal colonial language are not necessarily
reflective of the theoretical and cultural complexes that form the basis for such demands;
consequently, the articulation of Indigenous land rights legislation is more revealing of common
law legal structures than of Indigenous legally relevant protocols.7

Reynolds’ collection of early documents indicates that a discourse surrounding what was to be
articulated in terms of land rights dated back to the very beginning of the colonies:
[i]n 1821, Governor Brisbane told a visiting missionary that the British were taking the land ‘from
the Aborigines of this country’. The Tasmanian Colonial Secretary referred to the Island blacks
who had been ‘removed from their native soil’; Governor Arthur wrote of the settlers as ‘intruders
on their native soil’; his successor, Franklin, argued that the settlers had taken possession of the
land ‘to which these poor creatures have a natural right’; and Governor Denison referred to the
Aborigines as the ‘former owners of the soil’. In Western Australia, Governor Hutt wrote of the
Europeans taking ‘possession of their countries’. On the other side of the continent, Governor
Gipps issued an official statement referring to the Aborigines as the ‘original possessors of the
soil’; and his Colonial Secretary issued an official statement referring to them as ‘the Aboriginal
Possessors of the Soil’. In South Australia, Governor Gawler argued that the local Aborigines had
‘very ancient rights of proprietary and hereditary possession’; and Charles Sturt, his Land
Commissioner, referred to their ‘natural indefeasible rights ... vested in them as their birth right’. 8

6

See above, Chapter Three.

7

See also Gregory P Jones, Aboriginal Land Rights legislation. An examination of the publications
associated with Commonwealth legislation (Canberra College of Advanced Education, 1983).
8

Henry Reynolds, ‘Native title and historical tradition: past and present’ in Bain Attwood (ed), In the age
of Mabo: history, Aborigines and Australia (Allen & Unwin, 1996) 17, 26.
121

Moreover, he writes, mentioning the report of a Select Committee on the Native Inhabitants of
the Empire issued in 1837,
the committee strongly affirmed the importance of property rights. ‘It might be presumed’, the
argument ran, ‘that the native inhabitants of any land have an incontrovertible right to their own
soil: a plain and sacred right, however, which seems not to have been understood. Europeans have
entered their borders, uninvited, and when there, have not only acted as if they were undoubted
lords of the soil, but have punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a disposition to
live in their own country.’ 9

Furthermore, and even more strongly
[t]he Letters Patent drafted for the new colony [of South Australia] were even clearer on the
principle of Aboriginal proprietary rights. They included the clause: ‘Provided always, that nothing
in these our Letter Patents contained shall affect or be constrained to affect the rights of any
Aboriginal natives of the said Province to the actual occupation or employment in their persons or
in the persons of their descendants of any lands now actually occupied or enjoyed by such
Natives.’ 10

Reynolds’ accounts are revealing of an awareness of the possible existence of Indigenous land
interests articulated in terms of land proprietary rights since the early days of colonisation.

However, Aborigines enjoyed no such rights until the late 1960’s. The Aboriginal Lands Trust
Act (1966) 11 in South Australia established the Aboriginal Land Trusts, an institutional body
made of Aboriginal members in which Aboriginal reserves and other lands could be vested. The
Aboriginal Lands Act (1970)12 in Victoria vested freehold title to the Lake Tyers and
Framlingham reserves in the residents of each, while the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority
Act (1972) 13 established the Aboriginal Land Trust, and advisory body designed to hold title to
reserves and to administer those reserves. Bennett writes that ‘[t]hese initiatives were not the
end of the land rights story, for Aborigines eventually came to see land rights as involving the
granting of inalienable ownership rights, a principle not included in the lands trust model.’ 14
This, he argues, gave rise to the juxtaposition between ‘Land Rights’ on the one hand, and ‘State
9
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Rights’ on the other.15 Pearson writes that ‘[t]he negative results in the now infamous case of
Milirrpum v Nabalco (Milirrpum) in which Blackburn J in the Supreme Court of the Northern
Territory held that the common law of Australia was not cognisant of native title, gave rise to a
political response to Aboriginal needs for land.’16

Following the recommendation of the Woodward Royal Commission appointed by the Whitlam
Labor Government, the Fraser Liberal Government enacted the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), 17 which ‘is widely regarded as the high water mark in land
rights legislation’ 18 because of its four hallmark features: ‘a) a strong title to land, b) Aboriginal
control of vital decision-making and c) solid financing arrangements that d) underpin strong
representative organisations for dealing at the interface between the Aboriginal and the nonAboriginal worlds.’19 Mick Dodson has called it ‘a resilient and uniquely powerful piece of land
rights legislation’ 20 and its relevance in the Northern Territory has remain untouched until the
recent Northern Territory Intervention.21 Other States followed shortly.

No single model for land rights legislation existed in the different States and Territories. Instead,
as McRae and Nettheim have noted, ‘each system emerged from the local political
circumstances of the time.’22 Despite a promise from the Hawke Labor government and
persistent community campaigns through the 1970’s and 1980’s, a national land rights statute
modelled on existing State and territory laws never materialised.23 Nonetheless, a few common
issues and traits can be identified. Firstly, the type of legal rights obtained by Indigenous people:
inalienable freehold dominates the national picture, due mainly to the schemes in the Northern
Territory and South Australia. Aboriginal leasehold and reserves contribute about one third of
the total and there is some alienable freehold, mainly in the Northern Territory and New South
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Wales. Secondly, the categories of land are statutorily defined and usually pertain to otherwise
unallocated land and ‘Indigenous land’ (mostly former and existing Aboriginal reserves).
Thirdly, regarding Indigenous beneficiaries, the two most commonly used eligibility criteria in
legislation are traditional ownership and local residence. Fourthly, and finally, processes can
include one or more of the following: transfer, claim and (under New South Wales land rights
legislation) purchase.24 The size of Indigenous estate under land rights legislation has been
estimated at around 1.2 million square kilometres, a total of around only 16 per cent of the total
area of Australia. 25

Goodall has reconstructed the path that led to the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW).26 By
the year 1910, ‘between 1500 and 2000 Aborigines were recorded as living on or in direct
association with these [Cumeragunja et al] reserves. This meant ... around 25 per cent of the
enumerated 7300 Aboriginal population.’27
As Aboriginal people remember these lands, they usually recall them as being owned primarily by
one man, or a married couple, but there were mutual expectations that kin members would come
and work on the land and share its produce at different times of the year. There were then even
more people belonging to extended kin networks who had experience of participation in using the
reclaimed lands. 28

From the 1910’s and 1920’s, ‘Aboriginal people moved long distances searching for work and
safety, but most tried to remain within reach of their own traditional country and their
supportive kin. ... These new living areas were often the camps outside towns in the district.’29

The relevance of kinship relationships in asserting the connection to country will be explored
more thoroughly in Part C, but it is worth noting that such relevance remains almost absent
from land rights legislation. In NSW ‘Claimable Crown lands’ as defined by s 36 (1) of the
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) are lands that
(a)

are able to be lawfully sold or leased, or are reserved or dedicated for any purpose,

under the Crwon Lands Consolidation Act 1913 or the Western Lands Act 1901;
(b)

are not lawfully used or occupied;
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(b1)

do not comprise lands which, in the opinion of a Crown Lands Minister, are needed or

are likely to be needed as residential lands;
(c)

are not needed, nor likely to be needed, for an essential public purpose. 30

Even though approximately 45 per cent of all parcels of land held under Australian land rights
legislation are located in New South Wales, 31 ‘[t]he Act gave freehold title over reserves
presently occupied to the residents, but there was no means whereby former reserves could be
claimed. The only non-reserve land that could be claimed was Crown land that was not being
used or had no future use.’32 Moreover, ‘[i]n recognition of the greater white penetration of this
State by comparison with either South Australia or the Northern territory, there was no
recognition of traditional ownership of land.’ 33

Most authors have been highly critical of land rights legislation. Pearson writes about the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 that
[i]n the absence of Aboriginal people having rights to land as a matter of law, the Federal
Parliament acted to create ‘rights’ under statute and presumed to grant land to Aboriginal
traditional owners. Therefore Aboriginal ‘rights’ to land emanate from the same source as the land
tenure held by non-Aboriginal Australians, that is by virtue of Crown grant. The indigenous people
possessed no inherent or pre-existing legal rights to land. 34

The passage highlights two points. Firstly, it presents a perspective that is in complete
opposition to the doctrines and principles upon which the acquisition of sovereignty
(sovereignty upon which such grants would be based) is based. Secondly, it shows the intrinsic
contradiction of granting land to traditional owners by virtue of their own traditional
connections to such land (which are clearly framed in the protocols of traditional cultural
practices and beliefs) while at the same time completely rejecting any claim of legal validity to
those very same traditional cultural practices and beliefs.

Bennett notes that, on the one hand the birth of the land rights movement and discourse has
brought Indigenous issues to the political and legal forefront, while, on the other hand, it has
also heavily acted against Indigenous interests:
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From a position where few whites paid any heed to their political demands, by the 1980’s it could
be said that even those politicians who disagreed with Aborigines could no longer ignore them ...
The heightened profile of Aboriginal politics could be measured by the inclusion of certain words
into our political lexicon: Freedom Rides, land rights, Aboriginal Embassy, Aurukun, selfdetermination, Noonkanbah. ... [However,] [t]he position has altered significantly since the
passing of the Northern Territory Land Rights Act in 1976, for in the past decade Aborigines have
had to fight harder for fewer successes. They are no longer guaranteed a sympathetic ear from
government, and their opponents now feel freer to attack and criticise them ... Looking back, it is
possible to see the referendum as the high point in the attitudes of white Australia, for there was no
clear agenda in 1967, other than the vague belief in the need to ‘remedy the wrong’. Since then,
many attitudes have hardened, to the point where it is clear that many white Australians do not
share the moral certainty that Aborigines might feel in their cause. 35

Bennet’s analysis is reinforced by the comments made by then Leader of the Opposition,
Andrew Peacock, in 1984:
I understand the relationship between people and land. I well understand that Aborigines have an
affinity with land, but so do other Australians. I have it myself with my farm in Victoria, and it’s
wrong to believe that only one section of Australia has a special affinity with land. What
Australian who has saved and gone without 30 years to his or her own home doesn’t have an
affinity with the land? 36

Not only does this comment show a complete lack of understanding of many underlying
cultural, philosophical and ontological differences, but it also reflects and reinforces a
conception of land rights legislation based on a dominant legal framework that is inconsistent
with Indigenous cultural protocols, practices and premises.

In this regard, Gumbert has highlighted the numerous inconsistencies and fallacies of
anthropological field work often used as supporting evidence in land claims. 37 One of the most
effective critiques of land rights legislation and of its consequences has been articulated by
Rose:
[t]he Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) produces an event in which a European judge (to date all
male) decides whether or not a set of Aboriginal people are who they say they are. The Aboriginal
people in question must produce for examination and cross-examination an identity that meets the
requirements of an Act produced by Europeans. The onus is on Aboriginal people to “prove” their
identity according to an alien means of determining truth and falsehood ... Surely neither justice
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nor reason can be said to prevail under a system that offers “rights” only in the context of its own
power to create a discourse of authenticity, to require conformity to that discourse, and to make
final determinations of authenticity. It is difficult to conceive a more cruel and elegant expression
of cultural domination.38

Indeed, in light of the epistemological framework of this thesis, land rights legislation is a direct
example of legal centralism, predicated on the assumptions of the acquisition of sovereignty
explored in Chapters Six and Seven. The Mabo (No 2) decision, on the other hand, is often
presented as a recognition of Indigenous native title to the land, a recognition of Indigenous
interests in land, hence implying a judicial and theoretical opening to legal pluralism. It is thus
time to analyse Mabo (No 2) in light of this perspective.

II. MABO (No 2)
Nettheim states that ‘[i]t is relatively easy to state the essential decision (or ratio decidendi as
lawyers might say) of the High Court of Australia’s decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2). 39
‘[T]he Court decided by a 6:1 majority’, he writes, ‘that pre-existing land rights (‘native title’)
survived the extension of British sovereignty over Australia, and may still survive today,
provided that the relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people still maintain sufficient
traditional ties to the land in question; and that the title has not been extinguished by
governmental action.’40

In this section, I will explore and analyse a number of critiques

advanced on one of the most well known Australian decisions.

Eddie Koiki Mabo was a Meriam man, a member of the traditional people living in the Murray
Island in the Torres Strait.41 In 1982 Mabo, along with four other Murray Islanders, commenced
action in the High Court of Australia asserting their traditional land rights. They claimed that the
islands and the surrounding reefs had been continuously inhabited by their people living in
traditional social organisations. The claim acknowledged the British acquisition of sovereignty
in 1879, but ‘subject to the rights of the plaintiffs to the lands according to: (a) their local
custom (... ownership by custom); (b) their original native ownership (... “traditional native
title”); (c) their actual possession, use and enjoyment of the said islands (... “usufructuary
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rights”).’42 In claiming continuous enjoyment of their land rights until those rights had been
extinguished by the sovereign, they claimed that their rights had never been validly
extinguished and continued to be recognised, albeit passively, by the Australian legal system.
The State of Queensland attempted to defeat the claim by passing the Queensland Coast Island
Declaratory Act (1985) 43 which attempted to extinguish all land rights claim also providing that
no compensation would be paid for rights retrospectively taken away.44 In 1988 the High Court
ruled that the Act was contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act (1975). 45 In 1992 the High
Court upheld the Islanders’ claim, ruling by six to one that ‘[w]here the Crown ha[d] granted
freehold or land leases to others, native title [had been] extinguished. Where land [had]
remained Aboriginal reserve, vacant Crown land, stock rout, or national park, native title
continue[d] if the local system of traditional law recognise[d] present owners or managers.’ 46
Moreover, ‘[u]nder the Constitution, the Commonwealth could not extinguish native title except
on payment of just compensation.’47 On the other hand, ‘[t]he majority in Mabo held that
extinguishment of native title did not give rise to a right of compensation.’48

The first issue considered in the case was that of sovereignty. Frank Brennan reports that
Justice Brennan (with Mason C.J. and McHugh J. concurring) took as his starting point the
principle stated by Justice Gibbs in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case: ‘The acquisition of
territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged,
controlled or interfered with by the courts of that State’. Justice Brennan went on to say, ‘The
recognition is accorded simply on the footing that such prerogative act is an act of State the
validity of which is not justiciable in the municipal courts’. 49

This point has been already explored in Chapter Four. If issues of sovereignty cannot be
addressed in any municipal court, it follows that the High Court has no authority to make any
legally binding comment on the nature of the acquisition of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the High
Court does provide an explanation of the acquisition of sovereignty, as reported by Brennan:
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Justices Deane and Gaudron said, ‘The assertion by the Crown of an exercise of that prerogative to
establish a new colony by “settlement” was an act of State whose primary operation lay not in the
municipal arena but in international politics or law’ ... Justice Toohey said, ‘A sovereign can, by a
positive act, seize private as well as public property in the act of acquiring sovereignty and the
seizure is non-justiciable’. 50

The final statement appears to be in contrast with (or at least an unclear version of) the Doctrine
of Discovery presented in Johnston v M’Intosh. 51

Frank Brennan confirms that ‘[s]ome Aboriginal groups have questioned how the High Court
can reverse the law on terra nullius while saying it is incompetent to review the act of state
which asserted British sovereignty over the continent.’ 52 Mansell stated even more strongly:
[t]he Court was silent on the equally unjust use of the doctrine to deny sovereignty. The Court
refused to follow precedent on the issue of terra nullius for to do so would be to maintain a legal
fiction based on political convenience. Yet the very same convenience was relied on by the Judges
to shut the door to any Aboriginal hopes for arguing Aboriginal sovereignty in the courts.53

In opposition to this, Pearson states that, ‘[w]hatever the merits of the criticisms, clearly it is
now settled law that no Australian court will entertain any review of the acquisition of
sovereignty by the Crown. If such a review is to take place,’ he writes, ‘it must be a matter of
international law for determination by an international forum.’ 54 Furthermore, Frank Brennan
discusses the feasibility of this issue ever being taken to the International Court of Justice:
The only circumstance in which the ICJ could conceivably be asked to adjudicate on Australian
sovereignty would be if there were a dispute over Australian territory between sovereign states that
are members of the UN. There is no way that Aborigines will ever be able to ask the International
Court to adjudicate or advise on the British assertion of sovereignty over Australian territory and
peoples in 1788. ... Coe’s valiant attempt established that Aboriginal sovereignty is not a matter
that can be successfully challenged in Australian courts. Neither will it ever be adjudicated by the
ICJ. Aboriginal sovereignty is at best a political claim.55
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It appears that such discourse is intrinsically connected to the ‘traditional interests in land’ that
the recognition of native title entails. As a consequence, it is not possible to satisfactorily
eliminate the discourse from the discourse on native title. The power to discuss the acquisition
of sovereignty by municipal courts is denied by the very statements presented by the High Court
above. Moreover, regardless of the decision of the Court to entertain the discourse regardless of
the inconsistency, the justification presented is neither binding (as the sovereignty issue is nonjusticiable) nor it is sufficiently clarifying of the international legal principles discussed above.
Furthermore, the Mabo (No 2) decision does not contain a rejection of the principle of terra
nullius in regards to the acquisition of sovereignty while at the same time it does reject the same
principle in relation to the survival of native title to the land; as a consequence, there appears to
be a logical incongruence that has not been properly clarified by the current legal discourse.
Finally, the sovereignty discourse is advanced only either at an international or at a municipal
level; in Part D of this thesis a third avenue, combining the two levels, will be explored instead.

Pearson’s critique of the Mabo decision focuses instead on another point:
[t]he Mabo decision gives belated recognition of original Aboriginal title to the country. It is a very
pragmatic decision and quite conservative in terms of its application to establishing Aboriginal
title. Coming as late in Australia’s history as it does, the decision will give rights to only a very
small percentage of the indigenous population of this country ... how is the country going to
acknowledge the rights and the titles that have been lost to date - the 90 to 95 per cent of rights
that have been extinguished across the continent?’ 56

It would indeed appear reasonable to imagine that native title would be an instrument perceived
as ineffective by Indigenous claimants, given such a small window of applicability. However,
the symbolic value of native title has been noted by a number of authors. Morton talks about a
‘symbolic substitution’; ‘[m]yths’, he writes, ‘are symbolic narratives. When histories change
and harden into myths, so too do narrative sequences, which go through processes of logical
transformation.’ 57

With this concept of symbolism in mind, the words of Frank Brennan are very clear:
Even though native title provides less security and fewer rights than a statutory title which grants
inalienable freehold (i.e. title with all the incidents of freehold except that the owners cannot sell it
or give it away and the Crown cannot extinguish title except with specific statutory approval),
there are many Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders attracted by the symbolism of native title as
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recognised by the High Court. For them, it is important that the title is not granted or given by the
Crown but is recognised by the courts as having preceded colonisation and as having survived the
assertion of sovereignty by foreigners. ... Inevitably, Aboriginal groups will attempt to expand the
ideas espoused by Justice Toohey relating to possessory title and the Crown fiduciary obligation
towards indigenous people. Justice Toohey was the only one of the majority to find that
extinguishment of native title ‘would involve a breach of fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown
to the Meriam people’. 58

The issue of whether native title preceded colonisation and survived the British assertion of
sovereignty or on the contrary it was later revived by the Courts after having been completely
extinguished by the act of acquiring sovereignty was addressed by the High Court in Mabo (No
2). Pearson rather optimistically asserts that ‘[t]wenty years after the decision in Milirrpum, the
High Court has now decreed that the common law of Australia recognises a native title which
arises from the traditions of its indigenous people. This title existed at the time of white
“settlement” and survived the acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown.’ 59

Although the majority of the Judges presented such views, the view was not unanimous. Bartlett
explains that
[a]ny rationale of native title that ‘fully respects’ the rights to land of the indigenous people, or
which recognises the indigenous people as the ‘rightful occupants of the soil’, dictates that the
source of native title is the traditional indigenous occupancy of or connection with the land by the
people as a community or society. Brennan J emphasised the need for the occupancy or connection
to be in accord with a system of laws and customs and thus be of a community or society.60

The High Court accepted the dicta in Attorney-General v Brown (1847), 61 Williams v AttorneyGeneral (NSW) (1913)62 and Randwick Corporation v Rutledge (1959)63 whereby it was
affirmed that upon settlement title was vested in the Crown. The High Court reconciled this
radical title vested in the Crown with the recognition of native title to land by determining that
native title is a ‘burden’ on the radical title of the Crown. The Crown acquired the radical title
over the entire territory of Australia upon the acquisition of sovereignty, but such radical title
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was limited by the ‘burden’ of native title. The reasoning appears consistent with the concept of
pre-emptive title discussed in Chapter Four in regards to the Doctrine of Discovery.

Consequently, native title is defined as a land right which continued throughout colonisation
unless extinguished. ‘The concept of native title at common law contemplates that no
recognition by the legislative or executive is necessary to give effect to that title. The concept
“accepts that the antecedent rights and interests in land possessed by the indigenous inhabitants
of the territory survived the change in sovereignty”’.64 Mulqueeny confirms this point: ‘[t]he
judgement of Brennan J holds (as does that of Toohey J) that native title survived the Crown’s
acquisition of sovereignty and proceeds to explain that the term “native title” conveniently
describes rights under the traditional laws acknowledged by the indigenous inhabitants.’65

However, although this view was the view held by the majority, a minority view denied the
survival of native title after the British acquisition of sovereignty.
In contrast, the joint judgement of Gaudron and Deane JJ. is admittedly inconsistent with the idea
of the survival of native title. In their view, rights and interests subsisting under the ‘preexisting’ (Aboriginal) law were extinguished by the assumption of sovereignty but
concommitantly ‘reignited’ by the introduced common law to henceforth comprise a ‘common law
native title’. Despite the fact that in adopting this approach the introduced common law is
perceived as having become the domestic law of the whole colony, there are indications that the
premise is not anathematic to the common law’s revivification of certain Aboriginal laws perhaps
momentarily extinguished by the act of State assuming sovereignty.66

The view was that of a minority of Judges, but it did influence successive judgements. McRae
and Nettheim write that ‘[t]en years after Mabo (No2), Gleeson CJ and Gummow and Hayne JJ
held in Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) ... that Indigenous rights on land,
including native title, depended entirely upon their recognition by the Australian legal system
that came into effect after white settlement.’ 67

Had this been the majority view, native title would have indeed been defined as a ‘common law
native title’; that is, as a legal construct of common law, hence based on structures and premises
derived from the common law tradition. However, that was not the case and instead ‘where it
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has not been extinguished, traditional title is given content by the traditional Aboriginal laws in
which it has its origin and the nature and incidents of that title must be ascertained by reference
to those laws. ... Native title, though recognised by the common law, is not (pace Gaudron and
Deane JJ) an institution of the common law.’ 68 Native title is recognised at common law and by
common law, but not within common law. In other words, the recognition of native title is the
recognition of rights existing (or more precisely, pre-existing) outside the cultural boundaries of
common law and of the Australian colonial legal system.69

Chief Justice Gleeson, in the Yorta Yorta case, noted that Indigenous laws and customs
‘constituted bodies of normative rules which could give rise to, and had in fact given rise to,
rights and interest in relation to land or waters.’70 The language is interesting in that it does not
define the Indigenous normative orders as legal systems, thus suggesting either a distancing
from acknowledging those normative orders as a system of law or a recognition of the
comparative legal complexity of such a consideration. Mulqueeny stated in 1993 that ‘[t]here
appears no reason in principle for a distinction drawn between laws and customs recognised for
the limited, if significant, purpose of supporting subsisting rights in land and the recognition of
Aboriginal customary laws of other descriptions.’ 71 This perspective was later denied in Walker
v New South Wales. 72

The consequence of the distinction between land rights law and criminal law, the first having
survived the acquisition of sovereignty where the second had been extinguished has been
analysed in Chapter Eight as imposing a common law structure of legal distinctions and
differences not necessarily consistent with the cultural categories in which Indigenous
normative orders exist. The distinction is thus artificial, suggesting that the first issue to be
addressed in recognising native title as an institution that is not of the common law is that of
defining the nature, the categories, the theoretical premises of native title, in other words the
Indigenous ontology in which native title is embedded. Apart from referring to the cultural
milieu of native title, however, the High Court remained painfully silent on the matter.

Justice Brennan’s own nine point summary of the limits of native title is indeed very revealing:
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1. The Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the several parts of Australia cannot be challenged
in an Australian municipal court.
2. On acquisition of sovereignty over a particular part of Australia, the Crown acquired a radical
title to the land in that part.
3. Native title to land survived the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title. The rights
and privileges conferred by native title were unaffected by the Crown’s acquisition of radical
title but the acquisition of sovereignty exposed native title to extinguishment by a valid exercise
of sovereign power inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy native title.
4. Where the Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest that is wholly or partially
inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to the extent
of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been extinguished by grants of estates of freehold or
of leases but not necessarily by the grant of lessor interests (e.g., authorities to prospect for
minerals).
5. Where the Crown has validly and effectively appropriated land to itself and the appropriation is
wholly or partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is
extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been extinguished to
parcels of the waste lands of the Crown that have been validly appropriated for use ... which
preclude the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title. Native title continues where the
waste lands of the Crown have not been so appropriated or used or where the appropriation and
use is consistent with the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title over the land ...
6. Native title to particular land (whether classified by the common law as proprietary,
usufructuary or otherwise), its incidents and the persons entitled thereto are ascertained
according to the laws and customs of the indigenous people who, by those laws and customs,
have a connection with the land. It is immaterial that the laws and customs have undergone
some change since the Crown acquired sovereignty provided the general nature of the
connection between the indigenous people and the land remains. Membership of the indigenous
people depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual recognition of
a particular person’s membership by that person and by the elders or other persons enjoying
traditional authority among those people.
7. Native title to an area of land which a clan or group is entitled to enjoy under the laws and
customs of an indigenous people is extinguished if the clan or group, by ceasing to
acknowledge those laws, and (so far as practicable) observe those customs, loses its connection
with the land or on the death of the last of the members of the group or clan.
8. Native title over any parcel of land can be surrendered to the Crown voluntarily by all those
clans or groups who, by the traditional laws and customs of the indigenous people, have a
relevant connection with the land but the rights and privileges conferred by native title are
otherwise inalienable to persons who are not members of the indigenous people to whom
alienation is permitted by the traditional laws and customs.
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9. If native title to any parcel of the waste lands of the Crown is extinguished, the Crown becomes
the absolute beneficial owner. 73

The summary shows very clearly the compromisory nature of the Mabo (No 2) decision and of
the ‘recognition’ of native title:
• sovereignty is asserted although the High Court had ruled that it was non-justiciable in a
municipal court, thus contradicting itself;
• sovereignty is asserted by reference to international laws and principles. These laws and
principles, however, have not been thoroughly explored, as some of the doctrines used to
justify the acquisition of sovereignty have been implicitly referred to but explicitly ignored in
the judgement;
• the same principle that is used to justify the acquisition of sovereignty, terra nullius, is
unchallenged in regards to sovereignty but rejected in regards to native title;
• the judgement refers to Indigenous normative orders as Indigenous laws and customs. It does
not, however, address the question of what constitutes Indigenous law. The silence suggests
either a formalistic view of law as a set of positive rules and institutions or the assumption of
the universality of the underlying philosophical categories that form the ontological and
epistemological basis of the Australian common law legal system; the consequence is an
implicit projection of such categories upon the undefined Indigenous laws;
• the distinction between law and custom is never explained, nor is there any reference to any
specific school of thought on the matter;
• the criterion of connection to the land is not further defined, nor it is clarified what it entails.
Is it unclear whether the judgement refers to such connection as physical occupancy of the
land; if that was the case, however, this criterion would be in direct contradiction with point
number 6 of the summary, as the laws and customs of the Indigenous groups whose
connection with the land is in question are not necessarily related to continuous occupancy;
• finally, the connection between biological descent and cultural identity is reminiscent of the
blood quantum used in previous racist legislation; the connection between cultural identity
and genetics is, in light of contemporary studies, outdated and irrelevant.
These last two points will be addressed in Part D.

Over all, the recognition of native title contained in Mabo (No 2) presents two major issues:
firstly, it doe not reconcile all the legal principles and doctrines used to justify colonisation, both
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because of its silence on certain topics and because of internal incongruities and contradictions.
Secondly, it appears to be an opening to legal pluralism, recognising the existence of legal
orders outside of the parameters of the Australian legal system. A comparative methodology to
address the issues presented by this pluralist recognition would appear to be paramount to
address the issue of native title; however, this is not the case and the decision does not introduce
a satisfactory methodology nor does it negotiate an understanding of the Indigenous legal
principles involved in native title.

Evidence of native title, as presented by Keon-Cohen, 74 is based both on documents and on oral
statements, with an enormous relevance given to the oral evidence given by non-Indigenous
witnesses (experts and other). Admissibility of evidence, along with ‘questions going to
relevance ... weight and so on, arose during the trial.’ 75 As Keon-Cohen reports, ‘in Mabo, the
technical question of whether and how such evidence is admissible was never argued in the
High Court.’76 Traditional evidence is ‘evidence as to rights existing beyond living memory
which may be admitted to prove title.’77 Such traditional evidence is often equated with hearsay,
and Keon-Cohen has presented a series of charts highlighting the connection of this ‘hearsay’
with criteria of admissibility.78

It would appear that a precise methodology would need to be established and specific
definitions of Indigenous law would need to be negotiated. Neither the Mabo (No 2) decision
nor the Native Title Act engage with this in depth. Indeed, ‘[t]he Mabo judgement has,
ironically, established criteria at a level of generality which develops prior common law
principles, and which probably renders much of the lengthy and detailed evidence of customs
and practices addressed in Mabo no longer necessary.’ 79 Brennan J stated his criteria thus:
Where a clan or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable) to
observe the customs based on the traditions of that clan or group, whereby their traditional
connection with the land had been substantially maintained, the traditional community title of that
clan or group can be said to remain in existence. The common law can, by reference to the
traditional laws and customs of an indigenous people, identify and protect the native rights and
interests to which they give rise. However, when the tide of history has washed away any real
74
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acknowledgment of traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs, the foundation
of native title has disappeared. A native title which has ceased with the abandoning of laws and
customs based on tradition cannot be revised for contemporary recognition. 80

Regardless of copious references to traditional laws and customs, the test of survival of such
laws and customs appears to rest on specific and individual judgements without a cohesive
theoretical framework to explain both the intrinsic nature of those laws and customs and the
models of their continuity. The pre-Mabo law which governed the trial, reported by KeonCohen, is that set out by
Mahoney J. in Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development ... :
(i) that (the claimants) and their ancestors were members of an organised society;
(ii) that the organised society occupied the specific territory over which the claimants assert the
aboriginal title;
(iii) that the occupation was to the exclusion of other organised societies;
(iv) that the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was asserted by England. 81

Pearson’s comments on the nature of native title are revealing of the shortcomings of this
incomplete theoretical approach:
legal commentators such as Hunt and van Hattem expressed the view that it was unlikely that
native title would be established in respect of regions such as Western Australia, because inter alia
Aboriginal people, unlike Murray Islanders, did not cultivate land for gardens and, rather than
having a ‘tenacious’ sense of individual (private) ownership of land, had concepts only of public or
community ownership. Presumably, the reason why native title is often referred to as a ‘communal
native title’ is precisely because the title is capable of being held by a group rather than by defined
individuals.82

There is a constant reference to Aboriginal tradition throughout the judgement in Mabo (No 2).
Aboriginal tradition is defined by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection
Act as ‘the body of traditions, observances, customs and beliefs of Aborigines generally or of a
particular community or group of Aborigines.’83 Wootten writes that ‘it is clear that the
Aborigines ... regard the traditions as timeless, and their antiquity is independently confirmed
80
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by the earliest European researchers in the area, Spencer and Gillen, whose work commenced in
the latter part of last century.’84 On the one hand, then, a much more thorough understanding of
the Indigenous philosophical basis of native title is required. On the other hand, such
understanding has been always deferred to the works of social scientists, without a cohesive and
comprehensive reconstruction and incorporation within the Australian legal system itself.

Commentators’ evaluations of the Mabo (No 2) decision are quite varied, ranging between
extremes. On the one end of the spectrum are the words of Attwood:
I will argue that the sense of national crisis provoked by Mabo was largely due to it being
perceived as a profound challenge to a traditional notion of Australian nationhood and national
identity. more specifically, I will argue that since the meanings of ‘Australia’ and ‘Australian’ are
primarily grounded in and formed by historical narratives, Mabo (or, more generally, the new
history of which it is an integral part) is considered revolutionary because, inasmuch as it
questions a long established and dominant history, it threatens many Australians with the loss of
their customary narrative and thus the loss of identity and nationhood. To express this another way,
I believe that Mabo forms part of a new historical narrative which portends for conservatives the
end of (Australian) history as they conceived it and, therefore, the end of their Australia. ... Mabo
and the new Australian history ends the historical silence about the Aboriginal pre-colonial and
colonial past upon which the conservative invention of Australia and Australianess was founded. 85

On the other end of the spectrum, the words of Mansell resonate much more negatively:
The Court did not overturn anything of substance, but merely propounded white
domination and superiority over Aborigines by recognising such a meagre Aboriginal
form of rights over land. The High Court had the opportunity to pronounce against the
racism so evident in Australian beliefs of white supremacy and denial of justice for
Aborigines. History will judge that it passed the opportunity by.86
Greater emphasis on the legal nature of the decision has been given by Nettheim, defining Mabo
as ‘a cautious correction bringing the common law of Australia belatedly into approximate
concordance both with Common Law principles accepted in other lands settled by the British
and with international law standards.’87
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In conclusion, it appears that the Mabo (No 2) decision represents an unfulfilled attempt to
recognise legal pluralism in Australia.88 The comparative legal pluralist perspective presented in
the previous chapter is even more necessary because of the silence on the theoretical framework
in which this attempt to legal pluralism is embedded. The question that needs to be addressed is
on the nature of the ‘Indigenous interests in land’. With this in mind, together with all the
unresolved and unclear issues presented thus far, it is now possible to address native title as a
legal instrument in order to determine the cultural protocols to be observed as the object of the
present comparison. Native title legislation can now become the conceptual filter for this
comparison.

88
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NATIVE TITLE

Mabo (No 2), as seen in Chapter Two, has provided an initial opening to legal pluralism but has
also left a number of issues unresolved or unaddressed.
The many outstanding issues left in the wake of Mabo (No 2) could have been resolved by
establishment of a negotiation process (as occurred in Canada after Calder v Attorney-General for
British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145) or through a development of the common law on a
case-by-case basis. However, legislation was deemed essential for three reasons: to validate titles
(overwhelmingly held by non-Indigenous interests) issued since 1975 which were thought to be
probably invalid under the RDA; to create a legislated process that would allow mining and other
development on native title land; and to identify with certainty which land was subject to native
title. ... Almost immediately, a stark dichotomy between a human rights context, and a “real estate”
context, emerged. To Indigenous leaders, native title was primarily a human rights issue. It called
for recognition of Indigenous rights to land, to socioeconomic equality and to self-determination.
It presented the opportunity for a radical reassessment of the relationship between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australia. The hardline State Premiers and many business leaders, particularly
from the mining and pastoral industries, saw Mabo (No 2) as a High Court-created real estate
problem. They wanted the issues resolved by legislation negating native title. 1

The passage reveals the attempt to regulate and control the potential (albeit rather limited)
opening to legal pluralism represented by Mabo (No 2). This is achieved by encapsulating
native title within the parameters of a legislated legal instrument.

I. GOALS AND PROVISIONS
Bartlett, in the introduction to his Native Title in Australia, begins by stating that
[n]ative title consists of the rights of Indigenous people to their traditional land and waters
recognised at common law. The degree of recognition of rights to traditional lands and waters
indicates the extent to which a settler society is prepared to confer the most fundamental of human
rights, equality before the law, upon indigenous people. The dispossession of indigenous people
without their consent or without the provision of any compensation entails the denial of equality
before the law. 2
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2
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The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was enacted with a number of well defined objects.3 Firstly, to
provide for the recognition and protection of native title, by protecting native title from
extinguishment in the future otherwise than in accordance with the Act. 4 Secondly, it
‘establishes ways in which future dealings affecting native title may proceed, and sets standards
for those dealings by the “future act regime” contained in Pt 2 Div 3 of the Act.’ 5 Thirdly, it
provides a mechanism whereby applications can be made for approved determinations of native
title and determinations of compensation. 6 Such determination may be made by the Federal
Court, by a recognised State/Territory body approved under s 207A of the Act, or by the High
Court.7 Moreover, it contains mechanisms for encouraging and facilitating agreed resolutions to
such claims. Furthermore
[t]his is not to say that native title rights and interests may not be determined in proceedings
outside the Act, but rather that any such determination of native title will not attract the statutory
benefits which attach to an approved native title determination. In particular, only one approved
determination of native title may be made for an area of land or waters and the determination may
be revoked or varied only in limited circumstances. Further, even before it is finally determined, a
native title determination application which has passed the registration test under s190A(6) and is
registered on the National Register of Native Title Claims established by Pt 7 of the Act, attracts
certain statutory benefits, including the right to negotiate in Pt 2 Div 3 subdiv P. 8

Fourthly, the Act provides for the validation of acts (past acts) attributable to the
Commonwealth which may have been invalid by reason of the existence of native title, and
leaves open the field to the States and Territories to legislate to like effect with respect to invalid
acts attributable to them. Finally, ‘following the amendments made in 1998, the Act provides
that certain classes of acts attributable to the Commonwealth, which are valid or validated by
the NTA, have extinguished native title: Pt 2 Div 2B. The Act, as amended, also permits the
States and Territories to legislate to the same effect.’9

The machinery provisions are also quite extensive. The Registrar of the National Native Title
Tribunal maintains (a) the register of Native Title Claims, established under Pt 7 of the Act,
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which contains details of native title determination applications which have passed the
registration test in s 109A(6) and which are, therefore, entitled to the statutory benefits of
registration, (b) the National Native Title Register, established by Pt 8, which contains
information about approved native title determinations and other determinations of, or in
relation to, native title, and (c) the Register of Indigenous Land Use Agreements upon which
indigenous land agreements, which have been accepted for registration under ss 24B1, 24CK,
24CL or 24DL, are registered. It is already visible the reliance of the entire machinery provision
on written documentations. This reliance appears to be in stark contrast with the oral and
progressive nature of knowledge in Aboriginal cultures.

The National Native Title Tribunal (the NNTT) is established under Pt 6 of the Act. Its functions
include: the provision of assistance in negotiating agreements (s 108 (1B)), and conducting
mediations with respect to applications made under s61 of the Act (ss 86A and 86B); the
determination of ‘right to negotiate applications’, namely, whether a future act covered by the
“right to negotiate” attracts the special expedited procedure in s 237, and the determination of
whether a future act can or cannot be done where the parties have been unable to reach
agreement (ss 75 and 139); conducting inquiries into ‘special matters’ relating to native title on
the direction of the Commonwealth Minister (ss 137 and 139 (c)); the determination of
objections to registration of an indigenous land use agreement (s 139 (d)). The Federal Court
has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals as per s 169. Finally, the Act also provides for
bodies, which satisfy certain criteria, to be registered as representative Aboriginal/Torres Strait
Islander bodies under s 203AD of the Act.10

The essential task of claimants to native title is ‘to establish that the territory claimed constitutes
their “traditional homeland”, “home country”, or “ancestral home”.’ 11 The elements required
need to show (a) connection, occupation or use or presence (b) under the laws or customs (c) of
an identifiable community, society or group. 12

More precisely, an application for a

determination of native title under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) must include a general
description of the factual basis on which it is asserted that native title exists, in particular that:
• the group and their predecessor had an association with the area; and
• ‘there exist traditional laws and customs’ that gave rise to the claim; and
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11

Bartlett, above n 2, 107.

12

Ibid.
142

• the group have ‘continued to hold the native title in accordance with those traditional laws and
customs. 13

This list is the most crucial element to be considered in light of the comparative perspective
adopted in this thesis.

II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION
Ms McDougall, Country Rapporteur to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Committee, wrote in 1999 that
[t]he original 1993 Act was considered by this Committee in ... 1993. The Committee accepted
that the original Act was compatible with the Convention. ... In the 1996 case, the Wik Peoples v
Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, clearly a pivotal decision, the High Court held that a governmental
grant of a pastoral lease over a given area does not necessarily extinguish Native Title over the
same area ... This left open the question of what exactly constituted valid extinguishment under the
Act. ... The government of Australia has presented its position that the amendments were required
by the Wik decision and merely clarify procedural inefficiencies and create legal certainty while
being faithful to Mabo and Wik and the original Act. But based on my own reading of the cases
and the statutes discussed in the governments’ submission, it appears that the central goals and
compromises that formed the basis of the original Act now bear little relationship to the amended
Native Title Act 1993. The main aims of the original Act, namely the protection and recognition of
Native Title, do not appear to be the central aims of the amended Act. The original Act sought to
establish a mechanism by which to affirm the Mabo decision. In contrast, provisions that
extinguish or impair the exercise of Native Title rights or interests pervade the amended Act. ... In
the original Act, in exchange for an agreement to legitimise past actions by the Australian
government in extinguishing Native Title interests, Native Title holders gained significant rights
with respect to future acts affecting their property rights. ... [The Committee expresses] concerns
over the compatibility of the Native Title Act, as currently amended, with the State party’s
international obligations under the Convention. 14

The concerns expressed by the Rapporteur presents a very negative view of the 1996
amendments to the Native Title Act. The Rapporteur states that ‘Native Title holders gained
significant rights with respect to future acts affecting their property rights.’ However, if native
title had been recognised in Mabo as pre-existing the British acquisition of sovereignty, this
acquisition of ‘significant rights’ would be in contrast with the continuation of those same preexisting rights. The Reports highlights a distinction between the concept of native title explored
in Mabo (No 2) and the legislative construct of Native Title that followed.

13
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Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision 2 (54), 54th Session, UN Doc A/
54/18,para.21(2) (18 March1999).
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It appears that the encapsulation of the concept of native title as introduced in Mabo (No 2)
within a precise legislative framework has severely limited the concept, both theoretically and
in its application. The number of legislative requirements imposed upon native title claimants
has indeed limited the investigation of the traditional interests in land as originated in traditional
laws and customs. The judicial and legislative history that followed Mabo (No 2), in particular
through the enactment of the Native Title Act, appears to have transformed the more flexible
concept of native title into a more rigidly structured legal instrument, Native Title. This
transformation has certainly impacted the possibility to recognise and identify the traditional
legal protocols that constitute the concept of native title. It is therefore necessary to investigate
some of the cases and of the legislation that has influenced this transformation.

Immediately after the enactment of the Native Title Act in 1993, the Western Australian
government enacted the Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 1993 (WA)15 which effectively
extinguished all native title throughout the State of Western Australia, substituting it ‘with
statutory “rights of traditional usage” which would be subordinate to all other interests.’ 16 The
ensuing ‘Native Title case’17 was decided by the High Court in 1995 with an effectively
unanimous decision that upheld the Aboriginal challenges to the Western Australia Act, on the
basis of the Act being incompatible with the Racial Discrimination Act18 while confirming the
legislative power of the Commonwealth to enact the Native Title Act.19

The 1996 election of the Howard government saw a proposed amendment to the Native Title Act
which proposed ‘various limits on the “rights to negotiate” and greater defence to the States and
Territories, guaranteed validity for future renewals of existing interests and [proposed] a new,
much higher, threshold test for the registration of native title applications.’20 Before the
amendment could be enacted, however, the High Court decided the Wik case.21 In analysing the
pastoral leases granted under the Land Act 1910 (Qld) and the Land Act 1962 (Qld), the High
Court found that the grant of pastoral leases did not necessarily and automatically extinguished
15
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native title. On the contrary, native title could co-exist with other interests in the same land to
the extent the two were legally consistent with each other. Brennan CJ issued a minority
judgement, relying on
common law property notions derived from the English feudal system of land inherited in
Australia in 1788. It treated the pastoral lease as a true lease and, using feudal principles,
concluded that the grant was one of exclusive possession which, upon expiry, converted the
Crown’s interest into full beneficial ownership of the land. 22

Hepburn argues that, although Brennan CJ’s argument had been rejected by the majority,
Australian native title is nonetheless still trapped in an inappropriate feudal framework of
property rights. 23 Because it assumes that ownership flows from the Crown, the feudal doctrine
of tenure has strangled the potential for native title law to accommodate Indigenous interests.
She recommends the rejection of such doctrine, in favour of a ‘pluralist property culture, where
Indigenous and non-Indigenous title exist as equalised entities.’ 24 Moreover, the application of
the doctrine of tenure appears to be inconsistent with the idea of pre-existing rights that survived
the act of acquisition of sovereignty.

The government then introduced a series of amendments to the Native Title Act, with the Native
Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) 25. Nettheim has provided an excellent summary of the features
of the Amendments:
• Native title claimants have to satisfy a stringent - and retrospective - new registration test before
they may have access to the “right to negotiate” (RTN) in relation to government proposals for
mining activity or some compulsory acquisitions. The test also represents a barrier to some other
processes under the Act.
• States and Territories may replace the RTN on such areas as pastoral leases and national parks
with weaker processes of their own.
• Native title holders will also have reduced procedural rights concerning mineral exploration.
• Holders of pastoral leases may diversify into other primary production activities without the
need to deal with any native title holders.
• It will be easier for state governments to compulsorily acquire co-existing native title rights on
pastoral leases and to upgrade a lease to freehold, so as to extinguish native title.
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• Native title holders will have a reduced say in a range of government activities on their country,
including management of national parks, forest and other reserves, public land facilities and
water resources.
• Native title holders will have no meaningful say in regard to offshore fishing or offshore mining
activity which may affect native title rights.
• States and territories are authorised to “confirm” a lengthy list of “previous exclusive possession
acts” as having extinguished native title, conceivably as far back as 1788. Many of these acts
would not have extinguished native title under common law principles.
• Generally, states and territories have increased powers, and incentives, to establish their own
tribunals and processes to deal with native title issues.
• Processes for native title determinations will be more legalistic.
• There are welcome provisions for negotiation of Indigenous Land Use Agreements which can
serve to avoid the more adversarial processes under the Act.
• There are also useful provisions to strengthen the role of “representative Aboriginal/Torres Strait
Islander” bodies. But such bodies are also required to undergo, within a year, a process of “rerecognition” by the Minister. 26

The transformation from native title (as a legal concept) to Native Title (as a legal instrument) is
already visible.

As reported by McRae and Nettheim, ‘[b]y the year 2000, there were still only a handful of
positive determinations of native title. Eight years from Mabo (No 2), government resistance to
the recognition of native title remained strong.’ 27 New South Wales was the first State to
recognise native title, but it also extinguished the native title it had recognised in return for
negotiated benefits agreed with the Dhungutti people of the north coast of New South Wales in
the Dhungutti case. 28 The case represents very well the compromising nature of the machinery
of native title. In the Northern Territory, Hayes v Northern Territory restored partial ownership
of the Arrernte people over township areas that could not be achieved under the Aboriginal
Land Rights Act.29 In Western Australia, Anderson v Western Australia represented the first
successful native title case. 30 In the Northern Territory the Yarmirr case 31 was significant for a
26
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few reasons. Firstly, it excluded the existence of any concept of offshore native title, the claim
over sea country being rejected by the High Court. Secondly, it ‘foreshadowed the more
constrictive approach to native title’ 32 that would dominate future judgements. Finally, it dealt
with the issue of qualified exclusivity; the High Court decided that the right to exclude others
under traditional law only applied to other Aboriginal people. This last point has not been
reconciled with further arguments by the High Court with the broader Doctrines presented until
now in relation to the acquisition of sovereignty and to the extinguishment of native title.

Two decisions restricted even further the scope of recognition of native title. In Wilson v
Anderson,33 the High Court was faced with the question of whether a perpetual pastoral lease
would confer exclusive possession on the pastoralists and thus exclude native title for the
Aboriginal people living in the interior of New South Wales known as the Western Division.
Although reminiscent of Wik, the final decision was radically different. The majority noted the
many statutory controls and restrictions on the lessee and the reservations in favour of the
Crown, but it concluded that ‘the creation of a perpetual interest was intended by Parliament to
improve the prospects of western graziers obtaining finance, using their property as a
security. ... [Consequently,] the grant resembled a fee simple interest and there was no room left
for a co-existing native title.’34 The companion decision to Anderson, dealing with similar issues
in the Kimberley region of Western Australia was the Ward case.35 The essential question was
whether native title is truly a ‘title’ akin to ownership, the kind of interest in land that Australian
law would translate into a freehold title.36 The High Court rejected the view that would have
equated connection under traditional law with ownership in Australian law. ‘The result is
extinguishment doctrine more destructive of native title than it might otherwise be.’ 37

It is significant to highlight that the issue of what constitutes the traditional laws and customs
upon which native title is based had not been addressed by the High Court. Instead, it has been
replaced by a very active jurisprudential evolution that has increasingly limited the recognition
of native title (not better defined and, or, recognised within its traditional framework) within the
Australian legal system. The Yorta Yorta case, one of the most significant and dismaying cases,
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addressed the issue only indirectly, and with a highly detrimental outcome.38 It is useful to refer
to the case itself at some length in order to clarify the position of the High Court toward this
point.

It is important to recognise that the rights and interests concerned originate in a normative system,
and to recognise some consequences that follow from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. Upon
the Crown acquiring sovereignty, the normative or law-making system which then existed could
not thereafter validly create new rights, duties or interests. Rights or interests in land created after
sovereignty and which owed their origin and continued existence only to a normative system other
than that of the new sovereign power, would not and will not be given effect by the legal order of
the sovereign. That is not to deny that the new legal order recognised then existing rights and
interests in land. Nor is it to deny the efficacy of rules of transmission of rights and interests under
traditional laws and traditional customs which existed at sovereignty, where those native title
rights continue to be recognised by the legal order of the new sovereign. The rights and interests in
land which the new sovereign order recognised included the rules of traditional law and custom
which dealt with the transmission of those interests. Nor is it to say that account could never be
taken of any alteration to, or development of, that traditional law and custom that occurred after
sovereignty. ... But what the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown necessarily entailed was
that there could thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it asserted
sovereignty. To hold otherwise would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty. ... [T]he
references ... to “traditional” law or custom must be understood in the light of the considerations
that have been mentioned. As the claimants submitted, “traditional” is a word apt to refer to a
means of transmission of law or custom. A traditional law or custom is one which has been passed
from generation to generation of a society, usually by word of mouth and common practice. But in
the context of the Native Title Act 1993, “traditional” carries with it two other elements in its
meaning. First, it conveys an understanding of the age of the traditions: the origins of the content
of the law or custom concerned are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. it is
only those normative rules that are “traditional” laws and customs. Secondly, and no less
importantly, the reference to rights or interests in land or waters being possessed under traditional
laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the peoples concerned, requires that the
normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed ... is a system that has had a
continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty. If that normative system has not existed
throughout that period, the rights and interests which owe their existence to that system will have
ceased to exist. ... Law and customs arise out of and ... go to define a particular society. In this
context, “society” is to be understood as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment
and observance of a body of law and customs. ... To speak of rights and interests possessed under
an identified body of laws and customs is, therefore, to speak of rights and interests that are the
creatures of the laws and customs of a particular society that exists as a group which acknowledges
and observes those laws and customs. ... It is, however, important to notice that demonstrating the
38
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content of pre-sovereignty traditional laws and customs may be especially difficult in cases, like
this, where it is recognised that the laws and customs now said to be acknowledged and observed
are laws and customs that have been adapted in response to the impact of European settlement. ...
[D]emonstrating some change to, or adaptation of, traditional law or custom or some interruption
of enjoyment or exercise of native title rights or interests in the period between the Crown
asserting sovereignty and the present will not necessarily be fatal to a native title claim. 39

The Yorta Yorta case emphasised society and continuity. The case does present a number of
interesting reflections in light of the current analysis. Firstly, it denies the existence of parallel
law-making systems alternative to that of the new British sovereign. This position of the Court
reinforces the notion that issues of sovereignty cannot be challenged in a municipal court but
rather need to be addressed at a political level with the authority that asserts the sovereignty
claim. On the other hand, the existence of multiple co-existing law-making systems is not
conceptually impossible, as testified by the Federal system of Australia, where both States and
the Commonwealth have separate legislative powers. Secondly, throughout the entire decision
there is a constant reference to traditional laws and customs, to the mechanisms and principles
regulating their transmission and to their adaptation. The content of all these, however, is not
further explored. Logic would dictate that in order to determine the nature, the continuity and
the extent of adaptation of those unspecified laws and customs a thorough analysis of their
content would be a priority. The High Court does not address any of those specific issues. It
does refer to a distinction between normative systems and laws, without defining the difference
between the two categories. It is therefore unclear where the boundaries of the legal are
considered to be by the High Court in Yorta Yorta. Finally, the definition of society offered by
the Court is in line with the definition presented in Chapter Two.

Overall, it appears that by ignoring the theoretical process required to identify the nature and
structures of the laws and customs it refers to, the High Court inevitably projects legal
categories and principles that are intrinsic to the common law. The question of what constitutes
continuity is therefore not answered with an investigation and an acknowledgment of traditional
laws and customs, but only by referring to them. It seems reasonable to assume that, as a result
of this silence, the complex of cultural premises that form the basis of the Australian legal
system is projected upon the traditional laws and customs to which the High Court refers to.
Traditional legal principles are invoked but not truly acknowledged, as a result of the failure to
engage in the theoretical process of identification. Finally, the level of adaptability of traditional
laws and customs is not necessarily dependent on a social choice, but rather on the specific
nature of European policies and practices. As a result, the finding by the trial judge of Yorta
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Yorta that ‘the tide of history [had] washed away any real acknowledgment of their traditional
laws and any real observance of their customs’ 40 sound particularly strident. It would appear
that the forced adaptation of Indigenous communities to violent practices of dispossession of
land and identity would warrant a much larger accommodation of the changes, adaptations and
interruptions to which the High Court referred to in the passage above, given the responsive
nature of these strategies of adaptation. Even more so because the strategies of adaptation have
not altered the fundamental structure and principles of the traditional normative system to the
extent suggested by the Court, as further explored in Part C.

Further cases after the Yorta Yorta case led to the latest substantial change to Native Title as a
legal instrument with the enactment of the Native Title Amendment Act 2007 (Cth). With this
Act ‘the National Native Title Tribunal was given some additional powers, a good faith
requirement was imposed on parties to a mediation ... and the Federal Court was authorised to
take into account regional mediation progress reports.’ 41

This brief historical overview shows that the history of Native Title cases and legislation over
the past two decades since the Mabo (No 2) decision has been focussed on an ongoing
engagement with Australian legal principles, without ever engaging successfully with the
underlying question of what actually constitutes traditional laws and customs. As a result, there
has been a transformation from native title as a legal concept open to legal pluralism to Native
Title as a legal construct of the Australian legal system.

III. ELEMENTS
Before concluding this brief overview of native title cases and legislation and before
summarising the essential elements to be used as filters for the comparative analysis of
traditional normative protocols and practices, a few key elements of native title need to be
explored. Perry and Lloyd have confirmed the nature of native title rights as ‘pre-sovereignty
rights ... sourced in traditional law and custom.’42 Two decision confirm and reinforce this. The
High Court explained in Fejo v Northern Territory that
Native title has its origin in the traditional laws acknowledged and the customs observed by the
indigenous people who possess the native title. Native title is neither an institution of the common
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law nor a form of common law tenure but it is recognised by the common law. There is, therefore,
an intersection of traditional laws and customs with the common law. 43

Similarly, in Yanner v Eaton, Justice Gummow observed that
Native title is not treated by the common law as a unitary concept. The heterogenous laws and
customs of Australia’s indigenous peoples, the Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders provide its
content. It is the relationship between a community of indigenous people and the land, defined by
reference to that community’s traditional laws and customs, which is the bridgehead to the
common law.44

No further explanation of the nature of those laws and customs is advanced.

Section 223(1) of the Native Title Act defines native title in the following terms:
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, group or
individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or
waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a
connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 45

The last paragraph (c) seems to be circular in that it reaffirms the premise upon which the
section is based.

However, the High Court in Yorta Yorta clarified the paragraph:
The reference to recognition by the common law serves a different purpose of which there are at
least two relevant features. First, the requirement for recognition by the common law may require
refusal of recognition to rights or interests which, in some way, are antithetical to fundamental
tenets of the common law. ... Secondly, however, recognition by the common law is a requirement
that emphasises the fact that there is an intersection between legal systems and that the intersection
occurred at the time of sovereignty. The native title rights and interests which are subject of the
Act are those which existed at sovereignty, survived that fundamental change in legal regime, and
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now, by resort to the process of the new legal order, can be enforced and protected. it is those
rights and interests which are ‘recognised’ in the common law. 46

Section 223(1)(a) posits the question of what are the rights and interests to land or waters. Perry
and Lloyd note that such a ‘starting point, their Honours held [in Commonwealth v Yarmirr], 47 is
inconsistent with any a priori assumption that those rights and interests must bear the features of
rights and interests traditionally recognised as “real property” by the common law.’ 48 In Western
Australia v Ward the majority used the metaphor of a ‘bundle of rights’, which
draws attention first to the fact that there may be more than one right or interest and secondly to
the fact that there may be several kinds of rights and interests in relation to land that exist under
traditional law and custom. Not all of those rights and interests may be capable of full or accurate
expression as rights to control what others may do on or with the land. 49

This passage is another opening to a legal pluralist approach to the concept of traditional rights
and interests. Nonetheless, Perry and Lloyd remark, ‘while not necessarily equating to rights
otherwise known to the common law, the connection between the native title group and the land
must ultimately be capable of being translated into rights and interests.’50

The question is whether this connection between the native title group and the land as translated
into rights and interests is perceived as inclusive of a series of ontological and epistemological
premises that might not be perceived as legal by the common law. Consequently, another
question is whether these premises are divisible from the rights and interests thus formulated.
The passage, however, suggests the need for a methodology capable of such a translation. The
majority in Ward confirms this:
The difficulty of expressing a relationship between a community or group of Aboriginal people
and the land in terms of rights and interests is evident. Yet that is required by the NTA. The
spiritual or religious is translated into the legal. This requires the fragmentation of an integral view
of the ordering of affairs into rights and interests which are considered apart from the duties and
obligations which go with them. 51
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Moreover, the High Court in Yorta Yorta, as seen above, held that traditional laws and customs
must have ‘a normative or law-making content so as to be capable of giving rise to rights and
interests.’52

In Ward the majority held the following:
[t]o some degree, for example respecting access to sites where artworks on rock are located, or
ceremonies are performed, the traditional laws and customs which are manifested at these sites
answer the requirement connection with the land found in para (b) of the definition in s 223(1) of
the NTA. However, it is apparent that what is asserted goes beyond that to something approaching
an incorporeal right akin to a new species of intellectual property to be recognised by the common
law under para (c) of s223(1). The “recognition” of this right would extend beyond denial or
control of access to land held under native title. It would, so it appears, involve, for example, the
restraint of visual or auditory reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there, or
elsewhere. 53

The imposition of Australian legal categories onto a different normative system accepted as a
legal system, in order to determine the extent of rights and interests that can be recognised
within the theoretical boundaries of the Australian legal system itself is here very apparent. This
projection of Australian legal categories is neither articulated within a strong comparative
framework or discourse, nor it is negotiated in order to provide a combined common perspective
together with the Indigenous normative systems. Both the requirement of connection with the
land and that of continuity of such connection are articulated in the theoretical language of the
Australian common law, without a thorough reconstruction of the pivotal structure of the
Indigenous systems of law to be recognised.

Perry and Lloyd highlight two further points. Firstly, they argue that
[a]uthority suggests that native title rights may also embrace rules of traditional law and custom
dealing with the transmission of those rights and interests. While the question whether this might
extend to the transmission of rights from one native title group to another has not yet been
resolved, it does appear to be clear that native title rights are not alienable outside the system of
traditional laws and customs. 54
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Secondly, they also state that ‘the inherent vulnerability of native title to extinguishment did not
mean that all acts which might extinguish native title could validly be done in disregard of
native title rights, even before the enactment of the Native Title Act 1993.’55

One last element to be clarified is that of biological descent. Bartlett writes that
[b]iological descent is not to be understood as an exclusive or universal criterion of membership.
Brennan J was offering a general commentary, and did not ... declare that every member of the
Meriam people must necessarily be a biological descendant of the community in occupation at the
time of the acquisition of sovereignty, irrespective of other qualifications as a member. In Ward on
behalf of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong People v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 503
Lee J declared that Brennan J’s ‘reference to “biological descent” involves a broad understanding
of descent, not the application of a narrow, exclusive test. He relied on genealogies that
represented ‘accepted social recognition of kinship’ and ‘biological descent in its widest sense’,
and acknowledged that ‘relationship between people, and their relationship with land, do not
depend solely, or necessarily, on biological descent’. 56

The acknowledgement of the disconnection between immediate genetic descent and cultural
continuity is indeed significant. It is not clear, however, whether the author, and the Judges,
would be prepared to disconnect the two entirely, and to accept cultural recognition regardless
of any biological connection. In Mason v Tritton Kirby P accepted that ‘it is next to impossible
to expect that Aboriginal Australians will ever be able to prove, by recorded details, their precise
genealogy back to the time before 1788 ... it would be unreasonable and unrealistic.’ 57 Bartlett
refers to the appropriate burden of proof suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon v
R [1985] 2 SCR 387 58 where the Supreme Court ‘rejected the argument that appellant had to
show the line of descent all the way back to an Indian band in 1752. Rather the court was
satisfied with proof that he was currently a member of the band which then and now lived in the
same area in dispute.’59

The central question left without a satisfactory explanation by the Australian Courts is that of
the intrinsic structural nature of the traditional rights and interests to be recognised, and of the
normative orders to which they belong. Such question has been constantly referred to non-legal
experts, in the majority of cases, to anthropologists. To provide just some examples, Professor
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Berndt, in giving evidence in Milirrpum v Nabalco, used the term ‘local descent group’ in
describing the ‘land owning’ group in traditional law in describing it as follows:
It does not refer simply to a “group of people living in the same locality”, a “co-resident group” although this may well be the case too. rather, it points to a group of people bound to the same
locality by ties of a more than transient kind - ties of descent and kinship, as well as of religion. In
other words, its members are united by a common patrilineal descent, share a given site or
constellation of sites, sacred or otherwise, and can trace their relationship genealogically. Its
territory is defined not so much by boundaries marking it off from similar units, but by the actual
sites which it claims. Ideally, this is inalienable; but members of other local descent groups are not
debarred from entry, or from hunting game or collecting food within its precincts, although they
may be denied access to a site where sacred objects are sorted. This is the land-holding group
linked by special spiritual and ritual ties. 60

The passage contains a wealth of information that appear to be immediately relevant to all
considerations regarding native title.

Another examples is the identification of ‘tribes’ given by Elkin:
The Aborigines are divided into tribal groups of which there were in 1788 over 500. A tribe is a
group of people related by actual or implied genealogy, who occupy and own a definite area of
territory and hunt and gather food over it according to rules which control the behaviour of the
smaller groups and families within the tribe. The tribal boundaries are usually fairly clearly
defined by natural features. 61

Furthermore, Tindale considered the tribe to be the
limit of political organisation ... the largest consistently named and recognised unit known
to aborigines ... [the] normally endogenous unit most commonly recognised in Australia
generally known as occupying a given territory, speaking mutually intelligible dialects,
having a common kinship system and sharing the performance of ceremonial rites of
interest to them all.62

Logic would dictate that, given the relevance of all those observations to the native title
discourse and to the identification of the prominent features of the traditional laws and customs
underpinning native title, the reconciliation of the many perspectives presented above and in the
existing literature would be of primary importance. Moreover, such reconstruction for the use
by the Australian legal system would certainly require an appropriate and precise comparative
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perspective and methodology combined with a thorough negotiated exchange. However, such
reconstruction at law is missing from the Australian legal landscape, being left in the hands of
highly skilled experts in disciplines other than law.

IV. NATIVE TITLE AS ANALYTICAL FILTER
As a result of this long analysis of native title, beginning with the analysis of the sovereign
power to recognise native title through to the legislated nature of the Native Title machinery
made of institutions and legal discourse, it is now possible to identify a few major elements of
native title as the analytical filter for the comparative analysis of what constitute traditional
interests in land.

Native title is based on the assumption that the acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown over the
territory of Australia is undisputed. As we have seen, this does not mean that it is indisputable,
only that the challenge to sovereignty cannot occur within a municipal court but needs to be
voiced within a different, political, arena. Moreover, sovereignty issues, at a theoretical level, do
not even engage with the totality of the colonial doctrinal provisions upon which they are based,
leaving a number of unresolved questions of principle. Native title can only be discussed by
leaving the sovereignty issue aside, yet the discourse of sovereignty is not separable from the
underlying traditional principles and claims that underpin the traditional rights and interests
forming native title.

Immediately following from the sovereignty discourse are the discourse on the status of
Indigenous people in Australia, a status that has been resolved retroactively in a similar fashion
to sovereignty, and the discourse on their legal systems. Assuming that sovereignty has been
acquired and that Indigenous Australians have always been British subjects first and Australian
citizens after, the third point regarding traditional laws and customs become immediately
relevant for native title. The question of what those laws and customs are is essential to the
understanding of the extent and more importantly of the impact of native title. Before analysing
this point further, however, the history of native title needs to be mentioned.

From the recognition of native title in Mabo (No 2) until the present time, a number of events
have occurred, modifying native title in order to make it fit with the Australian legal system.
There appears to have been a transformation from a concept of native title as engaged with in
Mabo (No 2), whereby the boundaries of what constitutes native title had been uncertain and
had referred strongly to traditional laws and customs for its definition, to a concept of Native
Title as strongly defined by legislative provisions and judicial discourses. The discourse on
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Native Title has been advanced within the theoretical boundaries of the Australian common law
legal system, with a continuous but superficial reference to the traditional legal systems in
which native title is acknowledged to originate.

The entire machinery of Native Title is constructed by and within the Australian legal system. It
is a complex machinery, which does not facilitate its own access by underprivileged and
dispossessed communities, and its operation is made more difficult in heavily urbanised areas,
given the nature of the provisions required for the recognition of native title in such spatial/
cultural contexts. The institutions connected to the process of identification and recognition of
native title are those of the Australian legal system, with no participation of traditional
institutions in any other form than those that have been artificially identified, or entirely
constructed, by the Native Title Act 1993 itself.

The discourse is based on arguments constructed within the legal framework of the Australian
common law legal system, with a constant but only superficial reference to the Indigenous
views that underpin the legal discourse and that are inseparable from it. As a result, any Native
Title process operates on the assumption that the rights and interests in land that constitute
native title can be disjointed from the traditional institutional machinery of Indigenous political
and legal relationships, or at least they can be considered in isolation from it. The effect and the
impact of this disconnection is quite significant, as I will show in the case study in Part D.

The recognition of native title has thus resulted in the creation of Native Title as a specific
machinery that only refers to the legal system from which native title originates and within
which is said to exist. The initial recognition of native title represented an opening to the
consideration of legal pluralism in Australia. That is, to the acknowledgment that multiple
normative orders co-exist and that their nature can be considered in terms of law, thus
acknowledging the existence of multiple legal systems in Australia. Such an approach is
certainly more effective in understanding the Indigenous demands and claims and in answering
the issue left unresolved by over two centuries of colonialism. However, the subsequent
legislation and the cases that followed Mabo (No 2) and the Native Title Act have transformed
the recognition of native title into a complex feat of including native title within the institutional
and theoretical boundaries of the Australian common law, without ever fully engaging with the
totality of the traditional legal systems that were claimed to be recognised by native title. The
initial opening to legal pluralism has thus received a very centralist response, both in terms of
institutional provisions and of theoretical arguments.
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The construct of Native Title has thus two major problems. Firstly, it contains intrinsic issues of
unresolved sovereignty claims which also include the status of Indigenous people and the extent
of recognition of pre-colonial normative and legal systems. These issues cannot be resolved in a
municipal court. However, this does not imply that the issues are resolved simply because they
cannot be brought to a municipal court, but only that any decision of the court is connected to
and dependent on the current theoretical assumptions on sovereignty until they are better
addressed in the appropriate political space. Moreover, such assumptions are not unquestioned
nor they have been finally settled. Secondly, Native Title fails to properly identify what
traditional ‘laws and customs’ are for its own teleological purpose of recognising rights and
interests in land. Rather than engaging with a thorough examination of traditional normative
systems, both epistemologically and methodologically appropriate while being also constantly
negotiated and discussed, the Native Title discourse reverts to the principles and premises of
common law, thus failing to thoroughly understand the cultural complex within which
traditional rights and interests in land are situated and the legal relevance of different aspect of
that cultural complex.

As a result, most of the assumptions that underpin native title in Australia are based on
historical and anthropological reconstructions, some of which are also rather denigratory. The
historical and anthropological reconstructions, then, becomes essential in order to determine the
legal relevance of traditional protocols. They will be used to reconstruct the second term of
comparison - that is, traditional normative orders - in light of the analytical perspective
introduced in Part A.

As explored above, the Native Title Act 1993 requires three major elements to identify native
title:
• the group and their predecessor had an association with the area; and
• ‘there exist traditional laws and customs’ that gave rise to the claim; and
• the group have ‘continued to hold the native title in accordance with those traditional laws and
customs. 63

In light of the legal critique advanced in the present chapter, it is now possible to use these
elements as the starting point for the creation of the analytical filter to be used to construct the
comparative observation. The first two points are fundamental, whereas the third appears to be
almost self-referential once the other two are properly established. The reconstruction of the
second term of comparison will thus focus on two major points. Firstly, on land use and on the
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physical connection between people and the land. Secondly, the focus will be on cultural
narratives and protocols that represent and regulate this connection.

The first fundamental question to be asked is that of the theoretical context in which ‘traditional
laws and customs’ are embedded. The first issues to be considered, in light of the model
presented in Part A, are ontological. What is the world view underpinning the normative order?
The exploration involves ontological, metaphysical and cosmological considerations. Secondly,
political and structural premises need to be considered. All these issues must be considered in
relation to normative protocols in order to determine whether such premises are distinguishable
and separable from those normative protocols.

Immediately after, the political and institutional structure of Indigenous groups need to be
addressed. Firstly, the issue of identity of any specific group need to be considered - what
defines the boundaries of the groups to which the Native Title Act refers. Connected to the issue
of identity is that of the spiritual connection to land that forms the ontological basis of
individual and group self-identification in connection to land. Secondly, the normative
relationship of different groups with land need to be explored and emphasised.

Finally, normative epistemological issues regarding transmission of protocols and the nature of
knowledge need to be addressed. In this section, processes of access to knowledge, theories of
knowledge (for example of intuitive knowledge against structured, descriptive, knowledge) and
processes of dispute resolution will be explored, in particular in relation to the normative
connection to land.

As a result of this exploration, it will then be possible to identify not what traditional law is
ontologically but what traditional protocols are legally relevant as a result of the comparison. In
Part B I have identified the legal boundaries of the comparison. In Part C, I will explore cultural
traits that are legally relevant, including theoretical premises and perspectives that are currently
ignored at law and that will prove inseparable and essential to the legal concept of native title.
Consequently, it will be possible to explore a case study in order to measure and exemplify the
intersection between Native Title as a construct of the Australian legal system and native title as
the ‘bundle of traditional rights’ that it refers to, thus showing the impact that the ‘recognition’
of native title has had on the traditional legal protocols that aims to ‘recognise’.

159

PART C
PROTOCOLS

Australia is a country where, for archeologists, the ancient past and the present converge,
for it is here that people survived through major climatic changes, suffered huge loss and
pain as a result of European colonisation, and, almost against the odds, managed to
maintain their cultural identity, now recognised and respected throughout the world. The
resilience of Aboriginal people is one of the great human stories of all time. 1
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The fundamental question of this thesis is: what does ‘recognising’ native title mean?
Consequently, what is the significance of such recognition in regards to the recognition of
traditional protocols? What are the traditional protocols to be considered legal protocols? What
is the impact of the legal concept of native title recognised by the common law of Australia on
those traditional legal protocols? In order to address these questions properly it is of paramount
importance to identify the traditional protocols involved. In Part A, I explored the theoretical
nature of any legal comparison in an anthropological context, and I have addressed the issue of
the identification of legally relevant cultural traits. In Part C, I will focus on these traits, in an
attempt to identify the key elements underlying all land rights discourses.
Rather than trying to define Indigenous law, I will look at normative protocols that cover the
same areas identified by the legal constructs introduced in Part B. These normative protocols which include ontological, epistemological and political considerations - are considered as
functionally, teleologically or structurally equivalent to the legal parameters introduced in Part
B. The result is that everything identified as equivalent becomes legally relevant. Consequently,
it can be treated as ‘Indigenous law’ for the purpose of the comparison.
A vast number of anthropological studies have been conducted on Indigenous Australians. It is
important to note that similar epistemological considerations to the ones advanced for any legal
comparison in Part A are also valid for any other cultural comparison. Cultural perspectives can
be projected upon any culture that is the ‘object’ of study. This requires a constant awareness of
the process of identification of cultural traits. In the case of Australian anthropological research,
a lack of cultural sensitivity is particularly detrimental, given the secret/sacred nature of certain
knowledges. In order to be as culturally sensitive as possible, I am extensively using the work of
only a few scholars who have been identified as culturally sensitive by the Indigenous
supervisor to this thesis. I have indeed consulted a wider range of scholarly work and I will
occasionally refer to it indirectly. Such work has been extremely useful in establishing the
parameters for the reconstruction of legally relevant traditional protocols that is the focus of Part
C. However, direct quotations have been limited to the scholarly work that has been approved as
culturally respectful by the Indigenous supervisor and by Indigenous Interviewees. The
reliability of such work has been cross referenced with the broader range of anthropological
research.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
‘FIRST AUSTRALIANS’

Discourses on Indigenous rights in Australia have increased dramatically, both in numbers and
in depth, from the second half of the twentieth century until today and they have involved a
broad range of arguments and issues. One of the most prominent and probably the most
challenging is the discourse surrounding the claims for self-determination. This discourse
depends on the identification of a specific human group as an independent and finite entity. In
other words, it depends on the definition of a human group as a ‘people’. This in turn depends
partly on the subjective definition of the group as a distinct entity based on the linguistic,
religious, ethnic and cultural practices of the members. Self-determination cannot be separated
from the capacity of Indigenous peoples to define and control their own cultural identities.2 The
current definitions of Indigenous Australians are the result of the process of colonial interactions
and are not necessarily a complete and correct description of a much more complex and varied
underlying reality.
The term ‘first’ (or ‘original’) Australians has been extensively used to describe the Indigenous
inhabitants of the geographical region that is the contemporary sovereign nation of Australia.
This definition, however, implies the existence of a concept of Australian-ness that predates the
European colonial enterprise and the creation of an Australian Federation. It forces upon a
number of diversified human groups a unifying conceptual essence that simplifies a much more
complex and varied reality. On the other hand, taking Australia as the reference point for an
historical overview, it is possible to ask the question of its inhabitation prior to the arrival of the
European colonial powers. In that sense, it would be probably more correct to define its original
inhabitants, instead of original or proto- Australians, as pre- Australians, that is as the ones that
predate the definition of the Australian continent as one unified entity. The question, therefore,
is whether it is correct (and possible) to group distinct human communities together today under
one common and reconstructed unity for any specific purpose. Keeping this question in mind, I
will firstly look at the delicate question of a common Indigenous identity in a colonial and postcolonial context and then focus the attention on the scientific evidence of the human population
of the Australian land-mass.
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Today, two distinct groups of Indigenous Australians are officially recognised, the people of the
Torres Strait Islands and the Aboriginal people of mainland Australia and Tasmania. The term
Indigenous Australians is officially used to embrace both groups. I will use the term Indigenous
(Australians) in the continuation of this thesis to refer to any inhabitant of the land belonging to
a pre-colonial society. The terms Aboriginal people or Aborigines are used to distinguish the
mainland and Tasmanian Indigenous people from the people of Torres Strait. As Josephine
Flood notes, ‘[she] follow[s] correct grammatical forms in using Aborigine/s as a noun and
Aboriginal as an adjective (“Aboriginals” is considered more politically correct, but some
Aboriginal people have told me they don’t like being just an adjective!)’.3 I will use the same
forms in the continuation of the thesis to refer to peoples of mainland Australia and of
Tasmania.
I. THE CREATION OF ABORIGINALITY
Shelley Wright radically states that
[u]ntil the Mabo decision, the legal position of Indigenous peoples’ cultures within Australia was
that they did not exist. [...] That is, there were no recognisably settled human inhabitants according
to European standard of the time. The people who did exist were treated, not as human allies or
enemies in the quest for continental control (as the native populations of America were), but rather
as part of the harsh natural landscape that had to be subdued or eliminated in order for settlement
to succeed. 4

Her thesis provides some interesting hypotheses on the peculiarities of the British colonisation
of Australia. Moreover, it also clearly provides the initial conceptual scenario in which the
constructed concept of “Aboriginality” evolved.
European colonial powers almost always had a need to form alliances with different Indigenous
groups in order to gain sufficient support in their struggle both with native and other European
powers. This has happened during the Spanish conquista of Mexico and Peru, and it is well
documented during the French-English struggle for the control of North America. 5 This need led
to the idealisation of Indigenous groups for political purposes. This earlier version of the ‘noble
savage’ later popularised by Rousseau6 contained both positive and negative constructions; as
long as the Indigenous support was crucial to the colonial enterprise the myths were more
positive, but once the balance of power was established more negative aspects emerged, often
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dismissing Indigenous peoples as bloodthirsty savages or subhuman primitives. Indigenous
peoples of Australia, however, were never necessary as allies to the process of colonisation. 7
Firstly, the British did not have any European rival in the struggle to establish colonial control
of the continent. Secondly, the social structure of Aboriginal groups was such that they were
often numerically overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of the colonists. As a result, the
Indigenous populations of Australia were never divided into allies and enemies.
Distinctions between different linguistic and tribal groups were never recognised by the British as
having either political or economic consequence. [...] Treaties with different groups were not
considered necessary. When Indigenous peoples stubbornly refused to disappear, policies of
assimilation similar to those adopted by North American governments, were implemented. 8

Another peculiarity of the British colonisation of Australia is that given the relative small
number of members of the Indigenous groups and their organisation as independent and
separate entities, armed resistance was never depicted as a military, or war-related, threat. This
has created the myth of the “peaceful” colonisation of Australia. Such a myth has only been
recently challenged by historians that have shown the complexity of responses of Indigenous
groups to the different phases and policies of colonisation.9 The will to simply dismiss any
armed response as politically inconsequential, the lack of a need for any form of treaty and the
radical cultural differences are all reasons that reinforced the construction of the myth of terra
nullius as the basis for the acquisition of British sovereignty of Australia. As a result, this myth
(that lasted until Mabo, for almost two centuries) is strictly linked to the ideological
construction of a common and homogeneous “Aboriginality”.
Until the arrival of Europeans, the human groups now collectively called Aborigines were not
an homogeneous entity. Rather, the terms and definitions currently used, ‘Aborigines’, ‘Kooris’,
‘Murrays’ etcetera, are the result of the interactions with Europeans in the context of
colonisation. The homogenisation of different and separate human groups is therefore the result
of a colonial process. This is the fundamental thesis that Bain Attwood advances in his book The
Making of the Aborigines.10 Attwood proposes an interpretive theory in which he seeks to
explore what I have called ‘the making of the Aborigines’, a process which was determined more
by Europeans than by Aborigines, because they had the power to shape the indigenous peoples as
‘Aboriginal’. The basis of the colonisers’ power lay, primarily, in the dispossession of the
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indigenes, and specifically in the expropriation of their land as an economic and cultural resource.
[...] I deal with the period after ‘the killing times’, and am concerned with examining cultural
forms of domination rather than physical or economic ones, seeing how there enabled European
colonisers to make Aborigines. [...] Although intent on showing how various colonial forces
shaped the structures within which Aborigines lived out their lives, I do not imply that these
determined their conditions of existence completely. It would be erroneous to assume that
Aborigines were merely the creation of Europeans or to cast them as the passive victims of
European colonisation. The aboriginal peoples obviously had a reality independent of European
intruders, and after 1788 they reacted to the European invasion as historical agents. Out of the
exchange of the dialectic between the dominant and the dominated there came a transformed
consciousness for the indigenes, one shaped both by European culture and by their own. 11

The tools adopted by the European intruders to ‘construct’ the Aborigines were ideological and
the resulting construction still inform, to the present day, all relations between Indigenous and
non Indigenous Australians in the way Indigenous issues are framed. Attwood identifies two
colonial forces that exerted the utmost pressure in this ‘making’. The first force is comprised of
the various agents of colonialism, and he focuses primarily on the impact of the missionaries
and their activities. The other force is identified as the the rule of law.
Missionaries had the determination to ‘civilise and christianise’ the natives;
in other words, it can be said that they tried to reconstruct the Indigenous’ sense of time and space.
The missionaries’ initial task was to alter the patterns of movements of the Indigenous peoples, by
settling them as their wandering and unsettled habits were diametrically opposed to the civilised
life they so much wanted to inculcate.12

Moreover, their effort was focused on civilising and changing not only the Aborigines but the
land itself. In doing so, however, they gave the land ‘a new significance which would destroy
what was unknown to them and undermine those meanings so integral to the Aborigines’ sense
of themselves’.13 The process of education imparted to young Aboriginal children was focused
on altering the traditional forms of transmission of knowledge within Indigenous groups by
removing the children from the physical space in which this transmission traditionally took
place.
The Aborigines’ response to these strategies was not a passive one. Attwod states that it was
‘generally part of an adaptive strategy of survival on their part: they were prepared to fake
interest in the missionaries and their spiritual message, mollifying them so that they could get
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their material goods’. 14 The dialectic of these opposing strategies shaped both the ideological
construction of a homogenous idea of “Aboriginality” and the much more complex and
articulated sense of Aboriginal identity.
Although missionaries tried to change Aborigines by transforming their traditional sense of space
and time [...], they were by no means successful. Aborigines reacted in accordance with their own
historical experience and tradition, while various contradictions and problems besetting the
missionary order helped to perpetuate something like their customary patterns, as did some
Europeans outside the mission enclaves. The Aborigines’ assertion of a different spatial and
temporal sense can be seen both on and off the missions.15

More positive images are today common within the wider Australian culture. An enormous
change has occurred since the time when Aboriginal peoples were seen as occupying
the lowest rung of the ladder of human evolution, [where] they represented culture at the stage of
its emergence out from nature - a sign whose value was purely negative in demonstrating how far
humanity had progressed beyond its ‘prehistoric’ origin. 16

Nonetheless, the contemporary images are still the result of a dialectic interactions between
colonisers and Indigenous forces. The images created are often
a highly romantic picture of traditional Aboriginal life, an encapsulation of exotic elements which
could be translated and transformed by novelists, poets, artists, musicians and so on. But that
transformation, when it was made, had little resemblance to the reality of traditional life or, for that
matter, to the changing circumstances of Aborigines, even in urban settings. 17

The most important consequence of this modern re-creation of the ‘imaginary Aboriginal’
results in the popular inference of a ‘scale’ of Aboriginality, with people living a lifestyle
perceived by the observer to be more traditional (according to the reconstructed picture
presented above) believed to be ‘more’ or ‘truer’ Aborigines. This form of contemporary racism
is based on the accumulation of ideological constructions throughout the entire colonial period
and perpetrates a distorted representation of Indigenous realities and identity. As Wright says,
[a]lthough we, as migrant Australians, might feel admiration and even pride in our shared cultural
heritage with such an ancient and spiritual people, we are still projecting our fantasies of
“Aboriginality” onto real Indigenous peoples who may or may not appreciate the position we
assign to them. 18
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The result of this ongoing dialectical interaction between a multiplicity of separate Indigenous
groups and colonial forces is double. On the one hand, it determines the nature of all
contemporary discourses on Indigenous rights. It shapes their language and their underlying
ideological frameworks. It also shapes the way in which identity is constructed in different
Indigenous groups. Because of that, there is often a difficulty of incorporating the complex and
varied realities of Indigenous groups and of their adapted and modified sense of identity within
the general discourses. On the other hand, it forces and homogenisation of different and separate
groups. The result is that
[t]his false appearance of unity presents us with one consequence of our depiction of the
“imaginary Aboriginal”. Real Indigenous persons have enormous difficulties making claims and
negotiating positions with governments and other bodies, not only because of the diversity of
Indigenous societies which is a natural outcome of the shape of Indigenous groups across the
country, but also because our own cultural traditions demand that there be “one” voice, “one”
tradition. 19

Therefore, ‘recognition of Indigenous peoples as culturally distinct entities is essential in
establishing effective bargaining positions’.20 If that is the case, it is consequently necessary to
briefly reconstruct the events that have shaped this dialectical interaction in order to identify the
constructions that have occurred in the historical representation of events, in the ideological
depiction of Indigenous Australians and in the legal events that have taken place since 1788.
Through this diachronical overview of events it will be possible to identify myths and
constructions that have determined the ideological framework in which Native Title legislation
has been inscribed.
II. POPULATING AUSTRALIA
When did modern humans first arrive in Australia? It is important to remember that according to
Aboriginal spirituality, the question of initial habitation of Australia is strictly related to the
concept of the Dreaming, the creation time. According to Indigenous knowledge, humans have
inhabited the land since the time of creation. In this perspective, therefore, the question of
original population of Australia is either invalid or inconsequential.
The truth is, of course, that my own people, the Riratjungi, are descended from the great Djankawa
who came from the island of Baralku, far across the sea. Our spirits return to Baralku when we die.
Djankawa came in his canoe with his two sisters, following the morning star which guided them to
19
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the shores of Yelangabara on the eastern coast of Arnhem Land. They walked far across the
country following the rain clouds. When they wanted water they plunged their digging stick into
the ground and fresh water followed. From them we learnt the names of all the creatures on the
land and they taught us all our Law. 21

This brief example of a creation story is just one of the many Aboriginal creation stories.
Ancestral events contained in these stories have great significance for Aboriginal peoples, for
they express a particular relationship with the land and with other members of the community.
The events that occurred during the Dreaming shaped the land and established ‘a system of
preservation and practice of this knowledge that constantly reaffirms custodianship of the
land’. 22 However, the present work is not an attempt to compare different cosmogonies; its goal
is to present a comparative legal analysis embedded in a theoretical model derived from the
contemporary scientific discourse. As a result of this, I shall briefly present the most recent
scientific theories on the human population of the Australian continent to serve as the basis for
the present discourse, yet all the while keeping in mind the existence of different cosmogonical
paradigms related to the question of ‘origin’.
The most recent scientific theories on the human population of the globe by modern humans are
based on models created by the global analysis and mapping of human DNA.23 Recent
evolutions in genetic analysis have allowed scientists to group human populations according to
the shared mutations of mythocondrial DNA (mtDNA) and Y Chromosome.24 Using this
models, it has been possible to extend the temporal boundaries of the origin of our species in
Africa to between 120000 and 150000 years ago. 25 According to these models, anatomically
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modern humans arrived in Australia between 55000 and 70000 years ago, crossing a then much
narrower water channel between Indonesia and Australia.
This dating is consistent with archeological sites throughout the entire continent. The oldest
rock art is estimated to be roughly 35000 years old, and it consists of hand-prints, handstenciles, cupules (small cup-shaped depressions) and petroglyphs.26 Stone tools found in the
Malakunanja and Nauwalabila rock shelters in Kakadu national Park have been dated to be
between 55000 and 65000 years old and are consistent with the genetic model.27
Probably the most important archeological site is that of Lake Mungo in the Willandra Lake
region. A number of buried skeletons have been uncovered and recorded in the area since
1968.28 Paleoanthropologist Alan Thorne dated the remains as 60000 years old,29 a date that
appears to be consistent with the genetic indications. The particular relevance of the Mungo
remains is manifold. Firstly, it proves the antiquity of human population of Australia. Secondly,
it supports the theory that the settlement of Australia occurred immediately also toward the
interior of the continent, where people could benefit of the abundant game of the central
plains.30 Thirdly, the Mungo burials are of the utmost importance in testifying the cultural
continuity of Aboriginal cultures. In fact, the remains present indication of funerary practices
similar to those encountered after 1788. 31 Finally, the remains are important because of their
physical characteristics as compared to remains found in other parts of Australia.
Berndt and Berndt have noted that specific conditions, like environment and diet in addition to
mutations and common genetic variations throughout 60000 years, have led to regional
differences among Aborigines, thus de-buffing the previous supposition that Aborigines were a
homogeneous people substantially of the same stock. 32

Although common physical
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characteristics are readily recognisable, nonetheless regional differences (developed over 60000
thousand years and most likely preserved by selected marriages) are still immediately visible to
Indigenous people, who are often able to identify members of a specific group or even of a
specific family by simply looking at their physical appearance. 33
No modern contemporary, living man, the Aborigines included, is identical with palaeolithic or
neolithic man. [...] The Aborigines are not survivals with a stone-age culture. They are our
contemporaries, modern men and women, motivated by the same basic urges as ourselves, but
traditionally with a different way of living, a different outlook, different values. And difference
does not necessarily imply inequality.34

This quote by Berndt and Berndt strongly dispel the racist idea that Aborigines were the
‘remains’ of a stone-age people, eventually and inevitably bound to disappear in the ‘tide of
history’. They are instead a very diversified number of peoples, whose differences evolved
because of regional realities and historical evolution. Nonetheless, some common traits have
been identified and can be applied to all Aborigines during the 60000 or more years of
occupation of Australia.
The first common characteristic is that of physical adaptation to the environment that resulted in
regional differences of common physical characteristics. The second common element is that of
a related cultural diversification, even though similar cultural traits have been identified
throughout all of Australia (although often very general traits, loosely connected).35 The third
element is that of both the antiquity and the continuity of cultural practices throughout
Aboriginal Australia. Josephine Flood describes this last trait as a particularly strong form of
cultural conservatism - that is, the long-term continuity of specific traditions - in which cultural
traits exerted a strong pressure against innovation. 36 It is undeniable, in any case, that such
cultural conservatism allowed cultural practices to adapt to the environmental changes that
occurred at the end of the last Ice Age without any dramatic change, but very progressively
instead.
Human inhabitation of Australia has had itself an impact on the environment over the human
occupation of Australia, in two different and yet related ways. Firstly with the extensive use of
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the land management technique described as ‘firestick farming’ by Rhys Jones, 37 in which fire
was used extensively both to increase and control food availability and to control the risk of
accidental fires; the protracted use of this technique has altered the flora of Australia. Secondly,
humans played a pivotal role in the extinction of the Australian megafauna.38 The extinction of
Pleistocene animals of a much grander size than contemporary fauna occurred worldwide, and it
is connected to the radical change in climate and in environmental conditions at the end of the
last Ice Age. Human hunters, however, have played a tremendous role in contributing to these
extinction events, although their role varies according to the geographical region in which they
occurred and to the animals involved. 39 Research has shown that a relatively sudden extinction
of certain species occurred in Australia before the height of the last glaciation, suggesting that
the role of human hunters was crucial. 40
One interviewee downplayed the overall role of human impact on the extinction of the
megafauna by pointing out that two reasons prevented hunters from relying on bigger prays as
the main source of food.41 The first reason advanced was the lack of food storage facilities that
would have wasted most of the acquired meat, the second referred to the relative danger in the
physical confrontation with bigger animals. 42
However, regardless of the scale of the impact of human settlement of Australia, two elements
must be noted. On the one hand, changes produced by both environmental changes and human
impact have been met with adaptive strategies that did not deplete the natural resources. On the
other hand, these strategies were encoded in a relatively stable process of cultural adaptation, in
which change occurred slowly and seemed to be non-existent, reinforcing the characteristics of
cultural continuity and social conservatism specific to all Aboriginal peoples.

If the original inhabitants of Australia developed rather distinct and independent cultural traits
throughout the millennia that predate the arrival of Europeans, is it then possible to group those
distinct traits within common categories generally applied to the entire Aboriginal population?
Anthropological research seems to answer positively to the question, by identifying some more
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or less shared commonalities.43 It is, however, imperative to remain constantly aware of the
independent nature of Aboriginal cultures throughout Australia; especially so for the purpose of
my comparative analysis, in order to avoid the mistake of imposing cultural traits that do not
belong to the communities being part of the research.
If the first reality shared throughout all Aboriginal communities is that of a multiplicity of
independent and autonomous groups, it is therefore necessary to analyse the way Aboriginal
groups are identified and identify themselves.44 This is particularly relevant in regard to the
social structure of Aboriginal groups themselves45 in relation to land.46
III. TRIBES AND CLANS
Cultural anthropologists have defined human societies as belonging to four general archetypes:
bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states. 47 Bands generally consist of small groups connected by
kinship ties and are characterised by an often egalitarian nature and a very informal leadership,
in which older members of the group are often looked to for guidance and advice and decisions
are made on a consensual basis; information are generally transmitted orally and nomadism that is, regular mobility and lack of a single base of residence - is common.48 Tribes are human
groups that share a common linguistic identification and a common identification with the area
with which that language is traditionally identified, provided that they themselves acknowledge
this; although less egalitarian in nature and possessing a hierarchical structure, unlike chiefdoms
and states they are still oriented around kinship and a shared belief system.49
In regard to Aboriginal Australia, a number of terms are used to describe the basic social
structures (neither chiefdom nor state are ever used as defining concepts, hence I omit to
describe their meaning here). The term tribe is commonly used to refer and identify the broader
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linguistic groups. At the time of European contact in the seventeenth century an estimated of
between 250 and 700 distinct linguistic groups50 existed, spread among a total population
ranging between 300000 and one million. 51
Two maps dissecting Australia into the territorial areas covered by these linguistic groups are
commonly used as references: the Tindale map (at the moment the most commonly used one in
the Northern Territory)52 and the Horton map.53 It is interesting to note that the two are not
identical and differ sometimes quite significantly. Although commonly used, the value of this
strict division in linguistic groups as the ultimate social reference for Aboriginal social
structures needs to be reduced, as it fails to portray the much more complex and flexible nature
of Aboriginal political units and social organisation.
As noted by Josephine Flood, Aboriginal tribes were loose linguistic groupings, void of either
fixed settlements or political units in the form of common villages. Moreover, ‘tribal members
did not act collectively as a social, economic or military unit. There was no racial solidarity and
tribesmen did not regularly fight together against invaders.’ 54 The absolute relevance of tribal
boundaries is connected to the spiritual belief system common throughout all Aboriginal
Australia, as remarked by Berndt:
the true tribal country is that in which the great mythical beings travelled or performed exploits,
instituted rituals, created the most important local features, before perhaps disappearing into the
ground or the sky or assuming a different shape. Through his links with these beings, an
Aboriginal is deeply attached spiritually to his own land ... They look back to it as their spirit
home, and try to return to it now and then for ritual purposes. When they are near death, one of
their main wishes is to get back and die in their own country. 55

Tribal boundaries were much less relevant than the picture presented by this division of
Australia in tribes would suggest. In fact,
contrary to popular belief, tribal territories and boundaries are, or were, relatively flexible. Also,
people were not invariably afraid to move across the territory of an adjacent tribe. As a rule, they
had grounds for fear only if they deliberately or inadvertently interfered with a sacred site ...
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Elkin ... points out that there were, as far as we know, no wars deliberately designed to take over a
stretch of country, or to conquer an enemy. 56

As a result, tribal connections become relevant in ceremonial and trade matters as tribal
gatherings revolving around specific ceremonies guaranteed the space for trade and marriage
opportunities and to settle disputes between groups. However, these gathering remarks the
looseness of tribal connections and highlight the fact that the fundamental and ultimate political
organisation was what could be classified as a band rather than a tribe type.
Berndt identifies four basic structures that interact to form the fundamental political
organisation of Aboriginal groups. 57 Firstly, he identifies the family (a man, his wife or wives
and his children). Secondly, he identifies the local descent group as
a group of people bound to the same locality by ties of a more than transient kind - ties of descent
and kinship, as well as of religion ... This is the land-holding group, linked by special spiritual and
ritual ties; and the land itself represents the most obvious, most enduring, and most consistently
visible, tangible focus. 58

This local descent group highlight the multiple connections that an Aboriginal individual might
have to different areas, regardless of the specific area he or she occupies or live in. Thirdly,
Berndt identifies the clan as ‘a group of people who claim to be descended in one line from the
same putative ancestor or ancestress, not always named and not necessarily in human shape.
They may not be able to trace their relationship to one another in genealogical terms, and may
not live in the same area.’ 59 Finally, he considers the horde, or band.
It is not a land-holding group, nor need all its members claim common descent. Rather, it is a
mixed group which varies a great deal in size and in composition. Typically, it is made up of male
members of a local descent group, plus their wives and children, and unmarried female members.
They move across the country, hunting and foraging, traditionally within an undefined radius of
the respective cult sites. [It] is the land-occupying group, and the main hunting and food collecting
unit. 60

Particularly interesting is the distinction between land-holding and land-occupying groups. The
four distinct elements combine together to identify the political entities that make up the
overarching political structure common throughout entire Australia. Another definition of this
structure has been advanced by Josephine Flood:
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A band is a residential group of people that live and forage together. Australian bands comprised
one or more extended families but composition was fluid. Core members were close relatives by
birth or marriage but individuals were extremely mobile ... Band numbers ranged from 8 to 70
persons but were usually between 14 and 33, with an average of 25. Each band had its own
“range” (the area from which it won its living) but with permission could forage more widely in a
neighbouring band’s territory. Bands were land-using “residence groups”, whereas “clans” were
“country groups” with a common identity, often based on claimed descent from a single Ancestral
Being. Each clan held a defined “estate”, generally identified by a focal point such as a
waterhole.61

To summarise, for the purpose of this thesis the basic unit of reference is the land-occupying
band. Neighbouring bands are however strictly linked by reciprocal ties, as clans or local
descent groups. Clan ties appear to be spiritual in nature, whereas the ones based on local
descent groups depend on the traditional kinship system. Clans and local descent groups,
however, appear to be intrinsically connected through a highly complex set of spiritual beliefs.
These spiritual beliefs are therefore fundamental in order to understand the connection between
distinct individuals both among themselves and in relation to the land. Tribal connections seem
to be much less relevant, from a political point of view. It is possible to hypothesise that
neighbouring bands might in fact have had much more ongoing interactions than inter-tribal
bands, therefore providing a series of reciprocal responsibilities that went beyond the
boundaries of any specific tribe. Finally, territorial boundaries appear to be strongly enforced in
regard to sacred sites, but are much more flexible in regards to hunting and foraging.62
The importance of territorial boundaries, therefore, shifts from their geographical nature to the
interactive political activity of the groups involved. Moreover, territorial boundaries are not
necessarily linked to the linguistic boundaries identified by the tribal grouping suggested by
early anthropologists. 63 It follows that it is not possible to identify the concept of tribe with that
of nation-state, in which all members live, or used to live, in a single, clearly bounded region.
However, both the term tribe and the reference to tribal territories are commonly used today to
identify Aboriginal groups and to support and validate specific political claims.
Not only the term “tribe”, but the idea of “the tribe” in Aboriginal Australia is embedded in the
relevant literature. So, even if its usefulness is questioned, at least some people will probably
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continue with it when they want to evoke a quality of life which is very much at variance with,
say, urban existence. It conveys both this and a vision of smallness, of non-complexity, as well as
of homogeneity. In the last few years there has been an increasing tendency either to avoid the
term altogether or to define it more precisely. This has meant looking more closely at the
importance (and the nature) of boundaries between territorially-based social units, and the degree
of flexibility traditionally permitted in relation to them. 64

The words of Berndt underline the necessity to analyse the concept of tribe in light of its
relation to the kinship system that connects local descent groups and to the belief system that
connects not only clans among themselves but also groups and individuals with the land. 65 It is
not possible to understand Aboriginal normative relations to the land without being precisely
aware of this relationship. Any recognition of traditional legal protocols (in the sense advanced
in Part A) can only happen when these points are properly considered.
IV. KINSHIP
Before looking at the set of beliefs that allow an observer to fully understand the complex
connection between individuals, groups and the land, it’s important to focus briefly on the
kinship system that determines the belonging to a specific local descent group and therefore to
the land-holding group. A number of classificatory distinctions among individuals form the
matrix of the Aboriginal kinship system.66 A first distinction is that among genders. A second
way of classifying individuals groups together people of alternate generations. 67
Fundamental is the system of classifying everyone within a group, a tribe, even within
neighbouring tribes (in fact of classifying every natural phenomena) in two distinct divisions
called moieties. This system of organisation provides a clear division for social and ceremonial
purposes and is strictly exogamous - that is, a person must marry into the opposite moiety and
never into his or her own.68 Radcliffe Brown suggests that an important function of this division
into moieties is that it systematises kinship arrangements, and that ‘where there are moieties
there will also be clans.’ 69 Patrilineal moieties are more common than matrilineal ones.70
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Another distinction closely linked to the moieties is that of sections and subsections, otherwise
called skins.71 Everyone belongs at birth to one specific category - the number of categories
varies according to the specific group - called a section (or subsection if it is a further division).
These categories influence marriage and kinship relations.
In particular, they group kin according to generation levels and cross-cousin relationships. (Crosscousins are children of siblings of opposite sex - children of mothers’ brothers or fathers’ sisters)
Each intermarrying pair of sections represents a generation level, and each generation level divides
the sections into cross-cousin categories. 72

Descent and belonging to a specific section is often indirectly matrilineal; that is, a person’s
section depends on his or her mother’s, but is not the same as hers. Moreover, ‘[w]here the
moiety system is not formalised with named divisions, it may be implicitly recognised in the
section and subsection system.’ 73 This further and overlapping division in sections and
subsections serves the purpose of classifying people not only for marriage and social
identification, but also for ordinary everyday behaviour.
Finally, familial relationships in Aboriginal societies extend beyond the biological ones. The
identification of direct and indirect relatives in Aboriginal societies is based on what
anthropologists describe as a classificatory system. That is, a limited number of kinship terms is
used and extended to cover all known persons. In Radcliffe Brown’s definition, a system of
‘nomenclature is classificatory when it uses terms which primarily apply to lineal relatives, such
as “father”, to refer also to collateral relatives.’ 74 As a result, a number of persons can be
classified as equivalent; each individual can easily have multiple classificatory fathers and
mothers.75 Moreover, in most Aboriginal societies a person married a person classified as a
cross-cousin, and people classified as uncles had special obligations related to the training,
discipline and initiation of youths. 76

71

Horton, above n 62.

72

Berndt, above n 17, 47.

73

Ibid.

74

Radcliffe Brown, above n 45, 158.

75

This fact should not create confusion: although a person may classify multiple individual as fathers or
mothers, that does not imply a lack of recognition and of a special connection to the actual biological
father or mother.
76

See Colin Bourke and Bill Edwards, ‘Family and Kinship’ in Colin Bourke, Eleanor Bourke and Bill
Edwards (eds), Aboriginal Australia (University of Queensland Press, 1998), 100.
177

The entire Aboriginal kinship system rests upon this intersecting and overlapping division.
Kinship is the basis for identifying reciprocal relations between individuals, even and especially
when they do not belong to the same land-occupying group.
Kinship is the basis of social relations, indicating the general range of behaviour expected in any
given case. Everyone must be identified in this way. A person coming into a strange group for
trading or ceremonial purposes is always allocated a kinship position. This section and subsection
systems offer a short-cut to this. If the visitor belongs to a certain subsection, or is allocated one on
the basis of what is already known about him, that simplifies matters a great deal. Throughout
Aboriginal Australia kinship is bilateral, which means that there is acknowledgment of both
matrilineal and patrilineal descent, although social units such as clan, local descent group, or
moiety, emphasize one rather than the other. 77

This highly complex kinship system provides the basis for any expected social behaviour,
it means (to repeat) conforming, in greater or lesser degree, to what is regarded as the proper line
of conduct in respect of him, or her. This may entail complete avoidance, or restraint and
circumspection, a speech tabu, or special duties or rights ... In addition, there are relationships
where mutual co-operation is more than usually significant, either in ordinary affairs or in the
sphere of ritual. 78

Aboriginal reciprocal identification is dependant not on the sense of belonging to an idealised
abstract group, but instead on the process of identifying specific and reciprocal classificatory
kinship relationships.79 Consequently, Aboriginal identity does not rest upon the identification
with an abstract group - as it is commonly understood in a nation-state sense, where the sense of
belonging and identity equates with the identification with a specific nation-state - but instead
on the inter-personal web of relations derived from this highly complex classificatory system
that connects both kinship and broader political connections. The European sense of social
identity is based on the abstract concept of nation as elaborated after the Treaty of Westphalia,
particularly by Hegel.80 Such a concept does not exist in Aboriginal society. The sense of
identity is not defined in relation to an abstract concept of social belonging - be it a nation or a
tribe - but in relation to each and all other individual. As a result, any contemporary attempt to
identify an Aboriginal person simply with a general tribe corresponding to the geographical
delimitation of specific linguistic groups is limiting. Indeed, it fails to acknowledge the complex
web of inter-relations that depend on this complex kinship system. The importance of those
relations greatly exceeds the relevance of the simple belonging to any single abstract tribal
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group. It is through positioning oneself in relation to all individuals that one’s identity is
defined. The kinship system allows this positioning to take place, whereas the belief system of
the Dreaming forms the theoretical basis for this system and for one’s relationship not only to
other human individuals but also to the environment and to all environmental features.
V. THE DREAMING
The kinship system is thoroughly connected to the belief system that provides the theoretical
and epistemological referent that connects different individuals. It is not possible to separate the
kinship system from the metaphysical background in which it is embedded, and it is not
possible to understand it without an understanding of that metaphysical framework.
Aboriginal spirituality throughout all of Australia is based upon a unique concept of the world
that Spencer and Gill described in 1899 as the ‘Dreamtime.81 Different words are used in
different groups, two of the most famous ones being the Arrernte word ‘Alcheringa’82 and the
Pitjantjatjara ‘Tjukurpa’. The literal translation can be ‘Eternal’ or ‘Law’, but the summoning of
a dreamlike quality to the concept is considered by Flood correct because ‘just as dreams are
real to dreamers, so the doings of Ancestral Beings are real to believers.’ 83 The Dreamtime is a
complex network of faith, knowledge and ritual that binds together all aspect of life, from
ordinary activity to metaphysical reasoning, by referring to a specific creation epoch during
which Ancestral Beings, shape-changing beings of immense power, emerged from a shapeless
substance and through their actions and travels performed all deeds of creation.84
Although the Dreamtime refers to a specific creation time, the events did not happen simply in
the past. The Aboriginal concept of time is not linear but instead cyclic, so that every moment is
constantly part of the events of creation. In other terms, the creation time could be defined not
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as the time ‘before’ time, but as the time ‘beyond’ time, encompassing past, present and future
at the same time.85 Because of that, the term was changed from ‘Dreamtime’ to ‘The Dreaming’
by Professor Stanner.86 Edwards remarks that this occurred
in acknowledgment of the fact that the Aboriginal creative epoch cannot be understood within a
Western framework of linear time. Western concepts of linear time with the separation of past
and present make it difficult to describe The Dreaming as it is conceived in Aboriginal thought.
While there is a sense in which The Dreaming activities occurred at the beginning of the world,
and are past, there is a sense also, in which they are still present. Through ritual, humans are able
to enter into a direct relationship with The Dreaming. The Aboriginal concept of time is therefore
cyclic, rather than linear, but in the sense that each generation is able to experience the present
reality of The Dreaming ... Stanner coined the term “everywhen” in an attempt to convey this
idea. “One cannot fix The Dreaming in time: it was, and is everywhen87

It is also important to note that the use of the terms is not related to the any sleeping activity. In
fact, it should not suggest
that it refers to some vague reflection of the real world. Rather, Aboriginal people see the world of
The Dreaming as the fundamental reality. The Indigenous terms have a meaning of story and they
refer to each group’s stories which enshrine their understanding about their origins.88

The first important element necessary to understand the social impact of this metaphysical
concept is the absolute relevance given to the stories in which creation events are told or reenacted. The stories form the core of all rituals and ceremonies, and convey a vast range of
information, both spiritual and practical. In fact, such a dichotomy between spiritual and
material is non existent in the Aboriginal concept of the world.89
Western ideas about reality and religion are based largely on the general acceptance of
dichotomies between natural and cultural, material and spiritual, past and present, secular and
sacred, subject and object. [...] Just as the clear demarcation between past and present is lacking in
Aboriginal conceptualisation, the other dichotomies are not present. 90

Aboriginal spirituality has been described as both animist and totemist.91 Animism is the
concept according to which all natural objects possess a spirit or a soul. Totemism is a
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relationship between an individual (or a group) and one or more natural element, be it a plant,
an animal, a natural phenomenon or even an abstract concept. Totems act as symbols of
reference by linking the human, the natural and the supernatural world. 92 The concepts of
animism and totemism are fundamental in order to understand the relationship between
Aboriginal individuals and groups and the land through the creation stories of The Dreaming.
The Ancestral Beings of The Dreaming are believed to be the ancestors of ‘both the Aboriginal
groups which live in the areas of the various stories and of the species associate with them.’ 93
Creation stories provide the framework in which the connection of each individual or group
with a specific land is established, through a spiritual connection of a totemist nature. Totemic
connections are manifold. Berndt has identified a number of different and distinct forms of
totemism.94 Individual, birth and conception totemism exist in conjunction with forms of sex,
moiety, section and subsection, clan and local totemism. The epistemological importance of the
symbolic nature of these totemic connections cannot be stressed enough.
What is meant ... by Totemism in Aboriginal Australia is always a mystical connection, expressed
by symbolic devices and maintained by rules, between living persons, whether as individuals or as
groups or as stocks, and other existents - their totems - within an ontology of life that in Aboriginal
understanding depends for order and continuity on maintaining the identities and associations
which exemplify the connection ... To Radcliffe-Brown ... totemism was a “representation of the
universe as a moral or social order”: to Elkin ... a “philosophy which regards man and nature as
one corporate whole”95

The journeys of the Ancestral Beings through the land are linked together in a continuous path
and the routes they took are often referred to as Dreaming tracks or songlines, 96
for the Ancestral Beings sang as they formed the land, laid down the Law and “sang up” the country into life.
They left songs as a record of their doings, teaching them to their human offspring. Each place where an
event occurred was marked by a named, sacred site with its own story, called a story place. It is believed that
performing the right songs and ceremonies at particular points along a ritual track gives people direct access
to the Dreaming. A songline is a long sequence of short verses that form a sung map of an Ancestral Being’s
creative journey. Song cycles have many verses that must be sung in the correct order. Each verse records the
events of a particular site and is repeated several times. Aboriginal elders travelled along songlines with their
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young people, telling the stories and singing the songs of the sites, so the children acquired a mental map of
the country.97

Songlines are the most interesting representation of the intimate connection between a set of
stories containing a wide range of information embedded in a holistic metaphysical concept, a
highly complex and detailed map of the land and of the human interactions with it, and a social
structure developed by distinct groups in order to regulate their relations among themselves and
with the surrounding environment. The spiritual nature of the stories is strictly linked to the
importance of ritual and ceremonies in Aboriginal societies, for it is during these events that
Dreaming stories are performed.
VI. SECRET/SACRED BUSINESS AND TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION
Ritual and ceremony permeated every aspect of daily life, culminating in events that involved
members of different tribes at specific and special times. The spiritual nature of the stories grant
a particular value to what is often seen or perceived as a purely artistic product in a Western
sense. I use the general term ‘arts’ as Dreaming stories are re-enacted through a number of
artistic media, ranging from oral narratives to songs and music, from dances and performing arts
to visual arts. The aesthetic nature typical of the arts in Western societies is secondary to the
spiritual creative nature given to the same actions by Aboriginal performers or artists. One
essential characteristic of the stories - whatever form they took - is their oral transmission.
The transmission and acquisition of information contained in the stories has always been
progressive. ‘Aboriginal stories and songs divide into secular and sacred, with a progression
from one to the other. [...] A public or “outside” version of major myths was told to the whole
community, but further, higher levels of meaning were revealed after initiation. The more
important myths were ‘owned’ by certain tribal elders.’98
Initiation through different levels of knowledge is another feature intrinsically connected to
Dreaming stories. Knowledge of specific stories, or of parts of them, can only be acquired
through a life-long path of progressive initiations. The consequence is that in the sacredmundane continuum, and in particular during rituals and ceremonies, certain parts or sections of
the stories are not accessible to the entire group but only to initiated individuals.
In nearly all sacred ritual, certain Aboriginal words were used to indicate that either all or a section
of that ritual was set apart. Restrictions excluded some persons while at the same time ensuring
access for others, particular others who conformed with specific conditions of entry. [...] In
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general, then, most Aboriginal words which may be translated as “sacred” imply some degree of
secrecy.99

The secret-sacred nature of Aboriginal spirituality reflects itself in the relationship with the land.
Complete knowledge of the metaphysical map of the land belongs only to a restricted group of
initiated individuals. It is their knowledge that determines the appropriateness of any interaction
with a specific territory. And it is their status of initiated men that grant them the authority to use
and enforce their secret-sacred knowledge in relation to violations and trespasses. This status
and the entire process of initiation is strictly linked to the entire kinship system, as the role of
transmitting specific stories is connected to the classificatory system presented above. As a
result, metaphysical concepts and the stories in which these concepts are enshrined, together
with their secret-sacred nature and their progressive acquisition through different stages of
initiation, are paired with the kinship system that create the social framework for that
transmission of information. These elements combined provide the instruments necessary to
understand the complex social relationship of Aboriginal groups with their territory.
VII. RECIPROCITY
Before introducing an analysis of the complex relationship of Aboriginal groups with their land,
it is important to remember that trade routes connected virtually all parts of Australia. The
principle underlying any form of economic exchange is that of reciprocity. Pitjantjitjara people
refer to it as ‘ngapartji-ngapartji, which could be translated as ‘in return’. Exchange based on
the principle of reciprocity is a fundamental characteristic not only of all aspects of economic
life, but also of spiritual encounters, as Dreaming stories could be exchanged similarly during
ceremonies and ritual. The principle of reciprocity is the absolute basis necessary to understand
the relationship of different groups with different territories.
Between individuals, local groups and larger groups there are systems of rights, obligations and
responsibilities based on this principle. If an individual or group gives food or a marriage partner
to another individual or group they expect to receive something or somebody in return.100

Berndt presents a detailed classification of different forms of reciprocal gift exchanges, the most
relevant of which being the one linked to the kinship system between members of specific
sections, subsections and moieties. 101 A network of reciprocal duties, rights and obligations is
therefore established by combining the kinship system and the principle of reciprocity.
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VIII. RELATIONSHIP TO LAND
The main question of this entire thesis revolves around the appropriateness of native title - both
as a legal concept and as a legal instrument - to recognise traditional protocols in respect to
interests in land. It is therefore imperative to look at the traditional relationship with the land as
it has been described in the literature. It is impossible to understand the complex relationship of
Aboriginal individuals and groups to the land without being perfectly aware of the
interconnectedness of the traditional elements presented above. 102
The major elements are: the epistemological and spiritual framework of the Dreaming within
which any relationship with the territory is constructed, perceived and described. Secondly, the
complex kinship system - which includes all political relations among individuals as well as
groups - that guarantees the correct and appropriate transmission of information contained
within the body of stories collectively shared by the entire community. Thirdly, the network of
duties, rights and obligations that binds together any kin relation and that is based upon the
principle of reciprocity. Only in light of these three strictly connected elements it is possible to
introduce the issue of traditional relationship with the land and the territory of Aboriginal
groups.
A detailed description of this relationship is the one made by Berndt.103 The most important and
relevant underlying concept is that the land is not personally owned in any way. ‘There is no
private land as such ... [l]and belongs to the local group, the clan, or even the tribe and is
inalienable.’104 There is indeed a sense of ownership of a particular stretch of territory, but that
ownership is shared by all members of the community, and it is perceived to be eternal and
inalienable. It grants rights but it also imposes duties and responsibilities. The nature of this
sense of connection with the land rests in the Dreaming.
Land is perceived to be given in trust to all descendants of the Ancestral Beings that shaped it,
in order to be maintained and cared for through the enactment of land-maintaining and
sustaining ritual actions.
They not only owned, or held in trust, particular stretches of country which contained within them
physical representations of the deathless, eternal spiritual and mythic beings, who symbolically
held the key to all natural existence. Also, they were themselves associated closely, through
descent or through spiritual manifestation, with the land and its mythic activators.105
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This spiritual connection creates an epistemological link of any individual with a particular part
of the land, a sense of intimacy and connection that is shared by all members of the community.
They were intimately familiar with everything within it, and the life they led demanded that they
should have this detailed knowledge. They also believed that they shared the same life-essence
with all the natural species and elements within the environment. Their social world was expanded
to include the natural world. 106

It is possible to summarise a number of relevant points applicable to each Aboriginal individual.
Firstly, a sense of spiritual connection with a certain territory is acquired through the learning of
different Dreaming stories. Secondly, this spiritual link gives each individual a bundle of ‘rights
and responsibilities’ It gives him or her a right of possession and use of the land, but it also
gives him or her a connected duty of maintaining it. Thirdly and finally, the land is considered
as given in trust by its mythical activators and, therefore, it is perceived as eternally inalienable.
However, this bundle of rights and responsibilities cannot and should not be considered as
bestowed upon any single individual. it is, instead, a collective duty one. Berndt introduces a
distinction between the religious unit and the economic unit, that is the local descent group and
the food-collecting unit - the unit effectively living together on a daily basis - as the landowning group and the land-occupying group. One of the common characteristics of local
descent groups is that they are exogamous and patrilinear. Members of the same local descent
group shared the same rights and responsibilities, inherited by birth from their fathers, with
other members of the same groups, even not living together on a daily basis.
The Aborigines’ ownership was both personal and social. They were linked to it, or part of it,
personally, but with their patri-kin they held that land collectively in trust. To put it another way,
the mythic being spiritually held that land, and in many cases were identified with that land. Their
human representatives, in consequence, also held that land. Both owned that land - mythic beings
and living human beings, as well as those now dead and those yet to be born.107

This is what Berndt emphasises as the ‘land-owning group’, that ‘can be easily defined in
relation to territory in virtually every part of Aboriginal Australia. The focus was/is on specific
sites and the area surrounding them.’ 108 The responsibility of enacting specific rituals, and thus
of reaffirming the spiritual links to the land, rests upon members of this group. It is through
these rituals that ownership of that land is collectively and constantly reaffirmed. It is interesting
to note that ‘owners’ of a specific ritual - and therefore, by extension, of the land connected to
the Dreaming stories linked to that specific ritual - were always assisted by other individuals
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defined as ‘managers’, members of other local groups.109 But ‘not just any members: always
specific members who are related to the owners in particular ways. This is axiomatic, and
underlines the matter of co-operation and reciprocity.’110
It is possible to identify a definite sense of group possession - which I will call ownership - of a
territory at the exclusion of other groups. This ownership depends on membership of a specific
group, and such membership is inherited at birth, both by men and women. Specific territories
relevant to local descent groups can be delineated in relation to their sites. Ownership is
constantly ratified through the performance of land-sustaining rituals and ceremonies to which a
number of distinct local descent groups may or may not participate. Indeed ‘[i]t was not simply
ratification and acknowledgment by the owners - but was also substantiated recognition on the
part of others, members of other descent groups in the same overall region.’111 Given the
spiritual and eternal nature of the connection with the land, ownership of the land is utterly
inalienable.
Although the local descent group represents the land-owning religious unit, the basic day to day
economic unit is the foraging unit, that can be composed of a single or of a number of extended
families, what has been previously described as the band. The two units are strictly
interdependent as they are made up by persons linked with one or more local descent groups.
‘Adult men, in particular, had two distinct types of role in relation to these units. In one, they
were land-owners, having an executive and active part to play in ritual etc.; in the other, they
were hunters and food collectors.’112 It is also important to remember that all members of a
foraging unit are related to each other, either directly or classificatorily. Consequently, they
share ownership responsibilities via the network of reciprocity established by the kinship
system.
Briefly, the food-collecting unit was concerned with land-occupation, land-utilisation and landexploitation ... This [unit was] semi-nomadic (sometimes called “restricted nomadic”) ... The area
over which such a party moved was limited in size (in space), but always involved more than a
couple of of the local descent group territories - sometimes a number of these ... [P]eople always
moved freely over their own and over other descent group territories, but did not trespass on
sacred or secret-sacred or traditional sites or enter them freely or without permission, or without
due reason. 113
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There is a fundamental distinction between two interrelated and yet distinct units: the local
descent group that represents ownership of the land - the authority of which is to be found in
Dreaming stories - and the foraging unit that used the land on a daily basis. The foraging unit
was usually made up of members of different local descent groups. The foraging unit occupied
and area larger than any one local descent unit territory, yet did not trespass or violate sacred or
other protected or restricted sites associated with any particular local descent group territory.
In the local sense, territory was defined in terms of sacred and traditional sites and of country
surrounding these, providing fairly clear-cut or fairly well articulated ‘boundaries’, or sufficient
evidence to justify one area of country being associated (in time depth) with members (particular
members) of one group in contrast to other similarly constituted groups: that is, the whole country,
not just little patches or highlights within it. Members of such a unit were spiritually, emotionally
and genealogically linked with that territory through consanguineal ties of kinship. They were the
owners of the land. In terms of usage - habitual usage, defined by traditional precedent - this
principle was already expressed in the composition of the foraging unit. Members always kept
their own particular local descent group territories in perspective; they never, traditionally, lost
sight of these. Normatively, at least, they never went so far afield as to lose touch with them because, traditionally, they always had responsibilities vis-a-vis them. [...] As members of the
wider foraging unit, they were able to avail themselves of a diversity of resources, not all of which
were represented in their own particular local descent group territories. In economic as well as in
religious pursuits, the Aborigines displayed the genius for organization and co-ordination which
enabled them to cope so successfully with their total environment, social as well as natural.114

There exists a strict interrelatedness between rules regulating social relations and rules
regulating the interaction - both individual and social - with the natural environment. It is now
necessary to analyse how Aboriginal groups traditionally maintained the structure of
relationship with the land presented so far and how they dealt with land trespasses both by
individuals and by other groups. In order to do so, it is important to briefly look at the
description of law, the maintenance of order and at dispute resolution mechanisms.
IX. ORDER AND DISPUTE
Aboriginal law is often identified as ‘customary law’, in an attempt to incorporate it within the
colonial law by identifying it as a secondary source of rules and regulations.115 Authors agree on
the existence of a complex set of rules established for maintaining social order and enforced by
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See for example, Flood above n 1, 158: ‘Law in a Western sense did not exist in Aboriginal Australia
but there were principles of communal regulation and punishment for transgressors, now known as
“customary law”’.
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one or more members of the group. 116 These rules, the authority of which is to be found in the
metaphysics of the Dreaming, are what can be identified as legally relevant for the present
comparison, as argued in Part A. For the purpose of this section, I will refer to these normative
protocols as ‘Aboriginal law’. I will alternate between the present and the past tenses in
referring to these rules, as the impact of colonisation often prevents their direct enforceability.117
The first fundamental trait of Aboriginal law is its informality. Law is not rigidly predetermined
by fixed verbalised rules, but is instead constantly negotiated by the action of individuals and
groups that refer to a very clear body of abstract rules articulated within the metaphysical
concept of the Dreaming. Therefore, the second relevant trait of Aboriginal law is that spiritual
and ‘legal’ matters are inseparable.
Quarrels and fights are not lacking, but in such cases they take place within the range of known
behaviour, where the rules of killing or making peace are understood and accepted. The pattern or
blueprint of behaviour is everywhere in traditional Aboriginal Australia framed in terms of the
past. To put it a little differently, the mythical characters instituted a way of life which they
introduced to human beings: and because they themselves are viewed as eternal, so are the patterns
they set. 118

The third relevant factor of Aboriginal law is that rules are perceived to be immutable. The rules
are learned since childhood through the process of initiation based on the kinship system
presented above, and they become progressively better known and understood until reaching the
status fully initiated adult. Given the social structure, it is clear that the most immediate pressure
to conform to the rules and to expected behavioural pattern comes from very informal
interpersonal relationships between people who intimately know each other. The strategies are
common and involve ridicule and other common forms of social pressure. Nonetheless,
breaches of rules occurred and provoked a number of identified reactions.
What is relevant, however, is not the description of each single rule and of the expected reaction
to its breach, but the mechanism in place to solve conflict and settle disputes.
In general terms, it is not the range of criminal and other acts which is significant in considering
the whole question of law in this context. The range is relatively narrow in Aboriginal Australia.
Women, revenge for death or injury, breaches of sacred laws and marriage rules, and a few other
points of minor importance, constitute virtually the social subject matter of legal procedure. [...]
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The real test of law should rest on how an infringement or breach, of whatever nature, is resolved
on an equitable basis, within the cultural perspective. 119

Rules regulating property are very few, given the scarcity - and cultural irrelevance - of material
possession. Rules regulating interpersonal behaviour cover all range of possibilities, from
marital behaviour to injury and murder. Physical retaliation has been recorded as the most
common method of dealing with immediate offences. According of the degree of the offence,
either the victim or a number of members of the group could be involved. In more serious
matters, particularly when breaches of sacred law are involved - such as ritual stealing, breaches
of marriage taboos, trespasses of sacred sites - a meeting of ritual leaders would have decided
the appropriate punishment, and either the leaders themselves or one or more individuals
appointed by them would have enforced the decision.
Meetings of elders to discuss and settle disputes are another frequent occurrence, but they are
characterised by a high degree of informality and looseness. Anthropologists have often
described these meetings as an ‘embryonic court’:
formal gatherings in the nature of law courts with judiciary functions do not exist in Aboriginal
Australia: there is no formally constituted court of law [neither permanently nor occasionally],
comprising special persons vested with authority and power to deal with cases, pass judgement
and impose punishment.’120

In general, apart from personal retaliation, two procedures are common in sanctioning a
perceived breach of the rules requiring retaliation. The first is a form of ceremonial ordeal, in
which a ritual combat is staged where the accused stands against one or more members of the
community and accepts to be tested in an ordeal involving forms of predetermined violence - as,
for example, being speared in the thigh. One common example of this procedure is provided by
the western Arnhem Land ‘magarada’. 121
The second procedure is that of ‘payback’ parties following an inquest often involving magic
and sorcery. 122 Ritual revenge was carried on by groups of individuals ritually prepared and
dressed for that specific activity. Naturally, resistance could be expected, and although
individual resistance could be overcome by numeric superiority, potentially leading the
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individual to death or forced exile,123 group resistance could escalate into group violence and
warfare. In fact, ‘murders or suspected murders have led ... to so-called blood feuds extending
over long periods and breaking out at intervals into open violence.’ 124
Basedow divided warfare into inter-tribal and intra-tribal (or intra-clan) feuding, indicating that
inter-tribal fighting was pretty common.125 However, open warfare rarely escalated into ongoing
permanent conflict. At ritual gatherings, councils of elders would have tried to reach consensus
and to settle all ongoing disputes. Ritualised combat, involving one or more individuals up to
the entire group, could be used to provide a form of settlement of the dispute, thus providing a
mechanism of control of feuds and inter-group disputes. 126 Reaching consensus and the will to
settle the dispute would have been facilitated by the network of interrelatedness provided by the
kinship system. Marvin Harris pointed out that social costs of injury and death of any single
individual would have had an enormous impact on a numerically small human group, therefore
exerting a pressure to limit ultimate violence and to develop negotiated ritual solutions
instead.127
This point is even more relevant in a society where each adult, given the small population
numbers, is also an important depository of a relevant part of the collective body of knowledge
that binds together social groups in their interaction with the environment Even more so as that
knowledge, given its secret-sacred and progressive initiation nature, is accessible only through
these same adult initiated men. The death cost of even a single individual would have been
heavy for the entire group.
To conclude, the fundamental nature of Aboriginal law, the trait that diversify it more radically
from the Australian legal system is that at its core it is based upon the daily interactions of
individuals strongly interrelated through a complex network provided by the kinship system and
epistemologically grounded in the metaphysical concepts of the Dreaming. Law is therefore
extremely informal not in the sense that it is randomly determined, but rather is the result of an
ongoing negotiated process among individuals depending on each other for daily survival.

123

Exile was the harshest form of punishment for an Aboriginal person. Not only it would have
disconnected him or her from any other human interaction, thus severing everyday reciprocal support in
order to survive in the harsh environmental conditions in which one single individual had very few
chances of long term survival if left alone, but more importantly it would have removed the individual
from the participation to all ritual activities, thus effectively severing his or her spiritual connection to the
land and therefore his or her complex sense of identity related to that land itself.
124

Berndt, above n 17, 346.

125

Herbert Basedow, The Australian Aboriginal (Preece and Sons, 1925).

126

Ibid.

127

Marvin Harris, Cannibals and Kings (Collins, 1978).
190

Whereas authors identify informality as the core characteristics of Aboriginal law, as opposed to
a rigidly predetermined scheme as seen in Western law, 128 I argue that this opposition suggests a
relative lack of complexity or of rigid references in the case of ‘customary law’. This is not the
case, given the enormous complexity and precision of the secret-sacred rules that encompass all
legal precepts. As a result, I would suggest that the most relevant feature of Aboriginal law is
that of being constantly negotiated, as opposed to being predetermined. As a result, the key
factor in trying to define an Aboriginal legal model is to clarify the system of personal
interrelatedness that constitutes the framework for that ongoing negotiation.
Specific rules of behaviour strictly regulated all interactions of individuals and groups with each
other in relation to land. A complex set of protocols exists, regulating interactions between
foreigners entering a new territory, between groups sharing the land and in regard to sacred
sites.
There were behavioural codes for appropriate relations between meetings of close kin or when
marriage bestowals were initiated; and rules for establishing or reaffirming friendly relations
between affiliated groups; or between strangers; codes governing the settlement of disputes, and
responses to the approach of potential enemies; or of known foes. They all required time for the
courtesies to be ascertained, or for the community to assemble. Some occasions were for males or
females only, while others required the attendance of the whole community.[In one example
reported by Spencer and Gillen], [b]oth parties were prepare for the meeting, and decorated and
armed themselves accordingly. Although they were affiliated groups and understood their kin and
classificatory relationships, these had to be re-ascertained and played out in public.129

X. ANALYSIS
To summarise, traditional interests in land connect together a number of apparently
interdependent and equally relevant elements: the kinship system, the epistemology and
metaphysics of the Dreaming, the core nature of law as constantly re-enacted and negotiated,
and a series of specific protocols. It is not possible to understand traditional interests in land
without being constantly aware of these four elements. These element are all equally legally
relevant and need to be considered cohesively as ‘traditional law’.
No attempt to a cohesive and complete reconstruction of an Aboriginal ‘legal system’ has been
done by comparative legal scholars. The possibility of such an enterprise in the Australian
context can be inferred from the similar work of researchers that tried to present a systemic
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outlook on traditional legal systems in other geographical regions.130 The first relevant question
regarding the construction of an Aboriginal legal model is whether to talk of one single
overarching system or of multiple separated and independent ones. The immediate answer
comes from a parallel with the general presentation of a common law family as opposed to the
civil law legal family.131 Although each national system is independent and autonomous, and
possesses a wide range of differences from other national systems, there are nonetheless
common traits that allow theorists to identify a general common law family. The same
theoretical model can be applied to Aboriginal Australia. Although an enormous range of
variations between different groups exists, certain traits allow to identify a general Aboriginal
legal system. Such an identification has not been done by legal scholars. It would seem that
such reconstruction would be the priority in presenting a cohesive framework to explain the
‘traditional laws and customs’ from which native title originate.
This thesis does not attempt to construct a model able to construct, or re-construct, an
Aboriginal legal system. The purpose of this thesis is to show that the lack of adoption of such a
theoretical model by legal practitioners - be they judges or legislators - has a direct detrimental
impact on the recognition of traditional interests in land. This will be done in Part D, thanks to a
specific case study in the Illawarra. Prior to this case analysis, however, I will explore further
the impact that colonisation has had on the protocols presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
ENCOUNTERS

As discussed in Chapter Eight, section X, traditional interests in land cannot be thoroughly
addressed at law without first addressing and acknowledging at law the kinship system and the
metaphysical framework upon which they rest. This recognition is far more important than the
generalist identification of any abstract tribal group in connection to land. The relevant question,
therefore, is whether the network survived the impact of colonisation, either in its original form
or in a modified one.
I. ‘INVASION DAY’ 1
After a series of voyage reports from a number of European navigators, 2 on 1788 a British
colony was permanently established on the land that is now the city of Sydney.3 Within two
hundred years, the number of Aboriginal individuals in contemporary Australia represent only a
small numerical percentage of the entire population.4 Before trying to understand from a
theoretical point of view the event that British defined settlement and Aboriginal invasion,5 a
question must be raised. How was it possible? What are the reasons that allowed a European
colonial power to exert its forced control over the population of an entire continent?
The question is not purely rhetorical. The reason of the question is to dispel any possible
concept of cultural superiority from the present discourse. Racist theories of cultural superiority
have indeed permeated the relationships between colonial Australians and Indigenous
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2 See J Kenny, Before the First Fleet: Europeans in Australia 1606-1777 (Kangaroo Press, 1995). It has
also been suggested that the Chinese were the first non-Aboriginal people to reach Australia: see Gavin
Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered the World (Bantam Press, 2002).
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Australians for well over two centuries.6 More objective answers to this question have been
recently provided by contemporary research. Particularly relevant is the work of Diamond. The
initial question of his most famous work, Guns, Germs and Steel, is the following:
Why did wealth and power become distributed as they now are, rather than in some other way?
For instance, why weren’t Native Americans, Africans and Aboriginal Australians the one who
decimated, subjugated, or exterminated Europeans and Asians?7

Building on the work of other influential materialist anthropologists,8 Diamond identifies a
strict connection between three factors: geographical context, adopted technologies and
population numbers. His thesis focuses on the geographical positions of certain human societies
at the end of the last Ice Age, highlighting the connection between population pressure,
availability of resources and the axis of the continents. The increase in population triggered by
the change in climate and the increased availability of resources raised the need for an ever
increasing number of resources needed to sustain the increased population. Resources were
made available through the development of appropriate social and technological instruments the most famous of which being the spreading of agriculture ten millennia ago. This, in turn,
created a self sustaining momentum marked by a constant race between population growth and
innovation of technologies used to increase resource availability. Neighbouring human groups
soon had to compete in order to survive, either physically (to avoid physical extermination) or
as separate cultural entities, and they had to do so by adopting the most efficient military
technologies available. The axis of the continents determined the rate of spreading of these
technologies, favouring the longitudinal axis of Euro-Asian societies both over the latitudinal
axis of American and African ones and over more isolated and insular ones.9
It was therefore a series of geographical accidents that led to a population boom in Europe after
the middle ages and to the development of military technologies that allowed Europeans to
prevail in the military confrontations that characterised the entire colonial expansion of
European societies during the course of the last five centuries. Focussing on the struggle for the

6 See, eg, something as recent as a short publication titled Our Aborigines, ‘prepared under the authority
of the Minister for Territories, with the co-operation of the Ministers responsible for Aboriginal welfare in
the Australian States, for use by the National Aborigines’ Day Observance Committee and its associates
in connection with the celebration of National Aborigines’ Day in Australia, 12th July, 1957, and revised
and reissued for National Aborigines’ Day, 8th July, 1962’.
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control of the Australian territory, the difference generated by different strategies of adaptation
to the environment developed throughout a number of millennia led to a striking disparity
between the opposing parties in population numbers, concentration of population and military
technologies available.
From the moment of initial contact between European navigators and Aboriginal peoples the
cultural gaps - and the inter-cultural misunderstanding that form the basis of racist colonial
assumptions - are clearly apparent.10 When Dampier encountered Aboriginal peoples in the
Kimberley region, he commented on visible aspects of Aboriginal life; that is, small scale
societies, close communal living, the habit of sharing all procured food, the scarcity of material
possession and the clear harshness of life. 11 However, he did not present any further cultural
analysis, nor he acquired any knowledge of complex cultural traits and visions of the world that
were not as readily apparent and would have required a thorough understanding of both
languages and cultural protocols in order to be learned.
The narrowness of his analysis led him to derive the first of many dismissive and racist
assumptions on Aboriginal cultures:
The inhabitants of this country are the miserablest people in the world. The Hodmadods
[Hottentots of Africa] ... for wealth are gentlemen to these. They have no houses, or skin garments,
sheep, poultry, fruits of the earth ... They are tall, straight-bodied and thin, with small, long
limbs ... Their eyelids are always halfway closed, to keep the flies out of their eyes ... They had
such bad eyes, that they could not see us till we came close to them. 12

The passage is revealing of the cultural perspective of an English navigator for whom cultural
value is equated with material possessions; moreover, his analysis of the causes of certain
cultural behaviours - for example that of not acknowledging his presence until physical contact
was made - rests on mistaken assumptions.13
The same cultural blindness is apparent in the more positive words of Cook, who also
comments on the scarcity (from a contemporary European perspective) and sparseness of the
population:
The natives [of Australia] do not appear to be numerous, neither do they seem to live in large
bodies but dispersed in small parties along by the waterside ... [They] may appear to some to be
the most wretched people upon Earth, but in reality they are far more happier than we
10
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Europeans ... They live in a tranquility which is not disturbed by the inequality of condition: The
earth and se ... furnishes them with all things necessary for life ... they live in a warm and fine
climate, ... so they have very little need of clothing ... they seemed to set no value upon any thing
we gave them, nor would they ever part with any thing of their own ... this in my opinion argues
that they think themselves provided with all the necessaries of life and that they have no
superfluities.14

The analysis rests entirely upon the assumptions of the European observer, with no attempt to
engage with an Aboriginal cultural perspective.
The cultural chasm between two societies separated by millennia of separate and radically
different modifications and changes (and adaptations to environmental transformations) 15
originated epistemological incomprehension the result of which was a violent clash between
uneven forces for the control of the land. When Cook claimed the Eastern coast of Australia, the
Admiralty instructions were:
You re also with the consent of the natives to take possession of convenient situations in the
country in the name of the King of Great Britain or, if you find the country uninhabited, take
possession for his Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions, as first discoverers and
possessors.16

The issue of consent presented to Cook was immediately frustrated by a number of factors. 17
Firstly, by the number of different languages for which Cook had no interpreter. Secondly, by
the Aboriginal ‘tendency to “make off” when strangers appeared’18. Thirdly, by the lack of
identifiable leaders with whom to negotiate. Fourthly and finally, by the apparent lack of
cultivation, by the lack of houses, villages, fields and domesticated animals, and by the lack of
any apparent - or better, any immediately recognisable - system of land ownership or
government. Flood reports that Sir Joseph Banks (a passenger of Cook’s expedition whose
opinion was far more influential) 19 decided that, as the land seemed to be populated only by
small nomadic groups,
the land was “thinly inhabited” and that the unseen interior was probably “totally uninhabited”, in
view of a lack of smoke far inland and the apparent scarcity of animal life or “wild produce” away
from the sea coast. [He] argued that because there was no cultivation on the coast, there was none
inland, and that people could not exist inland without cultivation.20
14
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The assumption of the inland of Australia being uninhabited was clearly proven wrong at the
very time that the colonists moved inland, but also the issue of the lack of cultivation has been
challenged in more recent times.21 Australia is a ‘drier and flatter [continent], with generally
shallower soil and less biomass than any other inhabited continent, with the world’s most
unpredictable climate.’ 22 According to Dreaming stories, nature and the environment is a
resource that does not need cultivation or improvement. According to archeological and
anthropological research, agriculture developed rather independently in various part of the
planet - where food resources able to be domesticated were more abundant - at the end of the
last ice age circa ten millennia ago.23 Agriculture has been described as the trigger of the
technological advancements that eventually led to the militarily advanced and numerically
superior European societies that have colonised the planet during the last five centuries. 24
Why didn’t this development occur in at least certain coastal areas of Australia? In fact,
‘Australian soils and climate permit modern agriculture and were amenable to Stone Age
horticulture. [P]lants domesticated in Southeast Asia are also endemic in northern and central
Australia, where they are used but not cultivated.’ 25 Moreover, hunter-gatherers’ methods of
procuring food were characterised by a degree of unpredictability and relative uncertainty, when
compared to the regularity of crops yielding methods of agricultural societies. 26 Why, then,
wasn’t agriculture developed independently in Australia?
One initial answer states that agriculture is not necessarily inevitable in cultural adaptation to
the environment.
Some have argued that agriculture is the natural end point to which all societies evolve, and
Australia’s slowness in this respect was due to the lack and plants suitable for domestication.
Others maintain that food production is by no means inevitable. In Australia, pressures for
domestication were outweighed by those against, especially extreme religious conservatism, which
21
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was diametrically opposed to change. Ceremonies were performed for the maintenance of food
plants and animals but Aboriginal beliefs strictly opposed the concept of food production. taboos
and totemism (spiritual linkages between people and the natural universe) forbid modifications of
the environment, for there is a strong belief in the interrelatedness of all living things. Likewise,
storage of food for future private consumption is incompatible with the ubiquitous practice of
sharing, and the use of food surpluses to support large ceremonial gatherings. 27

Another answer to this question is provided by the work of Diamond, 28 who argues that a
certain population threshold was necessary to trigger the need to transition from a semi-nomadic
hunting-gathering lifestyle to a more permanently settled proto-agricultural one. Diamond notes
that initial agricultural societies had less available food resources per capita than huntinggathering contemporary due to the population density reached at the end end of the Ice Age,
although they were conversely marked by a steady increase in population. The population
growth, in turn, forced the primitive agricultural societies to domesticate more plants and
animals in order to increase food production. This eventually allowed to intensify production
even further via a social redistribution of power and labour until the food procurement could be
substantially more efficient than that of hunter-gatherers societies.29 The initial population
threshold was determined by the increase in population density within a finite space with
limited available resources, and by the subsequent need to develop alternative methods of food
production to deal with this sudden overpopulation. This population pressure in a highly
contained space did not occur in Australia, not to the point that cultivation became more
efficient as a food source than hunting-gathering Moreover, the number of plants and animals
available for domestication was significantly lower than that of the places where agriculture
developed, therefore removing the need for Aboriginal societies to develop cultivation in the
sense used by European settlers.
Nonetheless, even though Aboriginal societies did not develop agricultural methods of food
production, they did manage the land in order to increase food availability. The most striking
example is the use of what has been described as ‘fire-stick farming’; 30 that is, the regular and
controlled burning of the landscape to prevent accidental fires and to facilitate hunting.
Although cultivation in the sense of agricultural methods of permanently settled food
production units never existed in Australia, nonetheless Aboriginal people used different
strategies to maximise and increase food resources. These strategies were incorporated in the
27
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cultural structure that connected different individuals and groups through the kinship system)
with the land (through the concept of ritual ‘ownership’ of the land presented in the previous
chapter) and that was encapsulated with the authoritative stories and epistemologies of the
Dreaming.
The complete incomprehension of something even as socially basic as food production is but an
example of a much wider cultural gap. Frost explains very well the core reason of the utter
incomprehension between two culture separated not only by half of the world but also by
millennia of distinct evolutions. ‘Cook and Banks’, he writes,
were percipient, tolerant of racial and cultural difference, and empathetic to a remarkable degree ...
If any group of Europeans of this time might have adjusted their perceptions and modes of
procedure to accommodate the fact of the Aborigines, it was this one; the Aborigines were simply
too un-European for them to comprehend truly.’ 31

Whether the attitude of the European navigators was really as positive as presented here or not,
the result of this cultural gap led to dire consequences for Aboriginal people.
II. FRONTIER WARS 32
‘Was Australia settled or invaded? Pioneered or conquered? Won by sweat or won by blood?
Was it the fruit of industry or a prize of war?’ 33 The certain fact is that the confrontation
between prior inhabitants and subsequent arrivals was not a peaceful one.
Phillip was ... keen to have no “dispute with the natives, a few of which I shall endeavour to
persuade to settle near us, and who I mean to furnish with everything that can tend to civilise them,
and to give them a high opinion of their new guests.” Importantly, the British perceived
themselves not as invaders but as guests, albeit uninvited ones, and their mission not as a
dispossession but a peaceful establishment of a small colony among the natives.34

Nonetheless, the hopes of a peaceful settlement were in fact abandoned quite early.
In 1802 Governor King issued a proclamation reminding colonists that any ‘instance of injustice
or wanton cruelty towards the natives will be punished with the utmost severity of the law’ but
that ‘the settler is not to suffer his property to be invaded, or his existence endangered by
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them.’ 35 The conflict originated from very radical misunderstanding between the two cultures,
in what Professor Mulvaney called an ‘immense saga of challenge, response, and encounters.’36
The first uncomprehending visitors were Dutch sailors employed by a trading company who saw a
people whose economy was neither commercial nor agricultural. These Aborigines regulated their
lives without calendars, chronometers or books, yet observed formal and complex rules of
etiquette and relationship. [...] Every instance of early racial contact took place on Aboriginal land,
but few of the newcomers acknowledge this reality. The rules governing relationships in
Aboriginal society were highly structured, placing strict obligations both on the hosts and on the
visitors. There were behavioural codes for appropriate relations between meetings of close kin or
when marriage bestowals were initiated; and rules for establishing or reaffirming friendly relations
between affiliate groups; or between strangers; codes governing the settlement of disputes, and
responses to the approach of potential enemies; or of known foes. They all require time for the
courtesies to be ascertained, or for the community to assemble. Some occasions were for males or
females only, while others require the attendance of the whole community. Individuals also were
responsible for special roles which could not be performed by others. A mutual ignorance of
behavioural rules and individual roles produced many unfortunate misunderstandings. [...]
Explorers or settlers seeking new pastures normally were in a hurry and became impatient of
ritualised exchanges, or conversed with an inappropriate person. In mutual linguistic ignorance,
both parties resorted to sign language, but gesticulations often conveyed the wrong meaning.
Consequently, it was easy for the newcomer to appear grossly insulting. [...] The approach of
Europeans [...] must have violated numerous rules, causing grave offence and creating total
bewilderment. 37

These perspectives have been analysed and reconstructed by a number of scholars led by
Professor Henry Reynolds. In his parallel works Frontier and The Other Side of the Frontier, 38
he collected documentary history of the initial reactions of both parties to the conflict. Reynolds
reveals that the
black response to the invaders was more complex and more varied than anyone has hitherto
suggested ... [t]here was always diversity, contradiction, competing objectives. [...] Aborigines
were curious about white society and endeavoured to incorporate new experiences within the
resilient bonds of traditional culture.39
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Aborigines at the point of initial contact must have suffered from a number of cultural shocks as
well.40 Firstly, Aboriginal societies were numerically small when compared with the population
of the colonists. Aboriginal groups had to deal with population numbers that had never been
encountered before. The numerical imbalance clearly affected the outcome of armed conflict but
it was first and foremost a social reality entirely alien to a lifestyle that had maintained the
population numerically constant for over 60000 years. Secondly, Aborigines fought no wars. 41
That is, there were not instances of violent conflicts that involved different groups on a
permanent basis, particularly when land was involved. Conflicts occurred, but they involved
feuds and reciprocal violence, and they were generally carried out in a controlled and
ceremonial context, isolating the event in time and minimising the human costs of violent
confrontation.42 As noted in the Chapter Eight, every individual was part of a complex network
of interrelated kinship relations which involved both reciprocal rights and responsibilities. This
network connected all groups together, in a land management system that crossed different
groups and linked them to different and yet interconnected parts of the land.
This combination of reciprocity and retaliation, of rights and responsibilities, puzzled European
settlers, who failed to understand the motives for what it seemed to be a sudden change of
behaviour of the natives. At first, Reynolds reports,
Aborigines hospitably allowed squatting parties to establish themselves and even assisted them
during the first few weeks of their occupation. Clearly white and black perceptions of what was
taking place were very wide apart. Unless forewarned Aborigines probably had no appreciation of
the European’s determination to stay indefinitely and “own” the soil ... Aborigines reacted less to
the original trespass than to the ruthless assertion by Europeans of exclusive proprietorial rights
often from the very first day of occupation. It was a behaviour probably unheard of in traditional
society. Increasingly the newcomers impinged on accustomed patterns of life, occupying the flat,
open land and monopolizing surface water. Indigenous animals were driven away, plant life eaten
or trampled and Aborigines pushed into the marginal country. Patterns of seasonal migration broke
down, areas remaining free of Europeans were over utilized and eventually depleted of both flora
and fauna. Food became scarcer ... and even access to water was often difficult. Attacks on sheep
and cattle, made frequently in desperation, provoked violent retaliation: reprisal and revenge
spiralled viciously. 43

Another issue of misunderstanding was the apparent shyness and avoidance of Aboriginal
peoples at the moment of initial contact, as reported by a number of navigators and early
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colonists.44 In fact, it was neither shyness nor fear that regulated Aboriginal behaviour,45 but the
application of those protocols of interaction mentioned above. ‘Decorum not apathy determined
Aboriginal behaviour as the more perceptive explorers and settlers realized.’46 Apart from the
nature of cultural protocols of interaction, Aboriginal reacted wearily to Europeans newcomer
also for the necessity to incorporate them in the complex network of reciprocal interrelatedness
of the traditional kinship system.
Owing to the Australian kinship system everybody is - or can be - related to everybody else. If a
friendly stranger approaches a camp, he is always finally recognized as being related to someone
of the group. Consequently, for the Australians, only one ‘world’ and only one ‘human society’
exist. The unknown regions outside familiar lands do not belong to the ‘world’ - just as unfriendly
or mysterious foreigners do not belong to the community of men, for they may be ghosts, demonic
beings, or monsters.’ 47

As the nature of the kinship system rests upon the Dreaming - all kinship relations trace back to
common Ancestors in the Dreaming - it is natural that the debate on where to position the
newcomers within the social network revolved initially on the spiritual nature of the white men.
The sudden arrival of Europeans provoked more than fear and curiosity. It sparked intense and
often prolonged debate as to the true nature of the white men, their origin and objectives. During
the early years of settlement many blacks believed that Europeans were beings returned from the
dead. [...] [Aborigines regarded] Europeans as reincarnated countrymen. 48

How long did this view hold? It is only possible to speculate, but it is realistic to believe that the
same routes that criss-crossed all of Australia (and that allowed the existence of a very lively
trade, as noted by the discovery by European explorers of European artefacts well into the
interior of Australia) also carried information on the white men, especially when violent
confrontation erupted.
What is relevant, however, is the attempt by Aborigines to inscribe the newcomers within the
conceptual framework of their existence and within the network of reciprocity and relationships
established by the kinship system. The consequence of this attempt is apparent when white men
failed to comply with what was expected from them on the basis of reciprocity and specific
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relationship, with an explosion of retaliatory violence that escalated into full scale armed
conflict. It is apparent that a sense of momentous change marked the reaction of Aboriginal
groups to these strange newcomers.49 Their numbers, their physical differences and the
difference of their material possessions, their entire being alien to the world of the Aborigines
caused stress and natural confusion. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the initial Aboriginal
response to the arrival of Europeans has been an attempt to accommodate these strange beings
into the traditional cultural framework, by incorporating them within the network of the kinship
system. This entailed the consequence of initially sharing the land with the colonists according
to the traditional socio-economic principle of reciprocity. The incomprehension and the
subsequent disrespect of traditional cultural protocols and of protocols that regulated the shared
use of the land generated a violent retaliation. I argue that the Aboriginal perception of an
‘invasion’ did not occur at first because there was no theoretical reference for such an event.
However, when land usage protocols became disrespected, a ‘delayed reaction’ took place, and
violent armed conflict occurred, according to the rules of retaliation typical of inter and intragroup traditional conflict.50
What is important to consider is also the colonists’ reaction to such violent response. I have
mentioned that at the time of arrival the linguistic barriers prevented them from understanding
the complex Aboriginal world view, and consequently the entire network established by the
kinship system. Moreover, the ignorance of protocols of interaction caused a number of radical
misinterpretation of Aboriginal behaviour. On the one hand, avoidance was often interpreted as
shyness or fear, whereas on the other hand traditional patterns for regulating the shared use of
land where entirely ignored. When Aboriginal groups hunted cattle and sheep - following
traditional patterns of use of shared resources - colonists perceived it to be a trespassing of
private property and required the intervention of colonial troops or organised armed parties
themselves. 51
The result was a spiralling of violence. The initial reaction of Europeans was one of constant
anxiety. Colonists were impressed by the bravery and self control shown by Aborigines even in
situations of extreme stress and fear. 52 What was even more readily apparent was the self
confidence that Aborigines showed in relation to the environment. The intimate relationship
with the land fostered by the incorporation of all knowledge in the epistemological framework
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of the Dreaming bestowed an immediate superiority upon Aborigines in using the territory to
their advantage.
Aboriginal self-confidence was not based solely on the mastery of practical skills but on the
spiritual relationship with the land, the sense of belonging and responsibility for performing the
increase ceremonies which ensured the proper ordering of nature, the coming of the rain and the
renewal of plant and animal life.53

The intimate knowledge of the land and the consequent unpredictability of Aboriginal
movements was one of the main causes of alarm. The psychological status of early settlers has
been described as one of ‘constant dread; ... anxiety became habitual ... [People] were in “mortal
terror” of the Aborigines whose stealth “got on their nerves”. They were appalled by the horror
of “waiting, waiting, waiting for the creeping stealthy, treacherous blacks”.’54
This sense of unpredictability quickly spiralled in a series of revenge actions of escalating
violence. Aboriginal motives were not understood. Retaliatory actions of revenge parties were
not considered in the context of their cultural framework. Europeans colonists considered the
action of Aborigines either as a trespass of private property or, when colonists were the victim
of a violent action (whether or not they had caused it, knowingly or unknowingly), as mindless
violence, as an example of a ‘wanton and savage spirit.’ 55
A shift in the representation of the natives occurred during these early conflicts, as a direct result
of the theoretical gap that prevented colonists from understanding the cultural framework of
their opponents.
The concept of savagery bolstered the belief that Aborigines, “like savages all over the world”,
could only be subdued with violence, controlled by terror. The source of conflict could, therefore,
be traced not to the actions of the Europeans, or to the general colonial situation, but to the nature
of the Aborigines themselves.56

This shift formed the conceptual justification for violent actions that eventually resulted in the
violent dispossession of Aboriginal land, while preventing the colonists from considering such
actions as a form of military (or even just violent) conquest.
In fact, the level of violence described in documentary history is quite unsettling.57
Violent hatreds, always surging close to the surface, boiled over with volcanic fury whenever
Europeans were killed, particularly if women or well-known settlers suffered. On such occasions
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the desire for revenge became overwhelming, as numerous surviving accounts graphically
illustrate. In [...] 1854 [...] a New England pioneer, described the aftermath of an Aboriginal
attack on a station resulting in the death of three shepherds and the loss of their flocks. When the
revenge expedition was being planned the stockmen were “savagely anxious to be chosen for
this painfully imperative task”. The thought of their dead friends made them “pant for an
opportunity of vengeance” and when the party cornered a group of blacks “shot after shot, with
curses wild and deep, the excited fellows launched at their hated foe”. 58

In this changed perspective, Aborigines were not treated as inferior allies in the struggle
between opposing powers as it had happened in other continents, nor were they a foe that
presented a recognisable (to Europeans) army as it happened, for instance, in New Zealand.
Instead, Aborigines were demonised as a social whole. That is, the nature of savage enemy was
extended to every single Aborigine, on the assumption of their innate savagery mentioned
above. This demonising perspective, born out of initial fear and sense of inferiority and of not
immediately identifiable enemies, often led to outright and indiscriminate massacres, both of
children, women and elders, and of Aboriginal groups not related to the initial causes of
conflict. 59
From the very beginning, conflict between Aboriginal groups and colonists was marked by three
distinct features.60 Firstly, Aboriginal violent actions had a retaliatory nature, as they were
originated by misdemeanour of colonists in regards to traditional protocols. As a result, armed
resistance was always a secondary and delayed response to the actions of the Europeans. This is
relevant in assessing the conceptual nature of the conflict.
Secondly, the conflict took the aspect of guerrilla warfare. The numbers of Aboriginal warriors
in each group, their mobility and intimate knowledge of the land and the traditions from which
tactics were derived led to this mode of fighting. Limited population numbers inevitably led to
avoidance of full scale battlefield confrontation. High mobility pressured even forward toward
hit and run tactics. Moreover, the traditional method of confrontation that could be easily
adopted was the revenge party described in the previous chapter. Large gathering of warriors
facing each other, although not unknown of, had occurred only at time of large gatherings and
were therefore impractical to be adopted in the conflict toward the invaders;61 moreover, a set of
rigid protocols regulated these ceremonial mass confrontations and these protocols were
unknown and ignored by Europeans. As a result, the strategy displayed by Aboriginal groups
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was one of small, highly mobile parties engaged in guerrilla warfare, who maximised the
advantage provided by the superior knowledge of the land.
Finally, the conflict was characterised by an uneven distribution of numbers, military
organisations and weaponry. The Europeans could deploy professionally trained soldiers in
numbers that far exceeded those of Aboriginal armed parties; moreover, these soldiers were
armed with superior weaponry and were provided with horses, which improved both power and
mobility. It is with three elements in mind that conflict should be observed.
Throughout Aboriginal Australia the appearance of strange blacks carried the threat of revenge
killing, abduction of women or the exercise of potent magic. But it did not portend forced
dispossession or exile from the homeland. While conflict was ubiquitous in traditional societies
territorial conquest was virtually unknown. Alienation of land was not only unthinkable, it was
literally impossible. If blacks did not react to the initial invasion of their country it was because
they were not aware that it had taken place. They certainly did not believe that their land had
suddenly ceased to belong to them and they to their land. ... The black owners may have been
pushed aside but many refused to accept that they had been dispossessed; they never conceded the
major premise of the invasion.62

A plausible hypothesis about the social impact of this unexpected and prolonged conflict upon
traditional societies is that a constant state of warfare was introduced. Warring parties tended to
become more permanent and more organised.63 A shift in relation to land ownership occurred.
Whereas land ownership was previously regulated and re-asserted during a number of
ceremonial gatherings and through specific and recurring rituals, the ongoing conflict forced
Aboriginal groups to become more positively assertive of their specific relationship toward a
land they undeniably considered as ‘theirs’; that is, that they had a specific, both deeply spiritual
and very practical, daily relationship with, and to which they undeniably considered more
specifically connected to, as opposed to all foreigners, be them Aborigines from other groups or
Europeans.
This paradigmatic shift is the initial basis for a different form of land claims, much more
recognisable to Europeans and still adopted today in land rights’ discourses.
[T]he history of inland exploration indicates that local groups tolerated the passage of European
expeditions provided they behaved with circumspection. On many occasions Aborigines
hospitably allowed squatting parties to establish themselves and even assisted them during the first
few weeks of their occupation. Clearly white and black perceptions of what was taking place were
very wide apart. Unless forewarned Aborigines probably had no appreciation of the European’s
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determination to stay indefinitely and “own” the soil ... The white invasion often forced blacks into
a more assertive and possessive stance concerning clan territories. E. S. Parker came to the
conclusion that it was an “important and unquestionable fact” that the Port Phillip Aborigines were
“not insensible to their original right to the soil”. [...] But Aborigines reacted less to the original
trespass than to the ruthless assertion by Europeans of exclusive proprietory rights often from the
very first day of occupation. It was behaviour probably unheard of in traditional society. 64

The perception of the Europeans in regard to the Aboriginal also underwent an interesting shift:
Many features of the conflict were new to the British, even to those who had been in the armed
forces in Europe and other parts of the Empire. Their Aboriginal adversaries were constantly on
the move; they had no villages, fields or fortifications which could be captured. They lived off the
land, exploiting an ancient and sophisticated bushcraft. Their movements were unpredictable,
groups waxing and waning for no apparent reason, adopting the classical stratagems of the weak
when pitted against the strong - stealth, surprise, secrecy.65

A shift occurred, from a state of ‘constant dread’, of ‘universal terror’ in face of the
unpredictability of the adversary, to an escalation of violence in light of the view that violence
was the only possible means to subdue the natives, what Reynolds has described as a ‘tradition
of brutality’ of ‘generations hardened against the natives’. 66
Progressively, violence became the common response adopted by all colonists, not only by
military forces. From the very beginning, ‘[v]iolence was to be used not only to punish the
guilty, but to deter “all of them” from future resistance’.67 The strategic advantage of the
Aborigines in their intimate knowledge of the land was faced against superior numbers and
military technology. One initial example of this confrontation was the military operation known
as the ‘Black Line’ that was conducted in Tasmania in 1830 in an attempt to mount a full scale
military operation to end the conflict with the Tasmanian Aborigines.68 Although this operation
was judged ‘an expensive failure’, as it did not reach its goal in itself, however ‘such a massive
display of manpower and firearms achieved the desired effect. [...] Aborigines did not know it
was a unique operation, far too costly to repeat, and it convinced them to consider a negotiated
peace’. 69
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Although and armed resistance did indeed occur, the uneven distribution of military power and
the prolonged and ongoing nature of the conflict inevitably forced Aboriginal groups to find
alternative strategies of resistance and survival. A number of relevant examples of a desire for a
negotiated settlement is provided by Reynolds, who also believes that such desire was probably
much more widespread ‘than the available evidence will ever suggest’.70
An ever increasing number of colonists privately resorted to violence.
When the settlers wanted the land they used guns; when they needed cheap labour they put them
down and picked up their whips, brandishing them just as freely and with little interference from
the law. [...] Atrocities [...] of one sort or another [were committed]. Poisoning, rape, mutilation,
torture, savaging with hunting dogs - all had accompanied frontier skirmishing. 71

A good description of a number of large scale killings is provided by Flood. 72 The

legal

response to these massacres was not immediately repressive, as exemplified by the Myall Creek
massacre. It is therefore understandable that Aboriginal groups attempted to negotiate a peaceful
end to the highly destructive ongoing conflicts. Not only because of the immediate costs of
violent confrontations, but also for the cultural costs imposed by a constant state of warfare that
altered the traditional patterns of ceremonial gatherings that regulated and reaffirmed all social
and inter-group relationships.
Apart from conflict, Aborigines were faced with a much more devastating enemy, to which no
resistance was possible. Introduced diseases are considered the major factor in the rapid
demographic decline of traditional societies wherever European invaders arrived in the course
of their colonial enterprise.73 Australia was no exception. Contemporary historians agree that the
major impact on the depopulation of Aboriginal groups was caused by introduced germs.74 The
two combined events, conflict and introduced diseases, are the causes of a rapid decline of the
Aboriginal population. One question asked by Reynolds is whether it could be considered
genocide. The immediate answer is clearly negative, as Aborigines survived the conflicts and
the invasion. However, the central question is formulated rather differently: ‘[d]id significant
numbers of settlers seek the total destruction of Aboriginal Australia?’. The answer to this
delicate question rests in that ‘from at least the 1820’s many colonists expected the Aborigines
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to “die out” or “pass away”’. 75 This is important as it forms the theoretical basis of most of the
colonial policies.76
III. POLICIES
Aboriginal fear both stimulated European assertiveness and entrenched black submission ... For
their part the Aborigines had “learnt in their terror to submit to anything the conquering race”
chose to do ... Large-scale killing of Aborigines came to an end when they moved onto pastoral
stations and into fringe camps. 77

This brief quote marks the passage from a violent conflict to an extended period of colonial
policies forcibly imposed upon the Aborigines. A number of reasons had led Aboriginal groups
to seek and end to a devastating conflict: the uneven numbers of the parties to the conflict, its
permanent ongoing nature and its costs, both in cultural terms and in terms of human lives. The
analysis of the cultural modifications that followed is fundamental to assess the impact such
modifications have had on traditional land related protocols.
As a result of the pressure exerted by direct conflict and depopulation due to introduced diseases
and violence, Aboriginal groups became ‘fringe dwellers’;78 that is, they were forced to
progressively alter the pattern of seasonal migrations in order to receive protection and often
immediate support.79 Whereas Aborigines at the outskirts of bigger settlements were considered
outcasts and were rejected from any European social activity, Aboriginal people living at the
fringes of pastoral stations were employed as stockmen and pastoral helpers. The European
‘construction’ of the Aboriginal - that is, the misinterpretation of traditional cultural traits, the
subsequently mistaken social descriptions and the political actions taken as a consequence happened throughout this entire period.
European mode of labour was entirely alien to traditional patterns of production. 80
The move from the bush into white society was not merely a spatial journey. Among other things it
was a transfer from one economic system to another, from the domestic mode of production to the
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burgeoning capitalist economy of colonial Australia. When groups of blacks walked into camps
and stations and township they carried few material possessions. Bt their cultural luggage was very
much richer and more important in determining their reaction to the new world. They came from a
society where economic activity was geared to immediate use not to the creation of a surplus for
exchange. 81

Aboriginal economies holistically integrated labour dedicated to the production of goods for
immediate use and the complex set of rituals and ceremonies that regulated all human activities.
Rituals and ceremonies played a pivotal effect on traditional economic life in that ritual
practices affirmed the inter-groups and inter-individual relationships upon which the use of the
land was based. As a result, ritual had always been an essential part of the Aboriginal mode of
labour. This point, however, was never considered by European settlers. The term ‘going
walkabout’ is still used to describe an apparently random and aimless wandering, thus depriving
Aboriginal actions of their spiritual and ritual value. 82 The resulting ‘construction’ of Aboriginal
workers was one of unreliability and laziness. 83
A number of issues were the direct result of an abrupt, radical and often violent change of a
lifestyle maintained for 60000 years: begging, prostitution, alcohol consumption et cetera. 84
These common sociological responses to cultural dispossession became a cultural marker used
to define not any and dispossessed human groups but a specific one. Aboriginal culture itself
became stigmatised because of these reactive changes, as it had happened with violence and
conflict before.85
The settlers’ motives and justifications started to become contradictory. On the one hand, a
claim of moral superiority became more and more widespread and supported itself by feeding
on these constructions. On the other hand, personal and cultural exploitation became common. 86
A significant example is represented by the European attitude toward Aboriginal women. Flood
reports that settlers were horrified by the brutal violence with which women were treated in
Aboriginal society.87 Settlement of disputes often involved physical violence which involved
both men and women. This inter-gender violence was appalling to the European sensitivity of
the time, where women were generally portrayed as ‘damsel in distress’ and certainly not as
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pursuers of active military roles.88 Although Europeans professed to be appalled by the use of
brute force to exert physical superiority over women, however, Europeans’ abuse of Aboriginal
women was widespread:
Moral superiority was all very well, but most frontiersmen were much more interested in the
physical advantages of being in a position of absolute power over the Aborigines. Ready access to
black women was one of the attractions of outback life and there is abundant evidence that women
were forcibly abducted in all parts of Australia from the early years of settlement until the 1930s
and 1940s. The nature of the abduction varied widely. There were casual episodes when women,
seen by chance in the bush, were run down and raped in brief, brutal encounters. On other
occasions parties of stockmen went out on “gin hunts” deliberately seeking women for sex.89

This forced change of lifestyle imposed a change in the economic mode of production.
Traditional patterns of seasonal migration were forcibly suspended. As a result, traditional
ceremonies and rituals were, to various degrees, discontinued. It is important to note, however,
that although those rituals could not be practised continuously, their knowledge did not simply
vanish. In fact, the derogatory term ‘walkabout’ used by Europeans in fact highlights a
continuity of cultural practices.90 An important consequence of the altered lifestyle was the
dietary change imposed on Aborigines, with the increase of obesity and the high incidence of
diabetes still recorded today.91
Another important consequence of this forced change was the partial disruption of traditional
social fabric exerted by different approaches of older and younger Aborigines toward European
commodities at the moment of contact.
Aboriginal society was loosely articulated; during a typical year groups waxed and waned, clans
coalesced and dispersed. Visits to European camps or stations could be easily encompassed within
the normal pattern of movement about tribal territory. What is more the attraction of the white
settlements worked on latent divisions within traditional society. Discipline was maintained by the
older men who managed both the pace at which the young were initiated and the bestowal of
women and girls as they became available for marriage. While the fully initiated men controlled
the only possible, or conceivable, passes on to the plateau of full adulthood their authority over the
young remained unshaken. The Europeans, often unwittingly, challenged that dominance. 92
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The last important cultural modification imposed upon Aboriginal groups was the high number
of Aboriginal kids born as a result of sexual abuses mentioned above, as well as of union of
European and Aboriginal parents. These kids were perfectly integrated within the social
structure established by the kinship system.93 However, physiognomical differences formed the
basis for the forced removal of Aboriginal children and were used to directly equate culture and
genetics through the constructed idea of ‘race’.94 Aboriginal kids were defined as ‘half-caste’ et
cetera, according to the number of ‘full-blooded’ Aboriginal ancestors. This equation between
inherited genetic traits and acquired cultural traits, although totally rejected by modern
anthropologists and geneticists as simply racist and void of any scientific validity,95 informed
both policies and discourses on Indigenous issues.
In contrast to the negative constructions of the natives as violent, unreliable and lazy savages, a
number of apparently more benign constructions appeared in the European racial discourses.
These constructions formed the basis of colonial policies and actions that had an equally
detrimental and violent effect on traditional Aboriginal societies. The notion of the ‘noble
savage’ championed by Rousseau had accompanied the first European navigators. 96 This notion
was soon followed by the concept of the ‘great chain of being’.97 According to this concept, all
living beings were arranged in an ordered, hierarchical pattern beginning with the simplest
creatures and ascending, through primates, to humanity and further toward God. Accordingly,
‘during the eighteenth century it became common to distinguish different types - or races - of
men and to arrange them in hierarchical sequence’. 98 Darwin’s theory of evolution combined
with this concept to produce social darwinism, a view of the world that incorporated the
premises of different races of men hierarchically ordered in an evolutionary ladder, with the
result of grading the world’s people accordingly, the Europeans occupying the most advanced
position of cultural evolution.99

Phrenology and other disciplines combined to provide
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described as ‘living fossils’, as marked by ‘ape-like characteristics’ and as representing the
‘childhood of the human race’.100
The result was that Aborigines were seen as a ‘dying race’,101 whose fate was inevitable in face
of cultural evolution and enlightenment, as it was ‘the design of Providence that inferior races
should pass away before the superior races’.102 As a consequence, voices arose to ‘protect’ and
‘save’ the Aborigines. Missions and reservations were established.103 Missionary activity was
focused on providing Aborigines with spiritual knowledge in order to save their souls before
their bodies, with the result of an impact on the metaphysics of the Dreaming because of the
amount of pressure that missionaries were able to exert by controlling basic provisions.104
Arguments against segregation on large reserves and in favour of integration and assimilation
paved the way for later government policies.105 One of the main policies was based on ethnic
assumptions. The number of Aborigines in the reserves had grown significantly by the 1880s,
due to better diet and resistance to disease.106 The vast majority of Aboriginal people living in
the reserves were of mixed descent.107 Anthropologists remarked on the rapid physiognomic
changes of Aborigines of mixed descent: ‘[p]hysically Aborigines absorb readily and rapidly
into the white population. Indeed, three successive generations of mating with full whites can
suffice to eliminate all distinctive Aboriginal traits.’ 108 This idea of physical absorption within
the wider white community influenced the White Australia Policy. 109 This policy had ‘three
main elements - a belief that “mixed-blood” Aborigines should be absorbed into the white
population, that further non-European immigrants should be excluded and that suitable white
colonists should be encouraged to settle.’ 110
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Although the absorption described by anthropologists referred to ethnic traits,111 the policy was
aimed at an entire cultural absorption, with the result of erroneously equating genetic and
cultural heritage. The initial policy was to ‘protect “full-bloods” and absorb ... “half-castes”.’112
However, the policy rapidly extended to include all Aboriginal children. This forced removal of
Aboriginal children from their families, known as the stolen generations, involved numbers that
varied between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children, heavily affecting Aboriginal
culture during the first three quarters of the twentieth century.113
The impact of such an event is immediately understandable. In a culture where the oral
transmission of information rests on the particular connections between teachers and students,
the forced removal and separation of the learning generation from the teaching one has dire
consequences. What is extremely relevant in order to assess the impact that this event has had
on traditional land related protocols is to assess whether the fundamental elements of traditional
protocols presented in Chapter Eight are still existent and recognisable.
Legally relevant traditional protocols related to land are based on the kinship system, on the
metaphysical concept of the Dreaming as encapsulated within specific narratives and on the
correct transmission of such narratives according to the protocols established and enforced by
the kinship system. 114 Therefore, the question is whether these elements are still present today
or whether they have disappeared as a result of conflict and colonial policies and practices. If
such elements do in fact still exist, then it can be argued that the fundamental complex of
‘traditional laws and customs’ - and consequently of ‘traditional interests in land’ - is still
essentially present, regardless of the changes in lifestyle that are the result of colonisation. I will
explore the survival of these foundational protocols in Part D, looking at a case study which is
particularly significant because of its geographical position and of having endured the full
impact of two centuries of colonisation.
Before focussing on this case study, however, I will explore briefly the history of claims
advanced by Aboriginal activists. The need to claim - or, sometimes, re-claim - traditional land
through conflict (be it armed, political or through a court process), rather than through
traditional rituals and ceremonies, represents a further cultural change imposed by the colonial
process. This modified social perspective has been adopted by Aboriginal activists and still
shapes Aboriginal claims today.
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IV. CLAIMS
In order to examine the claims advanced and the actions taken by Aboriginal groups and
individuals both in the political and in the legal arenas during two hundred years of
colonisation, I will rely mainly on the oral and documentary evidence gathered and
diachronically articulated by Attwood and Markus.115 The methodology used by the researchers
in compiling an exhaustive collection of data paid particular attention to the distinction between
‘historical information or evidence’ 116 and ‘historical statements - ... feelings, evaluations,
explanations and ideas concerning what happened -’,117 the authors are very aware of the fact
that ‘oral history tends to produce accounts of the past that emphasise its continuity or sameness
with the present ... rather than its discontinuity with or difference to the past’. 118

The political claims that Aboriginal groups and activists have voiced toward the colonial
political powers as a response to colonisation have had to be voiced in a cultural framework
different from the traditional one from the very beginning of the colonial period.119 The need to
adapt to a different set of theoretical discourses and methodologies certainly played a major role
in what Attwood calls the ‘creation of Aboriginality’. 120 Examples of radically dissenting
perspectives and demands are clear from the onset of European colonisation. Historians have
recorded what I have defined as the delayed armed response to European dispossession of the
land.121 This armed response was the first reaction to be adopted, as soon as the actions of
Europeans were perceived as an unjust dispossession of traditional land.122

Since the outcomes of armed conflict forced Aboriginal groups to seek alternative compromises,
the nature of any political action has been shaped around the policies of the colonial powers,
first the colonies and then the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories. Attwod and
Markus explicitly state that ‘in a general way Aboriginal political activity has existed in an
ambiguous relationship with the state and so is shaped by this; but in a more specific sense the
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parameters of Aboriginal protest have been determined by the nature of colonial regimes’.123
Consequently, the nature of all Aboriginal claims and of the political dialogue created with the
colonial governments has been shaped in such a way that it moulds itself around colonial
discourses rather than around traditional protocols and practices. Nonetheless, it maintains a
strong link with these protocols and practices.

It is deceptive to assume that “colonial Australia” ended with the coming of the twentieth century,
or that successful British settlement meant the end of “colonial” relations between Aborigines and
non-Aborigines ... In the short and long term, colonialism drastically jeopardised the personal
liberty of Aborigines. They immediately lost choices over movement and residence, which was
especially devastating for a people for whom travel was a necessity. Their lifestyle was frequently
dictated by governments and Christian missionaries who wanted them to become sedentary, or
remain under control of their “settlements”. Aboriginal families also suffered the extreme trauma
of having their children taken away to dormitories or distant towns. Association with their own
Aboriginal parents and kin was said to be degrading or subjecting them to neglect. Girls and boys
were segregated and taught to conform to sex roles approved by an outside culture ... [However,]
[a]s well as a history of conflict and domination, there was also a history of negotiation,
compromise and exchange between Aboriginal people and colonisers. Alliances were formed.
Aboriginal midwives delivered white women’s babies and Aboriginal women nurtured, even
suckled, these children ... Aboriginal women had children by white men. Bodies, words, culture,
arts, aesthetics, ideas, images became entwined in a complex physical and mental dialogue which
continues today, and is most evident in human reproduction and cultural exchange. 124

This passage highlights one of the most important elements defining Aboriginal political
activism, which is often overlooked. That is, its personal and individual nature. Aboriginal
decision making has always been based on direct personal involvement and negotiation.125 As a
consequence, the first and foremost feature of political activism is the direct involvement of all
individuals in an immediately present, ongoing, day to day, political exchange. Another
consequence, directly connected to this, is that every day activities had a political connotation
for Aboriginal people from the very beginning of colonialism. Another element of traditional
decision making is the attempt to reach a social consensus on all decisions. These three
elements are therefore fundamental to understand the nature of Aboriginal political activism: its
direct and personal character, the fact that it was not, and is not, separable from every day
activities and its tendency toward a consensually agreed solution.
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One initial transition in the form of Aboriginal response to colonisation was the forced shift
from armed resistance to other forms of self preservation. That is, self preservation both in a
cultural and a very practical sense. Aboriginal voices have been aware of the need for this
change, as reported by McGrath:
Amy Laurie, a Gurindji woman, spoke of how her grandchildren could not understand why the
past generations had not fought back harder when attacked. The elders explained: “You know why
we bin let ‘em shoot we. Why? We frightened? No, we never gotim rifle.” And we didn’t care,
they reckon, “We can die in our own country.” Aboriginal perceptions of threat by various forces
in white society have been perpetuated by a long heritage of control with often harsh means of
enforcement. The theft of their land has made them sceptical of white justice. Frontier periods
throughout Australia were the shaping times of colonial authority. Early violence against
Aboriginal people was an expected “price” of colonial expansion ... The frontier period thus set the
tone of “law and order” to be imposed on Aboriginal people. Tragically, force or its threat became
the key means of establishing British justice ... Forcibly dispossessed of their land and traditional
livelihood, retreat, starvation and migrations to the fringes of white occupied areas or reserves
became inevitable. Through its legacy of fear, violence had a lasting impact on Aboriginal people,
as was intended. Once they had come within such influence, they would be more likely to obey not
just British laws but any white person. Many white frontiersmen literally took the law into their
own hands; .. [o]rdinary citizens thus remained closely involved in “keeping the blacks in their
place’.126

It does not come as surprise, then, that the story of Aboriginal protest begins in the middle of the
eighteenth century, with the petitions from Tasmanian Aborigines to the colonial and imperial
government in the mid-1840’s, after the so called ‘black war’. 127 Although the protest was local
in focus, and although Tasmanian Aborigines advanced their claims as ‘original inhabitants’ of
the place without trying to argue in the name of any pan-Aboriginal group, the protest itself did
not involve the traditional group only, be it the land-owning clan or the land possessing band.128
Instead, the protest was advanced in the name of the Aborigines of a colonial formation. This
represents the beginning of the development of a particular Aboriginal political consciousness,
the result of which carried well into the present. It represents the formation of a political identity
that is abstract from the pre-existing social structures and that responds to concepts and ideals
typical of the colonial mentality.
Moreover, both the language and the structures adopted to voice and frame those claims,
demands and protests were borrowed from and articulated in the discourses of the colonial
powers. The result is that demands and claims framed in such a way might not always respond
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to the need or represent the will of pre-existing and underlying social structures. It is important
to remember that traditional social structures were based on the complex structure of the kinship
system: they did not rest upon abstract social ideals but on the direct and unique personal
relationship of each individual with each other and with specific features of the surrounding
environment. This personal and direct political involvement does not automatically reconcile
with a representative approach typical of western democracies.
[P]rotesters were anything but local in the principles (or ideals) which they articulated. Rather,
they couched their demands in terms of a widely held political language They legitimised their call
for change on historical grounds, by reference to their prior occupation of the land of the colony
(or state), demanding land and other rights on the basis of that Aboriginality ... Aborigines,
however, did not always speak the language of difference; instead (or sometimes simultaneously)
they called for the same (“equal”) rights as other human beings - as British subjects, for example which had no reference to history ... Whatever the political language these local protesters spoke,
though, it is clear that they were very familiar with the political discourses of the day. This
suggests that such protests often rested on the literacy that some Aborigines had acquired through
their intensive contact with missionaries and other teachers.129

A number of interesting points can be derived from this passage. Firstly, it is clear that
Aborigines transformed the armed resistance in a political struggle from the very beginning of
colonisation. Secondly and consequently, they adopted, from the very early moments of
colonisation, the political language of the colonisers. Consequently, they had to deal with the
underlying political premises and epistemologies of that political language, even when they
were not openly doing so. As a result, the entire history of political activism should not be
simply observed from a western political standpoint, but instead as a constant dialogue between
traditional social structures and epistemologies upon which all claims and demands were - and
still are - based, and the political language adopted to voice and frame those claims and
demands.
An important point can be made about the legitimisation of claims and demands based on
historical grounds. These claims were based on prior occupation of the land pre-dating the time
of European arrival in a temporally linear sense, rather than on the complex justification
contained in the ontological Dreaming stories.
Another important point to remember is that not all Aborigines had equal access to the language
of the colonial interlocutors. As Ann McGrath points out, ‘Aboriginal people were expected to
fit in with a western-style labour system but they were not entitled to its privileges.’ 130 That is,
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the ambiguous attitude of the colonial and imperial powers toward Aborigines had the practical
result of excluding them from colonial education. As a result, only a few individuals had the
possibility to learn the colonial political language in which to articulate their claims and
demands. The result was an alteration of traditional forms of political activity, by differentiating
the individual participation as a result of a ‘privileged’ access to European education of certain
individuals.
Regardless of this embryonic and developing pan-Aboriginal political consciousness, however,
Aboriginal activism was always local throughout the entire nineteenth and the first half of the
twentieth century. 131 The three most interesting documentary examples of early protests
presented by Attwood and Markus are the cases of Flinders Island, of Coranderrk and of
Maloga. 132 The first case is the prime example of the beginning of an Aboriginal political
consciousness framed in the language of the colonial power as the result of the literacy acquired
by younger men and women.
The second case represents an initial example of claims advanced on behalf of social groups
based not on traditional social structures but on colonial ones. The European responses to this
case are interesting, in that they acknowledge the pre-existence of traditional protocols to which
a degree of respect and acknowledgment is advocated.
Humanitarians ... believed that Europeans were superior to Aborigines and had a duty “to colonise
the waste places of the earth” (such as Australia), but they also acknowledged “the great fact” that
Aborigines were the “original possessors” and Europeans were “intruders” whose “hostile
invasion” had deprived the indigenes of “their former mode of existence” and almost
“exterminated” them. Accordingly, they believed that Aborigines had an “inalienable” right ... and
had a “claim” upon the colonisers.133

From the very beginning of the advocated recognition of traditional claims and ‘rights’, these
very claims and rights are recognised insofar as they are framed in the colonial language.
Common to all forms of protest is their local nature, even when the local claims do not
correspond to local traditional entities but to colonial local entities instead. The same is true for
the first political organisations founded in the 1920’s and 1930’s, several of which, however,
connected Aboriginal communities over large areas.134 AAPA, Native Union, AAL, Australian
Aborigines Association (AAA), Euralian Association, Aborigines Progressive Association
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(APA) are some of the names of political organisations of the early twentieth century. The most
celebrated protest of this period was the 1938 Day of Mourning. 135
[T]hese Aboriginal organisations naturally drew upon and were influenced by the dominant
Australian discourses of the day, and they formed alliances with non-Aborigines and nonAboriginal organisations. All were familiar with the ideas of Christian humanitarianism, British
liberal democracy and/or socialism; and [...] they were supported by non-Aboriginal men and
women in organisation which espoused these ideals. These organisations largely campaigned by
means of writing letters and forming delegations to politicians - both state and national - but also
by sending letters and petitions to the imperial monarch. 136

In parallel with Aboriginal organisations, a number of non-Aboriginal organisations and
individuals were involved in shaping Aboriginal claims and demands, for example, the
Association for the Protection of the Native Races (APNR).137 From the 1920’s, anthropologists
also played an influential role in Aboriginal affairs. Professor Elkin, the most important figure
in Australian anthropology during the entire first half of the twentieth century, was a
vigourous campaigner for a positive and uniform policy that would replace the existing
fragmented approach which, he believed, consisted “merely of protective measures” that were “not
aimed at advancing the race”. [He] became a powerful voice for assimilation and a trusted advisor
to the Commonwealth government. 138

The role of anthropology and of anthropologists in Australia, therefore, was not been perceived
as that of neutral scientists and narrators, but instead of active participants in shaping Aboriginal
affairs.
The Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement (FCAA), later the Federal Council for the
Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI), emerged in 1958. This
represents the first national organisation aimed at representing Indigenous Australians as a
whole. 139 Among other actions adopted to fight discriminatory policies, its programme focussed
on citizenship rights in order to acquire equal treatment.
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Aboriginal political activism was given wide media visibility at the time of the ‘Freedom Ride’,
the protest bus trip around New South Wales co-ordinated by Charles Perkins. 140 Following the
example of similar freedom rides in the United States, the protest organised by Student Action
for Aborigines (SAFA) in 1965 represents the first attempt to fully use the media in order to
further the political cause.141
In 1967, over 90 per cent of voters voted ‘yes’ in a Referendum to alter two sections in the
Australian Constitution in reference to Aboriginal people. This event has been represented as an
event of considerable relevance in Australian history. Although its results were less momentous
than generally claimed,
over the years it has been popularly claimed that the referendum gave Aboriginal people the vote,
granted equal citizenship, repealed racially discriminatory laws, transferred Aboriginal affairs from
the states to the Commonwealth, or that it did all of these things. 142

In 1966 Aboriginal stockworkers went on strike on Wave Hill and Newcastle Waters, protesting
against a decision to postpone the payment of equal wages for Aboriginal pastoral workers. This
industrial action, supported by FCAATSI, was soon transformed into a claim for land by the
Gurindji who, led by Vincent Lingiari, walked off Lord Vestey’s Wave Hill station and sat down
at Wattie Creek. This protest contributed to the articulation of land claims in terms of ‘land
rights’. 143 At almost the same time, in 1963, Yolngu people on the Gove peninsula had advanced
the Yirrkala bark petitions - two documents sent to the Commonwealth and traditionally
encoded on pieces of bark - in which they both challenged the doctrine that Australia had been a
terra nullius and stated that they owned that land since time immemorial. The case that
followed, known as the Gove Land Right Case,144 has already been explored in Chapter Six.
The plaintiffs failed to convince Justice Blackburn in the Northern Territory Supreme Court and
the claims were thus rejected.
These two events represent the birth of ‘land rights’ activism in its contemporary political and
legal form. 145 A dualism can be noted in this emerging ‘land rights’ discourse. On the one hand,
land claims form part of a strategy of resistance that can trace its origin to the first encounters
between Indigenous groups and European colonial powers and that is based on traditional
140
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structures and premises. On the other hand, land claims are framed in specific political and legal
forms in response to the process of colonisation. These structures can be in conflict with the
traditional protocols identified in Chapter Eight.
Attwood and Markus relate the retroactive attribution of the term ‘land rights’ to Aboriginal
demands and claims of the 1930’s.
[A]s the documentary evidence discussed by Goodall and other historians of Aboriginal political
organisations of the 1930’s shows, the dominant political language they used was that of
citizenship rights, and while the loss of reserve lands was undoubtedly a major concern, and their
return was an important - for many campaigners the paramount - demand, this was never couched
in terms of ‘land rights’. This term cannot be found in any documentary sources of this period. 146

The authors use this example to argue that
oral history tends to produce accounts of the past that emphasise its continuity or sameness with
the present ... - for example, ‘land rights’ - rather than its discontinuity with or difference to the
past ... - ‘citizenship rights’. 147

It is also equally relevant to consider the underlying nature of the emphasised sameness. Claims
and demands derive from Aboriginal cultural connection with land and from the continuity of
such cultural connection as a result of the continuity of the kinship system that determines it.
Opposite to this underlying continuity are the political forms that claims and demands take
because of different strategies of resistance. These forms in turn shape future and further
activism, claims and demands. This potentially conflicting dualism is particularly evident in the
political discourse that begun with ‘land rights’ activism.
The introduction of political claims voiced in terms of ‘land rights’ gave birth to a new wave of
activism.148 A sense of a national, pan-Aboriginal identity developed even further when
Aboriginal activists founded a Tent Embassy in front of former Parliament House in Canberra
on January 1972.149 The Tent Embassy followed the then Prime Minister McMahon’s rejection
of Aboriginal land rights on Australia Day 1972.

Attwood and Markus state that the Tent

Embassy symbolises the sense of dispossession of Aboriginal people, of being foreigners in
their own land.150

The Tent Embassy also introduces a statement of autonomous and

independent political identity, by adopting a concept - the Embassy - articulated in terms of
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contemporary internationally recognised sovereign entities.151 The existence of the Tent
Embassy challenges the premises upon which Australian sovereignty is founded.
The embassy also heightened the demand for Aboriginal autonomy while expressing an argument
that that hitherto had not been voiced or at least barely heard in Australian political discourse - a
claim to Aboriginal sovereignty - which Paul Coe among others was to champion.152

Bolder political methods started to be adopted. Activists began to show ‘pride in Aboriginal
history and culture, deploying old and new symbols of Aboriginality.’153 Young militants
challenged what they saw as white domination of political activism attacking white control of
Aboriginal past, such as skeletal remains, and developing and adopting highly recognisable
symbols of pan-Aboriginal identity such as a pan-Aboriginal flag. 154 This culminates in a series
of political events and claims that are not the direct articulation of traditional protocols.
Although originated in traditional identity and protocols, these claims are voiced in a political
language determined and shaped by colonial structures.
Aboriginal activism continued to shift from fundamental citizenship rights to more specific
Aboriginal rights, at the same time articulating claims of ‘land rights’ as well as demanding
separate Aboriginal sovereignty, following and mirroring a similar international discourse
advanced by Indigenous Peoples around the world.155 The Australian government, in turn,
modified its approach to Aboriginal demands, creating programmes and institutions aimed at
reducing the historic disadvantage of Indigenous Australians, granting some land rights156 and
establishing the first nationwide representative body, the National Aboriginal Consultative
Committee (NACC). 157
At the same time the main organisation that had led Aboriginal activism, FCAATSI, declined as
a result of internal conflicts.158 The central organisation to provide nationwide coherence to
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Aboriginal activism moved from an independent movement to a heavily bureaucratised,
government influenced, one. The result of the new federal approach to Aboriginal demands
shifted the focus of Aboriginal activism from protest to management, as many Aboriginal leaders
were charged with the responsibility of implementing new policies, and so became incorporated in
the task of administration, either as employees of the federal government or of the agencies
established to deliver services to Aboriginal communities.159

A new tension arose between the recognition of Indigenous Australians as Australian citizens
and the recognition of Indigenous symbols of autonomy and self-determination such as the
adoption of the Aboriginal flag by government bodies in official contexts. Such tension adds
further complexity to the tension between Aboriginal demands derived from traditional culture
and the political forms and structures in which such demands are shaped as a result of the
colonial process.
This tension is particularly evident with the successor of NACC, the National Aboriginal
Conference (NAC). What was meant to be a pan-Aboriginal representative body was not
grounded in Aboriginal culture and socio-political structures but was instead shaped in a form
imposed and determined by the colonial power. Organisations based on local communities, such
as local land councils and legal services gained much greater acceptance within Aboriginal
communities, although ‘cooperation between and coordination of these organisations at a
national level was minimal’.160
The inclusion of Aboriginal demands within a colonial bureaucratic structure did not still radical
claims. 161 Aboriginal groups put forward the position that ‘they had rights stemming from prior
occupation of the continent that had never been abrogated by treaty or any other legitimate
means’. 162 The articulation of the discourse in terms of rights was again shaped by a legal
discourse framed in terms of a colonial political - and eventually legal - discourse. The spectrum
of Aboriginal demands ranged from the proposal of a treaty to be negotiated between the
Commonwealth and Aboriginal people,163 to seeking change by applying pressure through
international forums, 164 to constitutional changes that would recognise Aboriginal rights and the
159

Ibid, 277.

160

Ibid, 278.

161

See, eg, Mudrooroo, Us mob (Angus&Robertson, 1995).

162 Attwood

and Markus, above n 115, 277.

163

See Kevin Gilbert, Aboriginal Sovereignty, Justice, the Law and the Land (Burrambinga Books, 1987);
S Harris, It’s coming yet… An Aboriginal treaty within Australia between Australians (The Aboriginal
Treaty Committee, 1979).
164 See D Ivison, P Patton and W Sanders, Political theory and the rights of Indigenous peoples
(Cambridge University Press, 2000).
224

status of Aborigines as prior owners of the country, 165 to court actions pursuing the avenue of
legal redress.166
The Federal government addressed issues of inequality and discrimination, both with the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 167 and with the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission’s Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Children from Their Families.168 It also established the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC, established in 1990 and closed in 2005) and the Australian Institute of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS, established in 1989). 169 Finally, the
turning point of this dialogue between Indigenous claims and colonial responses is represented
by the Mabo (No 2) 170 case and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 171 Both have been explored and
analysed in Part B.
I have argued that the Mabo (No 2) decision represents a potential opening to a legal pluralist
perspective.172 This legal pluralist perspective could potentially reconcile the tension between
Aboriginal demands originated in a traditional cultural framework and articulated in a colonial
political language that has been presented in this chapter. This reconciliation, however, can only
be possible if traditional protocols are given appropriate and effective recognition. Such
recognition must transcend the language of political and legal activism and include an
appropriate analysis of traditional protocols based on an appropriate research methodology and
conducted with appropriate cultural protocols of interaction with participants and
interviewees. 173 Part D will explore a specific case study, in order to explore such protocols
within the analytical perspective introduced in this thesis. The present section has shown that
political and legal claims are not sufficient to uncover the full extent of Aboriginal claims. With
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this in mind, then, it is possible to analyse a specific case study focussing on claims and
traditional protocols in the Illawarra.
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PART D
OBSERVATIONS

When I take people out into the land I say: ‘Let’s watch the land talk to us.’ And you’ll see
some jaws drop. But that’s what it’s doin’ - it’s talking to us without a voice. Our land does
that all the time; our water does that, our wind. Grandmother Moon, Grandfather Sun do it
all the time. They show us things, what’s happening. They are talking to us constantly. And
what do we do? We ignore them; we ignore what the Mother, the land, is telling us. We don’t
do the ceremony we used to do, we don’t sing in the trees when we plant them, we don’t see
which direction the songlines are taking. We just rip down trees or plant them willy-nilly.
And we wonder why the rains don’t come to the trees.1
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In Part C I formulated a working hypothesis on the traits of Indigenous normative systems that
can be considered legally relevant, and consequently considered ‘traditional laws and customs’,
when addressing native title issues. In Part D, I will apply this working hypothesis to a specific
case study in the Illawarra. The case is particularly relevant for two main reasons. Firstly, not
only has the area been heavily impacted by European colonisation, almost for the entire duration
of the European colonial period, but also it is highly urbanised and heavily populated, with the
vast majority of the population being non-Indigenous. As a consequence, the myth of the ‘dying
race’2 has played, and constantly plays, a major role in the area, in its transformed narrative of
the ‘lost culture’. This case study will reveal the absolute fallacy of this narrative. Secondly, not
only has the area seen the unfolding of a potential native title case that has then been suspended
- thus giving a powerful illustration of the implications of native title for traditional interests in
land - but also, the area is home to one of the very few Aboriginal Tent Embassies in Australia,
the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy.

As explored in Chapter Eight, the elements within Aboriginal normative orders that are
identified as fundamentally legally relevant are: firstly (and foremost) the kinship system;
secondly, the Dreaming ontology as articulated in specific narratives; and thirdly, the specific
protocols that regulate the transmission of knowledge contained in such narratives. These three
points form the essential structure of traditional normative orders and cannot be severed into
separate parts. As an inseparable whole, they are ‘traditional laws and customs’.

In the course of the case study, I have applied appropriate cultural protocols, as indicated and
directed by the Indigenous participants - and as mentioned in Chapter One - in order to avoid
inappropriate cultural intrusions. I aim to establish whether the elements indicated above are
still identifiable today in the area chosen for the case study, and whether they have played any
role in land related issues and in particular in a potential native title claim. By placing at the
centre of the analysis a community heavily impacted by colonisation, the theoretical model
developed in this thesis will also be put to the test more rigorously.

Moreover, I will look at a case where the Native Title claim was never completed. I will look at
the express reasons for this, at the alternative and preferred solutions to land agreements, and at
the theoretical conflicts that my approach highlights. I will then use the results of this case study
to highlight a number of theoretical contradictions and shortcomings of a common law

2

Russell McGregor, Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and doomed race theory, 1880-1939
(MUP, 1997).
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articulated concept that claims to recognise non-common law derived principles, without ever
fully engaging appropriately with such principles. I will then suggest the advantages of adopting
a legal anthropological perspective based on negotiated epistemologies and on culturally
respectful enquiry protocols. Finally, I will suggest that more profound solutions should involve
an open debate on renegotiated sovereignty, using the language of international relations as well
as that of the municipal colonial legal system.

Chapter Ten will investigate existing documentary history on the Illawarra. This is not to
suggest the primacy of documentary information over the information shared by Indigenous
participants in the following second section. Quite the opposite indeed. The research
acknowledges the relevance of oral knowledge in Indigenous culture. Rather than measuring
oral information against documentary history, the research adopts an opposite approach: in
effect, measuring documentary history against oral knowledges.

Because not all participants in the research consented to be named, I have excluded all names
from the research in order to prevent individual identification. Different participants are
indicated as ‘interviewees’ each with a specific number assigned to them.

While also generally aware of boundaries concerning non-disclosable knowledge, by their
nature I do not and cannot have a full appreciation of them. I have therefore asked the
participants to indicate either at the beginning or during the course of the interviews, or at any
time, whether we could proceed or whether we had to stop, and I have removed all information
of such nature.

Finally, I have not edited the interviews more than necessary to ensure comprehensibility in the
context of this thesis. Instead, I have endeavoured to offer a verbatim presentation of the
interviews, leaving my own reflections and conclusions to be articulated separately, in the
context of the theoretical framework for this thesis.
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CHAPTER TEN
ILLAWARRA, A HISTORY

In Blood on the Wattle Bruce Elder wrote that
[i]t is easy to romanticise the lifestyle of coastal Aboriginal people before the arrival of
Europeans. ... They spent most of their time by the sea where they lived on a diet of crustaceans the waters are rich with abalone, prawns, lobsters, mussels - and fish. if the tides were right, and
the hunters were lucky, they probably had enough to feed the entire group after a couple of hours
effort. When they needed to supplement their ocean diet the rainforest behind the coast had
substantial colonies of opossums and small marsupials, and the coastal plain and escarpment were
home to numerous varieties of kangaroo and wallaby. ... It never really gets cold by the sea. ... So
most of the families lived in the open. ... Life on the coast was easy and uncomplicated. The men
hunted. The women cooked and raised the children. There were strong familial and social ties
between the groups. They shared food supplies, gathered regularly for ceremonial occasions, and
were happy with the complex ties produced by intermarriage and agreed land ownership. They
were not tribal by any conventional meaning of the term. They operated in small, extended family
social units which were deeply connected to streams, lakes, and stretches of the coastline, the
foothills and the escarpment. 3

Elder’s idyllic reconstruction is highly suggestive of the specific geographical and cultural
context of the Illawarra area.

The documentary history of the Illawarra region has recently been collected by Organ. 4 The
oldest document regarding the Illawarra area is a map by Portuguese navigator Christovano de
Mendonca in 1522. Not long after, the Dieppe maps of 1536-66 are a series of maps that
delineate the east coast of Australia, showing Lake Illawarra as the ‘Bays de Neusne’, based
upon information supplied by de Mendoca and others. Organ reports that a copy of the Dieppe
map was taken on board of the Endeavour by Joseph Banks in 1768 and used by Captain Cook
as he sailed up the east coast of Australia.5
3

Bruce Elder, Blood on the wattle: massacres and maltreatment of Aboriginal Australians since 1788
(New Holland, 1998) 18.
4

Michael Organ, A documentary history of the Illawarra and south coast Aborigines 1770-1850:
including a chronological bibliography 1770-1990 (University of Wollongong, 1990).
5 Michael Organ, Historical Records of the Illawarra Region of NSW, Australia 1770 - 1855. A
Chronological Guide to Sources and Events (29 November 2011) <http://www.michaelorgan.org.au/
ilchron1.htm>.
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In April 1770, Cook reported smoke from the south coast and attempted to land near the
modern-day coastal suburb of Woonoona.6 Captain Cook recorded in his log: ‘[w]e saw haul’d
up upon the beach 3 or 4 small Canoes, which to us appeared not much unlike the Small ones of
New Zealand.’ 7 Joseph Banks’s Journals also contain relevant information:
[i]n the morn we stood in with the land near enough to discern 5 people who appeared through our
glasses to be enormously black: so far did the prejudices which we had built on Dampier’s account
influence us that we fancied we could see their Colour [sic] when we could scarce distinguish
whether or not they were men. 8

It is interesting to note Banks’s remark and awareness of the prejudices and cultural biases that
informed the interaction with Indigenous people even before the interaction actually took place.
Later Banks observed:
[f]our men were at this time observed walking briskly along the shore, two of which carried on
their shoulders a small canoe; they did not however attempt to put her in the water so we soon lost
all hopes of their intending to come off to us, a thought which we once had flattered ourselves. ...
They sat on the rocks expecting us but when we came within about a quarter of a mile they ran
away hastily into the countrey [sic]; they appeared to us as well as we could judge at that distance
exceedingly black. Near the place were four small canoes they left behind. ... The trees were not
very large and stood separate from each other without the least underwood; among them we could
discern some cabbage trees but nothing else which we could call by any name. In the course of the
night many fires were seen. 9

The surf prevented Cook and the crew, on a small boat, from landing and the following day the
Endeavour sailed into Botany Bay where Banks and some of the crew made a successful
landing.

There are no accounts of the Illawarra Aborigines’ reaction to news of the arrival of the First
Fleet,10 but it is reasonable to assume, as suggested by Organ, that news would have quickly
spread throughout the Indigenous networks and ‘members of the Illawarra and South Coast
tribes, many of whom had visited Sydney Harbour over the years to engage in social activities

6

Organ, above n 4; Elder, above n 3; J C Beaglehole (ed), The Journals of Captain James Cook & The
Voyage of the Endeavour 1768-1771 (Cambridge, 1955); J C Beaglehole (ed), The Endeavour Journals of
Joseph Banks 1768-1771 (Angus & Robertson, 1962).
7

James Cook’s Log in Organ, above n 4, 2.

8

Joseph’s Banks Journal in Organ, above n 4, 3.

9

Ibid, 3-4.

10 See also Keith Willey, When the sky fell down: the destruction of the tribes of the Sydney region,
1788-1850’s (Collins, 1979).
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such as corroborees and initiation ceremonies, would have also been aware of them.’ 11
Unnamed escaped convicts are likely to have been the first European to enter the region, but
understandably there are no records of such events. Organ refers to the 1839-1840 diaries of a
geologist Reverend W B Clarke, whereby he recorded a song composed to describe the arrival
of the First Fleet and enacted at a corroboree. His comments are revealing of the colonial
attitude:
[o]n enquiry I find the burden of the song to be: “that the white man came to Sydney in ships and
landed the horses in the saltwater”. it is of such ridiculous subjects that the Blacks of New Holland
make their songs - and any trifling event is celebrated by a song.12

The attitude of racial and cultural superiority discussed in Chapter Nine is very apparent in this
passage. As Elder has asked, ‘what went wrong?’ 13
By 1804 the Aboriginal people of the South Coast had changed from Cook’s ‘they are far more
happier than we Europeans’ to ‘they were of a hideous Aspect, wore frightful beards, & hitherto
were estranged to every race but their own & if the report of their civilized countrymen be true,
they still adhere to their primitive cannibal habits’ according to a report in the Sydney Gazette. In
the space of less than two decades the noble savage had been demonised. ... The demonising made
the killing easier. 14 After all, these people weren’t human. They were ‘estranged to every race but
their own’ and therefore killing them was an entirely reasonable thing to do. ... The nature of
settlement, and the nature of the Aboriginal groups living along the South Coast, was such that
there were never any major massacres as there would later be in central and western Queensland.
There were constant skirmishes and misunderstandings as the Europeans tried to assert their rights
over the land and the Aboriginal people resisted this incursion. .... [O]n 6 April 1806, the Sydney
Gazette reported the first ‘massacre’ when it revealed that the crew of the George, a sealing vessel,
had killed nine Aboriginal people at Twofold Bay. ... The pattern was clear. Aboriginal people
lived off the land and they took from the land what the land offered them. When European farmers
started growing vegetables and maize and grazing cattle and sheep, the Aboriginal people saw this
as food for everyone. The European retaliated with indiscriminate shootings and rape. They
demonised the local ‘blacks’ as ‘pests’. The problem was always tit-for-tat killings. If one side
transgressed, the other side immediately retaliated. And, as always, the spear and nulla nulla were
no match for the musket and organised posses of troops.15
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The pattern of violence and dispossession explored in Chapter Nine and found to be common
throughout Australia is here reproduced in Elder’s words.

Within very few decades the impact of violent dispossession was strongly felt throughout the
region. What can historical documents tell us of the area? Organ has articulated his investigation
around five main questions:
• Who were the original Aboriginal inhabitants of Illawarra?
• What happened to them, and what caused their demise?
• How many were living in Illawarra prior to 1788?
• How and where did they live; and what do we know of their culture and tradition?
• What was the fate of their descendants?16

I will reformulate the questions as follows:
• Who were the original inhabitants of Illawarra, how and where did they live and what do we
know of their culture and tradition?
• How many were living in Illawarra prior to 1788? What happened to them and what caused
their reduction in numbers. What was the fate of their descendants and what do we know of
the cultural continuity of the inhabitants of the area?
• What events occurred in the area that are relevant for determining the extent of a potential
native title claim?

Answers to these questions will rely both on documentary history and on the collaboration of a
number of local Indigenous interviewees. The present reconstruction does not intend nor
pretend to be in any way complete. Its primary purpose, in the context of this thesis, is to
provide a vehicle for illustrating the shortcomings of native title from a comparative legal
perspective. Further and more detailed exploration and qualitative data collection would need to
occur in order to provide a complete analysis of the area.

Organ states that prior to his investigation, ‘[s]atisfactory answers ha[d] never been given to any
of these questions, due to a supposed lack (by historians) of available contemporary
information.’ His study instead revealed that ‘a wealth of such material exist[ed] and perhaps

16

Organ, above n 4, xxxvii.
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the answers may be found (or indicated) among the documents reproduced.’ 17 Nonetheless,
documents cannot give complete answers. Indigenous oral narratives need to be added in order
to provide a complete reconstruction.

I. STORIES
Who were the original inhabitants of Illawarra, how and where did they live and what do
we know of their culture and tradition?
Organ writes that the Illawarra Aborigines
consisted of a number of family groups who occupied the coastal trip from Bulli and Stanwell
Park in the north, to Shoalhaven and Kangaroo Valley in the south. They were mostly coastal
dwellers - though they also used the resources of the mountain areas to the west of the escarpment
- and lived on a diet of fish (sea, freshwater, and shell) supplemented by local flora and fauna. 18

Organ’s words mirror Elder’s description of South Coast Aboriginal groups. Furthermore,
Organ adds,
[t]hey made regular excursions out of the district to places such as Appin and Bong Bong, and
occasionally as far as Sydney and the Blue Mountains for special corroborees and initiation
ceremonies. Most families lived in the open, or within gunyahs or rock shelters, their only clothing
consisting of opossum rugs and ornamental regalia. ... Their religious beliefs and social customs
(e.g. the rules surrounding marriage, initiation, and conflicts over land issues) were complex. In
these areas our information is most sparse. 19

Organ then reports that
[t]he aspect of inter-tribal rivalry is unclear - some authors state that each tribe was hostile to its
neighbour (e.g. the Wollongong people were at war with those of Kiama), but friendly to those
farther afield; some say conflict was isolated and based on specific events, such as affairs of the
heart or individual confrontation, and was not deep rooted. The concept of ‘tribe’ is also
questionable. A reading of the contemporary documents in this compilation does not indicate
specific tribal or language affiliations or boundaries used by the Illawarra Aborigines prior to
1850. The earliest references are simply to ‘the natives of the district known as Alowrie’ (c.f.
Flinders, 1796), or to the ‘Five Islands Tribe’, as the whole district was then known as the Five
Islands. It is only from the turn of the century - when white historians and anthropologists were
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recording in earnest aspects of Aboriginal cultures along the South Coast - that specific names
such as Wodi Wodi and Thurrawul were allocated to local ‘tribes’ and languages. 20

I will return to the issue of naming tribal and language groups shortly, given the current
relevance of the debate. The point, however, is also confirmed by other sources in relation to the
greater Sydney area:
[t]here is some disagreement as to the degree of cultural separateness of the people who
traditionally lived in the adjoining lands which comprise Greater Sydney, encompassing most of
the western suburbs and stretching up to the Blue Mountains. The claim that the language
groups ... were of one tribe is based on an understanding that they spoke the same language, but
in ... distinct dialects. However, there is much evidence to suggest that the major language groups
of greater Sydney were different groups using different languages and different initiation rites.
There is evidence of Aboriginal people migrating in a north-south direction but none from east to
west. The appearance of men from the inland group was different from that of coastal men who
were missing their right incisor tooth, removed during their initiation. Similarly, when Bennelong
of the Wangal people went into Parramatta in 1789, he did not understand the language spoken
there so that’s another practical example of tribes being distinct entities. The twenty-nine or so
clan groups of the wider Sydney region were associated with specific areas of land by family
boundaries, and distinguished by body decorations, hairstyles, songs and dances, tools and
weapons. 21

The same diversity recorded for the greater Sydney area is likely to have occurred in the
Illawarra.

The Illawarra natives did not follow a tribal system with defined chiefs and social hierarchies ...
but lived in relatively small family groups, with complicated family structures and close
associations to specific areas of land. Elderly members of the groups were given due respect, but
were only allocated the title of ‘chief’ or ‘King’ by Europeans. For example, from surviving
records we know that the Hooka family group lived by the shores of Lake Illawarra (near presentday Dapto and along Hooka Creek) during the period 1820-40; the Timbery family during the
same period claimed a belonging to the area now known as Berkeley; and the Bundle family
claimed an association with the land upon which the town of Wollongong grew. We do not know
how long these individual families had lived in the area, though it may have been for many
thousands of years.22
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This passage highlights the relevance of families in local Indigenous communities. The family
patronymics used are clearly a result of European influence and pressure. Nonetheless, they
allow to identify specific family groups and a continuity of relationship between family groups
that can be traced back to the first colonial records and therefore, by inference, to the time
immemorial that preceded them. Family relationships present the most valid avenue to
understanding and reconstructing (at law, that is, as there is clearly no need for such a
reconstruction among Indigenous people) kinship relationship in the Illawarra. Because of the
relevance of kinship relationship for cultural continuity, it follows that family relationships
today are paramount to understand cultural continuity in the Illawarra.

White settlers initially grouped the local people into tribes based on locality, calling them the ‘Five
Islands tribe’, or ‘Bong Bong tribe’, and during the 1830’s and 1840’s used this system to assist in
identification during the distribution of blankets. The official ‘Returns of Blankets’ issued by the
New South Wales government to local Aborigines between 1832-42 ... specify the various ‘Tribes’
and ‘Places of resort’ to which the local people were subscribed. ... [M]ost [of these returns] are
generalised, having been compiled by white Government officials usually with no intimate
knowledge of Aboriginal languages and customs. ... In all cases the stated tribal name upon those
Blanket Returns is based on a locality, so that, for example, all the Aboriginal people resident in
central Illawarra at the time were referred to as members of the ‘Five islands’ or ‘Wollongong’
tribe. However modern-day tribal groupings of the Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines are based
on information compiled by white anthropologists from the late 1870’s. Two divisions were
initially presented ... using geographical location and language, though these criteria are now
expanded into five divisions and given Aboriginal names as follows ... :
* Thuruwal (or Dharawal) - general name for the Aboriginal people of the area on the east coast of
New South Wales from Botany Bay to Shoalhaven, and west to Berrima and Camden.
* Wodi-Wodi (or Wadi-Wadi) - a subdivision of Thuruwal, includes the Aboriginal people of the
coast from Wollongong to the Shoalhaven.
* Gurandada and Tharumba (or Dharumba) - those people living around the Shoalhaven River.
* Wandandian - those people living south of the Shoalhave River and north of Jervis Bay.
* Gundungarra - the upland tribe (probably equivalent to the Bong Bong tribe of the 1830’s).
Some local people also refer to the ’13 Tribes of the South Coast.’23

It appears that the naming categories used to identify Indigenous people in the Illawarra are
derived from later records and not from contemporary documents. It is reasonably safe to
assume that the purpose of the blankets’ distribution list cited above was not to consider the
complexities of the kinship system. Indeed, Organ adds that
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[t]he historical relevance of these divisions is questionable. For example, the adoption of the term
‘Wodi Wodi’ in reference to the Aborigines of central Illawarra is based on the testimony of Lizzy
Malone, daughter of a woman of the Shoalhaven tribe, who stated ... [in 1875] that Wodi Wodi was
the name of the language spoken by the Aboriginal people of the Illawarra, from Wollongong to
Shoalhaven. At some stage between 1875 and 1983 the term ‘Wodi Wodi’ has been adopted/
extended by white researchers to refer to the Aboriginal people of the Illawarra, along with their
language. Just as the word Koori once referred to an Aboriginal man from a specific area of
central-west New South Wales, and Yuin was used by some of the South Coast people, now Koori
is used as a general term throughout the State instead of the more general, and European,
Aborigine. So also terms such as Wodi Wodi and Thurrawul have been misappropriated by both
black and white researchers over the years and their original meaning lost. The original inhabitants
of central Illawarra may have had no specific tribal name, and the term ‘Wodi Wodi’ does not
appear in any accounts prior to Ridley’s reference of 1875.24

Although the passage is suggestive of the layers of complexity related to naming issues of
languages and groups, it is, in light of my research experience, imprecise. The lack of records
prior to 1875 suggests an absence of identification either because of an absence of naming that
predate the records or because of a lack of interest in precise naming at the time. Given the
impact of European diseases and violence in the areas, and the drastic reduction in numbers that
occurred at the onset of European settlement in the Illawarra, I believe it more likely that the
lack of records was due both to a lack of access to direct informants (similar to what happened
in the Sydney basin) and to a lack of interest in collecting precise information (as explained
later). The absence of evidence, in this case, doesn’t seem to be strong enough to suggest
evidence of absence.

The suggestion that Indigenous inhabitants of the Illawarra would not have had naming
references to their groups of belonging contrasts with the views expressed by the numerous
interviewees with whom I have discussed the issue, as evidenced in Chapter Eleven. All
interviewees have named, albeit partly differently, the original inhabitants of the area. To
suggest that the original inhabitants may not have had a specific tribal name is to suggest that
Indigenous people of the area today have adopted as theirs the names advanced unilaterally by
European researchers subsequent to the European settlement of the area. I believe it more
probable that the tribal subdivisions suggested by Europeans have been artificial in that they
have been unable to reproduce the social structure (and consequently the appropriate
‘subdivisions’) based on the complex kinship relationship mentioned above.

Organ suggests that
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[i]t seems more appropriate to denote Aboriginal ‘tribal’ or family groupings according to locality
(e.g. Alowrie or Five Island tribe) or original family name as given in the 1832-42 blankets returns
(e.g. the Hooka and Timbery families), than to some much later tag assigned by white
anthropologists. The above stated tribal subdivisions are therefore somewhat artificial and
meaningless, as it was common for family groups to intermingle and interact along both physical
and social boundaries. For example, the Aboriginal people from the Appin and Cowpastures areas
west of the Illawarra escarpment made an annual excursion to Illawarra via the mountain pass at
Bulli prior to the 1840’s ... and there was regular communication between the Aborigines of Bong
Bong, Kangaroo Valley, Kiama and the Shoalhaven according to historical accounts. D K Eades
(1976) made detailed subdivisions of the Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines based on
knowledge of extinct and extant language patterns. She concluded that the Thuruwal language was
spoken throughout the southern Sydney and Botany Bay region, in Illawarra, and south to the
Shoalhaven, depending on which author is referred to: whilst Dhurga was spoken south of
Shoalhaven. Yet as early as 1796 Matthew Flinders had noted that the language of the Five Island
people varied from that of the natives of Botany Bay. These divisions of tribes and languages,
being artificially imposed by European anthropologists and researchers, have varied considerably
amongst authors over the years. The movement of Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines to
Sydney, La Perouse, and south to areas such as Wreck Bay and Wallaga Lake after the 1850’s has
complicated the issue, such that a language which was once possibly confined to Illawarra has had
its borders extended north to Botany Bay and Port jackson and south to Shoalhaven. More detailed
ethnographic and historical analysis will need to be undertaken before we can suggest the true
boundaries of the original (pre 1788) Aboriginal languages, and their variations with time. 25

There are two co-existing issues here. One is that of linguistic boundaries. Grouping of
languages in language groups and dialects is the enterprise of linguists. Although influential in
determining the sense of identity of different groups, belonging to a specific language group or
family does not necessarily equate with belonging to a specific cultural groups. Cultural
structures are clearly distinct and relatively disconnected from the linguistic networks with
which they are nonetheless interwoven.

Organ is correct in stating that cultural subdivisions in the Illawarra are the result of a series of
artificial projections by European researchers.26 However, I disagree on the extent of such a
claim. I would argue that such artificial projections are not a construction ex-novo by European
researchers but are rather based on cultural patterns received in a confused way or with
inappropriate cultural frameworks. The reference to locality does not take into account the
practice of shared spaces between Indigenous groups presented in Chapter Eight, whereas the
reference to family names given for governmental purposes during the nineteenth century does
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not consider the complexities of a kinship system that is only partially reproduced by European
family structures.

The movement of Indigenous people in the area has been mentioned as pre-dating the European
arrival. Communication and movement of Indigenous people, as shown by anthropological
research throughout Australia, have never occurred with a casual attitude but have rather been
always regulated by precise cultural protocols. The infringement of such protocols would have
carried consequences that have been indeed limited by the introduction and domination of
European laws. Nonetheless, it seems speculative to assume that the cultural framework of
protocols regulating interactions would have simply disappeared. This is, in particular, because
of the relevance of kinship relationships in determining such protocols.

Indeed, two elements are prominent in Aboriginal interactions, as identified in Chapter Eight:
firstly, kinship is the fundamental institutional structure that regulates behaviour among
Indigenous people. Secondly, regulatory practices and protocols are not formulated in a strictly
pre-determined verbal form but are instead negotiated contextually. In the course of my research
study I have witnessed both elements in practice. During the numerous meetings I have had
with Indigenous participants, the elaboration of kinship relationships has always been the
longest and most crucial form of introduction between participants. I have been made aware of
the protocols in place a number of times, and I have equally been able to observe the same
protocols in place independently in various places during my investigation. Reciprocity is
indeed articulated in terms of family names and genealogies based on a western language and
apparent framework; however, all Indigenous participants have shown an intuitive
understanding of non-European kinship relationships that transcended the apparent
classification of someone as a cousin, or second cousin, or distant uncle et cetera. I have also
observed specific protocols of communication, mostly non-verbal (reciprocal sitting or standing
position, silence and turns of speaking, use of suggestive rather than direct language et cetera).

These protocols suggest a cultural structure strongly in place and intuitively understood and
adhered to by the Indigenous participants with whom I have conducted interviews and have
otherwise been in contact. This suggests a continuity of cultural practices that pre-date the
European impact on traditional cultural protocols. Such continuity would in turn suggest a
continuity of cultural protocols that have not been erased by European settlement, by radical
changes in group numbers and contiguity or by movement of individuals and of family groups.
Consequently, the suggestion that Indigenous people simply moved around without any further
explanation would suggest a pattern of movement similar to that of European migrants, where
individual and group identity can be separated from the specific land and country in which
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individuals and groups exist. It is much more realistic to posit, in accordance with Aboriginal
ontology, that people moved either within the parameters of cultural mobility or at least
maintained cultural ties with those parameters.

In addition, intrinsic to the nature of traditional cultural protocols is their lack of formulated
verbalisation. 27 Most protocols of individual interactions would have been learned, as shown in
Chapter Eight, through observation and reproduction of behaviour from an early age. It appears
reasonable to infer that this learning method has continued throughout the entire European
colonial period and has informed inter-personal interactions until the present day. That being the
case, it is also reasonable to infer that within those protocols of kinship recognition, information
regarding reciprocal identification in relationship to land and Country have also been carried
until today.

The major maps used to identify Aboriginal people in the Illawarra are the map suggested by
Tindale in 1974, the one proposed by Meredith in 1989 and the Horton map, currently found on
the AIATSIS website. 28 Also relevant, albeit very different, is Fraser’s map compiled in 1892. 29
Norman Tindale’s allocation of tribal names is based on references dating from the earliest days
of European settlement.30 Tindale identified Wodi Wodi as the group occupying the Illawarra
district, north of the Shoalhaven river to Wollongong, although he mentioned that the the WodiWodi area lies within the Tharawal area. Alternative spelling and names for Wodi-Wodi
proposed by Tindale are Woddi Woddi and Illawarra. The Tharawal area is located from the
south side of Botany Bay to north of the Shoalhaven river and as far inland as Campbelltown
and Camden.31 Surrounding groups named by Tindale are the Gandangara (at Goulburn and
Berrima, north along the Nepean and Wollondilly rivers to Camden), the Ngunawal (on the
highlands west of the Shoalhaven river), the Wandandian (Ulladulla to the Shoalhaven river and
Nowra), the Walbanga (inland on the Shoalhaven river, Ulladulla to Cape Dromedary), the
Djiringanj (from Cape Dromedary south to beyond Bega) and the Thaua (from north of
Merimbula south to green Cape).
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Meredith’s map in 1989 identifies Wodiwodi as the group occupying the area stretching from
Bulli to Jervis Bay and inland to Moss Vale), the neighbouring groups being Tharawal (Bulli to
Botany Bay), Eora (Greater Sydney region), Gundangarra (along the Nepean and Wollondilly
river, from Camden to Goulburn), Daruk (immediately north of Gundangarra, along the
Hawkesbury river) and Wandandian (south of Jervis Bay).32

The map found on the AIATSIS website was published by Aboriginal Studies Press as part of
the Encyclopaedia edited by Dr Horton. The map identifies the area stretching from Jervis Bay
to La Perouse as Tharawal, the neighbouring groups being Eora (Sydney area) and Kuring-gai
(immediately north of the Eora area), Gundungurra (inland from the Tharawal area), Dharug
(north of Gundungurra and west of Eora and Kuring-gai) and Yuin (from Jervis Bay south to
Eden). The AIATSIS governing body, the Council, has never endorsed or adopted the map and
has insisted that the map contain an important disclaimer:
The map represents work carried out for the Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal Australia. Using the
published resources available between 1988 and 1994, the map attempts to represent language,
tribal or nation groups of Australia's Indigenous peoples. ... This map indicates only the general
location of larger groupings of people, which may include smaller groups such as clans, dialects or
individual languages in a group. The boundaries are not intended to be exact. This map is not
suitable for use in native title or other land claims. 33

In light of the cultural constructions presented summarised in Chapter Eight, the disclaimer
expressly indicates that the map does not present an accurate description of cultural groups as
described by existing anthropological literature.

Another relevant map, with very different names for the same areas, is the one proposed by
Fraser in 1892.34 In his map, the group occupying the area from Bulli to south of Cape Howe
(the entire South Coast of New South Wales) is named Murrin-jari, the neighbouring groups
being the Wira-dhari (immediately west), Kurig-gai (from Bulli north to Port Macquarie) and
Kamal-arai (west of the Kurig-gai area). The names Wira-dhari, Kurig-gai and Kamal-arai are
recognisable in the different spelling of Wiradjuri, Kamilaroi and Kuring-gai used in different
maps, the name Murrin-jari is quite unique. Moreover, the areas covered by Fraser’s boundaries
are much more extensive than the areas covered by the same names in other maps. This suggests
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a variability of boundaries pointing to a common origin of the names to be identified not in
spatial boundaries but in stories referred to the investigators. I will return to the point shortly.

Uncertainty surrounds also the names adopted by Europeans for the area. The name Wollongong
is said to originate form the Aboriginal word Woolyungah meaning ‘Five Islands’ 35 or from the
Aboriginal word Wollonyuh or Wollonga meaning ‘sound of the sea’, ‘hard ground near the
water’ or ‘sound of the waves’, 36 whereas the name Illawarra is said to be an adaptation of the
Aboriginal word Elouera or Allowrie meaning ‘pleasant place near the sea’ or ‘high place near
the sea’ or ‘white clay mountain’.37 Goodall, finally, shows the use of the word ‘Koori’,
meaning ‘one of our people’ in current usage, in the south coast of New South Wales. 38

It is clear that existing literature presents a number of conflicting data. The use of such
documentary data for a potential native title claim would be thus uncertain. However, even the
division of areas according to such names as alternative areas is questionable. It is clear from
existing documents and from the uncertainty of clear boundaries contained in such documents
that the tribal boundaries suggested in such divisions are artificial and are more revealing of a
European lack of understanding than of an intrinsic uncertainty of cultural belonging. It is also
clear that those divisions refer to some common elements from which the various names are
derived. The cultural reconstruction of Aboriginal groups as connected by kinship ties and by
shared ontological parameters verbalised in Dreaming stories presented in Chapter Eight would
appear to be more appropriate and at the same time more capable of partially clarifying the
conflicting issues. I will neither attempt to provide a final definition nor a complete
reconstruction here, as much more ethnographic research would need to be carried out and
negotiated with a culturally appropriate methodology capable of conveying the appropriate
information. I will only suggest a number of relevant results of my investigation that might
provide an indication on how to achieve clarity on the present issues.

Indigenous sense of identity, as explored in the previous chapter, is much more defined by
reciprocal identification within the kinship system and in relation to each other than it is in
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relation to an abstract concept of belonging to an impersonal ‘group’. In other words, kinship is
much more relevant than tribes in determining Indigenous identity. In the course of my research
I have witnessed many times the occurrence of this. Interviewees, and participants in general,
have constantly established reciprocal relations not by reference to any specific tribe but in
relationship to common or related ancestry or direct kinship. The exploration of those direct
relationships has always been not only prevalent in the words of the participants, but also in the
time that they have allocated to this process of discovery. Almost no time has ever been devoted
to ascertain the abstract group or ‘tribe’ of belonging, whereas significant time has always been
spent in exploring direct kinship connections. The issue of belonging to a specific group, on the
other hand, assumed immediate relevance when Indigenous participants engaged with a nonIndigenous audience. In this case, the debate shifted on the primary naming of the location of
origin, thus echoing the European expectations of singular, alternative, naming.

It appears that the relevance of identifying a specific area with a single, specific name and
belonging to a single, specific group has been much more prominent in a European context than
in an Indigenous one. This might have been the result of contextual policies as in the case of the
Blanket Returns;39 nonetheless, the effect has been of emphasising a shift toward a European
abstract concept of belonging to a ‘nation’, rather than belonging to a specific network of
individuals, with whom the relationship needs to be ascertained reciprocally on a case by case
basis. Indigenous participants and interviewees have expressed multiple times different views
on those alternative names, but have rarely shown particular interest in determining precise
spatial boundaries for the areas in question. On the contrary, one of the interviewees expressly
manifested the irrelevance of precise and separate boundaries, emphasising the importance of
overlapping boundaries, where the shared use of the territory is resolved through a process of
discussion and negotiation. 40

The lack of interest in precise exclusive territorial boundaries, combined with the relevance of
the process of establishing direct kinship relationships, suggests that the search for single names
for certain areas is inconsistent with the cultural protocols followed at present by the Indigenous
inhabitants of the area. The question then shifts to the understanding of the relationship that
individuals have with the land they inhabit and with the extent of such land, or Country.

Goodall states that
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[t]here are strong grounds then for arguing that for Aboriginal people in south-eastern Australia
before the invasion, land was the physical and symbolic basis for almost every aspect of life.
Social relations were expressed, managed and negotiated through relations to land; political
standing was legitimated and authority grounded in landholding. Knowledge was structured by its
relation to place, and it was taught, held in memory and performed according to this organisational
framework. New experiences were analysed by and incorporated into that oral tradition and so
they too became organised within it by place. 41

It is relevant to add that the entire relationship to land was always articulated through Dreaming
stories. Indigenous Dreaming stories have often been described as myths or legends and have
also often been equated to fairy and fictional tales, thus hiding the practical and political
relevance that these stories hold. In order to understand the relationship that individual and
groups have always had with land, it is therefore necessary to look at these stories.

Commenting on some of the most famous compilation of Dreaming stories, the ones compiled
by Reed, 42 one of the interviewees stated that ‘they come from all over’. 43 The comment
suggested a much stronger need for connection between the physical place to which those
stories refer to and the stories themselves. The same interviewee had already strongly rejected
the use of the term ‘myths’ to refer to those stories, as suggestive of something which isn’t true,
something which belongs to the realm of pure imagination, something which is too abstract
from reality to be tangible in any possible way.44

Organ, regarding Dreaming stories in the Illawarra,45 records that
[a] small number of the Dreaming Stories of the Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines (also
referred to as ‘myths and legends’ by Europeans) have been published and taken down over the
years since the arrival of white men. These stories, long considered juvenile and inconsequential
by the non-Aboriginal population, are of great significance both to the Australian Aborigines and
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our study of their culture, for within them we often find the rules of social and religious behaviour
as laid down for various tribes, and descriptions of events in their history.46

More importantly, they contain a wealth of information regarding the connection of the
Aboriginal people possessing those stories with specific tracts of land. The majority of the
stories collected by Organ are
from the recordings of white anthropologists taken during the period 1870-1900, with a number
also gathered by ... Peck in the 1920’s and 1930’s and ... Robinson during the 1950’s ... The
earliest stories in this collection were obtained long after traditional society had been corrupted by
the influence of white civilisation. ... Unfortunately few of the stories ... are first hand accounts by
Illawarra Aborigines, with only those published by Andrew Mackenzie in 1874 attempting to
remain true to the original language and structure. Even more unfortunate is the dislocation of
many of the stories from their original locality/environment - an integral part of any Aboriginal
narrative - and the failure of many authors to record the name of the narrator or the circumstances
and date of the telling.47

Although it is indeed true that part of the epistemological process of sharing stories connects the
storytelling to the place to which the stories are connected, it is also true that Indigenous stories
share some morphological similarities with European folk-tales. This is far from suggesting that
Indigenous stories can be read and analysed simply as folk-tales. Indeed, the wealth of cultural
and ontological information contained in Indigenous stories far surpasses that of the numerous
collection of folk-tales that appeared from the eighteenth century onward in Europe. 48 The
distinction is well known to an Indigenous interviewee who asked ‘what’s the moral of tales like
Snow White? They don’t teach children the proper way. They’re not like our stories. Our stories
are not made up.’ 49 The connection between stories and reality is very apparent and Indigenous
story-tellers are constantly aware of this. Nonetheless, at a superficial level, certain
morphological similarities allow Indigenous stories to be interpreted as children’s stories, thus
sharing certain similarities with the folk-tales mentioned above. 50 Indeed, some of the stories are
told to children, but they only represent the first level of introduction to a much more complex
code that is to be explored at different subsequent stages, revealing always more and more
complex information.
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The morphological similarity that Indigenous stories share with folk-tales, on the other hand,
make them much more difficult to erase from cultural consciousness, as comparatively visible
in the European folk-tales that carried from Aesop until La Fontaine over two millennia. The
version of the stories that have been shared with me during the course of my research is the
initial version I just mentioned, and that is the one I will refer to given their public accessibility.
Even in this version, however, the connection between stories and places is immediately visible.
On the other hand, in respecting the need to connect the stories to the specific places in which
they should be told,51 I will only refer to the title and to the general content of those stories in
the course of this thesis.52

All Indigenous stories transform into narratives regarding the awareness of the connection that
Indigenous people have with the surrounding land. When asked what it meant to be Indigenous
an interviewee replied:
It’s my nature. When I say this ... people think I’m talking about my inner self ... about what
makes me do what I do. And that’s true. But this is also my nature [pointing to the surrounding
beach and forest]. ... To know who I am, I must know all of my nature. That’s what makes me
Indigenous to this place.53

The awareness of the interconnectedness between the surrounding reality and one’s internal
world, and the capacity to reconcile that dialogue between the two ‘natures’ within the
parameters of cultural narratives defining one’s identity is a perfect example of the very clear
connection between Indigenous people and the land, and a perfect indication of the depth of
cultural narrative that encapsulate such connection. Indigenous sense of identity, these words
suggest, transcend the boundaries of an individual’s body and consciousness. This is the first
element to consider in approaching the stories.

Secondly, those stories are place-specific. As noted above, commenting on Read’s collections of
Indigenous stories, one interviewee stated that ‘they’re all over the place’,54 meaning that the
collections are entirely disconnected from the places to which the stories refer and to which they
should be connected. Moreover, another interviewee expressly stated the need to tell stories
‘where they’re meant to [be told].’55 The third element to consider are the protocols that
regulate the communication of certain stories only by some individuals entitled to share the
51

Interview with Interviewee No 4 (Wollongong, 9 November 2007).

52

Most stories have also been collected by Organ, above n 4; Peck, Robinson and Mathews, above n 44.

53

Interview with Interviewee No 4 (Wollongong, 9 November 2007).

54

Interview with Interviewee No 1 (Wollongong, 15 August 2005).

55

Interview with Interviewee No 5 (Wollongong, 11 February 2010).
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information contained in the stories (and probably trained to de-codify the multiple layers of
meaning of such stories) and, or, only to certain individuals. Kinship relationship is fundamental
in determining whether information can be shared or is rather to be withheld. On multiple
occasions, multiple interviewees, referring to certain stories or to certain individuals, stated that
‘they shouldn’t be telling that story.’

Of the stories shared with me, I will mention the story of the Waratah.56 One of the creation
stories connected to the Dreaming couple of Tungku and Ngari, and one that is associated with
the ‘Yuin nation’, the story connects the wandering of the two Dreaming Ancestors Tungku and
Ngari with the Waratah flower, said to represent the heart of Ngari and, as a metaphorical
transposition, the heart of the Yuin nation. Further analysis of the story shows the connection of
the ‘Yuin nation’ with the geographical extension of the area in which the Waratah would
flower. The story is particularly revealing of the relevance of the story in determining the
supposed boundaries of a traditional tribe that has been identified by various anthropologists in
the maps discussed above. The story does not only contain information regarding the extension
of territory mentioned above, it also contains practical information such as, for example, food
collection. It seems reasonable to hypothesise that, as knowledge of the story would have
granted access to a wide range of practical information, the elders knowledgeable about such a
story could claim and grant freedom of movement within the area indicated by the
environmental boundaries suggested in the story itself. This entails a number of interesting
consequences.

The definition of boundaries would not rest in abstract groups connected to immutable
geographical coordinates abstracted from the environmental condition to which they would
apply, confirming the analysis of traditional protocols advanced in the previous chapter. On the
contrary, boundaries would be connected to specific and precise environmental characteristics.
This is confirmed by the words of Uncle Max Dulumunmun Harrison:
boundaries or borders are a way of life in the Aboriginal communities. People with nomadic
lifestyles knew how important it was to maintain and keep each and every one of them. They
didn’t go uninvited across the boundaries without permission. The only time tribal warfare would
break out was when the young men would be too eager in their hunting. ... There are also borders
between the tribes and the aquatic people [dolphins] in the animal world. There’s always a border
there. ... The borders and territories ... have to be approached with caution and with respect.
Everything was done respectfully by the tribes. They had to practise the laws at all times and not
go up against them and try to break those rules, you see. ... There’s also borders and boundaries in
storytelling; there’s boundaries in languages. ... Some people think language is just talking, here
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and there, but it is much more. It represents a border and it holds culture and law. ... If we read the
signs nature shows us where our boundaries are; the slipperiness of the rocks tell us to be careful
and not tread there. ... Boundaries were kept even on the coastal strips on the ocean where people
would gather shellfish. They would look at the leftover shells on the middens (pile of shells) to see
which type of shellfish had been eaten by the mob that went before them or had a ceremony before
them. By seeing the leftover shells people knew they were the ones they shouldn’t eat, and those
borders within borders were respected. 57

Uncle Max’s words confirm that traditional boundaries are not abstract indications but instead
are very strongly connected to the environmental indicators contained in the stories shared and
held by the elders.

The ontological shift required in moving from a concept of fixed, abstract boundaries to one of
moving, co-existing ones has been well explained by Graham:
Place, or the physical, ‘natural’ world, is predominantly conceived, experienced and articulated
anthropocentrically, as something separable and ‘other’ to human subjectivity. Until recently, this
dichotomous paradigm has meant that people are seen either as dominated by nature, chained to
the physical world or as dominating and transcending it. ... Theories of law and justice in modern
western philosophy and law despite enormous and diverse variation are predominantly
anthropocentric. Legal theory and theories about law are concerned with relations between
individuals, between communities, between states and between these elementary groupings
themselves. ... The absence of place is the condition of the possibility of a universal and
universalising law that extended ‘across the whole globe, like a coinage reducing all things to a
common measure’ ... Modern property law is not, of course, universal, but it is universalising. 58

The ordering principles contained in the story of the Waratah and in Uncle Max’s words are, on
the contrary, neither universal nor universalising. Place is immediately relevant to the concept of
boundaries in its physical and tangible nature. Moreover, the specificity of place in relation to
individual and social identity is directly articulated into language and narratives that are,
consequently, place specific. In this sense, the concept of connection to land suggested in most
Native Title judgments, of an abstract title over the land recognisable at common law, is almost
antithetic to the principles that regulate and determine the traditional protocols identified and
identifiable as native title. Boundaries are not separable from specific environmental indicators.
It follows that change in the environment inevitably determines a change in boundaries. In the
specific of the story, the change of flowering area of the Waratah would also entail an immediate
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change in boundaries. Moreover, multiple boundaries co-exist within the same geographical
region, thus involving multiple stories interwoven together.

The story of the Waratah, in light of Uncle Max’s words, is a direct example of a diverse
ontological perspective on place and law as encoded in language and narratives. It stands to
reason to assume that multiple co-existing boundaries would have involved an ongoing process
of negotiation between the holders of the stories that referred to those interwoven boundaries,
hence shifting the focus from the abstract definition of those boundaries to the ongoing process
of political negotiation of spatial use based on the exchange of narratives such as the one just
presented. This is confirmed by Uncle Max’s words above, suggesting that law, in the
Aboriginal sense suggested, is not considered a precise set of rigidly constructed verbalised
rules, but rather is a constant process of negotiation and exchange. The role of the holders of
those stories, and in particular of the elders, is thus paramount.

You should never question the Elders. When you ask ‘why?’ or ‘what for?’ you are disrespecting
your Elders’ order and you are being very disrespectful. So you never do that. If you go over into
an area where you have been told not to go, well, then you are likely to get whacked. if you are a
grown man you are likely to be speared. You are not told why you should not go into an area but
you should think that an area might be sacred. It’s important that you obey without question, and
you do it even today. ... Those places of sacredness you stay out of without question. So you are
then holding your Law of discipline. You are holding your Law that has been handed down to you
just by that order of, ‘Don’t go there.’ You are putting that into practice. 59

Uncle Max’s words confirm the different underlying concept of ‘Law’ as an ongoing, dynamic
process rather than a series of abstract rules. Moreover, they confirm kinship protocols designed
to ensure particular respect for certain knowledge holders. This point has been further
confirmed by my observations of individual interactions among Indigenous participants and
interviewees. Body language, silences and speaking turns: all these indicators pointed to a very
strong application of the respect due to the elders just mentioned. The connection of the story of
Tungku and Ngari to specific environmental indicators is also reinforced by the connection that
the two Dreaming Ancestors share with specific rocks in a special sacred place. Uncle Max
organises guided visits to some sacred places in the South Coast of New South Wales, where he
takes people to areas of special spiritual significance while sharing and applying the appropriate
cultural protocols required to access the area. I participated in one of these visits in December
2009 and during the visit two rocks were explicitly identified as Tungku and Ngari and as
forming part of a creation story.
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Two other stories offer further understanding on the connection between individuals, groups and
place. The first story is the story of Bundoola and of his thirteen wives.60 In the story, Bundoola
is identified as one of the Ancestors, whereas his thirteen wives have names that can be
recognised as tribal names: Tharawal, Gadigal et cetera. In the story, Tharawal is one of
Bundoola’s thirteen wives. The story indicates a much more articulated cultural connection
between what have been attempted to be described as separate tribal groups with precise and
exclusive boundaries. The second story, connected to the Tharawal people in the existing
collections, is the story of the Whale and the Starfish. In this story, the Whale Ancestor is
connected to the coastal people covering a long stretch of the coast of what is the State of New
South Wales. The story has been also narrated to me by a number of separate interviewees.61 In
all versions of the story, the connection between the Whale and the Law (or Narrambeen, the
local word equated with Altjeringa or Tjukurpa, thus representing the concept of the Dreaming
articulated, in this case, as primordial and immutable Law) is strongly emphasised. Connected
to this story is the indication that whale lawmen engravings cover a long stretch of the South
Coast of New South Wales. Indeed, rock engravings depicting whales, described as ‘places of
law’, stretch into the Sydney basin, to be then replaced by Wallaby engravings on the northern
beaches of Sydney and northward.62

These brief and rather generic examples are here used to indicate that the relevance of
traditional narratives for understanding geographical belonging has been certainly glossed over
in the Illawarra. Moreover, rather than exploring the connection between these narratives and
kinship relationship, attention is generally given to a single and specific naming for a group in
relation to an area, in a manner that is more reminiscent of European conceptualisation of
boundaries than of Indigenous relation to place. Furthermore, access to these narratives is not
public and generically identical in all cases, instead specific protocols and places of
communication must be respected; these protocols have been explored even less by nonIndigenous researchers. Yet, reconstruction of these narratives, and of their political and social
meaning (with attention given to the necessary cultural protocols required for such an
enterprise), would appear to be paramount to the understanding and reconstruction of the
traditional laws and customs that form the basis of native title.
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The richness of these narratives and the implications that they suggest for a true understanding
of traditional laws and customs is something that is certainly legally relevant in the sense
adopted in this thesis. It is also something that cannot be simply disconnected and ignored when
considering native title as a concept originating from Indigenous traditional law. So long as the
literature ignores all this it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that native title is instead
considered from the legal perspective of the common law, assuming the legal, ontological and
political categories of the common law as the necessary and inevitable premises of Indigenous
normative systems without any epistemological caveat.

What the current research shows is, firstly, that traditional narratives indicate epistemological
avenues for understanding individual and social connection to place. Secondly, that such
narratives have been maintained; possibly not necessarily in their original fullness, but certainly
to an extent that they are known by contemporary Indigenous people of the area. Thirdly, that
cultural protocols of kinship interaction related to the sharing of knowledge connected to these
narratives are still present and practiced, albeit in an adapted form that is consistent with the
enforceability of European legal requirements. The nature and the continuity of traditional
narratives together with the continuity of cultural protocols indicate a much stronger cultural
connection to place than what could be superficially indicated by the lack of ceremonies and of
traditional food production and economic practices.

The question of ‘who were the traditional inhabitants of the Illawarra and what was (and is)
their culture’ is thus strictly connected to the issue of establishing the cultural parameters of a
potential native title claim. It is not the scope of the present research to establish such cultural
parameters, only to suggest that they are directly and immediately relevant to native title
concerns (in the words of this thesis, that they are immediately legally relevant) and, more
importantly, that they exist in a very present, albeit adapted, form. There exists a clear and
diffused knowledge of traditional stories and narratives. Such narratives are more than folktales, they represent the epistemological tools with which cultural, political, ontological and
normative indicators are shared and transmitted. There exists a self-declared awareness of the
importance and relevance of these narratives in relation to what is determined by native title,
that is the direct connection between social and individual identity and belonging, specific
places and those narratives. Moreover, there exists an awareness of the protocols of who is
entitled to share such narratives with whom, where and when; in other words, there exists an
awareness of the kinship relationship underpinning the ‘ownership’ of those stories. Finally,
there exists a very clear awareness of the normative relationship with places embedded in those
narratives and inextricably connecting the stories themselves with kinship relationship and
cultural protocols.
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The structural cohesion of the elements indicated here cannot be sectioned and separated.
Severing any one of those elements from the others doesn’t allow the proper understanding of
its place in the normative system as a whole, nor is it intuitively possible to consider them in
isolation from each other. It follows that all those elements are thus equally relevant, or better
equally legally relevant, in dealing with the area identified by the ‘recognition’ of native title
and its reference to ‘traditional laws and customs’. Narratives, together with specific kinship
relationships and cultural protocols of transmission of information (most of whom are neither
verbal nor rigidly regulated), form part of those ‘traditional laws and customs’ by virtue of their
reciprocal inseparability. A question that arises is whether this complex that forms what native
title has come to construe as ‘traditional laws and customs’ has actually been used in the context
of any native title claim in the Illawarra. Before exploring this, however, it is useful to identify
the documentary history related to the ‘fate’ of the Illawarra Aborigines and to the European
settlement of the area.

II. ORIGINAL INHABITANTS
How many Aborigines were living in Illawarra prior to 1788? What happened to them and
what caused their demise, what was the fate of their descendants and what do we know of
the cultural continuity of the inhabitants of the area?
That an Indigenous culture exists in the area today has been proven both in the examples shown
in the previous section and in the numerous events I have attended and interviews I have
conducted. The nature of such culture and of its continuity will be assessed and evaluated
shortly, in light of the documentary reconstruction that follows.

Organ 63 has provided a thorough analysis of documents available from initial settlement and has
attempted a plausible reconstruction of the original numbers of the inhabitants of the Illawarra.
When smallpox ravaged the Aboriginal people of the Sydney area in 1789, it is quite likely that
it reached Illawarra, a mere 50 miles south of Sydney, ‘and may have travelled further south,
though the true effects are unknown.’ 64 Indeed, the exact effects of early smallpox epidemics
and other diseases on population numbers can only be guessed at. Previous to the inclusion in
the Australian census in the 1960’s, ‘only the Blanket Returns of the period 1832-42, and
Aborigines Protection Board census from 1882 to the 1960’s, are available.’65 The problem,
however, is that ‘by about 1850 the original Aboriginal tribes of southeastern Australia had been
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decimated, corrupted, dispersed.’ 66 However, by using existing data, the author is capable of
reconstructing a plausible approximate number.
According to the Blanket Returns of 1833-44, by the end of the 1830’s the Aborigines of central
Illawarra numbered less than one hundred, though it should be pointed out that not all Aborigines
submitted to the possible humiliation of receiving blankets from white authorities, and these
figures may be low. 67 ... A low birth rate, with an average of only 2-3 children per family, was
probably common amongst the Illawarra Aborigines after 1788. ... based upon this information and
Butlin’s theories we could suggest that there were anywhere from 500-1000 Aborigines in central
Illawarra (Bulli to Kiama) on 26 January 1788.The lower figure is more plausible if we take into
account the local lifestyle and availability of resources. If an original population of 500 lost half of
its members during the smallpox outbreaks of 1789 and 1829-30, it is easy to see that a figure of
100 individuals surviving by the late 1830’s is not so extraordinary. 68

If these were the numbers in 1788 and after, the question of what became of them is then to be
asked. ‘By the 1860’s - whatever the cause - those of northern and central Illawarra were largely
an extinct race, at least in the eyes of the new settlers.’69 Very poignantly, Organ points out that
the European perceptions that shaped all subsequent policies (and are likely to influence and
shape contemporary native title discourse) are not necessarily the reality of what happened to
the Illawarra Aborigines. The intrinsic resilience of Aboriginal culture has been shown both in
Part C in general and in the previous section in relation to the Illawarra. Such resilience can
account for a cultural continuity that the existing documents - written, I should add, by people
influenced by that very perception - might be unable to reveal. Organ has summarised the
content of the documents as follows:
• A large number of Illawarra Aborigines succumbed to disease introduced by the white settlers
shortly after 1788. Smallpox and influenza were the most devastating, with individual epidemics
wiping out large percentages (?greater than 50% at a time) of the population.
• Some Aborigines left the district for more isolated areas of the country to the west or south to
avoid conflict with white settlers and find new hunting grounds, though this was always difficult
as they were seen as intruders by the neighbouring tribes, and their ties to traditional lands were
so great that to drive them out would be analogous to driving a family of the 1980’s from their
comfortable brick home onto the street - the effect was physically and emotionally shattering to
the Aboriginal people, and for this reason they did not easily leave their traditional homelands.
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Many were prepared to suffer the humility and physical degradation of fringe camps rather than
break all ties with their place of birth.
• Many undoubtedly starved and perished as a result of their traditional hunting grounds and
sources of food being taken from them, and subsequently forced to live on handouts from
Europeans.
• Large numbers were killed - by white settlers in conflict over land and women, or more rarely
by fellow Aborigines in tribal skirmishes.
• A low birth rate, with an average of only 2-3 children per family, was probably common
amongst the Illawarra Aborigines after 1788. White families in Illawarra during the 1820’s and
1830’s, with access to proper medical facilities, commonly had up to 10 children. The effects of
venereal diseases further reduced the Aboriginal birth rate and they were subsequently
numerically overwhelmed. The ... British prejudices against inter-marriage with black people
was also a factor in their decreasing numbers.
• Many tried to adapt to the whiteman’s way of life, becoming part of that community, or living in
camps on the fringes of township. Many Aboriginal women married or lived with white men on
the more isolated stations. 70

Organ’s reconstruction presents a very dark and disheartening picture. Within it, however, it is
already possible to identify some elements that point to a story of cultural resilience able to
ensure cultural continuity even against such dismaying odds. The role of direct family in
transmitting fundamental cultural and normative information (rather than devoting such
transmission to specific, impersonal institutions), the enlarged notion of family typical of
Indigenous kinship structures, the morphological nature of traditional narratives (able to be
transmitted in an apparently simple form) and the cultural isolation forced by white exclusivist
policies all suggest a cultural path that can be continuously traced back to before the arrival of
Europeans.

Moreover, the people who decided to move from their traditional lands, most likely did not
simply sever their connections with them but rather followed precise patterns of movement that
connected distinct groups across interconnected areas. It is likely that this produced increased
cultural pressure and strained relationships, but it is also as likely that it ensured a certain degree
of maintenance of cultural protocols of movement, suggesting that the movement of people did
not result in the suggested absolute reshuffling of Indigenous populations. Instead, it suggests a
certain continuity between previous and subsequent inhabitants of the area. 71 When asked about

70
71

Ibid, xxxvii-xxxviii.

See also Jeremy R Beckett, ‘Kinship, mobility and community in rural New South Wales’ in Ian Keen,
Being Black: Aboriginal cultures in ‘settled’ Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, 1991) 117.
254

this point, all Indigenous interviewees referred to specific family relationships in order to
explain their connection to the area, tracing back their relationship a number of generations. 72
Such cultural continuity, however, was neither perceived nor suggested in the documents
collected by Organ.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century the remnants of the original Illawarra tribal and
family groups were forced into camps at localities such as Red Point (Hill 60, Port Kembla),
Minnamurra and Bass Point, or further south away from densely settled areas. Around 1878 a
group headed north to help form the settlement at La Perouse, on the shores of botany Bay, and
their descendants remain there to this day. In the eyes of many whites throughout Illawarra the
Aborigines were just a memory by 1900, and to the younger generations of white Australians
living in urban areas throughout the country who had never seen an Aborigine in person, they have
only existed in the media, or ‘outback’ throughout much of this century [the twentieth]. The
average non-Aboriginal Australian’s knowledge of the Aborigines and their culture is therefore
minimal, even in 1990. The European invasion, subtle and relatively bloodless though it may have
appeared in the official records of the British Empire (though bloody in reality) had nevertheless
been successful in bringing the race to near extinction by the mid nineteenth century, especially
along the eastern coast of Australia and in Tasmania. Intermarriage between whites and blacks
tended to enhance this view towards ‘extinction’ of the Aboriginal people, with ignorant whites
refusing to accept so-called half-castes or other descendants as ‘true’ Aborigines right up until the
present day. The term ‘half-caste’ was used, and is still used, in a derogatory fashion by whites.
These people of mixed race were considered neither white nor truly Aboriginal, and therefore not
due any special consideration by white Australia. Most ended up living with their Aboriginal
families, for the white community would generally not accept them, even though it encouraged
inter-marriage as a means of ‘whitening’ the colour of the native Aborigine. The official
‘assimilation’ policies of the Aborigines Protection Board from 1909 onwards were nothing less
than a continuation of the attempt to completely destroy the indigenous culture, which action had
been pursued since the earliest days of white settlement. Assimilation is still considered a
realizable objective by ignorant no-Aboriginals. By the turn of the century some whites were
beginning to regret the decimation of the native population of Illawarra and the South Coast, and
we have a number of local historians and anthropologists (e.g. R.H. Mathews, Archibald
Campbell, E. Dollahan, John Brown) compiling as much information as they could on the local
people and aspect of their culture and languages. The result is a dismal, fragmentary record, with
rare hints of what was once an obviously rich heritage. No native Illawarra Aborigine recorded
first-hand on paper his/her reminiscences of their people’s history or aspects of their traditional
culture during the period between first contact and 1900. All surviving stories and reminiscences
are second-hand, with amendments and alterations by the recorder. Transcriptions of the native
tongue, as in lists of names for local geographical features, are especially suspect. For example,
the local Aboriginal word for ‘Cabbage Palm’ has been variously recorded by Europeans since
1827 as: Thurrawal, Turruwal, Towel, and even Thirroul. Of images, the few drawings by Mickey
72
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of Ulladulla around the 1880’s are almost unique for the region. It was not until the 1960’s that the
first major collection of Illawarra and South Coast Aboriginal oral histories were compiled on tape
(by Janet Mathews), and not until 1987 that the first collection of reminiscences by local
Aborigines was published, though unfortunately by that stage much had been lost forever, and the
informants (many of whom were not descended from the original pre-1788 inhabitants of
Illawarra, but came to the region from other parts of the country) only remembered events this
century. Hopefully within the memories of the descendants of the Illawarra Aborigines aspects of
the traditional cultures survive and are yet to be revealed.

Answering Organ’s hope, this thesis shows that the wealth of information contained in
traditional cultures of the area is far from having disappeared. On the contrary, there exists a
cultural continuity that transcends individual memory but is instead embedded in complex
narratives that have survived white attempts at cultural eradication, thanks to the survival of a
kinship network and the awareness of unwritten traditional protocols of interaction.
Nonetheless, the instrument developed to ‘recognise’ such cultural continuity, native title, is
likely to be detrimental to such recognition, or at the very least not necessarily effective in
allowing it.73

Cultural continuity to the present day is suggested by a number of factors, the examples of
which are visible in the previous section. Traditional narratives, the kinship system (although
articulate in white-man’s language), cultural protocols and respect for the elders as knowledge
holders are all still present today. The measure and nature of their adaptation is certainly open to
exploration. Nonetheless, their existence is a proven fact which needs not to be questioned any
further. In addition, patterns of movements of Aboriginal people out of and into the area have
certainly occurred within the same cultural framework, thus dispelling the hypothesis of a
random reshuffling of Indigenous populations. Moreover, it is also possible to hypothesise that
specific information about the area (and the normative entitlements connected to such
information) have not simply vanished but have rather been passed along those very channels.
This point has indeed been confirmed by one of the interviewees in relation to the area
(including sacred places) around Mount Keira. 74

The small number of the Indigenous population after European settlement should equally be
disregarded as rather irrelevant. Population numbers were relatively small (when compared to
contemporary European) even before 1788; the fact that Indigenous Peoples became a numeric
minority because of the vast numbers of European immigrants in the area is irrelevant to the
73
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issue of cultural continuity: indeed, no population explosion is required for a culture to
continue. Furthermore, genetic considerations are in fact an indication of larger cultural
numbers than the documents indicate. The impact that mixed unions had on ethnic appearances
has indeed been particularly strong in the area, so much so that the majority of Indigenous
people today share no major ethnic indicator that identifies a specific cultural belonging.75 On
the other hand, the numbers of so-called ‘half-castes’ have much surpassed those recorded
previously; the inclusion of people of mixed descent within the Aboriginal communities,
however, means that the numbers of Aboriginal people, form a cultural point of view of people
who grew and inherited Aboriginal culture, are much higher than the ones that suggest a
progressive cultural diminution.

Another important point can be made about cultural integrity. A number of interviewees have
indicated a particular connection of coastal Aboriginal communities with communities from
central Australia, suggesting that certain initiatory practices required both a cultural exchange
and a physical journey with that region. 76 The interconnected nature of Indigenous communities
presented in Chapter Eight is confirmed by this suggestion. Indigenous communities do not
appear to exist as isolated groups but rather as cultural strings interwoven together at different
points and by connections of different lengths, presenting ‘not a general map of separate
boundaries but instead a web of connections spanning across all of Australia.’77

It is finally possible to counter the argument that the cultural traits and protocols discussed and
presented by Indigenous people of the area today are the result of the adoption of vague and
confused traits that followed the European settlement and its impact on traditional societies. To
suggest this is to diminish the resilience of Indigenous culture against all the arguments
presented so far and supported by the numerous examples. More importantly, it is to suggest
either a sort of cultural conspiracy or a sort of cultural delusion on the part of all the Indigenous
people of the area. Not only does it seem more just, it is also much more reasonable to accept a
cultural continuity of traditional elements that are very much present today and that find their
75
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origins in a continuity that pre-dates the European arrival in 1788. Overall, the story of the
Illawarra is not a story of genocide, but the story of an heroic cultural survival.

Although cultural traits show a continuos cultural connection to the area, the instrument
designed to recognise such cultural connection, native title, has proven in this case neither
successful nor preferable. Before getting to this, however, I want to reconstruct the other events
that have occurred since European settlement and that are relevant to native title considerations.
In other words, I want to set out the remaining path that led to a potential native title case in the
Illawarra.

III. GRANTS
What events occurred in the area that are relevant for determining the extent of a
potential native title claim?
After the initial contact recorded by Cook and Banks, Collins reports the arrival in Sydney of
Gome-boak, a warrior from south of Botany Bay, possibly from Illawarra or the far South
Coast.78 Unnamed escaped convicts were likely the first Europeans to enter the Illawarra. In
1796, eight years after the arrival of the First Fleet, Bass, Flinders and Martin, aboard the Thom
Thumb, set foot in Illawarra, the first Europeans to officially do so even though their accounts
confirm the presence of Europeans living with the natives there (most likely, those unnamed
escaped convicts).79 Flinder’s journals show both the prejudices with which the expedition
approached the area, believing the natives to be hostile and cannibals, and the guarded
behaviour of the natives they encountered (during a very peaceful and friendly encounter, I
should add), suggesting that Indigenous people in the area were already aware of the impact that
Europeans were having on neighbouring groups and communities.80

The Sydney Gazette reports in 1813 the journey to Sydney of the survivors of the wrecks of two
vessels, the Mercury and the Endeavour, which had floundered at Shoalhaven. 81 Hostilities with
local Indigenous people over food occurred. More violent conflict, however, occurred in the
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Sydney region beginning in 1814 and culminating in the war of 1816, ten years after the death
of Pemulwuy in 1802.82 Organ writes that
[t]he initial confilcts of 1814 would culminate in the war of 1816, with numerous deaths to both
whites and blacks (though there were at least 10 Aborigines killed for every white person) and
stern measures imposed upon the Aborigines by Governor Macquarie later that year. In most cases
it is revealed that hostilities initially arose due to abuses and atrocities (such as indiscriminant
shooting, murder and rape) carried out by white settlers who took umbrage at the Aborigines
‘stealing’ their corn and crops. The Aborigines simply regarded their actions as a continuation of
their constant struggle to live off the provisions of the land, as they had done for thousands of
years. The whites, in their greed, ignorance and arrogance, retaliated with guns and swords, and
attempted to remove all trace of the original inhabitants from their farms and grazing areas. They
viewed the Aborigines as ‘pests.’ ... It was not until 1838 that the first Europeans in New South
Wales were brought to trial, found guilty, and hung for barbarities committed against the
Aborigines, despite many blatant cases both before and after the date for which the authorities took
no action. 83

It is during this period that the first white settlement in the Illawarra occurs. Charles Throsby
and his party move cattle into the area in 1815 and establish a stockyard and a stockman’s hut in
the area that is today Wollongong.84 At the same time, concerned reports are issued over the fate
of George Wood and his party of cedar getters directed toward Shoalhaven. Shortly after, reports
with conjectures over supposed outrages by Aborigines at Shoalhaven are issued. Meanwhile,
Governor Macquarie declared an unofficial war against the Aborigines to the west and southwest of Sydney, by ordering Captain Shaw to lead indiscriminate punitive expeditions, issuing
detailed instructions that allowed extreme use of unprovoked force to seek out ‘Hostile Natives’
and take all others encountered as ‘Prisoners of War’, shooting them if they attempted to
escape.85 In the same year, the Sydney Gazette was reporting on the ‘friendliness of natives at
the new stock settlement at Illawarra:
The natives of the new Stock Settlement at the Five Islands are described as being very amicably
disposed towards us and the general mildness of their manners to differ considerably from the
other tribes known to us. Several Gentlemen have removed their cattle thither, as the
neighbourhood affords good pasturage; and it is to be anxiously hoped, that the stockmen in
charge of their herds may be able to maintain the friendly footing that at present exists with
them. 86
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Governor Macquarie’s actions show, however, that this positive attitude of the settlers toward
Indigenous people was quickly wiped away by the slightest of perceived provocations.

One year after the punitive expedition, Governor Macquarie directed his attention to the
Illawarra, reporting to Earl Bathurst
I have the pleasure to report to Your Lordship that an extensive rich tract of country, fit for the
purposes of pasturage and agriculture, has some little time since been discovered, distant about 45
miles to the southward of this [Sydney], on a part of the coast known generally by the name of the
‘Five Islands’, but called by the natives ‘Illawarra’. 87

One year later, in 1818, Throsby and his party moved as far south as Jervis Bay, marking the
beginning of land grants in the Illawarra and surrounding regions.
Following the widespread issuing of land grants in the Illawarra district during 1816, large
numbers of cattle, sheep, and Europeans began to settle there, placing increasing pressure on the
local Aboriginal inhabitants who frequently came into conflict with them. Also around this time
gangs of cedar cutters were working in the forests of Illawarra and Shoalhaven, and reportedly had
a corrupting influence on the local natives. Governor Macquarie’s military actions of 1816 had
successfully terrorized and placated the Aborigines of the region west of the Illawarra escarpment
around Appin and Camden, and the action of Sydney entrepreneurs such as Merchant Browne,
Charles Throsby, and William Wentworth in moving their stock to Illawarra led to further
instances in which the local natives were dispossessed of their land and their environment radically
altered. According to surviving records there was no large scale, aggressive opposition by the local
tribes to white settlement during this period, though just as in every other frontier in the Colony
incidents obviously occurred and the Aborigines of Illawarra would have raised numerous
objections to their displacement from traditional homelands without regard to their human rights
(for they had no real legal rights). ... [M]any conflicts between whites and natives during this
period were never officially reported. 88

The ambivalent attitude of Europeans toward Indigenous Australians is further confirmed by the
words of the missionary W Walker, writing to Reverend Walton in England, describing the
Sydney tribes; in particular the tribe around Botany Bay is described as ‘not numerous, but very
immoral’, whereas the tribe of the Five Islands is described as ‘numerous-fierce-cannibals.
Probably ... will be among the last that shall be civilized.’89 An interesting addition is the remark
that ‘[t]he language of all these tribes are different so much so that one tribe rarely understands
another in every particular.’ 90
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Lindsay provides a very detailed recount of the initial European settlement in Illawarra.91 The
initial arrival of cattle stocks mentioned above had been possible under Free Grazing Permits. In
1816, the occupiers of the area under grazing permits obtain promises of land:
Those gentlemen and free settlers who have lately obtained promises of grants of land in the new
district of Illawarra, of Five Islands, are hereby informed that the Surveyor General and his deputy
have received instructions to proceed thither in the course of the ensuing week, to make a regular
survey of the new district, and to locate the several promised grants; and in order that the locations
may be made accordingly, those persons who have obtained promises of allotments are hereby
required to avail themselves of the approaching occasion of the surveyors being on duty in
Illawarra to get their locations marked out to them; and for this purpose they are required to meet
the Surveyor General at the hut of mr Throsby’s Stockman in Illawarra, or the Five Islands district,
at noon on Monday, 2 December 1816.92

Shortly after, the first grants of land in the Illawarra district were issued by Governor Macquarie
in 1817, and were recorded as follows by Lindsay:
David Allan, 2,200 acres, called “Illawarra”, situated at Five Islands and including Red Point.
Robert Jenkins, 1,000 acres, called “Berkely”, situated at Five Islands and including Flag Staff
Hill.
Richard Brooks, 1,300 acres, called “Exmouth”, and situated to the south of lands now occupied
by the private town of Dapto.
George Johnston, 1,500 acres, called “Macquarie Gift”, situated on the northern bank of
Macquarie Rivulet, and later part of the estate known as Johnston’s Meadows.
Andrew Allan, 700 acres, called “Waterloo”, and situated on the south bank of the Macquarie
Rivulet, opposite the Macquarie Gift grant. 93

In 1821, further issuing of similar grants followed.

The title over the land of the large estate holders changed with the transition from the Colony of
New South Wales to the State of new South Wales, as recalled by Lindsay:
The Colony had been created a self governing State in 1855, and in 1861, Mr (later Sir) John
Robertson had succeeded in getting the first Crown Lands Alienation Act passed by Parliament.
Under the Act (colloquially called The Free Selection Act) the whole of the Crown Lands, other
than Reserves, Town Lands, and Population Areas, became available for selection (Conditional
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Purchase) on and after the 1 January 1862. Had the Trustee of D’Arcy Wentworth’s Estate not
secured a firm title to this 2,000 acres before the date, the land would probably have become a
bone of contention between the Estate and would-be selectors. 94

Beginning in the 1830’s there are also reports that at least one of the holders of free grants had
begun selling portions of the larger estate as small farms to the new settlers that came into the
area under assisted immigration from England, Ireland and Scotland between the 1830’s and the
1860’s. In acquiring a freehold title over their farms, these new settlers led to the progressive
dismemberment of the large estates previously established.95

In parallel to this process, records of Aboriginal population and of events affecting them began
to appear.96 Around 1830, the ‘battle of Fairy meadow’ is recorded occurring between the
‘Wollongong’ and ‘Bong Bong’ tribes, ‘in which a number of warriors were killed on both
sides.’ 97 In 1832, there is the report of a massacre of defenceless natives by white settlers at
Murra Merang in retaliation for the spearing of cattle.98 In 1830, the Sydney Gazette reported the
trial and execution of a Shoalhaven Aborigine named Broger for the murder of one of Alexander
Berry’s men at Coolangatta. 99 In 1838, the existence of an Aboriginal camp near Wollongong is
reported and a ‘Return of Aboriginals at Wollongong, Shoal Haven, Ulladulla, and Jervis Bay’ is
compiled in association with the issue of blankets.100 During 1845-6 the New South Wales
Legislative Council undertook an investigation into the condition of the Aborigines of the east
coast of Australia via the appointment of a Select Committee.101 Information on local people
was sought by sending written requests to local magistrates and clergymen. One of the
participants who responded was Reverend M D Meares from Wollongong. Some of his
responses are very revealing of the European attitudes and assumptions toward Aborigines:
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[Q]

Are there any, and how many, half-castes in your district? Are they living with or after

the manner of the Aborigines?
[A]

There are two or three adult half-castes who live as do the Aborigines, and with them.

[Q]

Is there any disposition on the part of the white labouring population, to amalgamate

with the Aborigines, so as to form families?
[A]

There is no desire on the part of the white labouring population to amalgamate, in a

legitimate way, with the Aborigines; cases have occurred in which white men, working among the
mountains, as cedar cutters, have cohabited with black women for months together; in one instance
for two years, but the connexion has always ceased immediately on their return to a settled part of
the district.102

Interestingly, the racist comments about ‘half-castes’ and the implication of the second answer
suggest a more numerous Indigenous population than the one indicated in the records.

King Mickey was the most famous Illawarra Aborigine in the latter years of the nineteenth
century. He had been proclaimed King of the Illawarra tribe at the Illawarra Centenary
celebrations held in conjunction with the Wollongong Show in 1896,103 reaffirming the practice
of projecting the status of ‘chief’ or ‘leader’ upon a culture in which tribal leaders were
unknown. Bayley writes:
Possibly one of Kiama’s best regarded inhabitants was King Mickey of the aborigines. In 1855 the
aboriginal encampment was noted as being on the flat near Minnamurra bridge where existed ‘a
couple of rudely constructed huts made of old sacks and saplings. There are also some mia-mia’s
whilst dusky children of all shades of colour are roaming about on the level grassy sward.’ Mickey
was a noted runner in his youth and died at the camp in 1906, aged 72, being buried in Kiama
cemetery. He was invested in 1896 by Archibald Campbell, M.L.A., with a crescent-shaped brass
plate inscribed “Mickey Johnston, King”. For Queen Rosie in her old age the public erected and
furnished a small cabin at Minnamurra in 1923. 104

By 1870 a few white Australians began to express concern for the fate of the Aborigines,
including people from the Illawarra and South Coast regions. Over thirty years, between 1870
and 1899, a number of investigators (among whom Reverend William Ridley, R H Mathews, A
W Howitt, John Brown and Archibald Campbell)105 ‘went about collecting material and
reminiscences of the local Aborigines, realising that with the deaths of the older natives much of
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the local culture would be lost forever as it was no longer being passed from generation to
generation.’106 In reality, we have seen in the previous chapter that traditional knowledge was
much more resilient than suspected, and transmission of information occurred uninterrupted,
albeit certainly altered, during the entire colonial period. Nonetheless, the myth of the dying
race appeared too alluring for all investigators, who collected information but never involved
Indigenous participants with a leading and driving role in the collections.

The result was a constant reinforcing of the myths indulged by the investigators themselves and
by the society at large. The projection of European cultural paradigms, the numerous prejudices,
the forced identification of chiefs and tribal leaders were all common examples found in the
literature of the time. A good example is provided by the words of Judge McFarland, whose
book represents the first published history of the Illawarra and South Coast regions:
The government of the Blacks is not responsible, it is despotism, tempered by assassination which last often regulates the law of divorce, as well as the change of dynasty. At that time, no
thought had entered the White man’s head of interfering with their customs, even when an ‘old
hand’ fell a victim under it. Nor was ‘Peter’ [an Aboriginal man identified as the ‘resident Chief’]
a man to forego any of his rights; for good or for bad, he had a will of his own, and acted upon it.
He kept his Blacks not only in strict subjection to himself, but faithful in all that related to the
homestead. There was also noticeable in him a dignity, an absence of all littleness of puerility,
which imparted itself to the whole tribe. Their bearing was open and bold, and their customs duly
observed and honoured. Thus, their corroboree was a martial dance, performed with solemnity, and
shrouded from the vulgar gaze - far different from at present, when any set of Blacks will
corroboree without the martial incentives, and without the war paint, and to amuse loafers for so
many glasses of brandy. The sequel will show that Peter’s followers well knew, and would not
abate, their rights either.107

It is quite understandable then, given the tone of the writing, that most information collected
was both uncertain and fragmentary and pointed to a cultural decline. Investigation was indeed
designed to confirm the expectations of the investigators themselves. Extensive attention was
given to the languages of the area, often leading to an equation between language and culture
groups as discussed in section I.108 Ridley identified a number of languages, among them:
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Turuwal, ‘the language spoken by the now extinct Tribe of Port Jackson and Botany Bay’109 and
Wodi Wodi, ‘the language of Illawarra, from Wollongong to Shoalhaven.’ 110 The recurring
theme of the dying race is apparent here as well.

Around 1878 a group of Illawarra and South Coast Aborigines travelled north to the shores of
Botany Bay to help form a settlement at La Perouse. In 1883 the Aboriginal Protection Board
was formed. In 1887 an Aboriginal skeleton was found near Bulli, likely in the same
contentious area where the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy is now situated. In 1900 the
Aborigines Protection Board attempts to remove the Aborigines of La Perouse, trying to move
them to Wallaga Lake, 500 kilometres to the south. When they refused, the Board retaliated by
withdrawing rations.111 In 1907 the Roseby Park reserve was created near Nowra. The year
after, in 1908, the Bomaderry Aboriginal Children’s Home was established. In 1929 an Illawarra
breastplate was dug up at La Perouse; the inscription indicated the breastplate belonging to ‘Joe
Timbery, Chief of the Five Islands.’112 The Sydney Sun reported on the remnants of the Illawarra
Aboriginal group living at Hill 60, also known as Red Point, near the entrance of Lake
Illawarra: ‘[o]nly a dozen of the original tribe occupy “Hill 60”, over which a new road is built,
the land of their forefathers, and home of the Illawarra tribe.’113 One of the last descendants of
this group, also reported in the same article, was Uncle Jacky Andersen, ‘who claimed direct
descent from King Mickey who was “Crowned” at Wollongong.’114 The last fluent speaker of
the traditional language of the region, one of the interviewee told me, was Aunty Nell De Rome,
sister to Aunty Jean and Aunty Joan referred to further in Chapter Eleven. 115 The people
occupying Hill 60 were finally removed to the Coomaditchie reserve at Shellharbour Road in
Warrawong, which was gazetted in 1962. 116

This brief (and by all intent not exhaustive) recollection of the European settlement in Illawarra
and the connected European attitude toward the original inhabitants of the region is revealing of
a number of issues. No document indicates any form of acquisition of the land from the original
inhabitants. Free grants were issued with complete disregard for the Indigenous people of the
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area. Indigenous inhabitants were treated as completely non-existent, regardless of the
voluminous documentary evidence to the contrary.

In light of the Doctrine of Discovery

presented in Chapter Four, however, this is rather problematic.

The Doctrine of Discovery as formulated in Johnson v M’intosh states that
[t]he exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole
right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with
which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the
assertion of which, by others, all assented. Those relations which were to exist between the
discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being
exclusive, no other power could interpose between them. ... In the establishment of these relations,
the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their
own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it. 117

The Illawarra experience is in direct contrast with the Doctrine of Discovery. There was no sign
of negotiation with the Indigenous inhabitants, who were indeed the ‘rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it.’ Even accepting the doctrine of
terra nullius as the unjust but legally valid doctrine that justified the British acquisition of
sovereignty over the area, such a doctrine was not to be found, both in international law and in
the sources accepted and used at the time, sufficient to automatically acquire lands by
dispossessing and blatantly ignoring the Indigenous inhabitants. There exists, moreover, clear
and well recorded knowledge of the natives and of their expressed interest in maintaining their
land. The principle of terra nullius might have justified the acquisition of sovereignty, but
certainly it did not justify the unilateral dispossession of land. Yet that is what occurred in the
Illawarra: no legal justification was ever advanced, as if no one had ever lived there.

All land rights considerations in the Illawarra area must take this issue into account. The
justification provided by native title judgements and legislation has not yet proven sufficient to
address this issue de jure. Moreover, if the Indigenous inhabitants were treated as legally nonexistent, then the question of whether they were British subjects or not becomes immediately
relevant. If they were, then the issue of legal protection and illegal dispossession is still
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lingering in areas on which the law of Australia has not been able to shed sufficient light. If, on
the other hand, they were not, then issues of sovereignty are immediately to be raised.

Two further points are also directly relevant in order to analyse the story of a potential native
title case in the Illawarra region. Firstly, there has been no effort, as shown by European
documents, to effectively learn about the traditional culture (including the traditional ‘laws and
customs’) of the Indigenous inhabitants of the region. Cultural collections and cultural
descriptions have all been advanced within the cultural framework of European settlers, without
direct epistemological involvement of Indigenous participants. In addition, they have all
operated from the premise that the Indigenous population of the area, and certainly their culture,
were ‘dying’ and their cultural richness was irreversibly vanishing. Such claims have been made
constantly throughout the two centuries of interactions, as shown by the documents examined
above. Nonetheless, Indigenous inhabitants profess and maintain a cultural identity that is
distinct from that of the European colonists. It would therefore appear to be more appropriate to
investigate the nature of cultural adaptations, acknowledging a self-evident cultural continuity,
rather than professing for over two centuries the apparent death of a culture drawing its last
breath, for to do otherwise is to see a very, very long breath indeed.

The final issue to be immediately relevant to the potential native title case in the Illawarra is the
issue of artificial boundaries. During the course of the past two centuries, the delineation of the
area has been determined much more by colonial divisions than by specific geographical
regions or by an acknowledgment of the traditional network of belonging. Although true of all
of Australia, the length of colonial settlement makes the point particularly visible in the
Illawarra. It is with all of this in mind that it is now possible to reconstruct the story of a
potential native title case in the area, in order to evaluate the impact that the construct adopted
and designed to ensure the legal ‘recognition’ of traditional interests in land has on the
‘traditional laws and customs’ in which those interests are articulated.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
ILLAWARRA, A CASE STUDY

The reconstruction of the background of a potential native title case in the Illawarra is offered
here to show the connection between native title as an instrument at common law and the
Indigenous interests in land that native title is designed to potentially recognise. Although native
title is declared to be assessed in the context of traditional laws and customs and of traditional
interests in land, a very striking dichotomy is readily visible in the case of the Illawarra region,
particularly in light of the context presented so far. Apart from a partially advanced native title
case, other distinct claims exist in the areas, representing the articulation of specific traditional
interests in land in the area in forms other than the ones required by the current native title
discourse.

In accordance with the indications given by the interviewees, I will use the spelling Wadi Wadi
to refer to the group involved in the native title case considered in the present chapter.
Alternative spelling might still be used when specifically adopted in documents or
conversations.1

As mentioned in Chapter One, the interviews are presented here in their entirety and
unabridged. Such a decision has been negotiated with the participants and it has been supported
by the Indigenous supervisor to this thesis. The primary reason for presenting the transcripts in
their entirety is to maintain Indigenous narrative epistemology as much as possible. For this
reason, the questions have been maintained at the most general level possible, in order to allow
the participants to present their narratives.

I. A WADI WADI CLAIM
The reconstruction of the history of the Wadi Wadi claim relies mainly on the interviews I
conducted with three participants. One of them, Interviewee No 1, has presented the most
complete reconstruction of the history of the case.

1

See Michael Organ, A documentary history of the Illawarra and south coast Aborigines 1770-1850:
including a chronological bibliography 1770-1990 (University of Wollongong, 1990) xiii.
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The history of the Wadi Wadi native title claim was instituted by Aunty Joan Wakeman and Aunty
Jean Carriage. They initiated the quest to get traditional land back well before, long before the
Mabo case. In fact, they launched it out ... shortly after the New South Wales Land Rights Act
[NSWLRA] came into effect. The only avenues of ... legal action ... were to either go through a
peak body ... nothing available except from the Local Land Council ... which ... ideally should
have been ideally placed to oversee it but because of so much internal conflict ... at the time ...
they would not ... go down that road ... so they strongly rejected involving the Local Land
Council which was made up by Indigenous people from everywhere, not only traditional
owners ... and the only avenue left for them being ... both being barely literate, and certainly
not having the skills to do the independent research themselves, they listed the Redfern
Aboriginal Legal Service, and they were appointed a solicitor there who took on the struggle ...
and it wasn’t going anywhere, it went on for ages ... nothing seemed to be happening. ... this
struggle to get the land back was within ... the terms of reference ... within the powers of the
Aboriginal Legal Service and within the powers of the NSWLRA... so they were limited in that
they didn’t have the broader base that the later Mabo decision gave. ... In the meantime I had
gathered up a lot of information, a lot of documents that validated continuous connection to land
and ... continuous genealogies ... and that all became very useful. After the Mabo case and ... after
the Native Title Act [NTA] was enacted ... I became involved in the struggle ... we transferred from
the paradigm of the NSWLRA to the Mabo paradigm, by then the NTA. Under that we lodged
claims under the NTA to proceed with our struggle. ... And then began the real hard work,
because the NTA had strict guidelines we had to follow, we had to do a thousand things in
order to get it rolling, and at the same time the Redfern Aboriginal Legal Service folded ... and ...
there had been several changes of solicitors in the time that the Legal Service was holding
our case; there wasn’t a lot of continuity, but the last solicitor who was there ... had to leave ... and
set up his own practice. It was up to us was whether we left the case with the Legal Service or
whether we left with that solicitor and take the case with him to his private practice. Because
of the dislocation of having multiple solicitors one after the other, we thought it best at the
time ... to have one person do it. In retrospect that might not have been the best thing to do,
purely from the financial backing system, because the Legal Service was funded to do certain
things, whereas the solicitor in private practice was not always able to get funds and he had
to work hard to get enough funds to work for us ... he did an enormous amount of work and
that went on for quite some time. ... As time passed we lost Aunty Joan and ... other relevant
people we also lost. My cousin Alan and myself we were the key people doing the negotiating at
the time with the solicitors from the National Native Title Tribunal [NNTT], genealogists and so
on ... and eventually ... the case was finally presented to the NNTT for adjudication and they
decided that we did not have enough to take to court, so they rejected our claim at the time
on the basis of the integrity ... apparently we hadn’t met all the requirements and this and
that. We actually appealed to the Court ... and we lost the appeal. Now that didn’t kill the claim ...
it certainly put a spanner in the wheel. The appeal was lost little after Aunty Jean’s death, and that
meant that it was left to me and my cousin Allan to carry on all the weight. ... Shortly after that
there was the introduction of the Ten Point Plan Amendment to the NTA ... which was
seriously going to impinge on whether we could continue with the claim or not, plus it
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emerged quite a lot of internal conflict within our ... corporation which was the peak body for
the claim, because of the enrolment of a range of new members who were fairly subversive and
had a lot of conflicting ideas ... What happened with the Ten Point Plan when the Ten Point Plan
went through Parliament ... among the ... points was the registration test ... the registration test was
one of the key ones. We had from the time the Ten Point Plan Amendment was gazette,
executed, from the time it starts, which I think was October, we had until the 31st of
January ... to satisfy the registration test we had to provide genealogies dating back to preEuropean contact and have them authenticated by registered genealogists. You don’t get a
genealogist for under 500 [dollars] a day, we didn’t have any money whatsoever ... there was
no finance for us, the NNTT had no funds for that because they had already exhausted their
support for us previously. If we hadn’t registered by the 31st of January then our claim
would be knocked out never to be reinstated. If we registered before then we could continue
our claim but we wouldn’t be able to register unless we had every i dotted and every t
crossed, i.e. the genealogist ... plus a range of other things. ... The only way to subvert the
notion of being knocked and never being able to reinstate our claim was to suspend our claim
prior to the registration expiry date. ... Only those NTC who registered prior to the expiry date
of the 31st of January 1997 ... are still alive and the claims that have been suspended. The
suspended status is the Wadi Wadi claim. ... We suspended in order not to get knocked out. 2

Other participants later confirmed this reconstruction. 3 Furthermore, in a combined interviewee,
three of the participants articulated very strongly the legal argument upon which the suspended
Native Title case had been based, revealing a thorough articulation of native title within the
parameters created by previous native title judgements and by the Native Title Act rather than
emphasising the traditional laws and customs that form the basis for the claim. I have combined
the voices of the interviewees into single answers to facilitate the reconstruction of the
narratives shared with me.
A little bit why the High Court knocked our appeal back. Because they stated that ... the land
which we were claiming initially, in the early 1800’s had been given in grant to a Scottish farmer
and the conditions of the grant were that that man farmed the land and make it productive ... and if
he didn’t farm that land, the land could be resumed. The Scottish farmer held it for a long time and
he didn’t do a thing, there is no single record of him ever visiting it ... and then he disappeared and
it was assumed he had gone back to Scotland and no one ever heard of him again. Then it was
resumed by the Crown and given in grant again a second time and a similar situation occurred, that
the land was not put to a productive use. So again, it was resumed by the Crown. ... Under the
terms of the NTA and the Mabo case, what the Mabo case didn’t do, and neither did the Act,
was to make clear what to do where native title had not been extinguished by another grant
that had been given. It was made clear that when land was given in grant then native title
had been extinguished. But it didn’t make any ruling on the situation where ... land had been
2
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given in grant and then resumed by the Crown. If it was Crown land again, we argued, then
it was up for grab, regardless of the fact that it was once given in grant. We argued that ...
the land being resumed by the Crown, made Crown land again, therefore it should have been
open to a native title claim. The Court argued that once that was given in grant native title was
extinguished. basically, we lost our appeal because of a lack of a ruling in the Mabo case. Not
because of the ruling ... but because of a lack of a ruling. ... Likewise, there was nothing in the
NTA that covered the business of land resumed by the Crown ... where people had dishonoured the
terms of the grant. ... The Crown didn’t rule that the land could not be given in grant again ...
because they did give it in grant. But they can’t give it to Aboriginal people. The first grant
didn’t extinguish the right to the second grant, so why should it extinguish the right of the
traditional owners to that land? 4

I then proceeded with a number of direct questions designed to identify the traditional
normative protocols that I have suggested as the legally relevant protocols to be considered the
‘traditional laws and customs’ forming the basis of the traditional interests in land implied in the
claim. The questions invited the participants to answer as extensively as they pleased. The
questions have been divided into distinct sets.

The first set of questions deal with traditional identity and sense of belonging:5
Q

Could you please tell me to which cultural group you belong?

A

I identify with the Wadi Wadi people of Wollongong.

Q

How would you describe your belonging to this particular group in relation to

Aboriginal customs?
A

Kinship affiliations. There are strict rules of kinship, without which I might be lost.

Relationships are important in locating yourself within your clan groups. ... If you look at
relationships in whitefella’s way, then so many of us would have fragmentations. ... We’d have
fragmented identities which under the Native Title Act ... Under the Native Title Act it’s
whitefella rules and relationships, rather than blackfella rules and understanding. While I
was born on Country down here, my father’s people originated from western New South Wales ...
however, under kinship rules his brother married into Wadi Wadi down here and under strict rules
of kinship my father then automatically was drawn into the Wadi Wadi group because his brother
had married in and also my father had association with direct descendants of the Wadi Wadi
people, Queen Rosie. ... Under those blackfella rules, I identify strongly in blackfella terms ... but
you see, there is that conflict there, between white law and Aboriginal law, particularly in

4
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terms of native title and ... western laws surrounding native title, they conflict because they
don’t recognise those disjunctions.

Q

Is it possible to belong to more than one group?

A

You identify with one but you would have affiliations with others. So you have

links with others.

The second group of questions dealt with traditional knowledge. 6
Q

Can you comment on the importance of the oral tradition of transmitting knowledge?

A

It’s vital, it’s absolutely the key thing that preserves cultural maintenance. Without

the oral traditions still being very much a robust part of Aboriginal culture today, ... we
wouldn’t have Aboriginal culture in so much of Australia. We’d probably only have the remote
communities, if it wasn’t for that oral tradition. You would have found that when you talked to
[another interviewee], it would have been very evident there, and there are so many of our
people who are just like that, they can sit and just talk, talk, talk about all this stuff, and
they’ve never written it down either, they can just sit and talk about it. ... My cousin had all
this wonderful, wonderful knowledge, he was the custodian, we call him the custodian of all the
genealogies. Because he could go right back and put everyone right back ... two hundred
years nearly, he could put people in their rightful place. And also the younger generations,
who the young ones married with and had children with. ... He never forgot the names. He
remembered all the names of all the groups and the individual names, who their parents
were, who their grandfathers were, all that. ... You could always rely on him to provide us
with what information we needed. I daresay that none of us remembers exactly what he did ...
but each of us remembers some of it, so together we can still produce a full body of
knowledge. And I think if we didn’t have that oral tradition, the culture in urbanised areas
would have died out and it certainly hasn’t. ... We preserve that culture through that
transmission of that knowledge.

Q

How did you acquire those knowledges and from whom? How was it transmitted

according to the kinship system?
A

I [interviewee no 1] personally didn’t connect with my family until later in life, there

was a lot of that family knowledge I wasn’t aware of until then. But my cousins ... they were very
forthcoming, once I come into the fold ... and they passed on an enormous amount [of knowledge].
I met up with old Aunty Nell ... who was the oldest one in that family and she was at that time
the last surviving speaker of the Wadi Wadi language, she had the language and we know
that all the concepts of culture are encoded in language, and ... she just had so much
knowledge, I learned a lot from her and ... from the other Aunts ... and my cousins ... They have

6
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all been able to contribute to my stored knowledge and that’s all been done orally, nothing
written, all been done orally. ... I found quite a bit of documentary evidence produced by nonIndigenous scholars ... but the substance, the greatest substance [of knowledge], I had it from
the oral stories. The scholarly documents I looked at reinforced it, they didn’t add much to
it, they reinforced the oral stories. ... Having said all that, as a young child, because I was born
in the mish and I had a very close intimate association with a lot of Aboriginal people there in my
very very early, tiny tiny years and you automatically assume a lot of knowledge ... the same as
any child learns how to behave in the society into which he’s born. I learned a lot there, but
that sort of laid latent for many years. as I got older I remember more and more ... and more
of what I remember reinforce those oral stories that I was told much later in life. So much
had to do with who did what and where. Where the women was to go to get food sources ... I
learned a lot like that, I learned about birthing sites and things. And I always seem to have that
understanding, that resonated with what throughout all my life imagined that I knew, but in
fact it was actual knowledge that I had acquired just by being a child born into that. I
remember all the women going to certain places but there was no bloke, only women there.
Only later I rationalised that ... it was women’s business. That was reinforced by some of the
things the Aunts told me.

Q

Do all people share all knowledge or are some part restricted to selected people?

A

Definite restrictions on certain knowledges, there’s only certain peoples within certain

groups that can be the custodians of certain knowledges. I had no idea of certain women’s sites,
for example, until one of my Aunts ... she carried that knowledge about particular women sites. ...
What she did, one day when I was with her she said “I want you to take me somewhere”, and I
said “Ok, where are we going?”, and she said “I’ll tell you when we get there!” ... I followed her
directions and we finished up at a particular site, and we sat down ... and she told me about that
place to be the place to go when I wanted to know more, because that was definitely a women’s
business site and all the old women spirits come there ... What she was doing was divesting ... her
knowledge onto another person. I know she didn’t pass her knowledge to all the other women. I
think she told one other woman in our family. ... I’m talking about 11 years ago. It’s not ancient
history, this isn’t ancient history. ... The Aunty empowered me with that knowledge. ... The
place was secret ... firstly because a women’s business site. Men might not have know it was ...
maybe they know it’s women’s business and nothing more. She would have regarded it as sacred
because of the statements she made. ... I wasn’t to show to anyone, only to other Aboriginal
women eventually. I had to be very selective. ... I could take people there and tell them “This is a
special place” but not give any other information, depending on the person. ... In sharing the
knowledge, you don’t share all of the knowledge that you have with all of the people, you
might share some of the knowledge with some of them. ... What she impressed upon me was
never to show off that space, never to make it public, never to show it to men with the
knowledge of what it was. That space has a picnic table ... lots of people go there ... but Aunty’s
logic was that the minute it becomes known that it’s a women’s secret/sacred site, then you would
have archeologists and anthropologists and whatever digging there. ... So not passing the entire
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knowledge but only portions of knowledge, that’s how people would know what was secret. I
remember as a kid going to this particular location [a different one from the previous example] on
numerous occasions and I remember this big circle of stones, quite big stones and they were pretty
much embedded in the dirt. It was made into a big circle and there was a lot of fire ash in the
middle and nothing much grew in the middle of that ... I never knew what it was. Years later I
realised it was ... an initiation site ... It’s still there. I won’t go there, because I know what it is, it’s
a men business site.

Q

How were the people holding secret/sacred knowledge identified?

A

It would have always been within the community group.

Q

That takes us back to the kinship system. Therefore, identifying family relations

would have been fundamental to identify who is the holder of knowledge.
A

Correct.

Q

Are there lots of places whose knowledge is held by only a few selected individuals?

A

Yes, they are everywhere. And there is a lot of cover-ups.

The interviewees then proceeded to discuss specific geographic regions of connection between
certain sites and knowledge. I thus moved to the third group of questions, related to the
definition in (more or less) abstract terms of the connection with land.
Q

Can you please tell me how you would define your relationship with the land?

A

It’s my spirit. I don’t call it spirituality. It’s my spirit. My spirit is in this land. ... I was

born here [Coomaditchie], and there were three Aunties, I discovered many years later, and they
sat at my birth and they did the same thing that Aboriginal women had done for years [information
removed from the transcription].

Q

How would you define traditional territorial boundaries?

A

Might be a river, or a creek, or a lake. ... A geographical feature usually, but there

were always convergence areas too, not clean lines. ... Groups always had communal
relationships ... because that’s the way it still operates, we know that pattern. ... It was
interesting what happened in Canada when the referendum was held in Canada with the Quebecois
separatist group there ... what happens to those Indigenous people there if the Quebecois win,
because already the Indigenous people are subjected to their boundaries, to their definition of their
land and the extent of their land, because it goes from Canada into the U.S. and already they’ve
got two separate governments, two separate countries that they have to negotiate with about their
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land. ... Colonial boundaries don’t mean a damn thing to Indigenous people, they’re a very
different thing. You think about those artificial boundaries not being a convergence area, they
are governed by strict western rules of nationhood and sovereignty and you can’t freely move
across that artificial line. ... People on either side of that line are separate people. Aboriginal
traditional boundaries are less structured, less clear, they’re more blurred, because it’s a
convergence area ... where tribal groups would have held ... big ceremonies. People would come
together.

Q

To clarify, you are saying that the knowledge of these convergence areas would be

contained within the broad knowledge shared among the entire community and contained in the
stories mentioned before?
A

Absolutely. ... Aunty Nell was really good at that, she had a lot of this knowledge on

that sort of stuff.

Q

Are there rules to cross other people’s lands?

A

Yes, there are plenty of cultural protocols. 7

Q

Are those protocols still known to people?

A

Of course. It has been reinvented to day as acknowledging country. Today we

acknowledge that we are on someone else's country. ... The first people you speak with you
acknowledge that people’s country and you pay respect to the elders and to the traditional
custodians of the land. ... It’s another reason for which the welcome to country ceremony is
being held ... and that’s ok, because cultures always modify. In talking about boundaries ... it’s
important to understand that there would have been a geographical division among groups, a
geographical division rather than boundaries because I think it’s somehow better, that
Aboriginal people never saw it as a problem ... even though we had tacit understandings of
where your country begins and ends, without any aspirations to acquire the next clan’s country.
There were never disputes over land. Certainly there were disputes between neighbouring groups,
mainly over domestic issues, or criminal activities or such and such ... Aboriginal people never
went to war. War is over land and resources, that’s what war is about. ... Aboriginal people never
coveted the next person’s land. ... Respect that that was that group’s land. That points to the
different understandings of, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal understandings of land tenure.

7

In an informal conversation had at Lake Mungo with an Aboriginal guide in March 2008, I have also
been told specific protocols of the area, further confirming the contemporary knowledge of such
protocols.
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Having concluded the three sets of questions, I then proceeded to ask the participants about their
feelings on the broader intersections of normative orders contained in native title in light of the
knowledge shared so far.
Q

Do you feel that the native process dealt properly with traditional knowledge?

A

No.

Q

Can you please comment on how the acknowledgment of traditional knowledge, or lack

thereof in this case, transpired during the process and how it impacted it?
A

The Mabo case as opposed to the NTA. The Mabo case recognised ... that there was

an inherent set of values and “rights” to be recognised as the owners of this land, for a lack
of a better word. The NTA did not necessarily do that. I think it was important, but I also think
it was cumbersome ... It needs some amendments. ... Amendments haven’t yet happened, the
amendments needed haven’t happened. The Ten Points Plan was not the amendments that the NTA
needed. The NTA did not embrace and encode within it Indigenous points of view on land
tenure and sovereignty. The Mabo case and the NTA that followed proceeded from an
English legal precedent.

It was a western legal debate in court. It was a western legal

debate in Parliament. ... All of the reference points for the decision on Mabo and for the NTA
came out of earlier cases from British government. ... All the native title business had nothing
to do with Indigenous rights. It’s just that within the context of those early British
reasonings ... that recognition that Indigenous people had rights and whatever, and that’s what
informed the judgement in the Mabo case. It wasn’t Eddie Mabo that informed the judgement, it
was that British precedent. It had absolutely nothing to do with the consideration of
Indigenous rights in land. It had to do with honouring an earlier British judgement.

Q

As consequence of that, did you feel forced to follow the British legal system or did you

feel that you could express traditional laws and customs?
A

We were absolutely forced to follow the British legal system. I don’t think that would

have happened if they could have found a way around it. It wouldn’t have happened. They didn’t
want to give up anything. Absolutely, we were forced. And then they jiggled it. ... And the bottom
line is that the land was given in grant [in the Illawarra] not once, but twice. And in both cases the
grant was not honoured in any shape or form ... the land was resumed by the Crown. The NTA
clearly states that you can launch a native title claim over Crown land.

Q

To further clarify the point, was everything we discussed before - kinship, traditional

knowledge et cetera - a major issue, was it ever relevant to pursue the claim?
A

No. The only thing was that we had to prove continuous links, and in order to do

that, you had to have genealogies. ... They wanted western style genealogies, not blackfella
genealogies, which brings in all the classificatory kinship stuff. It did refer to the kinship
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system which marks the continuity of connection with the land but it rejected the Aboriginal
kinship system in favour of the western kinship system.

Q

How did the need to define boundaries in native title conflict with the traditional

knowledge of boundaries and overlapping areas?
A

Yes, that’s interesting ... the imposition of the colonial idea of statehood and so on,

where you have a straight line that marks territories, that’s one of the most difficult for most
people to get over, particularly where it’s borderline, because you have native title groups
whose traditional land overlap ... those artificial borders. ... It can become problematic,
particularly in the border claims. In terms of the Wadi Wadi claim, it didn’t traverse State
borders but it did traverse council areas. ... It covered ... five separate council areas ... going
from north to south Sutherland Shire, Wollongong City Council, Shellarbour City Council, Kiama
City Council and Shoalhaven City Council. ... Those problems emerged too, where the boundaries
between council areas are different from the boundaries between tribal areas. ... The conflicts that
arose because of that had to do with negotiating agreements for the same sort of thing ... for
example a fire trail corridor ... within the claim area but within different councils, so you have
different negotiations. ... The negotiation process ... becomes very complicated and complex
because the more government ... areas involved, the bigger the consultative groups. ... There’s
also the problems with Federal laws overlapping with State laws, overlapping with local
government laws ... there’s lots of overlaps ... the negotiation process is very much complicated
by artificial boundaries. ... There’s very few native title areas that do not traverse ... artificial
borders. ... The southernmost boundary of the Wadi Wadi native title claim area overlapped
with the northernmost boundary of the Jerrinjah claim. That overlapping area constitutes a
very significant amount of territory. ... That was the other thing you had to negotiate. This is
traditional area where you don’t have a clear line but you just have an overlap, an area that
could be called a convergence. We had to consult and negotiate with the adjoining native title
claim group. We did so. ... We actually reached directly between us an agreement on what should
and should not happen of that convergence area. ...

Q

Can you please comment on the outcomes of the native title process? What does it mean

for the community?
A

The outcomes have been varied. ... There have been other ways Indigenous people have

acquired lands ... like with the Land Councils taking control of Reserve land. ... The outcomes
have been varied, mainly unsuccessful. Mainly after a lengthy, exhausting, convoluted process it
might still get knocked out ... There might have been eight or nine successful native title claims in
Australia, and even then they might not be as successful as they might have been. ... The despair,
the disadvantages, the loss of identity in today’s Indigenous communities can be directly
linked to the loss of land and ... everything that has been done over, say, the last forty years ...
since the referendum ... to address Aboriginal disadvantage ... has failed to recognise that
singular point that the loss of land is the cause of our disadvantage. ... That dispossession has
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resulted in non-Aboriginal people inheriting our wealth ... our real estate ... I put it in terms
of real estate because whitefellas don’t understand Indigenous sovereignty rights to land but
they understand real estate. Everything that has been done to redress Indigenous disadvantage
has always failed. ... I think ... 220 years that whitefellas have tried to fix us up, and they
haven’t fixed us up yet. It’s time to let us fix us up. And the only way we can do that is if we
have the right to our wealth, that is to our real estate, our land, the natural right to inherit
our own land. If we have our own land we have a power base ... and when we are empowered
we would be more able to address our own disadvantage. But because we are dispossessed,
we are disempowered.

Other less formal interviews have confirmed the information collected and presented here. For
example, one interviewee referred to having many mothers (according to the classificatory
kinship system discussed in the previous chapter). 8 It is not the purpose of the present research
to offer any cultural analysis of the very rich information contained in the interviews, but only
to show the relevance of culture for native title in a very specific case study. Moreover, the
research attempts to show the broader meaning of ‘traditional laws and customs’ in a
comparative sense, with direct examples, and to highlight the theoretical shortcomings of the
current native title discourse.

The Illawarra, however, is also home to one of the few Aboriginal Tent Embassies in Australia,
thus presenting a very unique outlook on ‘traditional interests in land’ articulated in a language
not necessarily framed within the parameters of native title law.

II. THE SANDON POINT ABORIGINAL TENT EMBASSY 9
In 1998 a Thirroul man became aware of a human skull bone being exposed on the sand dunes
of McCauleys Beach, between Bulli and Thirroul, in the place known as Sandon Point. Skeletal
remains had been uncovered previously in the area, dating back to the 1800’s.10 The report of
the discovery was given to Dr Richard Fullagar, a local archaeologist and human remains
specialist, who verified the find and immediately notified the Illawarra Local Aboriginal Land
Council, the National Parks and Wildlife Service and the police. A temporary wall was built
around the grave site in order to protect it from the sea while the Aboriginal community decided
what should be done. It was agreed that Richard Fullagar and Denise Donlan would excavate

8

Interview with Interviewee No 7 (Wollongong, 4 February 2010).

9

The information presented here is taken from Alessandro Pelizzon, Karen Gough and Barbara
Nicholson, The Sandon Point Project (University of Wollongong, 2010). A much more detailed book is
about to be published by Karen Gough.
10

Organ, above n 1.
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the overlying midden and recover the burial remains. The investigation discovered the skeleton
was completely intact and in situ.

The unusual positioning of the body and the grave goods found with him indicated it had been a
ceremonial burial of a very important person, buried in an area of great traditional significance
sometime between 800 and 6,000 years ago. Six weeks later, it was ascertained by the Illawarra
Local Aboriginal Land Council that the skull belonged to an ancient Aboriginal clever man, or
Kuradji. Kuradji, or Bugheen, or clever men, are individuals of special spiritual status and
traditionally gifted with spiritual power and authority, marking the area as of high cultural
significance. A few months after the initial discovery, in July 1998, the remains were finally
reburied.

After the 1998 find, the Illawarra Local Aboriginal Land Council and its chairman Roy Dootch
Kennedy decided to investigate the matter further. However, the area had also been selected for
development. The developer company Stockland was due to begin the development of what was
designed to become a large medium density residential area, allowing for an enormous increase
in population with the potential for tremendous cultural and environmental impact. On the 17th
of December 2000, the day before Wollongong City Council was due to make a decision on the
Development Approval for the area, a Sacred Fire was carried to McCauleys Beach from the
Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra through Victoria Park, Cockatoo Island and finally via
Wombarra to Sandon Point. The Sacred Fire embodied the first symbol of cultural resistance.
The Aboriginal flag was raised to alert the Council, the local community and the developers that
Sandon Point is a culturally significant area for Aboriginal people.

The Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy established itself near the mouth of Tramway Creek
on Boxing Day 2000. In February 2001 Yuin Elder Uncle Guboo Ted Thomas led a re-naming
ceremony for the Sandon Point area to give it the Aboriginal name Kuradji. As well, following a
unanimous decision of the membership of the Illawarra Local Aboriginal Land Council, the
whole area was declared State Significant for Aboriginal Culture and Heritage. Shortly after, the
local community decided to support the establishment of the Tent Embassy and a picket line
was formed to blockade the development. The picket caravan served as an important meeting
place for the community, where campaign strategy was discussed, information circulated and
the developer’s movements on site closely monitored.

Early in 2002 the developing company Stockland fenced off a large area and were set to begin
work on the southern side of Tramway Creek. The community formed a human wall to prevent
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Stockland entering the site with heavy machinery. The Tactical Response Police were sent in to
remove the protesters and many people were arrested. Meanwhile in Sydney, Dootch Kennedy
obtained a temporary injunction to stop the development from the NSW Land and Environment
Court. Under the court order Stockland was forced to remove all their machinery from the site.

A few months later the court upheld the development approval, with some conditions.
Stockland’s bulldozers began work by desecrating the ancient tool making site that had been
identified by local elder Reuben Brown and which was rich with Aboriginal artefacts and stone
tools. A long series of court actions then began and have continued up to now. Many cases were
fought by Uncle Allan Carriage of the Wadi Wadi Coomaditchie Aboriginal Corporation and
others by Dootch Kennedy on behalf of the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Concerns
regarding Aboriginal heritage have been addressed in the NSW Land and Environment Court,
but the traditional belief system and cultural complex has not been acknowledged, preferring the
perspectives of European experts to the oral history of Aboriginal claimants themselves. In the
past decade Sandon Point has generated a great deal of debate in relation to the protection of
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage and the legitimate rights of the Aboriginal community to be
consulted about the impacts of developments on sensitive cultural places.

Aboriginal sites at Sandon Point have been recorded to include midden grounds, tool production
sites, occupation sites (part of the mobile and seasonally migratory lifestyle of Aboriginal
groups), a meeting place, burial sites and sacred initiation sites. A number of Aboriginal
Heritage and archaeological studies of Sandon Point were produced between 2001 and 2007,
often prepared by consultants who were directly employed by the developers in order to meet
statutory requirements for the Environmental Assessment of their project. A more independent
study for the Sandon Point Commission of Inquiry recommended in 2003 that development of
the scale proposed by Stockland was unsuitable for the site, and that much of the area needed to
be protected for its outstanding Aboriginal cultural heritage and environmental values.

Information regarding the Sandon Point Aboriginal tent Embassy come primarily form the
person who has been most involved with the site since its origin. Most of the answers were
rather extensive and I have tried to preserve them in their entirety.11
Q

Can you tell me to which cultural group you belong?

A

I belong to the South-East coast of New South Wales. Growing up I only ever knew

it as one group, because I had family between Sydney and Melbourne. ... In the years when I

11

Interview with Interviewee No 4 (Wollongong, 9 November 2007); Interview with Interviewee No 4
(Wollongong, 16 January 2008).
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grew up the welfare board was still established in this country, and there were certain limitations
that our parents had that we were not aware of until we became adults. So, we can understand as
adults why a lot of cultural information was not passed on to us as children. I was born in Sydney
and at a very early age ... I would have been at least five, mum moved down south ... to
Wollongong ... to a suburb know as Port Kembla ... we lived in several places before we settled at
the Aboriginal settlement in Kemblawarra, known as Coomaditchie. There were only six families,
or six houses there, but there were some shacks in the back where the elderly people still lived in.
We grew up in that environment for the next six to seven years in the Aboriginal settlement which
was controlled by the Welfare Board but it didn’t have an administrator that lived on site as other
Aboriginal settlements did ... we were restricted to the rules of the Welfare Board, which meant
that we were required to attend school, we were required to maintain a healthy environment in
which we lived in, and that would be what the parent’s responsibilities were. ... There were things
that were happening in our early part of life at ... Coomaditchie where my mum and my stepdad
were involved in an advancement league group ... they were trying to get better conditions for
Indigenous people ... We still travelled the length of the coast from Sydney to the border ... to
visit family. And it was during those times when we travelled the coast linking up with family
that we learned about each of those areas which we visited. ... We got a fairly good
understanding of the coast because we travelled all of our lives just because of families there.
When we got older and we started hearing names which were assigned to specific ...
designated areas, like to the far south coast ... the Kurnai people ... in Bega you would hear of the
Yuin people ... then you would start hearing of ... Wandi Wandi, Wadi Wadi ... all of a sudden
these names were being brought out. But that started not long after the Welfare Board in
1968. ... I regard the country I lived on as part of the Yuin nation, mainly because I’m a YuinManera boy. Manera is my main group from the snowy mountains. Even though I was born in
Sydney, people would identify me as a Manera. But before the white man came to this country the
Manera got heavily involved with the Yuin people. They married up into that tribe. But there’s all
different ... members of my family from distant cousins wouldn’t agree with the name YuinManera, they would rather use [another name], or some would mostly identify themselves as
Woobanja, mainly because they spent most of their childhood within the boundaries of that
country. ... When we look at the movement of our people and the amount of families that exist
between those two boundaries, from the north to the south, they’re still related, they’re all
family. At one point it shows the web where it all connects. We call it the golden thread. ... We
know ... four levels up from me ... my great-grandparents ... and then we start filtering from there,
all these other families coming out of this one family. ... They all had brothers and sisters ... and
they started to marry into other families ... which connected them all over country, from north to
south, to west. ... Our family is dispersed all across the country, and so we cross many tribal
boundaries, not just one. ... Native title is a bit of a joke because it doesn’t encompass that
very fact, that fact alone is something they need to factor in. ... You have families here like
Stuarts, Browns, Walkers, Longbottoms, Sims, Carpenters ... and the list goes on ... but at some
point they connect ... they connect many clans, many tribal groups and much larger areas of
country and then becomes virtually impossible to identify a traditional boundary for one
specific family when the family has so many connections throughout country ... and the
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language group within it ... so straight away I have four tribal groups I come from, just looking at
my nan and grandfather from both side of my family. ...[the list of family ancestry shared during
the interview is much more detailed, it precisely identifies the groups of origin for all ancestors for
four generations] but I understand that on the old maps Yuin-Koori represent the Yuin nation,
and the Yuin nation goes all the way from the Hawkesbury river north of Sydney all the way
to Adelaide ... so we have three States here ... they are white men boundaries, but they are
not our traditional boundaries, because there is a sister tribe relationships between groups.
Kamilaroi and Wiradjuri have a sister tribe relationship too, or brother-sister tribe relationship.
And that is throughout country, throughout all of Australia. ... That web is throughout country, all
the way across ... it is a reality and something that black people ... it’s not so hard for me to
fathom ... but then I have to draw maps on boards in order to get the uneducated, most of
the non-Aborigine people, to understand how the system works. ... This is why these laws
haven’t really taken it into account ... and it does make it difficult for us to identify
traditional areas when there’s been such a melting pot among the families. ... My area I most
associate with, that I had the strongest affiliation with, is between Sydney and Eden. I have a
lot of family on Country ... from my mother side .. and I know a lot of stories that connect me
to that Country ... it’s virtually impossible for me to leave the circle of that Country ... and go an
live [somewhere else], I would become homesick, because my affiliation, my strength is this
Country here. It’s because of my knowledge of this Country, the stories I was told as a child
from my grandparents on my mother side ... it’s also my association with family growing
up. ... We have stories about ... the mountains. We were told stories of the mountains since we
were very young. We were told stories about certain rocks, that those rocks represent
something. ... Certain camps, which were ancient camps. ... We know areas along the coast
when certain fish would come to those areas ... You could tell even by the ripples on the waves
what type of fish was coming up along the coast. ... They are the sort of things we were conscious
of growing up ... We don’t lose that, if that’s your nature ... and when I say “that’s my
nature” I’m talking about the natural environment out there, because that’s my nature. The
ocean, the bush ... People don’t look at it in the context, they look at it as my personality. But
I say “yes, that’s my personality” but understand that my nature also is that natural
environment right beside you. ... When I’m in the bush and I say to people “this is my nature”
they understand exactly what I’m saying, because they’re in that environment with me and they
see how I relate to it. When I’m on Country I walk slow, I want to see everything that surrounds
me. the colours of the flowers, the wind in tress, the smell of the plants, the sound of the water
running, just a goanna I can spot from a hundred yards off, observing his movements while he’s
observing mine ... Indigenous people who are connected to Country, we look at all of that because
they’re the spirits of our people, the very trees, the very rocks, the mountains that we walk on,
we’re walking on our spirits. ... I choose to live this way, rather than being forced to. I can, if I
wish, have a motor car. I can have a house with all the electricity and all the luxury ... but I don’t
see for me as an Aborigine ... those lessons as a child armed me as an adult to look at it from a
different perspective. That’s my nature. Native title, land rights, their laws conflict with our
laws. We must find a way around that, somehow make it more just for us. For us being the
original people of the land, we have so much understanding of the land, we really need to be
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involved with the development of this land because we can see the harm that is done to this
land.

Q

Can you comment on the importance on the oral tradition of transmitting knowledge?

A

It’s hard in the modern world ... I think it’s a family thing. We are trying so hard to

revive culture. ... During the 1980’s through to the mid-1990’s we [had a] mandate ... to take
Aboriginal kids out of the education system and be taken into Country ... to see various Aboriginal
people ... in different career paths as role models ... Successive governments ... basically put an
end to that process which we had seen as very effective. ... I always knew I was a Koori ... there is
no disputing how I was shaped when I was young because ... we grew up in a very healthy
environment ... In high school I was taunted and teased just because I was an Aborigine ... which
made it difficult to get an education ... nonetheless I got my school certificate. I think my children
seeing me, that inspired them. ... Understand that ... the Dreaming is ever-changing, it’s vibrant.
Dreaming means that it doesn’t change, that it’s stagnant. There’s a story from the Dreamtime ...
when the white came here he brought these horses, and there was this dance all across
country known as the Yaramangarri and what it means in our language is “giddyap
horses” ... observing the white men breaking those horses ... the Aborigines invented this dance.
And this dance was then transferred through socialising with other groups all the way to Cape
York, and yet that dance originated here in Sydney. ... That was a Dreamtime story from only two
hundred years ago. We are a changing culture, a living culture, we don’t just stay stagnant
there in the Dreamtime as the white man sees the Dreamtime. ... And that story was passed
on orally over the years. ... Those paintings on those caves, they’re like hieroglyphics. You
need to be an Indigenous person to understand what they mean. They’re not just pretty
pictures on a wall. They are stories about Country and when you see a hand stencil, it’s a
signature of Country. ... All of this engraving sites are actually not done on a blank piece of paper,
they’re actually done on a very spiritual bit of ground, because the rocks are very much alive... I’ll
tell you a story about the Yuin nation ... on Mumbulla mountain ... on top of Mumbulla mountain
it’s men’s initiation ground. The boys go up there and come back as men ... they’re told the law of
Country on the mountain, then they cleanse off all the bad spirits ... and they come back with a
new spirit. There’s these rocks there that have energy. They tried to put a communication tower up
there ... when they put this tower up with those dishes that send their waves, you know, they
wouldn’t transmit ... the engineers discovered that there was energy in the rock ... so they exploded
the rock, which was a sacred site. When they exploded the rock, the transmissions worked. They
had to kill the energy in the rock to get their energy in the tower. That’s how they desecrate our
Country. ... At Bondi they put a golf course over a Dreaming trail, on a songline. That
prevented our people from going there and having ceremonies. ... You’ll find that where they
put their icons ... they’re put on top of existing spiritual places, preventing us from performing our
ceremonies, regressing culture because we can no longer use that area. ... [Under section 14 of the
Act that established the National Parks and Wildlife Service] they send out their anthropologists
and archeologists to identify important areas; they engage traditional Aboriginal people,
Lawmen, to tell them where these special areas are ... and then they hope that they can protect
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those areas, and then the white man goes in and destroys them. We’re given custodianship of
special places, I have been, and the white man destroyed them, and I failed to protect them
as a custodian because I couldn’t stop the mining companies from drilling under the caves
and as a result the caves collapsed ... and no one wants to take responsibility for desecrating
a sacred Aboriginal area.

Q

Can you comment on the relevance of family relations in regard to the issue of oral

transmission of knowledge?
A

A lot of it you don’t really know you’re learning, it’s just conversation you hear

when you move around from home to home ... or when you’re sitting around a campfire. It
depends on where you are at the time if certain knowledge is expressed. Previously under the
old law that knowledge would have been expressed around time of ceremony and ceremony
would have occurred nightly, when hunters had come in ... and talked a little bit about things that
had occurred during the day and then relating that to stories of the old, and then giving the young
people some understanding of life in general. In our case, because we never lived in that
environment, it’s when we travelled to visit family ... sometime old people were talking about
their past, the stories they had been told, and you can’t help but picking up those stories. ...
I’m fortunate that my grandparents on my mother side had many stories about Country, from
Sydney down to Melbourne. If we were ever in a vehicle with them ... when we came up to some
locations along the highway or in the townships that we visited, they would ... tell you some of the
stories that relate to that neighbourhood. ... You just pick up on those stories. ... Things that
occurred to me when we were young, we took them for granted ... we didn’t realise that they
were by means of the law. ... The travelling from camp to camp was seasonal ... if we were going
in summer, we knew we would be picking ... and diving to supplement our diet or the product ...
would be sold ... That’s knowledge we grew up with ... this part of the year we had to be at a
particular spot. ... As I got older ... [I set out on a] journey ... along the coast and started talking to
my elders in depth about what was important to our people. Through that journey several of the
elders ... my eyes were truly open to who we truly are and ... our Country. ... One old man in
Moree in particular, I remember walking there with my uncle to meet him, my uncle then
introduced me to him ... and he said “I know you, you’re one of those Cruse boys” and I said “No,
Uncle, you don’t know me”, because I had never seen him in my life, but he said “I know you,
you’re either Noleen or Linda’s son” and that really froze me. When you look at Aboriginal
families along the coast there are certain characteristics that separate from other families. ...
There seems to be a certain trait or facial feature that you can pick up on. ... He obviously
picked up on me ... I was taken aback from that, this old man knowing who I was when I had
never met him. ... When I go west ... they can see that trait on my father side. Here on the coast
they see my mother’s side, and I have cousins that look like me, but also inland. I think that’s
common around the globe, we seem to be more tuned into it because it’s a way of
understanding kin, and family and identifying who’s relation and who’s not relation. ...
That’s another common thing about Aboriginal people; wherever they go they say “How are you
going, what’s your name, who’s your mob, where do you come from?” ... It’s something that we
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all possess, this need to know people, to know who their mob is, where they come from, then to
see if we have something in common in the conversation that maintains that conversation, and
that’s how friendships are formed. But if I go back to knowledge ... the old people are very
particular about who they give information to, because a lot of our knowledge has been
exploited ... If an elder says to me “I now give you custodianship of something” ... generally
you keep that information quiet, you don’t say anything until [a particular place] is
threatened. ... For example, I know where to take didjeridoos ... there are only certain people that I
would take with me ... but my brother, and that is my own brother, he would exploit it. I took him
with me on a couple of occasions, but he has gone on his own, on my Country - because he’s only
my half brother, so to be there he needs to be with me or he needs my permission to go there and
cut, but on two occasions he went there without me and on the second occasion I wouldn’t talk to
him for over a month, and he called mum, our mum, asking why I wouldn’t talk to him and she
said “You’ve done him wrong, you didn’t ask for his permission, you went onto his Country when
you were told to wait.” ... You know within your family who you can trust and who you can’t
trust with information ... who should know and who shouldn’t know. ... The elders can see in
you, that young boy or that young girl, they watch you growing up and they can see your
nature developing and they know if they can trust you or if they can’t trust you.

Q

Can you explain what traditional territorial boundaries mean?

A

That’s a lot of what gets confused today. When we were children we didn’t even

know what tribe we were from and it was not until we got older and ... for white man’s law ...
we had to identify who we were, we were put into categories and boxes. ... the elderly people
were barred from speaking language and passing on their language to the young people. ... They
would slip and say a word and we would be curious to what that meant ... Most Aboriginal people
today certain words but they can’t speak the full language, them older people could. ... I did sit in a
room at Wallaga lake ... with three Uncles, Uncle Guboo, that is Uncle Ted Thomas, Uncle Mervin
and Uncle Alec and them three men were speaking Yuin language and I never heard our language
spoken ... and I was completely mesmerised to hear a full conversation in our language, because I
was told very young that our language no longer existed and here I am in my late twenties
listening to the language ... In general traditional boundaries are by rivers and mountains.
That’s generally what signify traditional boundaries along the coast. What you have here is
that there are stories that signify the boundaries too. One of the greatest stories is the story of
Bundoola. Bundoola was the king of thirteen tribes and those thirteen tribes make up one nation.
When we look at the thirteen tribes of Bundoola, we are looking at his thirteen wives. He had
twelve wives, then he took a thirteenth wife ... against the wishes of the group and as a result he
was killed. ... These thirteen women became the thirteen tribes of the Yuin nation and that signify
boundaries from ... Victoria all the way to the Hawkesbury river to the north. It takes in Eora, it
takes in Tharawal, it takes in Dhurga, Dhua ... all these groups from the north to the south. Then
you have another story ... which is one of the reasons why I dispute boundaries as they are
put on maps from the white people. The story talks of Tungku, who is the man and of Ngari,
who is the woman. Tungku and Ngari were sent to this planet on a star, which I signify as a
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meteor which brought life to this planet and Tungku’s role was to name all the animals. Ngari’s
role was to name all the plants. But when they landed this was barren lands and a lot of the
animals were asleep, so Tungku had to awaken the animals and in that each animal had a specific
trait about them, something about their personality is how he named them. ... So the kangaroo ...
started hopping and making that noise ... so he called the kangaroo Bundarra after the sound the he
was making. ... He started naming all the animals. Now his wife ... because the land was too
barren, she couldn’t name the plants yet, not enough water ... She was ... expecting a child. So
Tungku now has to go hunting for bigger game, more food for the family because his wife is
expecting a child. So he goes hunting with ... spear that he had made. It took him a long time to
make this spear. But he didn’t know much about hunting because he had never hunted before and
rather than hunting downwind of the animal he was hunting upwind and every time he got close to
the kangaroo, the kangaroo would smell him and hop off. For the all day, now, every time he got
close to the bundarra, the bundarra would hop off, so Tungku is getting very angry. So he grabbed
his spear and he threw it at the sky, because he thought that Mirrial, God was tormenting him.
When he threw his spear at the sky, Mirrial grabbed the spear and turned it into a boomerang. Next
thing the boomerang came down from the sky and landed at Tungku’s feet. And Tungku looked at
the boomerang, and because he was looking for his spear, when he saw the boomerang he grabbed
it and threw it back at Mirrial into the sky. ... Mirrial then, by one motion, removed Tungku from
the earth and placed him in the moon. ... Ngarri ... was looking everywhere, as it was starting to
get evening. ... So she went up Gulaga, she couldn’t see him anywhere, but then she saw the moon
rising and the moon, in the sickle of the moon, she could see Tungku’s face and she started to cry,
and the tears started to flow very heavy from the side of her face, down the side of the mountain
and making creeks and lagoons, and finally making the ocean. So all the water comes from the
tears of Ngari. But with all the water, the plants started to grow, and that’s when the birds came out
from where they were living in the rocks and the caves, and came into the trees to live. ... She was
so sad that she tore out her heart and she left her heart on the mountain like a beacon to Tungku for
him to come, and that is is home, where she left her heart. But over the years her heart grew up and
then fell down, it grew up and then fell down, and today what the heart is know as is the Waratah.
And that is where the Waratah comes from, it’s the heart of Ngari. Now, the moral to this story, the
discipline in this story is that you don’t hunt upwind ... you don’t get angry, or frustrated ... when
God was giving the boomerang, God was giving Tungku another hunting weapon so that he could
hunt down the kangaroo, but Tungku in his anger he threw it back into the sky. Now the Waratah
also grows only in one area of all of Australia, and that’s into the Sydney-Wollongong basin.
It only grows here. ... This is the area. So how can this not be Yuin country when the heart of
our people grows here? And that is the Yuin story of creation, so it’s what connects tribes.
The thirteen tribes of Bundoola can be named ... and that sets the boundaries for the thirteen
tribes, but then we look at the Waratah as the centre of where we come from. ... Stories
connect you to Country, they always will. ... The Waratah is a Yuin story. Now, [colonial
maps] they’re trying to cut Yuin down the Shoalhaven river. Now how can they cut it when it
grows on the other side of the Shoalhaven river and it’s the heart of our nation. When the
white man came, there were less people on Country and people of one tribe have been elevated as
the main group on Country and they ignored their association with other tribes. They elevated
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them and made them more important than all other groups. ... It’s generally the rivers that would
separate groups. And mountains, certain mountains belonged to a certain group, ceremonies
could be performed there only by a certain group, but there has always been a sharing of
Country and a sharing of sites. ... But when you look at the family structure it’s even more
amazing ... you find this incredible web interwoven throughout Country. ... Our boundaries
are quite extensive, they’re very big. When you look at the coastal people, they’re related all up
and down the coast. The same happens to the river people, they’re related all up and down the
rivers. ... Even though they have many groups ... they’re all related. ... And that’s why I have
been able to retain all that in my head, we didn’t need to write it down in a book. ...
Songlines should be retained within the group and within the families and it should be
shared with the families ... you can’t tell too much or they’re going to write books about them.
But what they do, they connect this web and show that we’re connected throughout Country.
I’m not talking about my Country only, I’m talking about our association with neighbouring
tribes and of neighbouring tribes with their neighbouring tribes. And the trading network
that is part of that connects the continent throughout Australia ... Colours are important.
Red, yellow, black. These colours are important, because if I have another colour as another
group it means that I can go there and learn language. ... Yuin-Koori, Yuin nation and
Kuring-gai nation, brother-sister nations combined. Any people from my group, Yuin-Koori
can go to Arrente people in the centre of Australia because we share the same colour, the
same language, the same totems and so if certain stuff is not taught on Country here, they
can go there and learn it there. ... That connects you to all your songlines, because in certain
areas of Australia ceremonies are still strong and knowledge is still strong. They might be
lost on our Country, but boys from here have gone to Arrente and come back.

Q

Can you please comment, after everything we’ve discussed, on the local native title

claim.
A

The problem with native title is that is causing division among families. Because

their structure is nowhere near our structure. That’s the reason for which we have been
unsuccessful. They are asking us to be a category of our own and then no one of us can truly
draw boundaries when so much of our land is shared. A lot of ceremonial areas are shared, a
lot of campsites are shared, and even the food resources are shared. ... I think they should
have asked more information. When you have one person going in and representing our
interests, it doesn’t really cover all our interests. ... One problem I’ve found with native title
is that it can be exclusive, rather than inclusive. ... You have three traditional groups in this
area and you truly put the microscope on them you find that they are all related and they
don’t need to be three traditional groups. They should only be one traditional group. And
then you find that in each traditional group they only have a certain number of members rather
than encompassing all the families who qualify to be traditional on Country. I think that’s the main
reason why I never got fully involved ... to the extent of registering our entire family, because I
don’t want to get caught up in a situation that I feel can get exclusive. ... Investigate all the
families that are from Country. It is a hard process to get them all to sign on but it gives the
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claim more credibility, because there’s elder people among those who also have a story to tell.
And it’s those stories that ... associate us with Country. And the more stories they can hear of
that nature, the less they can contradict our claim to Country. I think that the NTA was written
from a western view rather than an Indigenous view, because I gave you a picture earlier of
how our families extend out ... we’re all related and interwoven and we need to involve all
this other people and families that have this different knowledge base. When you combine that
knowledge that gives you a better picture of our movement across Country, our association with
Country, what stories are still retained. Because some of us have stories about some areas, other
might have stories about other areas, and it would be good to have all those stories, as many as we
still have, and what an amazing picture we would draw. ... I can see the reality of that would be ...
our Dreaming. Which is not the past. It’s the present and the future. ... I think that’s one of the
reasons why native title hasn’t been really successful with many claims, not just with our claim,
because it leads to dispute, and to believe that certain people are above others, when they are not,
because they are equal. ... Resources is another thing that restricts how much information we can
collect and put together ... but we know ... that we are from Country and that certain places on
Country are very special.

III. CONSIDERATIONS
As mentioned before, it is not the purpose of this research to attempt, and even less to offer, a
cultural analysis of the rich information contained in the reported interviews. Nor was it
necessary to collect a great number of interviews in order to generate quantitative data to
support the qualitative analysis. The purpose of the present study has been to uncover local
narratives, which are able to clarify and contextualise the methodological critique of native title
advanced so far.

One thing emerges very clearly from all the interviews. All participants spoke extensively of
present and existing normative system without ever needing to use the word law. The wealth of
cultural practices cannot be distinguished from law, nor is it necessary to distinguish legal
elements from non-legal elements within the normative parameters considered until now. The
interviews suggest an existing cohesive structure composed of a multiplicity of separate
elements that nonetheless coexist in an inseparable continuum. All cultural elements suggested
in the interview have the same legal relevance in determining traditional interests in land. It is
certainly impossible, for example, to think of discussing traditional interests in land without
discussing kinship relationship within the binding context of the Dreaming stories that
inextricably connect kinship, identity and land. This indivisibility was very clear in all the
answers given during the course of the interviews.
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One thing that is very evident in the interviews is that traditional culture in the Illawarra is far
from being dead or even meaningfully diminished. When looking at ‘traditional interests in
land’ through the lens of native title, it is apparent that the ‘traditional laws and customs’ in
which these interests are framed are very present today. The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) process
and procedure, however, is not favourable to their recognition, indeed not even to their
identification, as the Illawarra case study reveals. Moreover, the documentary history presented
in Chapter Ten does not present a clear and precise picture of the reality of traditional culture in
the area, even though the interviews clearly suggest an absolute richness and wealth of
traditional knowledge. Furthermore, such documentary history goes against traditional interests
in land in presenting an incomplete and often imprecise picture of the present reality.
Documents are often articulated within the mystique of the ‘dying race’ in its aspect of the
‘dead’ or ‘watered down’ culture, in complete contrast to what the interviews reveal.
Consequently, kinship relationships and oral knowledge are measured against documents and
naming protocols imposed by European settlement, with the result that oral testimony not
consistent with such documents is now heavily questioned. Nonetheless, the consistency of the
oral testimonies presented here suggests that it is the documents and the methodology employed
to compile them that should be questioned.

The interviews presented in section I show that the legal paradigms adopted to articulate and
advance a native title claim in the Illawarra are those of the common law. The laws and customs
used for the arguments are not the traditional ones but rather the ones in which the entire native
title claiming procedure is constructed. The Interviewees were aware of this, as expressly stated
in the interviews.

Firstly, practical difficulties of access to justice occur. The need for a lawyer, the need for
genealogical consultancy, the time and effort required to pursue the court action are just some of
the examples of the demands imposed on claimants. Not only, then, do claimants have the onus
to prove their traditional title to the land their ancestors have inhabited and whose stories they
are intimately aware of, but they also have the burden of bearing the costs and the weight of the
practical requirements necessary to advance the claim. The funds institutionally allocated to
support the process have clearly been insufficient in the Illawarra case.

Consequently, political pressures, such as the change brought about by the change in legislation
with the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), dominate the claim. Indigenous claimants are
already in a difficult position, financially and culturally, because of the impact of two hundred
years of colonial policies. They have been given a short time to articulate their ‘traditional
interests in land’ in a legal framework radically different from that in which those traditional
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interests have always been framed. They are required to articulate their interests in land,
sometimes for the first time, in a way that is alien to their traditional normative structure.
Moreover, they are also burdened with rapid legislative changes that increase the pressure and
diminish their window of opportunity to launch a successful claim. In these circumstances it is
understandable that priority is given to legal considerations that are of the common law, rather
than focussing on traditional laws and customs.

The reconstruction and articulation of common law legal requirements is much more urgent
than the clarification of the traditional protocols framing Indigenous interests in land. This does
not mean that those normative protocols are secondary, nor that they are non-existent, but only
that claimants are forced to consider them as secondary due to the combined pressure of limited
time and practical concerns, including very onerous financial demands.

The Illawarra case, as reconstructed in light of the interviews, shows that Indigenous people
have to face a triple burden. Firstly, they are tasked with the onerous practical requirements of
launching and pursuing a native title claim while starting from a strongly disadvantaged
position and with insufficient support. Secondly, they are charged with the complete onus of
clarifying the traditional laws and customs in which interests in land are articulated to a
common law audience that hasn’t established any theoretical instrument to facilitate the
comparative analysis. Moreover, they are required to advance such a reconstruction while
tasked, at the same time, with a number of difficult legal requirements at common law. Thirdly,
and finally, they have the burden of justifying these traditional laws and customs by disputing
them against documentary evidence collected by non-Indigenous researchers during the entire
colonial period often without the appropriate epistemological ability to collect and present such
data.

It follows that the structure of native title, far from being an opening to legal pluralism, is,
rather, an onerous legal imposition. Native title offers only a superficial reference - not much
more than a verbal commitment almost - to the recognition (or even to the correct
understanding) of traditional laws and customs.

The explanation of the kinship system by the Interviewees in section I was intuitive and
immediate. Although the initial articulation of relationship was framed within a European
description, the interviews reveal an understanding of kinship that very quickly diverges from
the European construct. The same is also true for the family reconstruction offered by the
Interviews in section II. This point then leads to numerous suggestions contained within the
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interviews that kinship relations might affiliate primarily with distinct and different Countries.
Direct genetic connections do not appear to be the only mode of identification of an individual
with a group.

As a result, the picture implicit in the entire native title construct as it results from both judicial
sources and from the Native Title Act 1993 does not appear capable of understanding the
underlying reality. The idea of isolated groups determined by immediate genetic contiguity and
marked by well defined and exclusive boundaries is at odds with the general analysis presented
in Part C and confirmed by the interviews reported here. The current native title discourse is
therefore ill construed, both theoretically and procedurally, to ‘recognise’ the Indigenous
interests in land that it purports to recognise.

So called tribal boundaries do not exist without the kinship network which gives them meaning.
Moreover, they cannot be understood, or even known, without the epistemological structure of
stories within which they are embedded. Nor can they assume meaning outside of the strongly
interconnected worldview that has its centre in the concept of the Dreaming. Furthermore, the
entire system of kinship relations is based on shared areas, the access to which is regulated
through the kinship system itself. The exclusivity of title required by the native title discourse is
thus antithetic to the very structure that it aims to ‘recognise’.

Knowledge connected to specific territories is encapsulated in stories that are selectively shared
by some individuals with others. The interviews have shown multiple examples of such stories.
Interviewees have repeated on multiple occasions that there exist a lot of stories that connect
them to Country. More importantly, those stories are not kept as abstract collected knowledge
accessible by everyone, but as collective knowledge parts of which are entrusted to certain
individuals only. The relevance of oral knowledge, and, connected to this, of the protocols that
ensure the appropriate transmission of such knowledge, is thus paramount. When during the
first interview the interviewees state that ‘together [they] could produce’ the totality of
knowledge to prove their connection to Country, they are indeed remarking on the collective
nature of relevant knowledge discussed here. Furthermore, knowledge, as remarked by various
interviewees, is often ‘latent’, it is assumed since an early age without the need to explicitly
reconstruct it within a verbalised explanatory framework.

Nonetheless, the Native Title Act procedure requires a tremendous effort to construct and justify
the cultural framework in which the claims are articulated, often against documentary evidence
to the contrary collected, often imprecisely, during the colonial period. It is evident that stories
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are directly relevant to determining Indigenous interests in land, thus making them legally
relevant for any native title discourse. However, these stories cannot be abstracted from the
cultural context in which they assume meaning; indeed, stories assume their meaning only
within the context of collective knowledge, selectively shared and based on a constant
negotiation process made possible by the structure of the kinship system. In the Illawarra case,
however, the Native Title Act procedure has proven highly unsuccessful in facilitating, or even
allowing, the effective presentation of this cultural context that effectively constitutes the
‘traditional laws and customs’ from which traditional interests in land originate.

That a rich and continuous cultural knowledge is very present in the Illawarra is very clear from
the wealth of information contained in the interviews presented above. Such richness, however,
is not suggested by the documentary evidence analysed before. Traditional culture in the
Illawarra is certainly neither dead nor dying. However, the myth of the ‘dying race’ and, or, of
the ‘dead culture’ is the implicit parameter within which cultural continuity is measured in
advancing a native title claim. The burden of proving cultural continuity is placed on the same
disadvantaged people whose culture has been heavily attacked by the process of colonisation,
with minimal (if any) support from the Australian legal establishment. There exists no
theoretical facilitation by the Australian legal perspective. Such a difficult burden is what lead
the interviewees to explain that the argument to claim native title had to be articulate within the
European legal framework, prioritising the European legal discourse against any consideration
framed within traditional normative protocols. Both temporal and financial pressures, plus the
entire traditional political structure are, effectively, a negative pressure from the point of view of
the possibility of the recognition of the traditional legal framework of native title in the
Illawarra. Rather than facilitating the presentation of the traditional normative framework of
local interests in land, the entire procedure in the Illawarra has led both to a procedural impasse
and to an actual moving away from the use of native title as an effective instrument to articulate
Indigenous interests in land.

The case of the Illawarra is particularly useful to highlight the intrinsic inconsistencies of native
title. Traditional culture, as revealed by the interviews, is very alive and present in the area. The
continuity of such culture is implicit in the stories shared by all interviewees. Nonetheless, such
presence and continuity is measured against a numerical majority of non-Indigenous people and
imprecise documentary evidence that perpetrates the myth of the disappearing culture (or even
entirely vanished) in urbanised areas. Cultural survival has been guaranteed by the normative
glue that is the kinship system. The burden of proof of cultural presence and continuity, in the
case of native title in Illawarra, has been placed on Indigenous people themselves and against
the anthropological and sociological suggestions of non-Indigenous experts, often without any
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negotiated process on the content of information to be used. Moreover, such proof had to be
produced within very limited and limiting timeframes, with insufficient financial support and
without theoretical and institutional structures designed to facilitate it. The entire issue of
reserved (secret/sacred) knowledge has not been taken into account in the area. Nor has been the
mechanism of cultural adaptations to European colonisation (as, for example, the transformation
of the welcome ceremony suggested in one of the interviews). Traditional interests in land in the
area have been identified by Dreaming stories, some of which shared in the course of the
interviews, by the protocols to share such stories and by the kinship structures that allow,
regulate and enforce the transmission of such information. However, practical and theoretical
difficulties have led to a suspension of the native title claim in the Illawarra considered for this
case study. Traditional interests in land, however, have not disappeared because of such
suspension. Alternative forms of articulation of traditional interests in land are very present in
the area, as shown by the existence of the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Native title in
the Illawarra, as a result of this present analysis, is not an effective instrument to identify (even
less to recognise) traditional interests in land and the traditional laws and customs from which
these interests originate. Rich interview data have revealed on multiple occasions that native
title is seen as a European construct, and not an effective way to recognise the traditional
interests in land in the area. Its demands of articulating claims within the colonial framework
prevent a complete participation of the entire community, thus creating unnecessary and
detrimental divisions. Finally, the colonial acquisition of land in the area does not appear to
have happened in accordance to the Doctrine of Discovery principles with which it is justified.
Further exploration of such legal incoherence might also be necessary.

Native title in the Illawarra does not seem to be a valid example of legal pluralism, quite the
opposite indeed. The native title discourse implicitly suggests that the land rights claims are
solved once and for all by the conclusion of a native title claim, thus preventing the theoretical
possibility of further claims. The Illawarra case, however, shows that native title is not an
effective final legal instrument, as land issues represented in native title claims are not fully
representative of traditional interests in land. It would seem more appropriate that, given the
decision to recognise native title and the normative orders in which they exist in Mabo (No 2),
the priority should be to facilitate the reconstruction of those traditional normative orders for the
benefit of the understanding of the ‘recognising’ legal system. This would involve establishing
an appropriate theoretical perspective and a culturally aware methodology, and the negotiation
of any explanatory reconstruction with Indigenous participants. At the moment, however, native
title is incapable of doing this. The wealth of traditional information that the Native Title Act
procedure seems incapable of revealing is extraordinary.

293

Heather Goodall has argued that there is a urgent need for an alternative, more theoretically
appropriate solution to the window to legal pluralism opened by Mabo (No 2).
When we consider how Aboriginal societies in the south-east survived the invasion, these social,
political and cultural meanings of land are crucial. The onslaught took a terrible toll on the lives of
countless of senior, authoritative and knowledgeable men and women who died because of
introduced disease, violence and then the illnesses arising from poverty and repression. Much
detailed specific knowledge about the Dreamings and ceremonies was lost in this way, and in some
areas this was far beyond the restorative ability of the normal processes for ensuring proper
succession to many of the lands of the south-east. Yet the Aboriginal people who survived carried
with them a cultural experience of seeing land as the central organising principle of their society.
They knew to which lands they belonged, even if they did not any longer have access to all the
details of its stories. They expected to identify themselves by and with the land, to continue to be
responsible for it, and to authorise their political standing with reference to it. the changed
circumstances of their invaded lands made much of what they wanted to do impossible: they did
not have all the ceremonial knowledge in some areas, nor the numbers they needed for some
rituals. This may not have stopped people, however, from doing what they could, or from trying to
do more. It may not have stopped them from negotiating and organising their lives and those of
their families so that land continued to be a central goal and desire.12

The survival of stories and of kinship relationships suggests a much stronger connection to land
than the above passage conveys, or that a native title case could acknowledge or, more precisely,
recognise. The support that Uncle Guboo gave to the Sandon Point Aboriginal tent Embassy, the
initiation ceremonies performed by Uncle Max Harrison in the South Coast, and the many gifts
of knowledge shared with me in the course of my interviews are proof of a cultural structure
that, albeit altered and adapted, is very much still alive today. To deny its relevance in a
potential native title case suggests that the life of this cultural structure as lived and experienced
by all participants in this research (and possibly by all Indigenous people in the area) is not
worthy of recognition as such, because it represents only a pale shadow of a culture that is, in
reality, no more. Failing to recognise all of this as a living culture suggests that that culture has
already died, a conclusion that is in direct contrast to the insight offered by Indigenous
participants in this research. I would strongly argue that such an outcome is antithetical to the
‘recognition’ suggested in Mabo (No 2). Even if it is assumed that native title in the Illawarra
has been extinguished (according to the common law and legislative rules developed by the
Australian judiciary and legislature), the idea that the entire normative network presented here is
not deserving of recognition seems nothing more than an imperialistic assumption, and a
perpetration of the conquering attitude of the past.

12 Heather Goodall, Invasion to Embassy: land in Aboriginal politics in New South Wales, 1770-1972
(Allen & Unwin, 1996), 23.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
ALTERNATIVES

I think we do not need to look at any more alter-natives. We should stop to try and ‘alter’ the
‘natives’. Instead, we should return to the natives. 1

Ramsay Taum’s provocative suggestion reveals the need for a different perspective in
addressing Indigenous issues in a post-colonial world. The points raised by the analysis of
native title presented in this thesis lead to an agreement with Taum’s suggestion. The aim of this
thesis is not that of providing complete answers to these problems, only to suggest different
avenues for exploration. Such avenues might prove theoretically more coherent and practically
more successful.
The analysis of a native title claim in the Illawarra presented in Chapters Ten and Eleven has
revealed the failure of native title to address claims of traditional interests in land in the area. I
argue that this failure is due both to the theoretical premises and to the intrinsic structure of
native title, both as a legal concept and as a legal construct.
The analysis of the case study has shown, in accordance with existing anthropological literature
examined in Chapter Eight, that traditional normative systems articulate the interactions of
individuals and groups with land within ontological parameters radically different from the ones
of the Australian common law system. The kinship system connects the ontological premises of
the Dreaming enshrined in precise narratives with the larger social structure - clans, tribes,
moieties, skins - thanks to a series of highly regulated, direct, personal, ongoing interactions.
The normative protocols of the kinship systems are the primary referent for all regulatory
mechanisms, including the ones related to land. These protocols find their justification within
the collective complex of Dreaming stories. They represent the fulcrum without which all rules
become unenforceable and often epistemologically inaccessible. The enforcement of
prohibitions and permissions through family relations guarantees a strict adherence to the

1

Ramsay Taum, ‘An Hawaiian sense of Place’ (Paper presented at Keeping the Fire - Second Australian
Conference on Wild Law and Earth Jurisprudence, University of Wollongong, 25 July 2010).
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regulatory system, as the penalty for the infringement would be the disconnection form a
complex social network that provides both direct support and a sense of identity.
Consequently, I posit that the kinship system, the larger social structures, the Dreaming
narratives and the protocols of transmission of information represent cultural elements that are
inseparable from land related issues. It is not possible to discuss traditional interests in land by
isolating any of these elements. Consequently, all these elements need to be recognised as
equally legally relevant. In other words, these elements form, as a cohesive whole, the intrinsic
structure of the traditional laws and customs to be ascertained in any native title discourse.
The case study has shown the survival and continuity of these elements in the Illawarra. This
shows that even in urbanised areas, culture has not disappeared,2 nor has it changed to the point
of rendering interests in land entirely disconnected from the cultural complex in which they find
their meaning. Change in lifestyle does not automatically imply a complete change in the
ontological, political, social and normative cultural structure. Kinship is the cultural connective
that binds all the other legally relevant element identified in this thesis.3 The continuity of the
kinship system, therefore, guarantees the continuity of traditional protocols that are considered
legally relevant for the native title discourse.
see stone and continuity of the common law
Traditional interests in land can be certainly viewed as part of a normative system that can be
partly translated into rights and interests recognisable within the theoretical and doctrinal
boundaries of Australian colonial law. However, they also form part of a more complex whole
from which those rights and interests are indivisible and without which their justification could
not be found. The interviews conducted in the Illawarra have revealed that individual awareness
of this cultural complex does not necessarily occur at a conscious level for all persons. Similarly
to the knowledge of legal principles in the Australian legal system, not every individual is
intuitively acquainted with the complexities of the normative orders that regulate their
behaviour. Moreover, ontological premises (for example addressing the nature of the concept of

2 For the myth of the ‘vanishing culture’, see Russell McGregor, Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal
Australians and doomed race theory, 1880-1939 (MUP, 1997).
3

The continuity of kinship connections has been also guaranteed by initiatives such as the national
network of Family Tracing and Reunion Services (known as the National Link-Up Network), created to
assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people separated from their families as a result of past
governments’ policies and practices, addressing recommendations 30a and 30b and 33-35 of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s Bringing Them Home - Report: ‘To assist Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people separated from their families under past laws, practices and policies of
Australian governments, to undertake family tracing and reunion initiatives.’
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time), political assumptions and peer pressure often operate at a pre-conscious level, without
individuals being tasked with formulating them in most legal discourses. 4
The procedure instituted by the Native Title Act, however, places the burden onto Indigenous
claimants to explicitly formulate and clarify the ontological parameters within which traditional
interests in land are to be found. Furthermore, Indigenous claimants are required not only to
provide a complex and complete theoretical reconstruction, but also to translate it into
theoretical structures formulated in a language that is understandable in Australian courts, and
often to defend it against specialised non-Indigenous experts. It appears a lot to ask, when
Indigenous claimants are also asked to actively pursue these claims in very disadvantaged
economic and geographical positions.

The Illawarra case study has revealed that most of the articulation of the native title claim
happened in response to the requirements imposed by common law provisions. Issues of
boundaries - that is, the requirement of one specific group being connected to a geographically
defined area - have been framed in response to the specific legislative requirements. However,
multiple interwoven and intersecting connections constitute the essence of traditional interests
in land in the area, as revealed by the interviews. Moreover, traditional interests in land are not
defined in terms of abstract boundaries, but are instead strongly connected to the specificity of
the local bioregion.5 Finally, the case study has shown how a culturally defined web of oral
interactions is tasked with the burden of defending any oral reconstruction of traditional
knowledge against existing documentary ‘evidence’ often collected without an appropriate
cultural methodology.

Native title judgments and legislative provisions remain silent on the specificities of what
constitutes the essence of the traditional interests in land to be recognised at common law. They
have not established any overarching theoretical instrument to facilitate the comparative
analysis required to understand the normative orders in which traditional interests in land
originate.6 There are no provisions to recognise different layers of co-existing and intersecting
interests in land. Clans and tribes are not represented as integrated but only as alternative, given
the exclusive nature of any native title claim. Because of this lack of a coherent epistemological
framework, the determination of what constitutes traditional laws and protocols (and continuity

4

See Simon Roberts, ‘Order and Continuity in Everyday Life’ in Martin Robertson (ed), Order and
Dispute (1979).
5

For an analysis of the connection between human interactions and bioregions, see Thomas Berry, The
Sacred Universe (Columbia University Press, 2009).

6

See Chapter Eleven.
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of such laws and protocols) is left to the courts on a case by case basis. The result is extreme
discretion, unpredictability and projection of common law legal categories.

Native title might not be an institution of the common law, but it is indeed articulated within the
framework of the common law. As such, it appears unable to acknowledge more than superficial
issues of traditional laws and customs, the ones that are similar to, or can be equated with, the
common law. The structure of native title, far from being an opening to legal pluralism as the
initial concept had implied in Mabo (No 2), 7 has become, instead, an onerous legal imposition.
As a result the native title that developed from Mabo (No 2) offers only a superficial reference not much more than a verbal commitment almost - to the recognition (or even to the correct
understanding) of traditional laws and customs. It seems inappropriate to recognise the
existence of traditional laws and customs by the common law and at common law, but then
place the onus of identifying and clarifying the content of such recognition solely on Indigenous
people on a case by case basis, relying extensively on non-Indigenous anthropological research
to do so. Moreover, it does not appear to be effective, as has been confirmed by the case study.
It would seem theoretically more appropriate to prioritise and to facilitate the presentation of
relevant data in a culturally appropriate way by establishing a correct methodology and an
appropriate comparative perspective.

As a result, native title is both a concept that has not been fully theoretically articulated and a
construct that is not effective in ensuring the ‘recognition’ of traditional interests in land.
However, not only is native title incomplete, but its impact on traditional legal protocols can
also be detrimental, as revealed in the case study. It is therefore possible to evaluate native title
in light of the literature and of the case study presented in this thesis. Firstly, native title is not a
theoretically satisfactory concept. It engages with traditional ‘rights’ to land - that is, with
traditional interests in land - but it does not appropriately engage with the cultural continuum
within which these ‘rights’ exist and from which they originate. Secondly, if the Doctrine of
Discovery is the doctrine upon which the acquisition of sovereignty of Australia by the British
Crown has been predicated, then native title is a legally weak concept as it fails to answer a
number of issues raised in relation to the doctrine. 8 Thirdly, the burdensome requirements of the
Native Title Act procedure have the consequence that native title is not always the preferred
instrument with which traditional land claims - that is, claims on traditional interests in land are articulated by Indigenous claimants, as revealed by the case study.

7

See also Kirsten Anker, The Unofficial Law of Native Title (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2007).

8

See Chapter Seven.
298

If a true ‘recognition’ of traditional interests in land that find their origin in traditional laws and
customs is the goal, as advanced in Mabo (No 2), then the priority should be to facilitate the
reconstruction of these traditional laws and customs for the benefit of the Australian common
law. I argue that it is not truly possible to have a meaningful recognition of native title without
an appropriate recognition and understanding of the normative systems in which native title is
embedded. Such recognition and understanding cannot be left to a case by case scenario. On the
contrary, it must be the result of the establishment of a cohesive and coherent framework. Such
framework requires the establishment of an appropriate and well established comparative
methodology and perspective. 9 An understanding of what constitutes ‘traditional law’ must be
transcribed within the Australian legal system as a result of this comparative analysis.
The establishment of an appropriate comparative perspective able to engage successfully with a
discourse on legal pluralism is not sufficient to provide the final framework of reference. In
order to avoid the unilateral imposition of legal categories upon the constructed model of what
constitutes a traditional legal system, the construction of a theoretical model must be
cooperatively negotiated. It is not possible to have a true comparative analysis without a
negotiated discourse. This, however, raises issues of self-determination, such as the
identification of the Indigenous participants to the comparative construction. Therefore, it is not
truly possible to disconnect ‘recognition’ of native title from the more complex process of
decolonisation. Not to do so is just a form of legal neo-colonialism that continues that heritage
of colonialism.
Omojo Omaji reports an observation by the British House of Commons Select Committee on
Aboriginal Tribes in their 1837 report, British Settlements:
It might be presumed that the native inhabitants of any lands have an incontrovertible right to their
own soil; a plain and sacred right, however, which seems not to have been understood. Europeans
have entered their borders uninvited, and, where there, have not only acted as if they were
undoubted lords of the soil, but have punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a
disposition to live in their own country. 10

Engaging with the entire process of colonisation requires more than a more appropriate
comparative legal perspective, it requires the acceptance of challenging political premises, as
Attwood and Markus suggest:
It can be argued that democratic nation-states have been able to accommodate the demand of
Indigenous peoples for citizenship rights quite easily, since these have amounted to a call on the

9

See Part A.

10

Paul Omojo Omaji, ‘The Realcrime of the State and Indigenous People’s Human Rights’, in Sam
garkawe et al (eds), Indigenous Human Rights (Sydney Institute of Criminology, 2001) 228, 228-9.
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nation to be included on the same basis as everyone else. To a limited degree these states have
been able to tolerate demands for special rights for Indigenous peoples when these have been calls
for special treatment on the basis of need. However, demands for a particular kind of special rights
- Indigenous rights - have proven to be much more difficult for such states to accommodate,
because, as we have already remarked) they are based on a claim for rights that have a basis that is
both permanent and collective in nature rather than temporary or individual. The calls for land
rights, but more especially the recognition of sovereignty, pushes democracies to their intellectual
limits. 11

This attitude seem to be more responsive to one of the Interviewees’ comments:
We need to get a level of respect and recognition. And we can’t do it under their institutionalised
laws. That means we may have to be radical. Not extremists or terrorists. There must be a way that
we can engage in meaningful dialogue that would give us some sense of sovereignty on our own
land. That doesn’t mean that we have to pack every last white man on a boat and send them home,
because we do share the same air, we do share the same resources, we are sharing Country, and
that’s the reality today ... and if I can respect that, why can’t they respect my views too? 12

However, the issue of sovereignty is not as simple as asserting alternative sovereignty, as
suggested by Pearson:
Mansell clearly believes that any compromise from Aboriginal people asserting full-blown
sovereignty, would be to sell ourselves short and would be conceding legitimacy to the colonial
invasion that has left Indigenous people dispossessed destitute and pariahs in their own country. ...
But ... how realistic is the hope that recognition of separate nationhood can be achieved? It has
become an article of faith in the Aboriginal land rights movement that ... Aboriginal people were a
sovereign people and sovereignty still inheres in them ... The fact is that our advocates for full
nationhood status have failed to clarify these issues and ... with few exceptions we have avoided
grappling with the huge problems which face our claims ... My own initial view is that, apart from
being unachievable, it may not be necessary ... Recognition of this “local Indigenous sovereignty”
could exist internally within a nation-state, provided that the fullest rights of self-determination are
accorded. ... The Australian State has consistently failed to understand and to accept the right of its
Indigenous peoples to be allowed the fullest rights of self-determination. ... Whilst Indigenous
groups are agitating their rights to sovereignty at the international level, the best outcome which
could result from this process is not the recognition of fourth world peoples as sovereign nations,
but rather it will be confined to setting higher standards for the recognition of States of Indigenous
rights to self-determination within the nation. 13
11

Bain Attwood, and Andrew Markus, The 1967 Referendum. Race, Power and the Australian
Constitution (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2nd ed, 2007), 76.
12
13

Interview with Interviewee No 4 (Wollongong, 16 January 2008).

Noel Pearson, ‘Reconciliation: To Be Or Not To Be - Nationhood, Self Determination or Self
Government’ (1993) 3 (61) Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 14-7.
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It is clearly not possible to establish a meaningful discourse on the basis of a suggested
alternative and exclusive sovereignty. 14 Australia is, indeed, a recognised international sovereign
entity. Nonetheless, contested Indigenous sovereignty claims cannot be simply dismissed
because of numerical (given the small percentage of Indigenous population) or practical
considerations (given the inevitable difficulties of modifying the political structure established
by the Australian Constitution). In order to be meaningfully and permanently solved, the issue
must be address in rem, not simply in factum. Against Pearson’s pessimistic view of the
international arena, that arena is where the concept of sovereignty internationally recognised at
present has been constructed. It is therefore not only inevitable, but also necessary to refer to the
international context. 15
To conclude, it is possible to hypothesise that the negotiation of a process of de-colonisation in
Australia - a process in which the native title discourse is an integral and inseparable part requires a combination of political debate, of domestic legal language (that is, the legal
language of the Australian common law) and of the language of international relations and
international law.16 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is to be hoped that the analysis
presented here will play a role in facilitating future explorations of this intersection.

14

See, eg, John Bradley and Kathryn Seton, ‘Self-determination or ‘Deep Colonising’: Land Claims,
Colonial Authority and Indigenous Representation’ in Barbara Ann Hocking, Unfinished constitutional
business: rethinking Aboriginal self-determination (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005); Deborah Bird Rose,
Reports from a wild country: ethics for decolonisation (UNSW Press, 2004); Peter H Russell,
Recognising Aboriginal title: the Mabo case and indigenous resistance to English-settler colonialism
(UNSW Press, 2006), Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Sovereign subjects: indigenous sovereignty matters
(Allen & Unwin, 2007), Irene Watson, ‘Sovereign Spaces, Caring for Country and the Homeless Position
of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2009) 108(1) The South Atlantic Quarterly 27.
15

See, further, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, 61st
sess, Agenda Item 68, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).
16

It is not, however, necessary, to create ex novo a language that articulates international discourses on
de-colonisation of Indigenous peoples. A number of documents already exist (see further, n 17).
Moreover, Australia has either endorsed or adopted such documents, thus providing an existing legal
basis for this negotiated process of de-colonisation. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, 61st sess, Agenda Item 68, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September
2007). The declaration has been endorsed by the Australian Federal Government on the 3rd of April 2009
aby Hon Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous
Affairs.
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EPILOGUE

It is said that what is called the Spirit of an Age is something to which one cannot return ...
In the same way, a single year does not have just spring or summer. A single day, too, is the
same. For this reason, although one would like to change today's world back to the spirit of
one hundred years or more ago, it cannot be done. Thus it is important to make the best out
of every generation ... In the Kamigata area, they have a sort of tiered lunchbox they use
for a single day when flower viewing. Upon returning, they throw them away, trampling
them underfoot. The end is important in all things. 1

1

Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure. The Book of the Samurai (Willaim Scott Wilson trans, Kodansha,
1979) [trans of: Hagakure (1709-1716)].
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The journey that began with the question formulated in the Prologue is now at an end. And yet,
there are not ever really any beginnings, nor any ends. At the end of this research journey, the
hope is to have generated enough arguments to pursue other avenues of investigation, to have
laid a foundation for other research: on the theoretical perspectives and methodologies required
to properly understanding Indigenous laws and customs, on the implications of the Doctrine of
Discovery for native title considerations, on the rich cultural heritage in the Illawarra worthy of
recognition, on the intersections between the Australian process of de-colonisation and the
international arena.

I believe that solutions to such issues need to be found for a number of reasons. Political and
social justice issues require that Australia finally put an end to the heritage of colonialism and
engage in a meaningful dialogue with its colonial past. This dialogue would lead to a solution
for the many problems inherited over two hundred years of colonisation, a solution that would
be at the same time more just and more permanent. But there is something more. Just as this
long academic narrative was conceived as a story within a story and began with the story of a
personal journey, so its parting words should be encapsulated in another story.

In 2007, while visiting Darwin I happened to have an interesting conversation with an Officer of
the Northern Territory Fire & Rescue Service. The Officer was lamenting the danger posed by
uncontrollable bush fires sweeping across the region. At the time, I had just been reading about
the millennia old Aboriginal practice of fire-stick farming, and thus I asked why Aboriginal
people were not involved in preventing fires by employing this technique. His reply did not
truly answer my question, but it did open one of the most crucial avenues of reasoning on the
urgent relevance of re-discussing Indigenous sovereignty. According to the Officer, prior to
colonisation the type of grasses growing in the area were relatively short and thin. As a
consequence, fires burning across these grasses did extinguish their fuel faster than they could
burn trees and affect bigger vegetation. The last century, however, saw the introduction of cattle
in the area, with the consequent introduction of non-native grasses, much thicker and taller than
the ones previously living there and recently spreading extensively across the region. As a
result, fires had become a much more violent event, capable of scorching and killing trees
previously unaffected by periodic burning, thus slowly transforming wetlands into savannahs
and deserts.

This story resonated deeply with me. I realised that Darwin’s environment, and by inference
every other environment we live in, was profoundly shaped by the practices of at least two
distinct cultural models. Daniel Quinn has described these models as ‘Takers’ (mainly
identifying industrial and post-industrial societies) and ‘Leavers’ (pre-industrial societies,
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including the totality of Indigenous cultures).2 One model is designed to maximise immediate
utilisation of all available resources, regardless of the long term sustainability of such intensive
use, whereas the other model is designed for the long term sustainability of cultural structures in
relation to the surrounding environment, its shortcoming being the relatively long time required
for cultural adaptations to take place - times that have always been in tune with relatively slow
environmental changes. I then realised that the environmental changes we are experiencing at
the moment cannot be faced by either model alone. One model can certainly provide
technological solutions to immediate problems, but is incapable of guaranteeing the long term
cultural adaptation required.3 The other model, on the other hand, has never been faced with
such rapid and unprecedented environmental changes. 4 Only an effective cooperation of these
models can guarantee an immediate response to the current predicament that can be also
sustained over time.

I thus began to reflect on the deeper nature of the native title discourse I had been exploring,
wondering whether this represented a new track along my path of exploration or an entirely new
path altogether. Although apparently disconnected from the reasonings presented in this brief
story that is my thesis, I suddenly began to see inseparable connections between native title
discourse and environmental concerns. Indeed, if we are to re-think our legal self-description in
relation to the environment, this analysis requires the cooperation of distinct cultural models.
Indigenous ‘laws and customs’ must be capable of dialogue with the Australian legal system if a
combined and effective environmental response that can be sustained over time is to be found. It
is not possible for a dominant legal model to simply pick and choose the cultural elements
believed to be, prima facie, effective. Distinct cultural models must be able to sit at the dialogue
table as equal.

I thus began to see the native title discourse in an entirely different light. I began to see my
research as a stepping stone of a much more interconnected web of analyses and research paths.
I began to see my research as a story forming part of a much larger story, the directions of which
might appear blurred and unrelated at first, and yet revealing of the intrinsic inseparability of all
knowledge. It is thus with this promise of another story that I would like to part from this
research.

2

Daniel Quinn, Ishmael (Bantam, 1995).

3

See Jared Diamond, Collapse (Penguin, 2005).

4 See Tim Flannery, We are the Weather Makers: the history and future impact of climate change (Text
publishing, 2005).
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